| Message ID | 20231112194326.2539029-3-peter@korsgaard.com |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [1/4] Revert "package/tar: allowing building even on non-Y2038 compliant systems" | expand |
>>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> writes: > Fixes CVE-2022-48303: GNU Tar through 1.34 has a one-byte out-of-bounds read > that results in use of uninitialized memory for a conditional jump. > Exploitation to change the flow of control has not been demonstrated. The > issue occurs in from_header in list.c via a V7 archive in which mtime has > approximately 11 whitespace characters. > Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> Committed after adding the TAR_IGNORE_CVES entry for this, thanks.
>>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> writes: > Fixes CVE-2022-48303: GNU Tar through 1.34 has a one-byte out-of-bounds read > that results in use of uninitialized memory for a conditional jump. > Exploitation to change the flow of control has not been demonstrated. The > issue occurs in from_header in list.c via a V7 archive in which mtime has > approximately 11 whitespace characters. > Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> Committed to 2023.02.x and 2023.08.x, thanks.
diff --git a/package/tar/0002-Fix-boundary-checking-in-base-256-decoder.patch b/package/tar/0002-Fix-boundary-checking-in-base-256-decoder.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7bad339fe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/tar/0002-Fix-boundary-checking-in-base-256-decoder.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 3da78400eafcccb97e2f2fd4b227ea40d794ede8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sergey Poznyakoff <gray@gnu.org> +Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2023 11:57:39 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix boundary checking in base-256 decoder + +* src/list.c (from_header): Base-256 encoding is at least 2 bytes +long. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> +Upstream: https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/tar.git/commit/?id=3da78400eafcccb97e2f2fd4b227ea40d794ede8 +--- + src/list.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/list.c b/src/list.c +index 9fafc425..86bcfdd1 100644 +--- a/src/list.c ++++ b/src/list.c +@@ -881,8 +881,9 @@ from_header (char const *where0, size_t digs, char const *type, + where++; + } + } +- else if (*where == '\200' /* positive base-256 */ +- || *where == '\377' /* negative base-256 */) ++ else if (where <= lim - 2 ++ && (*where == '\200' /* positive base-256 */ ++ || *where == '\377' /* negative base-256 */)) + { + /* Parse base-256 output. A nonnegative number N is + represented as (256**DIGS)/2 + N; a negative number -N is +-- +2.39.2 +
Fixes CVE-2022-48303: GNU Tar through 1.34 has a one-byte out-of-bounds read that results in use of uninitialized memory for a conditional jump. Exploitation to change the flow of control has not been demonstrated. The issue occurs in from_header in list.c via a V7 archive in which mtime has approximately 11 whitespace characters. Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> --- ...oundary-checking-in-base-256-decoder.patch | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/tar/0002-Fix-boundary-checking-in-base-256-decoder.patch