From 90e7687d99f2e67e77eec43fd072be1a32a118b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Per Smitt <per.smitt@sbie.se>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 12:44:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Baby hab steps
---
board/freescale/mx28evk/hab.h | 921 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
board/freescale/mx28evk/hab_types.h | 916 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
board/freescale/mx28evk/mx28evk.c | 52 ++
board/freescale/mx28evk/sign/u-boot-spl.csf | 26 +
board/freescale/mx28evk/sign/u-boot.csf | 26 +
5 files changed, 1941 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 board/freescale/mx28evk/hab.h
create mode 100644 board/freescale/mx28evk/hab_types.h
create mode 100644 board/freescale/mx28evk/sign/u-boot-spl.csf
create mode 100644 board/freescale/mx28evk/sign/u-boot.csf
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,921 @@
+#ifndef HAB_H
+#define HAB_H
+/*===========================================================================*/
+/**
+ @file hab.h
+
+ @brief HAB main interface
+
+@verbatim
+=============================================================================
+
+ Freescale Semiconductor Confidential Proprietary
+ (c) Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. 2007, 2008, 2009 All rights reserved.
+
+Presence of a copyright notice is not an acknowledgement of
+publication. This software file listing contains information of
+Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. that is of a confidential and
+proprietary nature and any viewing or use of this file is prohibited
+without specific written permission from Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+
+=============================================================================
+Revision History:
+
+ Modification Date Tracking
+Author (dd-mmm-yyyy) Number Description of Changes
+--------------- ------------- ---------- -----------------------
+David Hartley 11-Dec-2007 ENGR55511 Initial version
+David Hartley 29-Jul-2008 ENGR82581 Add CMS, X.509v3, SHA-512
+ and ECDSA over P-521
+David Hartley 07-Nov-2008 ENGR92335 Implementation updates
+Rod Ziolkowski 29-Jan-2008 ENGR106570 Update IVT entry to a func ptr
+Ram Korukonda 04-Mar-2009 ENGR106041 Updated report_event and
+ authenticate_image descriptions
+Yi Li 25-Mar-2009 ENGR106040 Editorial correction for SIS
+Rod Ziolkowski 04-May-2009 ENGR112074 Update audit events for data
+ structures w/ invalid version
+David Hartley 15-May-2009 ENGR112382 Avoid excess authenticate_image
+ logs
+David Hartley 19-May-2009 ENGR112551 Assert only 1 byte of boot data
+ Check IVT self and entry
+ pointers for NULL. Clarify
+ authenticate_image return values
+ in non-closed configurations
+David Hartley 04-Aug-2009 ENGR111476 Byte array conversion
+David Hartley 02-Sep-2009 ENGR114783 Add support for export control
+Rod Ziolkowski 12-Nov-2009 ENGR117776 Expand scope of report event and
+ report status APIs outside
+ entry and exit.
+=============================================================================
+Portability:
+
+These definitions are customised for 32 bit cores of either
+endianness.
+
+=============================================================================
+@endverbatim */
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ INCLUDE FILES
+=============================================================================*/
+
+#include "hab_types.h" /* Shared types, constants, macros */
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ CONSTANTS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ MACROS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ ENUMS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ STRUCTURES AND OTHER TYPEDEFS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+/** Loader callback.
+ * @ingroup auth_img
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function must be supplied by the library caller if required. It is
+ * intended to finalise image loading in those boot modes where only a portion
+ * of the image is loaded to a temporary initial location prior to device
+ * configuration.
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * This function is called during hab_rvt.authenticate_image() between running
+ * the @ref dcd and @ref csf. The operation of this function is defined by
+ * the caller.
+ *
+ * @param[in,out] start Initial (possibly partial) image load address on
+ * entry. Final image load address on exit.
+ *
+ * @param[in,out] bytes Initial (possibly partial) image size on entry. Final
+ * image size on exit.
+ *
+ * @param[in] boot_data Initial @ref ivt Boot Data load address.
+ *
+ * @remark The interpretation of the Boot Data is defined by the caller.
+ * Different boot components or modes may use different boot data, or even
+ * different loader callback functions.
+ *
+ * @warning It should not be assumed by this function that the Boot Data is
+ * valid or authentic.
+ *
+ * @warning It is the responsibility of the loader callback to check the final
+ * image load addresses using hab_rvt.check_target() prior to copying any image
+ * data.
+ *
+ * @pre The (possibly partial) image has been loaded in the initial load
+ * address, and the Boot Data is within the initial image.
+ *
+ * @pre The @ref dcd has been run, if provided.
+ *
+ * @post The final image load addresses pass hab_rvt.check_target().
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS if all operations completed successfully,
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_FAILURE otherwise.
+ */
+typedef hab_status_t (*hab_loader_callback_f)(
+ void** start,
+ size_t* bytes,
+ const void* boot_data);
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** Image entry function prototype
+ * @ingroup rvt
+ *
+ * This typedef serves as the return type for hab_rvt.authenticate_image(). It
+ * specifies a void-void function pointer, but can be cast to another function
+ * pointer type if required.
+ */
+typedef void (*hab_image_entry_f)(void);
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @ref rvt structure
+ * @ingroup rvt
+ *
+ * @par Format
+ *
+ * The @ref rvt consists of a @ref hdr followed by a list of addresses as
+ * described further below.
+ */
+struct hab_rvt {
+
+ /** @ref hdr with tag #HAB_TAG_RVT, length and HAB version fields
+ * (see @ref data)
+ */
+ hab_hdr_t hdr;
+
+ /** Enter and initialise HAB library.
+ * @ingroup entry
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function initialises the HAB library and @ref shw plugins. It is
+ * intended for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the @ref rvt,
+ * prior to calling any other HAB functions other than
+ * hab_rvt.report_event() and hab_rvt.report_status().
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also intended for use by the boot ROM via hab_rvt.entry().
+ * @endrom
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * This function performs the following operations every time it is called:
+ *
+ * - Initialise the HAB library internal state
+ * - Run the entry sequence of each available @ref shw plugin
+ *
+ * If any failure occurs, an audit event is logged and all remaining
+ * operations are abandoned.
+ *
+ * When first called from boot ROM, this function also performs the
+ * following operations prior to those given above:
+ *
+ * - Initialise the internal key store
+ * - Run the self-test sequence of each available @ref shw plugin
+ * - If a state machine is present and enabled, change the security state
+ * as follows:
+ * - If the IC is configured as #HAB_CFG_OPEN, move to
+ * #HAB_STATE_NONSECURE
+ * - If the IC is configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED, move to
+ * #HAB_STATE_TRUSTED
+ * - Otherwise, leave the security state unchanged
+ *
+ * If any failure occurs in the operations above, an audit event is
+ * logged, all remaining operations are abandoned, and, if a state machine
+ * is present and enabled, the security state is set as follows:
+ *
+ * - If the IC is configured as #HAB_CFG_OPEN or #HAB_CFG_CLOSED, move to
+ * #HAB_STATE_NONSECURE. Note that if a security violation has been
+ * detected by the HW, the final state will be #HAB_STATE_FAIL_SOFT or
+ * #HAB_STATE_FAIL_HARD depending on the HW configuration.
+ * - Otherwise, leave the security state unchanged
+ *
+ * @warning Boot sequences may comprise several images with each launching
+ * the next as well as alternative images should one boot device or boot
+ * image be unavailable or unusable. The authentication of each image in
+ * a boot sequence must be bracketed by its own hab_rvt.entry()
+ * ... hab_rvt.exit() pair in order to ensure that security state
+ * information gathered for one image cannot be misapplied to another
+ * image.
+ *
+ * @ifrom
+ *
+ * @warning This applies to each boot path in boot ROM as well, except for
+ * the fabrication test path.
+ *
+ * @endrom
+ *
+ * @post HAB library internal state is initialised.
+ *
+ * @post Available @ref shw plugins are initialised.
+ *
+ * @post If a failure or warning occurs during @ref shw plugin
+ * initialisation, an audit event is logged with the relevant @ref eng
+ * tag. The status and reason logged are described in the relevant @ref
+ * shw plugin documentation.
+ *
+ * @post Security state is initialised, if a state machine is present and
+ * enabled.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on an IC not configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED,
+ * although unsuccessful operations will still generate audit log events,
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on other ICs if all commands completed
+ * without failure (even if warnings were generated),
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_FAILURE otherwise.
+ */
+ hab_status_t (*entry)(void);
+
+ /** Finalise and exit HAB library.
+ * @ingroup exit
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function finalises the HAB library and @ref shw plugins. It is
+ * intended for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the @ref rvt,
+ * after calling other HAB functions and prior to launching the next boot
+ * stage or switching to another boot path.
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also intended for use by the boot ROM via hab_rvt.exit().
+ * @endrom
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * This function performs the following operations:
+ *
+ * - Finalise the HAB library internal state
+ * - Run the finalisation sequence of each available @ref shw plugin
+ *
+ * If any failure occurs, an audit event is logged and all remaining
+ * operations are abandoned.
+ *
+ * @warning See warnings for hab_rvt.entry().
+ *
+ * @post #HAB_ASSERT_BLOCK records are cleared from audit log. Note that
+ * other event records are not cleared.
+ *
+ * @post Any keys installed by @ref csf commands remain active.
+ *
+ * @post Available @ref shw plugins are in their final state as described
+ * in the relevant sections.
+ *
+ * @post If a failure or warning occurs, an audit event is logged with the
+ * @ref eng tag of the @ref shw plugin concerned. The status and reason
+ * logged are described in the relevant @ref shw plugin documentation.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on an IC not configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED,
+ * although unsuccessful operations will still generate audit log events,
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on other ICs if all commands completed
+ * without failure (even if warnings were generated),
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_FAILURE otherwise.
+ */
+ hab_status_t (*exit)(void);
+
+ /** Check target address
+ * @ingroup chk_tgt
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function reports whether or not a given target region is allowed
+ * for either peripheral configuration or image loading in memory. It is
+ * intended for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the @ref rvt,
+ * in order to avoid configuring security-sensitive peripherals, or
+ * loading images over sensitive memory regions or outside recognised
+ * memory devices in the address map.
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also available for use by the boot ROM, both directly via
+ * hab_rvt.check_target() and indirectly via hab_rvt.authenticate_image().
+ * @endrom
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * The lists of allowed target regions vary by IC and core, and should be
+ * taken from the @ref ref_rug.
+ *
+ * @ifrom The allowed register sets for peripheral configuration and memory
+ * regions for image loading are defined in the @ref hal by
+ * #hab_hal_peripheral and #hab_hal_memory respectively. @endrom
+ *
+ * @param[in] type Type of target (memory or peripheral)
+ *
+ * @param[in] start Address of target region
+ *
+ * @param[in] bytes Size of target region
+ *
+ * @post if the given target region goes beyond the allowed regions, an
+ * audit event is logged with status #HAB_FAILURE and reason
+ * #HAB_INV_ADDRESS, together with the call parameters. See the @ref evt
+ * record documentation for details.
+ *
+ * @post For successful commands, no audit event is logged.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on an IC not configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED,
+ * although unsuccessful operations will still generate audit log events,
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS if the given target region lies wholly within the
+ * allowed regions for the requested type of target.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_FAILURE otherwise
+ */
+ hab_status_t (*check_target)(hab_target_t type,
+ const void* start,
+ size_t bytes);
+
+ /** Authenticate image.
+ * @ingroup auth_img
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function combines DCD, CSF and Assert functions in a standard
+ * sequence in order to authenticate a loaded image. It is intended for
+ * use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the @ref rvt. Support for
+ * images partially loaded to an initial location is provided via a
+ * callback function.
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also available for use by the boot ROM via
+ * hab_rvt.authenticate_image(). @endrom
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * This function performs the following sequence of operations:
+ * - Check that the initial image load addresses pass
+ * hab_rvt.check_target().
+ * - Check that the IVT offset lies within the initial image bounds.
+ * - Check that the @ref ivt @a self and @a entry pointers are not NULL
+ * - Check the @ref ivt header for consistency and compatability.
+ * - If provided in the @ref ivt, calculate the @ref dcd initial location,
+ * check that it lies within the initial image bounds, and run the @ref
+ * dcd commands.
+ * - If provided in the @ref ivt, calculate the Boot Data initial location
+ * and check that it lies within the initial image bounds.
+ * - If provided in the parameters, invoke the callback function with the
+ * initial image bounds and initial location of the @ref ivt Boot Data.
+ *
+ * From this point on, the full image is assumed to be in its final
+ * location. The following operations will be performed on all IC
+ * configurations (#hab_config), but will be only enforced on an IC
+ * configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED:
+ * - Check that the final image load addresses pass hab_rvt.check_target().
+ * - Check that the CSF lies within the image bounds, and run the CSF
+ * commands.
+ * - Check that all of the following data have been authenticated (using
+ * their final locations):
+ * - IVT;
+ * - DCD (if provided);
+ * - Boot Data (initial byte if provided);
+ * - Entry point (initial word).
+ *
+ * @param[in] cid Caller ID, used to identify which SW issued this call.
+ *
+ * @param[in] ivt_offset Offset in bytes of the IVT from the image start
+ * address.
+ *
+ * @param[in,out] start Initial (possibly partial) image load address on
+ * entry. Final image load address on exit.
+ *
+ * @param[in,out] bytes Initial (possibly partial) image size on entry.
+ * Final image size on exit.
+ *
+ * @param[in] loader Callback function to load the full image to its final
+ * load address. Set to NULL if not required.
+ *
+ * @remark Caller ID may be bound to signatures verified using keys
+ * installed with #HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_CID flag. See @ref cmd_ins_key and @ref
+ * bnd_obj for details.
+ *
+ * @remark A @a loader callback function may be supplied even if the image
+ * is already loaded to its final location on entry.
+ *
+ * @remark Boot Data (boot_data in @ref ivt) will be ignored if the
+ * @a loader callback function point is set to Null.
+ *
+ * @warning The @a loader callback function should lie within existing
+ * authenticated areas. @ifrom Or within the ROM. @endrom
+ *
+ * @warning It is the responsibility of the caller to check the initial
+ * image load addresses using hab_rvt.check_target() prior to loading the
+ * initial image and calling this function.
+ *
+ * @warning After completion of hab_rvt.authenticate_image(), the caller
+ * should test using hab_rvt.assert() that the Boot Data was
+ * authenticated.
+ *
+ * @post The post-conditions of the functions hab_rvt.check_target(),
+ * hab_rvt.run_dcd(), hab_rvt.run_csf() and hab_rvt.assert() apply also to
+ * this function. In particular, any audit events logged within the given
+ * functions have the context field appropriate to that function rather
+ * than #HAB_CTX_AUTHENTICATE. In addition, the side-effects and
+ * post-conditions of any callback function supplied apply.
+ *
+ * @post If a failure or warning occurs outside these contexts, an audit
+ * event is logged with status:
+ * - #HAB_FAILURE, with further reasons:
+ * - #HAB_INV_ADDRESS: initial or final image addresses outside allowed
+ * regions
+ * - #HAB_INV_ADDRESS: IVT, DCD, Boot Data or CSF outside image bounds
+ * - #HAB_INV_ADDRESS: IVT @a self or @a entry pointer is NULL
+ * - #HAB_INV_CALL: hab_rvt.entry() not run successfully prior to call
+ * - #HAB_INV_IVT: IVT malformed
+ * - #HAB_INV_IVT: IVT version number is less than HAB library version
+ * - #HAB_INV_RETURN: Callback function failed
+ *
+ * @retval entry field from @ref ivt on an IC not configured as
+ * #HAB_CFG_CLOSED provided that the following conditions are met
+ * (other unsuccessful operations will generate audit log events):
+ * - the @a start pointer and the pointer it locates are not NULL
+ * - the initial @ref ivt location is not NULL
+ * - the final @ref ivt location (given by the @a self field) is not NULL
+ * - any loader callback completed successfully,
+ *
+ * @retval entry field from @ref ivt on other ICs if all operations
+ * completed without failure (even if warnings were generated),
+ *
+ * @retval NULL otherwise.
+ */
+ hab_image_entry_f (*authenticate_image)(uint8_t cid,
+ ptrdiff_t ivt_offset,
+ void** start,
+ size_t* bytes,
+ hab_loader_callback_f loader);
+
+ /** Execute a boot configuration script.
+ * @ingroup run_dcd
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function configures the IC based upon a @ref dcd table. It is
+ * intended for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the @ref rvt.
+ * This function may be invoked as often as required for each boot stage.
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also intended for use by the boot ROM, both directly via
+ * hab_rvt.run_dcd() and indirectly via hab_rvt.authenticate_image().
+ * @endrom
+ *
+ * The difference between the configuration functionality in this function
+ * and hab_rvt.run_csf() arises because the @ref dcd table is not
+ * authenticated prior to running the commands. Hence, there is a more
+ * limited range of commands allowed, and a limited range of parameters to
+ * allowed commands.
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * This function performs the following operations:
+ * - Checks the @ref hdr for compatibility and consistency
+ * - Makes an internal copy of the @ref dcd table
+ * - Executes the commands in sequence from the internal copy of the @ref
+ * dcd
+ *
+ * If any failure occurs, an audit event is logged and all remaining
+ * operations are abandoned.
+ *
+ * @param[in] dcd Address of the @ref dcd.
+ *
+ * @warning It is the responsibility of the caller to ensure that the @a
+ * dcd parameter points to a valid memory location.
+ *
+ * @warning The @ref dcd must be authenticated by a subsequent @ref csf
+ * command prior to launching the next boot image, in order to avoid
+ * unauthorised configurations which may subvert secure operation.
+ * Although the content of the next boot stage's CSF may be out of scope
+ * for the hab_rvt.run_dcd() caller, it is possible to enforce this
+ * constraint by using hab_rvt.assert() to ensure that both the DCD and
+ * any pointers used to locate it have been authenticated.
+ *
+ * @warning Each invocation of hab_rvt.run_dcd() must occur between a pair
+ * of hab_rvt.entry() and hab_rvt.exit() calls, although multiple
+ * hab_rvt.run_dcd() calls (and other HAB calls) may be made in one
+ * bracket. This constraint applies whether hab_rvt.run_dcd() is
+ * successful or not: a subsequent call to hab_rvt.exit() is required
+ * prior to launching the authenticated image or switching to another boot
+ * target.
+ *
+ * @post Many commands may cause side-effects. See the @ref dcd
+ * documentation.
+ *
+ * @post If a failure or warning occurs within a command handler, an audit
+ * event is logged with the offending command, copied from the DCD. The
+ * status and reason logged are described in the relevant command
+ * documentation.
+ *
+ * @post For other failures or warning, the status logged is:
+ * - #HAB_WARNING, with further reasons:
+ * - #HAB_UNS_COMMAND: unsupported command encountered, where DCD
+ * version and HAB library version differ
+ * - #HAB_FAILURE, with further reasons:
+ * - #HAB_INV_ADDRESS: NULL @a dcd parameter
+ * - #HAB_INV_CALL: hab_rvt.entry() not run successfully prior to call
+ * - #HAB_INV_COMMAND: command not allowed in DCD
+ * - #HAB_UNS_COMMAND: unrecognised command encountered, where DCD
+ * version and HAB library version match
+ * - #HAB_INV_DCD: DCD malformed or too large
+ * - #HAB_INV_DCD: DCD version number is less than HAB library version
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on an IC not configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED,
+ * although unsuccessful operations will still generate audit log events,
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on other ICs if all commands completed
+ * without failure (even if warnings were generated),
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_FAILURE otherwise.
+ */
+ hab_status_t (*run_dcd)(const uint8_t* dcd);
+
+ /** Execute an authentication script.
+ * @ingroup run_csf
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function authenticates SW images and configures the IC based upon
+ * a @ref csf. It is intended for use by post-ROM boot stage components,
+ * via the @ref rvt. This function may be invoked as often as required
+ * for each boot stage.
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also available for use by the boot ROM via hab_rvt.run_csf,
+ * although it is anticipated that the boot ROM will mostly call this
+ * function indirectly via hab_rvt.authenticate_image(). @endrom
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * This function performs the following operations:
+ * - Checks the @ref hdr for compatibility and consistency
+ * - Makes an internal copy of the @ref csf
+ * - Executes the commands in sequence from the internal copy of the @ref
+ * csf
+ *
+ * The internal copy of the @ref csf is authenticated by an explicit
+ * command in the sequence. Prior to authentication, a limited set of
+ * commands is available to:
+ * - Install a Super-Root key (unless previously installed)
+ * - Install a CSF key (unless previously installed)
+ * - Specify any variable configuration items
+ * - Authenticate the CSF
+ *
+ * Subsequent to CSF authentication, the full set of commands is available.
+ *
+ * If any failure occurs, an audit event is logged and all remaining
+ * operations are abandoned.
+ *
+ * @param[in] csf Address of the @ref csf.
+ *
+ * @param[in] cid Caller ID, used to identify which SW issued this call.
+ *
+ * @remark Caller ID may be bound to signatures verified using keys
+ * installed with #HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_CID flag. See @ref cmd_ins_key and @ref
+ * bnd_obj for details.
+ *
+ * @warning It is the responsibility of the caller to ensure that the @a
+ * csf parameter points to a valid memory location.
+ *
+ * @warning Each invocation of hab_rvt.run_csf() must occur between a pair
+ * of hab_rvt.entry() and hab_rvt.exit() calls, although multiple
+ * hab_rvt.run_csf() calls (and other HAB calls) may be made in one
+ * bracket. This constraint applies whether hab_rvt.run_csf() is
+ * successful or not: a subsequent call to hab_rvt.exit() is required
+ * prior to launching the authenticated image or switching to another boot
+ * target.
+ *
+ * @post Many commands may cause side-effects. See the @ref csf
+ * documentation. In particular, note that keys installed by the @ref csf
+ * remain available for use in subsequent operations.
+ *
+ * @post If a failure or warning occurs within a command handler, an audit
+ * event is logged with the offending command, copied from the CSF. The
+ * status and reason logged are described in the relevant command
+ * documentation.
+ *
+ * @post For other failures or warning, the status logged is:
+ * - #HAB_WARNING, with further reasons:
+ * - #HAB_UNS_COMMAND: unsupported command encountered, where CSF
+ * version and HAB library version differ
+ * - #HAB_FAILURE, with further reasons:
+ * - #HAB_INV_ADDRESS: NULL @a csf parameter
+ * - #HAB_INV_CALL: hab_rvt.entry() not run successfully prior to call
+ * - #HAB_INV_COMMAND: command not allowed prior to CSF authentication
+ * - #HAB_UNS_COMMAND: unrecognised command encountered, where CSF
+ * version and HAB library version match
+ * - #HAB_INV_CSF: CSF not authenticated
+ * - #HAB_INV_CSF: CSF malformed or too large
+ * - #HAB_INV_CSF: CSF version number is less than HAB library version
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on an IC not configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED,
+ * although unsuccessful operations will still generate audit log events,
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on other ICs if all commands completed
+ * without failure (even if warnings were generated),
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_FAILURE otherwise.
+ */
+ hab_status_t (*run_csf)(const uint8_t* csf,
+ uint8_t cid);
+
+ /** Test an assertion against the audit log.
+ * @ingroup assert
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function allows the audit log to be interrogated. It is intended
+ * for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the @ref rvt, to
+ * determine the state of authentication operations. This function may be
+ * invoked as often as required for each boot stage.
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also available for use by the boot ROM, both directly via
+ * hab_rvt.assert() and indirectly via hab_rvt.authenticate_image().
+ * @endrom
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * This function checks the required assertion as detailed below.
+ *
+ * @param[in] type Assertion type.
+ *
+ * @param[in] data Assertion data.
+ *
+ * @param[in] count Data size or count.
+ *
+ * @par Memory block authentication:
+ * For #HAB_ASSERT_BLOCK assertion type, hab_rvt.assert() checks that the
+ * given memory block has been authenticated after running a CSF. The
+ * parameters are interpreted as follows:
+ *
+ * @par
+ * - @a data: memory block starting address
+ * - @a count: memory block size (in bytes)
+ *
+ * @par
+ *
+ * A simple interpretation of "memory block has been authenticated" is
+ * taken, such that the given block must lie wholly within a single
+ * contiguous block authenticated while running a CSF. A given memory
+ * block covered by the union of several neighboring or overlapping
+ * authenticated blocks could fail the test with this interpretation, but
+ * it is assumed that such cases will not arise in practice.
+ *
+ * @post If the assertion fails, an audit event is logged with status
+ * #HAB_FAILURE and reason #HAB_INV_ASSERTION, together with the call
+ * parameters. See the @ref evt record documentation for details.
+ *
+ * @post For successful commands, no audit event is logged.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on an IC not configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED,
+ * although unsuccessful operations will still generate audit log events,
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS on other ICs if the assertion is confirmed
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_FAILURE otherwise
+ */
+ hab_status_t (*assert)(hab_assertion_t type,
+ const void* data,
+ uint32_t count);
+
+ /** Report an event from the audit log.
+ * @ingroup event
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function allows the audit log to be interrogated. It is intended
+ * for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the @ref rvt, to
+ * determine the state of authentication operations. This function may
+ * be called outside an hab_rvt.entry() / hab_rvt.exit() pair.
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also available for use by the boot ROM, where it may be
+ * used to report boot failures as part of a tethered boot
+ * protocol. @endrom
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * This function performs the following operations:
+ * - Scans the audit log for a matching event
+ * - Copies the required details to the output parameters (if found)
+ *
+ * @param[in] status Status level of required event.
+ *
+ * @param[in] index Index of required event at given status level.
+ *
+ * @param[out] event @ref evt record.
+ *
+ * @param[in,out] bytes Size of @a event buffer on entry, size of event
+ * record on exit.
+ *
+ * @remark Use @a status = #HAB_STS_ANY to match any logged event,
+ * regardless of the status value logged.
+ *
+ * @remark Use @a index = 0 to return the first matching event, @a index =
+ * 1 to return the second matching event, and so on.
+ *
+ * @remark The data logged with each event is context-dependent. Refer to
+ * @ref evt record documentation.
+ *
+ * @warning Parameter @a bytes may not be NULL.
+ *
+ * @warning If the @a event buffer is a NULL pointer or too small to fit
+ * the event record, the required size is written to @a bytes, but no
+ * part of the event record is copied to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS if the required event is found, and the event
+ * record is copied to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS if the required event is found and @a event buffer
+ * passed is a NULL pointer.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_FAILURE otherwise
+ */
+ /* VIERTHAL this function is calles by the original freescale hab changes and should be on
+ */
+ hab_status_t (*report_event)(hab_status_t status,
+ uint32_t index,
+ uint8_t* event,
+ size_t* bytes);
+
+ /** Report security status.
+ * @ingroup status
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function reports the security configuration and state of the IC as
+ * well as searching the audit log to determine the status of the boot
+ * process. It is intended for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via
+ * the @ref rvt. This function may be called outside an
+ * hab_rvt.entry() / hab_rvt.exit() pair.
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also available for use by the boot ROM, and should be used
+ * rather than the HAL function hab_hal_read_sec_cfg(). @endrom
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * This function reads the fuses which indicate the security
+ * configuration. The fusemap varies by IC, and should be taken from the
+ * @ref ref_rug. It also uses the @ref shw state machine, if present and
+ * enabled, to report on the security state.
+ *
+ * @param[out] config Security configuration, NULL if not required
+ *
+ * @param[out] state Security state, NULL if not required
+ *
+ * @remark If no @ref shw state machine is present and enabled, the state
+ * #HAB_STATE_NONE will be output.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_SUCCESS if no warning or failure audit events have been
+ * logged.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_WARNING otherwise, if only warning events have been logged.
+ *
+ * @retval #HAB_FAILURE otherwise
+ */
+ hab_status_t (*report_status)(hab_config_t* config, hab_state_t* state);
+
+ /** Enter failsafe boot mode.
+ * @ingroup safe
+ *
+ * @par Purpose
+ *
+ * This function provides a safe path when image authentication has failed
+ * and all possible boot paths have been exhausted. It is intended for
+ * use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the @ref rvt.
+ *
+ * @ifrom It is also available for use by the boot ROM via
+ * hab_rvt.failsafe(). @endrom
+ *
+ * @par Operation
+ *
+ * The precise details of this function vary by IC and core, and should be
+ * taken from @ref ref_rug.
+ *
+ * @warning This function does not return.
+ *
+ * @remark Since this function does not return, it implicitly performs the
+ * functionality of hab_rvt.exit() in order to ensure an appropriate
+ * configuration of the @ref shw plugins.
+ *
+ * @remark Two typical implementations are:
+ * - a low-level provisioning protocol in which an image is downloaded to
+ * RAM from an external host, authenticated and launched. The downloaded
+ * image may communicate with tools on the external host to report the
+ * reasons for boot failure, and may re-provision the end-product with
+ * authentic boot images.
+ * - a failsafe boot mode which does not allow execution to leave the ROM
+ * until the IC is reset.
+ */
+ void (*failsafe)(void);
+};
+
+/** @ref rvt type
+ * @ingroup rvt
+ */
+typedef struct hab_rvt hab_rvt_t;
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @ref ivt structure
+ * @ingroup ivt
+ *
+ * @par Format
+ *
+ * An @ref ivt consists of a @ref hdr followed by a list of addresses as
+ * described further below.
+ *
+ * @warning The @a entry address may not be NULL.
+ *
+ * @warning On an IC not configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED, the
+ * @a csf address may be NULL. If it is not NULL, the @ref csf will be
+ * processed, but any failures should be non-fatal.
+ *
+ * @warning On an IC configured as #HAB_CFG_CLOSED, the @a
+ * csf address may not be NULL, and @ref csf failures are typically fatal.
+ *
+ * @remark The Boot Data located using the @a boot_data field is interpreted
+ * by the HAB caller in a boot-mode specific manner. This may be used by the
+ * boot ROM as to determine the load address and boot device configuration for
+ * images loaded from block devices (see @ref ref_rug for details).
+ *
+ * @remark All addresses given in the IVT, including the Boot Data (if
+ * present) are those for the final load location.
+ *
+ * @anchor ila
+ *
+ * @par Initial load addresses
+ *
+ * The @a self field is used to calculate addresses in boot modes where an
+ * initial portion of the image is loaded to an initial location. In such
+ * cases, the IVT, Boot Data (if present) and DCD (if present) are used in
+ * configuring the IC and loading the full image to its final location. Only
+ * the IVT, Boot Data (if present) and DCD (if present) are required to be
+ * within the initial image portion.
+ *
+ * The method for calculating an initial load address for the DCD is
+ * illustrated in the following C fragment. Similar calculations apply to
+ * other fields.
+ *
+@verbatim
+ hab_ivt_t* ivt_initial = <initial IVT load address>;
+ const void* dcd_initial = ivt_initial->dcd;
+ if (ivt_initial->dcd != NULL)
+ dcd_initial = (const uint8_t*)ivt_initial
+ + (ivt_initial->dcd - ivt_initial->self)
+@endverbatim
+ */
+struct hab_ivt {
+ /** @ref hdr with tag #HAB_TAG_IVT, length and HAB version fields
+ * (see @ref data)
+ */
+ hab_hdr_t hdr;
+ /** Absolute address of the first instruction to execute from the
+ * image
+ */
+ hab_image_entry_f entry;
+ /** Reserved in this version of HAB: should be NULL. */
+ const void* reserved1;
+ /** Absolute address of the image DCD: may be NULL. */
+ const void* dcd;
+ /** Absolute address of the Boot Data: may be NULL, but not interpreted
+ * any further by HAB
+ */
+ const void* boot_data;
+ /** Absolute address of the IVT.*/
+ const void* self;
+ /** Absolute address of the image CSF.*/
+ const void* csf;
+ /** Reserved in this version of HAB: should be zero. */
+ uint32_t reserved2;
+};
+
+/** @ref ivt type
+ * @ingroup ivt
+ */
+typedef struct hab_ivt hab_ivt_t;
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ GLOBAL VARIABLE DECLARATIONS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+/** @ref rvt instance
+ * @ingroup rvt
+ */
+extern const hab_rvt_t hab_rvt;
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ FUNCTION PROTOTYPES
+=============================================================================*/
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAB_H */
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,916 @@
+#ifndef HAB_TYPES_H
+#define HAB_TYPES_H
+/*===========================================================================*/
+/**
+ @file hab_types.h
+
+ @brief Constants, macros and types common to both external interfaces and
+ internal modules.
+
+@verbatim
+=============================================================================
+
+ Freescale Semiconductor Confidential Proprietary
+ (c) Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. 2007, 2008, 2009 . All rights reserved.
+
+Presence of a copyright notice is not an acknowledgement of
+publication. This software file listing contains information of
+Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. that is of a confidential and
+proprietary nature and any viewing or use of this file is prohibited
+without specific written permission from Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+
+=============================================================================
+Revision History:
+
+ Modification Date Tracking
+Author (dd-mmm-yyyy) Number Description of Changes
+--------------- ------------- ---------- -----------------------
+David Hartley 11-Dec-2007 ENGR55511 Initial version
+David Hartley 29-Jul-2008 ENGR82581 Add CMS, X.509v3, SHA-512
+ and ECDSA over P-521
+David Hartley 26-Aug-2008 ENGR88931 Restore PKCS#1 & SHA-256
+ Suppress ECDSA & SHA-512
+David Hartley 07-Nov-2008 ENGR92335 Implementation updates
+ Restore SHA-1, suppress SHA-256
+Yi Li 25-Mar-2009 ENGR106040 Editorial correction for SIS
+Rod Ziolkowski 25-Apr-2009 ENGR109160 Add key flags
+Rod Ziolkowski 07-May-2009 ENGR112074 Add HAB_BASE_VERSION
+David Hartley 15-Jun-2009 ENGR113329 Fix key flag doxygen
+Rod Ziolkowski 07-Jul-2009 ENGR113882 Restore SHA-256
+David Hartley 27-Jul-2009 ENGR113884 Add DCP support
+David Hartley 04-Aug-2009 ENGR111476 Byte array conversion
+David Hartley 27-Aug-2009 ENGR113895 Make mandatory signature binding
+ configurable
+David Hartley 02-Sep-2009 ENGR114783 Add support for export control
+Rod Ziolkowski ENGR116107 Add support for SCCv2
+ ENGR116108 Add support for RTICv3
+ ENGR116110 Add support for SAHARAv4LT
+ ENGR116111 Add support for SRTC
+ ENGR116112 Add support for CSU
+Rod Ziolkowski 04-Sep-2009 ENGR116267 Increase max allowed DCD size
+Rod Ziolkowski 09-Nov-2009 ENGR117778 Updates for report_event()
+ wildcard search
+=============================================================================
+Portability:
+
+These definitions are customised for 32 bit cores of either endianness.
+
+=============================================================================
+@endverbatim */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ INCLUDE FILES
+=============================================================================*/
+
+//#include <stdint.h> /* for integer types */
+//#include <stdbool.h> /* for bool type */
+//#include <stddef.h> /* for NULL and offset_of() */
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ CONSTANTS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+/** @addtogroup struct
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name External data structure tags
+ * @anchor dat_tag
+ *
+ * Tag values 0x00 .. 0xef are reserved for HAB. Values 0xf0 .. 0xff
+ * are available for custom use.
+ */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_TAG_IVT 0xd1 /**< Image Vector Table */
+#define HAB_TAG_DCD 0xd2 /**< Device Configuration Data */
+#define HAB_TAG_CSF 0xd4 /**< Command Sequence File */
+#define HAB_TAG_CRT 0xd7 /**< Certificate */
+#define HAB_TAG_SIG 0xd8 /**< Signature */
+#define HAB_TAG_EVT 0xdb /**< Event */
+#define HAB_TAG_RVT 0xdd /**< ROM Vector Table */
+/* Values b0 ... cf reserved for CSF commands. Values e0 ... ef reserved for
+ * key types.
+ *
+ * Available values: 03, 05, 06, 09, 0a, 0c, 0f, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 1b, 1d,
+ * 1e, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 2b, 2d, 2e, 30, 33, 35, 36, 39, 3a, 3c, 3f, 41, 42,
+ * 44, 47, 48, 4b, 4d, 4e, 50, 53, 55, 56, 59, 5a, 5c, 5f, 60, 63, 65, 66, 69,
+ * 6a, 6c, 6f, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 7b, 7d, 7e, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 8b, 8d, 8e,
+ * 90, 93, 95, 96, 99, 9a, 9c, 9f, a0, a3, a5, a6, a9, aa, ac, af, b1, b2, b4,
+ * b7, b8, bb, bd, be
+ *
+ * Custom values: f0, f3, f5, f6, f9, fa, fc, ff
+ */
+/*@}*/
+
+/** @name HAB version */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_MAJOR_VERSION 4 /**< Major version of this HAB release */
+#define HAB_MINOR_VERSION 0 /**< Minor version of this HAB release */
+#define HAB_VER_MAJ_WIDTH 4 /**< Major version field width */
+#define HAB_VER_MAJ_SHIFT 4 /**< Major version field offset */
+#define HAB_VER_MIN_WIDTH 4 /**< Minor version field width */
+#define HAB_VER_MIN_SHIFT 0 /**< Minor version field offset */
+/** Full version of this HAB release @hideinitializer */
+#define HAB_VERSION HAB_VER(HAB_MAJOR_VERSION, HAB_MINOR_VERSION)
+/** Base version for this HAB release @hideinitializer */
+#define HAB_BASE_VERSION HAB_VER(HAB_MAJOR_VERSION, 0)
+
+/*@}*/
+
+/* @} struct */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup cmd
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Command tags
+ * @anchor cmd_tag
+ *
+ * Tag values 0xb0 .. 0xcf are reserved for HAB. Values 0xf0 .. 0xff
+ * are available for custom use.
+ */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_CMD_SET 0xb1 /**< Set */
+#define HAB_CMD_INS_KEY 0xbe /**< Install Key */
+#define HAB_CMD_AUT_DAT 0xca /**< Authenticate Data */
+#define HAB_CMD_WRT_DAT 0xcc /**< Write Data */
+#define HAB_CMD_CHK_DAT 0xcf /**< Check Data */
+#define HAB_CMD_NOP 0xc0 /**< No Operation */
+#define HAB_CMD_INIT 0xb4 /**< Initialise SRTC */
+#define HAB_CMD_UNLK 0xb2 /**< Unlock SRTC */
+#ifdef HAB_FUTURE
+#define HAB_CMD_RMV_KEY /**< Remove Key */
+#define HAB_CMD_INS_DAT /**< Install Data (BLOB) */
+#define HAB_CMD_INS_REF /**< Install Reference Data */
+#define HAB_CMD_INS_PLG /**< Install Plugin */
+#define HAB_CMD_RMV_PLG /**< Remove Plugin */
+#define HAB_CMD_CHK_VER /**< Check SW Version */
+#endif
+/* Remaining values: b7, b8, bb, bd, c3, c5, c6, c9 */
+/*@}*/
+
+/* @} cmd */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup pcl
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Protocol tags
+ * @anchor pcl_tag
+ *
+ * Tag values 0x00 .. 0xef are reserved for HAB. Values 0xf0 .. 0xff are
+ * available for custom use.
+ */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_PCL_SRK 0x03 /**< SRK certificate format */
+#define HAB_PCL_WTLS 0x05 /**< OMA WTLS certificate format (NOT
+ * SUPPORTED)
+ */
+#define HAB_PCL_X509 0x09 /**< X.509v3 certificate format */
+#define HAB_PCL_CMS 0xc5 /**< CMS/PKCS#7 signature protocol */
+#ifdef HAB_FUTURE
+#define HAB_PCL_FSL 0x0f /**< FSL bound signature protocol */
+#define HAB_PCL_HMAC 0x30 /**< NIST HMAC message authentication */
+#define HAB_PCL_CBCMAC 0x33 /**< CBC-MAC message authentication */
+#endif
+/*@}*/
+
+/* Available values: 06, 0a, 0c, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 1b, 1d, 1e, 21, 22, 24,
+ * 27, 28, 2b, 2d, 2e, 35, 36, 39, 3a, 3c, 3f, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48, 4b, 4d, 4e,
+ * 50, 53, 55, 56, 59, 5a, 5c, 5f, 60, 63, 65, 66, 69, 6a, 6c, 6f, 71, 72, 74,
+ * 77, 78, 7b, 7d, 7e, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 8b, 8d, 8e, 90, 93, 95, 96, 99, 9a,
+ * 9c, 9f, a0, a3, a5, a6, a9, aa, ac, af, b1, b2, b4, b7, b8, bb, bd, be, c0,
+ * c3, c6, c9, ca, cc, cf, d1, d2, d4, d7, d8, db, dd, de, e1, e2, e4, e7, e8,
+ * eb, ed, ee
+ *
+ * Custom values: f0, f3, f5, f6, f9, fa, fc, ff
+ */
+
+/* @} pcl */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup alg
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Algorithm types
+ * @anchor alg_typ
+ *
+ * The most-significant nibble of an algorithm ID denotes the algorithm
+ * type. Algorithms of the same type share the same interface.
+ *
+ * Types 0x0 .. 0xc are reserved for HAB. Types 0xd .. 0xf are available for
+ * custom use. Within each reserved type N in 0 .. c, tag values 0xN0 .. 0xNc
+ * are reserved for HAB. Values 0xNd .. 0xNf are available for custom use.
+ */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_ALG_ANY 0x0 /**< Algorithm type ANY */
+#define HAB_ALG_HASH 0x1 /**< Hash algorithm type */
+#define HAB_ALG_SIG 0x2 /**< Signature algorithm type */
+#define HAB_ALG_FF 0x3 /**< Finite field arithmetic */
+#define HAB_ALG_EC 0x4 /**< Elliptic curve arithmetic */
+#define HAB_ALG_CIPHER 0x5 /**< Cipher algorithm type (UNSUPPORTED) */
+/*@}*/
+
+/** @name Algorithm type ANY
+ *
+ * Algorithms of type ANY have no common interface: the protocol must know
+ * what to do.
+ */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_ALG_RANDOM 0x03 /**< Random number generation (UNSUPPORTED) */
+/* Available values: 05, 06, 09, 0a, 0c, 0f
+ */
+/*@}*/
+
+/** @name Hash algorithms */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_ALG_SHA1 0x11 /**< SHA-1 algorithm ID */
+#define HAB_ALG_SHA256 0x17 /**< SHA-256 algorithm ID */
+#define HAB_ALG_SHA512 0x1b /**< SHA-512 algorithm ID (UNSUPPORTED) */
+/* Available values: 0x14, 0x12, 18, 1d, 1e
+ */
+/*@}*/
+
+/** @name Signature algorithms */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_ALG_PKCS1 0x21 /**< PKCS#1 RSA signature algorithm */
+#define HAB_PCL_DSA 0x2d /**< NIST DSA signature algorithm
+ * (UNSUPPORTED)
+ */
+#define HAB_ALG_ECDSA 0x2e /**< NIST ECDSA signature algorithm
+ * (UNSUPPORTED)
+ */
+/* Available values: 22, 24, 27, 28, 2b
+ */
+/*@}*/
+
+
+/* Available values: 60, 63, 65, 66, 69, 6a,
+ * 6c, 6f, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 7b, 7d, 7e, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 8b, 8d, 8e, 90,
+ * 93, 95, 96, 99, 9a, 9c, 9f, a0, a3, a5, a6, a9, aa, ac, af, b1, b2, b4, b7,
+ * b8, bb, bd, be, c0, c3, c5, c6, c9, ca, cc, cf, d1, d2, d4, d7, d8, db, dd,
+ * de, e1, e2, e4, e7, e8, eb, ed, ee, f0, f3, f5, f6, f9, fa, fc, ff
+ */
+
+/* @} alg */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup eng
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Engine plugin tags
+ * @anchor eng_tag
+ *
+ * Tag values 0x00 .. 0xef and 0xff are reserved for HAB. Values 0xf0 .. 0xfe
+ * are available for custom use.
+ */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_ENG_ANY 0x00 /**< First compatible engine will be
+ * selected automatically (no engine
+ * configuration parameters are allowed).
+ */
+#define HAB_ENG_SCC 0x03 /**< Security controller */
+#define HAB_ENG_RTIC 0x05 /**< Run-time integrity checker */
+#define HAB_ENG_SAHARA 0x06 /**< Crypto accelerator */
+#define HAB_ENG_CSU 0x0a /**< Central Security Unit */
+#define HAB_ENG_SRTC 0x0c /**< Secure clock */
+#ifdef HAB_FUTURE
+#define HAB_ENG_RNG 0x09 /**< Standalone random number generator */
+#define HAB_ENG_SJC 0x0f /**< Secure JTAG controller */
+#define HAB_ENG_WDOG 0x11 /**< Watchdog timer */
+#define HAB_ENG_SRC 0x12 /**< System Reset Controller */
+#define HAB_ENG_SPBA 0x14 /**< Shared Peripheral Bus Arbiter */
+#define HAB_ENG_IIM 0x17 /**< Fuse controller */
+#define HAB_ENG_IOMUX 0x18 /**< IO multiplexer */
+#endif
+#define HAB_ENG_DCP 0x1b /**< Data Co-Processor */
+/** @cond rom */
+#define HAB_ENG_RTL 0x77 /**< @rom RTL simulation engine */
+/** @endcond */
+#define HAB_ENG_SW 0xff /**< Software engine */
+/* Available values: 1d, 1e, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 2b, 2d, 2e, 30, 33, 35,
+ * 36, 39, 3a, 3c, 3f, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48, 4b, 4d, 4e, 50, 53, 55, 56, 59, 5a,
+ * 5c, 5f, 60, 63, 65, 66, 69, 6a, 6c, 6f, 71, 72, 74, 78, 7b, 7d, 7e, 81,
+ * 82, 84, 87, 88, 8b, 8d, 8e, 90, 93, 95, 96, 99, 9a, 9c, 9f, a0, a3, a5, a6,
+ * a9, aa, ac, af, b1, b2, b4, b7, b8, bb, bd, be, c0, c3, c5, c6, c9, ca, cc,
+ * cf, d1, d2, d4, d7, d8, db, dd, de, e1, e2, e4, e7, e8, eb, ed, ee
+ *
+ * Custom values: f0, f3, f5, f6, f9, fa, fc
+ */
+/*@}*/
+
+/* @} eng */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup sah
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Maximum data blocks in a single hash */
+#define HAB_SAHARA_BLOCK_MAX 12
+
+/* @} sah */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup dcp
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Maximum data blocks in a single hash */
+#define HAB_DCP_BLOCK_MAX 6
+
+/* @} dcp */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup rtic
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Maximum data blocks in a single hash */
+#define HAB_RTIC_BLOCK_MAX 2
+
+/* @} rtic */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup key
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Key types
+ * @anchor key_types
+ *
+ * Tag values 0xe0 .. 0xef are reserved for HAB. Values 0xf0 .. 0xff
+ * are available for custom use.
