| Message ID | 1455868726-26350-8-git-send-email-mst@redhat.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
On Fri, 19 Feb 2016, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > commit 428c3ece97179557f2753071fb0ca97a03437267 ("fix MSI injection on Xen") > inadvertently enabled the xen-specific logic unconditionally. > Limit it to only when xen is enabled. > Additionally, msix data should be read with pci_get_log > since the format is pci little-endian. > > Reported-by: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com> > Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> the follow up patch is missing from the pull request: http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=145553838801725&w=2 > hw/pci/msix.c | 4 ++-- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/hw/pci/msix.c b/hw/pci/msix.c > index eb4ef11..537fdba 100644 > --- a/hw/pci/msix.c > +++ b/hw/pci/msix.c > @@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector) > static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask) > { > unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE; > - uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA]; > + uint8_t *data = &dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA]; > /* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking > * and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */ > - if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) { > + if (xen_enabled() && xen_is_pirq_msi(pci_get_long(data))) { > return false; > } > return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] & > -- > MST >
On 19 February 2016 at 12:18, Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> wrote: > On Fri, 19 Feb 2016, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: >> commit 428c3ece97179557f2753071fb0ca97a03437267 ("fix MSI injection on Xen") >> inadvertently enabled the xen-specific logic unconditionally. >> Limit it to only when xen is enabled. >> Additionally, msix data should be read with pci_get_log >> since the format is pci little-endian. >> >> Reported-by: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com> >> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> >> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> > > the follow up patch is missing from the pull request: > > http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=145553838801725&w=2 does this mean I should prefer not to apply the pull, or can that patch be committed later ? thanks -- PMM
On Fri, 19 Feb 2016, Peter Maydell wrote: > On 19 February 2016 at 12:18, Stefano Stabellini > <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> wrote: > > On Fri, 19 Feb 2016, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > >> commit 428c3ece97179557f2753071fb0ca97a03437267 ("fix MSI injection on Xen") > >> inadvertently enabled the xen-specific logic unconditionally. > >> Limit it to only when xen is enabled. > >> Additionally, msix data should be read with pci_get_log > >> since the format is pci little-endian. > >> > >> Reported-by: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com> > >> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> > >> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> > > > > the follow up patch is missing from the pull request: > > > > http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=145553838801725&w=2 > > does this mean I should prefer not to apply the pull, or can > that patch be committed later ? I would have preferred the two patches to go in together, but I wouldn't want to delay Michael's fix. If he is not around to respin the pull request today, I'd say go ahead and commit it anyway.
diff --git a/hw/pci/msix.c b/hw/pci/msix.c index eb4ef11..537fdba 100644 --- a/hw/pci/msix.c +++ b/hw/pci/msix.c @@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector) static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask) { unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE; - uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA]; + uint8_t *data = &dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA]; /* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking * and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */ - if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) { + if (xen_enabled() && xen_is_pirq_msi(pci_get_long(data))) { return false; } return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] &
commit 428c3ece97179557f2753071fb0ca97a03437267 ("fix MSI injection on Xen") inadvertently enabled the xen-specific logic unconditionally. Limit it to only when xen is enabled. Additionally, msix data should be read with pci_get_log since the format is pci little-endian. Reported-by: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> --- hw/pci/msix.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)