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[3/3] target/arm: Implement FEAT_PAN3

Message ID 20230331145045.2584941-4-peter.maydell@linaro.org
State New
Headers show
Series target/arm: Fix ESR_EL2 buglet, implement FEAT_PAN3 | expand

Commit Message

Peter Maydell March 31, 2023, 2:50 p.m. UTC 
FEAT_PAN3 adds an EPAN bit to SCTLR_EL1 and SCTLR_EL2, which allows
the PAN bit to make memory non-privileged-read/write if it is
user-executable as well as if it is user-read/write.

Implement this feature and enable it in the AArch64 'max' CPU.

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
---
 docs/system/arm/emulation.rst |  1 +
 target/arm/cpu.h              |  5 +++++
 target/arm/cpu64.c            |  2 +-
 target/arm/ptw.c              | 14 +++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

Richard Henderson March 31, 2023, 5:04 p.m. UTC | #1 
On 3/31/23 07:50, Peter Maydell wrote:
> FEAT_PAN3 adds an EPAN bit to SCTLR_EL1 and SCTLR_EL2, which allows
> the PAN bit to make memory non-privileged-read/write if it is
> user-executable as well as if it is user-read/write.
> 
> Implement this feature and enable it in the AArch64 'max' CPU.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell<peter.maydell@linaro.org>
> ---
>   docs/system/arm/emulation.rst |  1 +
>   target/arm/cpu.h              |  5 +++++
>   target/arm/cpu64.c            |  2 +-
>   target/arm/ptw.c              | 14 +++++++++++++-
>   4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>

r~
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst b/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
index 2062d712610..73389878755 100644
--- a/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
+++ b/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@  the following architecture extensions:
 - FEAT_MTE3 (MTE Asymmetric Fault Handling)
 - FEAT_PAN (Privileged access never)
 - FEAT_PAN2 (AT S1E1R and AT S1E1W instruction variants affected by PSTATE.PAN)
+- FEAT_PAN3 (Support for SCTLR_ELx.EPAN)
 - FEAT_PAuth (Pointer authentication)
 - FEAT_PMULL (PMULL, PMULL2 instructions)
 - FEAT_PMUv3p1 (PMU Extensions v3.1)
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h
index c097cae9882..d469a2637b3 100644
--- a/target/arm/cpu.h
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.h
@@ -3823,6 +3823,11 @@  static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_ats1e1(const ARMISARegisters *id)
     return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr1, ID_AA64MMFR1, PAN) >= 2;
 }
 
+static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_pan3(const ARMISARegisters *id)
+{
+    return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr1, ID_AA64MMFR1, PAN) >= 3;
+}
+
 static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_hcx(const ARMISARegisters *id)
 {
     return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr1, ID_AA64MMFR1, HCX) != 0;
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu64.c b/target/arm/cpu64.c
index 0fb07cc7b6d..735ca541634 100644
--- a/target/arm/cpu64.c
+++ b/target/arm/cpu64.c
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@  static void aarch64_max_initfn(Object *obj)
     t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, VH, 1);       /* FEAT_VHE */
     t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, HPDS, 1);     /* FEAT_HPDS */
     t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, LO, 1);       /* FEAT_LOR */
-    t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, PAN, 2);      /* FEAT_PAN2 */
+    t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, PAN, 3);      /* FEAT_PAN3 */
     t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, XNX, 1);      /* FEAT_XNX */
     t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, ETS, 1);      /* FEAT_ETS */
     t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, HCX, 1);      /* FEAT_HCX */
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
index ec3f51782aa..499308fcb07 100644
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
@@ -947,6 +947,7 @@  static int get_S2prot(CPUARMState *env, int s2ap, int xn, bool s1_is_el0)
 static int get_S1prot(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_aa64,
                       int ap, int ns, int xn, int pxn)
 {
+    ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
     bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
     int prot_rw, user_rw;
     bool have_wxn;
@@ -958,8 +959,19 @@  static int get_S1prot(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_aa64,
     if (is_user) {
         prot_rw = user_rw;
     } else {
+        /*
+         * PAN controls can forbid data accesses but don't affect insn fetch.
+         * Plain PAN forbids data accesses if EL0 has data permissions;
+         * PAN3 forbids data accesses if EL0 has either data or exec perms.
+         * Note that for AArch64 the 'user can exec' case is exactly !xn.
+         * We make the IMPDEF choices that SCR_EL3.SIF and Realm EL2&0
+         * do not affect EPAN.
+         */
         if (user_rw && regime_is_pan(env, mmu_idx)) {
-            /* PAN forbids data accesses but doesn't affect insn fetch */
+            prot_rw = 0;
+        } else if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_pan3, cpu) && is_aa64 &&
+                   regime_is_pan(env, mmu_idx) &&
+                   (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_EPAN) && !xn) {
             prot_rw = 0;
         } else {
             prot_rw = simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap, false);