diff mbox series

[Trusty,1/2] Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.

Message ID 20190219122746.4197-2-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com
State New
Headers show
Series [Trusty,1/2] Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element. | expand

Commit Message

Kai-Heng Feng Feb. 19, 2019, 12:27 p.m. UTC
From: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>

In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:

struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;

In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:

...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
...

The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:

l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);

So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).

This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410

CVE-2019-3460

Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16)
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

Comments

Tyler Hicks Feb. 19, 2019, 1:09 p.m. UTC | #1
On 2019-02-19 20:27:44, Kai-Heng Feng wrote:
> This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
> 
> CVE-2019-3460

Thanks for working on this issue! Unfortunately, something isn't right
here as the patch is for CVE-2017-1000410 but the Ubuntu CVE Tracker
contains incorrect data about the fix for CVE-2017-1000410. Give me a
little bit to straighten things out and then I'll have a recommendation
about the correct metadata to include in this commit message.

Tyler
Tyler Hicks Feb. 19, 2019, 4:31 p.m. UTC | #2
On 2019-02-19 20:27:44, Kai-Heng Feng wrote:
> From: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
> 
> In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
> l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
> initialization:
> 
> struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
> 
> In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
> these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
> memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
> 
> ...
> case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
> if (olen == sizeof(efs))
> memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
> ...
> 
> The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
> if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
> added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
> 
> l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
> 
> So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
> L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
> sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
> avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
> attacker (16 bytes).
> 
> This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
> 
> CVE-2019-3460

CVE-2019-3460 should not be added to this commit message. The line above
should be changed to 'CVE-2017-1000410' when committing this patch. With
that modification,

Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

Tyler

> 
> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> (cherry picked from commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16)
> Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
> ---
>  net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> index 5eb3b2b55f2e..61d0f290c0c6 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> @@ -3305,9 +3305,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t data
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
> -			remote_efs = 1;
> -			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
> +			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
> +				remote_efs = 1;
>  				memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
> +			}
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
> @@ -3526,16 +3527,17 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len,
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
> -			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
> +			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
>  				memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
>  
> -			if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> -			    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> -			    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
> -				return -ECONNREFUSED;
> +				if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> +				    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> +				    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
> +					return -ECONNREFUSED;
>  
> -			l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
> -					   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
> +				l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
> +						   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
> +			}
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_FCS:
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 
> 
> -- 
> kernel-team mailing list
> kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com
> https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/kernel-team
Stefan Bader Feb. 22, 2019, 10:03 a.m. UTC | #3
On 19.02.19 13:27, Kai-Heng Feng wrote:
> From: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
> 
> In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
> l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
> initialization:
> 
> struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
> 
> In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
> these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
> memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
> 
> ...
> case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
> if (olen == sizeof(efs))
> memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
> ...
> 
> The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
> if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
> added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
> 
> l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
> 
> So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
> L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
> sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
> avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
> attacker (16 bytes).
> 
> This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
> 
> CVE-2019-3460
> 
> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> (cherry picked from commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16)
> Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
> ---

With CVE change mentioned by Tyler.

>  net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> index 5eb3b2b55f2e..61d0f290c0c6 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> @@ -3305,9 +3305,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t data
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
> -			remote_efs = 1;
> -			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
> +			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
> +				remote_efs = 1;
>  				memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
> +			}
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
> @@ -3526,16 +3527,17 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len,
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
> -			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
> +			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
>  				memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
>  
> -			if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> -			    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> -			    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
> -				return -ECONNREFUSED;
> +				if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> +				    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> +				    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
> +					return -ECONNREFUSED;
>  
> -			l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
> -					   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
> +				l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
> +						   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
> +			}
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_FCS:
>
Kleber Sacilotto de Souza March 12, 2019, 11:37 a.m. UTC | #4
On 2/19/19 1:27 PM, Kai-Heng Feng wrote:
> From: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
>
> In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
> l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
> initialization:
>
> struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
>
> In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
> these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
> memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
>
> ...
> case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
> if (olen == sizeof(efs))
> memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
> ...
>
> The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
> if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
> added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
>
> l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
>
> So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
> L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
> sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
> avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
> attacker (16 bytes).
>
> This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
>
> CVE-2019-3460


Applied to trusty/master-next branch, changing the above line to:

CVE-2017-1000410

Thanks,
Kleber

>
> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> (cherry picked from commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16)
> Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
> ---
>  net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> index 5eb3b2b55f2e..61d0f290c0c6 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> @@ -3305,9 +3305,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t data
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
> -			remote_efs = 1;
> -			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
> +			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
> +				remote_efs = 1;
>  				memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
> +			}
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
> @@ -3526,16 +3527,17 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len,
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
> -			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
> +			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
>  				memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
>  
> -			if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> -			    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> -			    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
> -				return -ECONNREFUSED;
> +				if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> +				    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
> +				    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
> +					return -ECONNREFUSED;
>  
> -			l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
> -					   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
> +				l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
> +						   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
> +			}
>  			break;
>  
>  		case L2CAP_CONF_FCS:
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 5eb3b2b55f2e..61d0f290c0c6 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -3305,9 +3305,10 @@  static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t data
 			break;
 
 		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
-			remote_efs = 1;
-			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
+				remote_efs = 1;
 				memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
+			}
 			break;
 
 		case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
@@ -3526,16 +3527,17 @@  static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len,
 			break;
 
 		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
-			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
 				memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
 
-			if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
-			    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
-			    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
-				return -ECONNREFUSED;
+				if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+				    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+				    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
+					return -ECONNREFUSED;
 
-			l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
-					   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+				l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
+						   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+			}
 			break;
 
 		case L2CAP_CONF_FCS: