| Message ID | 87095ffca1e3b932c495942defc598907bf955f6.1726571179.git.ritesh.list@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | powerpc/kfence: Improve kfence support | expand |
Le 19/09/2024 à 04:56, Ritesh Harjani (IBM) a écrit : > copy_from_kernel_nofault() can be called when doing read of /proc/kcore. > /proc/kcore can have some unmapped kfence objects which when read via > copy_from_kernel_nofault() can cause page faults. Since *_nofault() > functions define their own fixup table for handling fault, use that > instead of asking kfence to handle such faults. > > Hence we search the exception tables for the nip which generated the > fault. If there is an entry then we let the fixup table handler handle the > page fault by returning an error from within ___do_page_fault(). Searching the exception table is a heavy operation and all has been done in the past to minimise the number of times it is called, see for instance commit cbd7e6ca0210 ("powerpc/fault: Avoid heavy search_exception_tables() verification") Also, by trying to hide false positives you also hide real ones. For instance if csum_partial_copy_generic() is using a kfence protected area, it will now go undetected. IIUC, here your problem is limited to copy_from_kernel_nofault(). You should handle the root cause, not its effects. For that, you could perform additional verifications in copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(). Christophe
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> writes: > Le 19/09/2024 à 04:56, Ritesh Harjani (IBM) a écrit : >> copy_from_kernel_nofault() can be called when doing read of /proc/kcore. >> /proc/kcore can have some unmapped kfence objects which when read via >> copy_from_kernel_nofault() can cause page faults. Since *_nofault() >> functions define their own fixup table for handling fault, use that >> instead of asking kfence to handle such faults. >> >> Hence we search the exception tables for the nip which generated the >> fault. If there is an entry then we let the fixup table handler handle the >> page fault by returning an error from within ___do_page_fault(). > > Searching the exception table is a heavy operation and all has been done > in the past to minimise the number of times it is called, see for > instance commit cbd7e6ca0210 ("powerpc/fault: Avoid heavy > search_exception_tables() verification") This should not cause latency in user page fault paths. We call search_exception_tables() only when there is a page fault for kernel address (which isn't that common right) which otherwise kfence will handle. > > Also, by trying to hide false positives you also hide real ones. For I believe these should be false negatives. If kernel functions provides an exception table to handle such a fault, then shouldn't it be handled via fixup table provided rather then via kfence? > instance if csum_partial_copy_generic() is using a kfence protected > area, it will now go undetected. I can go and look into usages of csum_partial_copy_generic(). But can you please expand more here on what you meant? ... so if a fault occurs for above case, this patch will just let the fixup table handle that fault rather than kfence reporting it and returning 0. The issue we see here is when unmapped kfence addresses get accessed via *_nofault() variants which causes kfence to report a false negative (this happens when we use read /proc/kcore or tools like perf read that) This is because as per my understanding copy_from_kernel_nofault() should return -EFAULT from it's fixup table if a fault occurs... whereas with kfence it will report the warning and will return 0 after kfence handled the fault. I see other archs too calling fixup_table() in their fault handling routine before allowing kfence to handle the fault. > > IIUC, here your problem is limited to copy_from_kernel_nofault(). You > should handle the root cause, not its effects. For that, you could > perform additional verifications in copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(). Sorry, why make copy_from_kernel_nofault() as a special case for powerpc? I don't see any other arch making copy_from_kernel_nofault() as a special case. Shouldn't Kernel faults be handled via fixup_table(), if it is supplied, before kfence handling it? (maybe I am missing something) -ritesh
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c index 81c77ddce2e3..fa825198f29f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c @@ -439,9 +439,17 @@ static int ___do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, /* * The kernel should never take an execute fault nor should it * take a page fault to a kernel address or a page fault to a user - * address outside of dedicated places + * address outside of dedicated places. + * + * Rather than kfence reporting false negatives, let the fixup table + * handler handle the page fault by returning SIGSEGV, if the fault + * has come from functions like copy_from_kernel_nofault(). */ if (unlikely(!is_user && bad_kernel_fault(regs, error_code, address, is_write))) { + + if (search_exception_tables(instruction_pointer(regs))) + return SIGSEGV; + if (kfence_handle_page_fault(address, is_write, regs)) return 0;
copy_from_kernel_nofault() can be called when doing read of /proc/kcore. /proc/kcore can have some unmapped kfence objects which when read via copy_from_kernel_nofault() can cause page faults. Since *_nofault() functions define their own fixup table for handling fault, use that instead of asking kfence to handle such faults. Hence we search the exception tables for the nip which generated the fault. If there is an entry then we let the fixup table handler handle the page fault by returning an error from within ___do_page_fault(). This can be easily triggered if someone tries to do dd from /proc/kcore. dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null bs=1M <some example false negatives> =============================== BUG: KFENCE: invalid read in copy_from_kernel_nofault+0xb0/0x1c8 Invalid read at 0x000000004f749d2e: copy_from_kernel_nofault+0xb0/0x1c8 0xc0000000057f7950 read_kcore_iter+0x41c/0x9ac proc_reg_read_iter+0xe4/0x16c vfs_read+0x2e4/0x3b0 ksys_read+0x88/0x154 system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in copy_from_kernel_nofault+0xb0/0x1c8 Use-after-free read at 0x000000008fbb08ad (in kfence-#0): copy_from_kernel_nofault+0xb0/0x1c8 0xc0000000057f7950 read_kcore_iter+0x41c/0x9ac proc_reg_read_iter+0xe4/0x16c vfs_read+0x2e4/0x3b0 ksys_read+0x88/0x154 system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 Guessing the fix should go back to when we first got kfence on PPC32. Fixes: 90cbac0e995d ("powerpc: Enable KFENCE for PPC32") Reported-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com> --- arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)