+ */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_KEY_PUBLIC 0xe1 /**< Public key type: data present */
+#define HAB_KEY_SECRET 0xe2 /**< Secret key type: data present
+ * (UNSUPPORTED)
+ */
+#define HAB_KEY_HASH 0xee /**< Any key type: hash only */
+/* Available values: e4, e7, e8, eb, ed
+ *
+ * Custom values: f0, f3, f5, f6, f9, fa, fc, ff
+ */
+/*@}*/
+
+/** @name Key store indices */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_IDX_SRK 0 /**< Super-Root Key index */
+#define HAB_IDX_CSFK 1 /**< CSF key index */
+/*@}*/
+
+/** @name Key Counts */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_SRK_MIN 1 /**< Minimum Super-Root Key count */
+#define HAB_SRK_MAX 4 /**< Maximum Super-Root Key count */
+#define HAB_KEY_MAX 5 /**< Maximum installed key count
+ * (incl Super-Root Key)
+ */
+/*@}*/
+
+/* @} key */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+#ifdef HAB_FUTURE
+/** @addtogroup key_ecdsa
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Bitfield definitions */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_KEY_ECDSA_FLG_WIDTH 8 /**< Width of @a flg field */
+#define HAB_KEY_ECDSA_FLG_SHIFT 0 /**< Offset of @a flg field */
+#define HAB_KEY_ECDSA_TYP_WIDTH 8 /**< Width of @a typ field */
+#define HAB_KEY_ECDSA_TYP_SHIFT 24 /**< Offset of @a typ field */
+#define HAB_KEY_ECDSA_SIZ_WIDTH 8 /**< Width of @a siz field */
+#define HAB_KEY_ECDSA_SIZ_SHIFT 16 /**< Offset of @a siz field */
+#define HAB_KEY_ECDSA_REDBITS_WIDTH 16 /**< Width of @a red_bits field */
+#define HAB_KEY_ECDSA_REDBITS_SHIFT 0 /**< Offset of @a red_bits field */
+/*@}*/
+
+/* @} key_ecdsa */
+#endif
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup key_pkcs1
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Bitfield definitions */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_KEY_PKCS1_FLG_WIDTH 8 /**< Width of @a flg field */
+#define HAB_KEY_PKCS1_FLG_SHIFT 0 /**< Offset of @a flg field */
+#define HAB_KEY_PKCS1_MODBYTES_WIDTH 16 /**< Width of mod_bytes field */
+#define HAB_KEY_PKCS1_MODBYTES_SHIFT 16 /**< Offset of mod_bytes field */
+#define HAB_KEY_PKCS1_EXPBYTES_WIDTH 16 /**< Width of exp_bytes field */
+#define HAB_KEY_PKCS1_EXPBYTES_SHIFT 0 /**< Offset of exp_bytes field */
+/*@}*/
+
+/** @name Binding flag bitfield definitions */
+/*@}*/
+#define HAB_KEY_BND_FLG_WIDTH 5 /**< Width of binding flags */
+#define HAB_KEY_BND_FLG_SHIFT 2 /**< Offset of binding flags */
+/*@}*/
+
+/* @} key_pkcs1 */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup cmd_wrt_dat
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Parameter bitfield definitions.
+ *
+ * Apply to both @ref cmd_wrt_dat and @ref cmd_chk_dat commands. */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_CMD_WRT_DAT_FLAGS_WIDTH 5 /**< @a flags field width */
+#define HAB_CMD_WRT_DAT_FLAGS_SHIFT 3 /**< @a flags field offset */
+#define HAB_CMD_WRT_DAT_BYTES_WIDTH 3 /**< @a bytes field width */
+#define HAB_CMD_WRT_DAT_BYTES_SHIFT 0 /**< @a bytes field offset */
+/*@}*/
+
+/* @} cmd_wrt_dat */
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** @addtogroup bnd_obj
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Binding object IDs
+ * @anchor bnd_ids
+ *
+ * The ASN.1 object identifiers used to identify HAB binding attributes are
+ * defined in the following arc:
+ *
+@verbatim
+ id-fsl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) fsl(123456) }
+
+ id-habBnd OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ id-fsl hab(32) binding-objects(16) }
+
+ id-habBnd-dat OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ id-habBnd dat(1) }
+
+ id-habBnd-cfg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ id-habBnd cfg(3) }
+
+ id-habBnd-fid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ id-habBnd fid(5) }
+
+ id-habBnd-mid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ id-habBnd mid(6) }
+
+ id-habBnd-cid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ id-habBnd cid(9) }
+@endverbatim
+ *
+ * The ASN.1 object identifiers used to identify HAB binding attributes are
+ * single component extensions of id-habBnd using a component value less than
+ * 128 (so that the component can be DER-encoded in a single byte).
+ *
+ * The DER encoding of an object identifier in this arc is the concatenation
+ * of the DER prefix with the single byte identifier for the required binding
+ * object. Binding object attribute values are encoded as an ASN.1 SET with
+ * a single OCTET STRING member.
+ */
+/*@{*/
+
+/** DER prefix
+ *
+ * @todo update description and encoding of binding object identifiers with
+ * real fsl value instead of fsl(123456) encoded as 0x87, 0xc4, 0x40, and
+ * confirm chosen values for hab(32) and binding-objects(16).
+ */
+#define HAB_BND_DER_PREFIX \
+ {0x06, 0x0a, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x87, 0xc4, 0x40, 0x20, 0x10}
+#define HAB_BND_DAT 0x01 /**< Data type (mandatory) */
+#define HAB_BND_CFG 0x03 /**< Security configuration */
+#define HAB_BND_FID 0x05 /**< Fabrication UID */
+#define HAB_BND_MID 0x06 /**< Manufacturing ID */
+#define HAB_BND_CID 0x09 /**< Caller ID */
+/* Available values: 0a, 0c, 0f, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 1b, 1d, 1e, 21, 22, 24,
+ * 27, 28, 2b, 2d, 2e, 30, 33, 35, 36, 39, 3a, 3c, 3f, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48, 4b,
+ * 4d, 4e, 50, 53, 55, 56, 59, 5a, 5c, 5f, 60, 63, 65, 66, 69, 6a, 6c, 6f, 71,
+ * 72, 74, 77, 78, 7b, 7d, 7e
+ */
+/*@}*/
+
+
+/** @name Caller IDs
+ *
+ * Only the ROM caller ID is defined, but other caller IDs may be defined by
+ * later boot stages.
+ */
+/*@{*/
+#define HAB_CID_ROM 0 /**< ROM Caller ID */
+/*@}*/
+
+/* @} bnd_obj */
+
+#ifdef HAB_FUTURE
+/** @addtogroup sig_fsl
+ * @{
+ */
+
+#define HAB_BND_DAT_BYTES 512 /**< Maximum binding data size */
+
+/* @} sig_fsl */
+#endif
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/** Maximum supported CSF size
+ * @ingroup csf
+ */
+#define HAB_CSF_BYTES_MAX 768
+
+/** Maximum supported DCD size
+ * @ingroup dcd
+ */
+#define HAB_DCD_BYTES_MAX 1768
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ MACROS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+
+/** @cond rom */
+
+/** @addtogroup hal
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** @name Miscellaneous macros */
+/*@{*/
+
+/** @rom Count array entries
+ *@hideinitializer
+ *
+ * @param[in] a fixed size array
+ *
+ * @return Array entries
+ */
+#define HAB_ENTRIES_IN(a) \
+ (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))
+
+/*@}*/
+
+/* @} hal */
+
+/** @endcond */
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ ENUMS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+/** Supported widths of data commands.
+ * @ingroup cmd_wrt_dat
+ */
+typedef enum hab_data_width
+{
+ HAB_DATA_WIDTH_BYTE = 1, /**< 8-bit value */
+ HAB_DATA_WIDTH_HALF = 2, /**< 16-bit value */
+ HAB_DATA_WIDTH_WORD = 4 /**< 32-bit value */
+} hab_data_width_t;
+
+
+/** Flags for Write Data commands.
+ * @ingroup cmd_wrt_dat
+ */
+typedef enum hab_cmd_wrt_dat_flg
+{
+ HAB_CMD_WRT_DAT_MSK = 1, /**< Mask/value flag: if set, only specific
+ * bits may be overwritten at target address
+ * (otherwise all bits may be overwritten)
+ */
+ HAB_CMD_WRT_DAT_SET = 2 /**< Set/clear flag: if #HAB_CMD_WRT_DAT_MSK
+ * set, bits at the target address overwritten
+ * with this flag (otherwise it is ignored)
+ */
+} hab_cmd_wrt_dat_flg_t;
+
+/** Flags for Check Data commands.
+ * @ingroup cmd_chk_dat
+ */
+typedef enum hab_cmd_chk_dat_flg
+{
+ HAB_CMD_CHK_DAT_SET = 2, /**< Set/clear flag: bits set in mask must
+ * match this flag
+ */
+ HAB_CMD_CHK_DAT_ANY = 4 /**< Any/all flag: if clear, all bits set in
+ * mask must match (otherwise any bit
+ * suffices)
+ */
+} hab_cmd_chk_dat_flg_t;
+
+/** Flags for Authenticate Data commands.
+ * @ingroup cmd_aut_dat
+ */
+typedef enum hab_cmd_aut_dat_flg
+{
+ HAB_CMD_AUT_DAT_CLR = 0, /**< No flags set */
+ HAB_CMD_AUT_DAT_ABS = 1 /**< Absolute signature address */
+} hab_cmd_aut_dat_flg_t;
+
+/** Flags for Install Key commands.
+ * @ingroup cmd_ins_key
+ */
+typedef enum hab_cmd_ins_key_flg
+{
+ HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_CLR = 0, /**< No flags set */
+ HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_ABS = 1, /**< Absolute certificate address */
+ HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_CSF = 2, /**< Install CSF key */
+ HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_DAT = 4, /**< Key binds to Data Type */
+ HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_CFG = 8, /**< Key binds to Configuration */
+ HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_FID = 16, /**< Key binds to Fabrication UID */
+ HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_MID = 32, /**< Key binds to Manufacturing ID */
+ HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_CID = 64, /**< Key binds to Caller ID */
+ HAB_CMD_INS_KEY_HSH = 128 /**< Certificate hash present */
+} hab_cmd_ins_key_flg_t;
+
+/** Key flags.
+ * @ingroup key_pkcs1
+ *
+ * @ifrom
+ *
+ * The binding flags given here align with those in #hab_cmd_ins_key_flg
+ *
+ * @endrom
+ *
+ */
+typedef enum hab_key_flg
+{
+ /* Two more flag values available */
+ HAB_KEY_FLG_DAT = 4, /**< Key binds to Data Type */
+ HAB_KEY_FLG_CFG = 8, /**< Key binds to Configuration */
+ HAB_KEY_FLG_FID = 16, /**< Key binds to Fabrication UID */
+ HAB_KEY_FLG_MID = 32, /**< Key binds to Manufacturing ID */
+ HAB_KEY_FLG_CID = 64, /**< Key binds to Caller ID */
+ HAB_KEY_FLG_CA = 128 /**< CA key */
+} hab_key_flg_t;
+
+/** Binding data types
+ * @ingroup bnd_obj
+ */
+typedef enum hab_dat {
+ HAB_DAT_CSF = 0x0f, /**< CSF signature */
+ HAB_DAT_IMG = 0x33, /**< Image signature */
+ HAB_DAT_PLG = 0x3c, /**< Plugin signature (UNSUPPORTED) */
+ HAB_DAT_MAX
+} hab_dat_t;
+
+/* Available values: 55, 5a, 66, 69, 96, 99, a5, aa, c3, cc, f0, ff
+ */
+
+/** Target check types
+ * @ingroup chk_tgt
+ */
+typedef enum hab_target {
+ HAB_TGT_MEMORY = 0x0f, /**< Check memory white list */
+ HAB_TGT_PERIPHERAL = 0xf0, /**< Check peripheral white list */
+ HAB_TGT_MAX
+} hab_target_t;
+
+/** Security configuration types
+ * @ingroup status
+ */
+typedef enum hab_config {
+/** @cond rom */
+ HAB_CFG_FAB = 0x00, /**< @rom Un-programmed IC */
+/** @endcond */
+ HAB_CFG_OPEN = 0xf0, /**< Non-secure IC */
+ HAB_CFG_CLOSED = 0xcc /**< Secure IC */
+} hab_config_t;
+/* Available values: 0f, 33, 3c, 55, 5a, 66, 69, 96, 99, a5, aa, ff
+ */
+
+/** Security state types
+ * @ingroup status
+ */
+typedef enum hab_state {
+ HAB_STATE_INITIAL = 0x33, /**< Initialising state (transitory) */
+ HAB_STATE_CHECK = 0x55, /**< Check state (non-secure) */
+ HAB_STATE_NONSECURE = 0x66, /**< Non-secure state */
+ HAB_STATE_TRUSTED = 0x99, /**< Trusted state */
+ HAB_STATE_SECURE = 0xaa, /**< Secure state (UNSUPPORTED) */
+ HAB_STATE_FAIL_SOFT = 0xcc, /**< Soft fail state */
+ HAB_STATE_FAIL_HARD = 0xff, /**< Hard fail state (terminal) */
+ HAB_STATE_NONE = 0xf0, /**< No security state machine */
+ HAB_STATE_MAX
+} hab_state_t;
+/* Available values: 00, 0f, 3c, 5a, 69, 96, a5, c3
+ */
+
+/** HAB status types
+ * @ingroup status
+ */
+typedef enum hab_status {
+ HAB_STS_ANY = 0x00, /**< Match any status in
+ * hab_rvt.report_event()
+ */
+ HAB_FAILURE = 0x33, /**< Operation failed */
+ HAB_WARNING = 0x69, /**< Operation completed with warning */
+ HAB_SUCCESS = 0xf0, /**< Operation completed successfully */
+ HAB_STS_MAX
+} hab_status_t;
+
+/** Failure or warning reasons
+ * @ingroup evt
+ *
+ * Values 0x80 ... 0xff are reserved for internal use.
+ */
+typedef enum hab_reason {
+ HAB_RSN_ANY = 0x00, /**< Match any reason in
+ * hab_rvt.report_event()
+ */
+ HAB_ENG_FAIL = 0x30, /**< Engine failure. */
+ HAB_INV_ADDRESS = 0x22, /**< Invalid address: access denied. */
+ HAB_INV_ASSERTION = 0x0c, /**< Invalid assertion. */
+ HAB_INV_CALL = 0x28, /**< Function called out of sequence. */
+ HAB_INV_CERTIFICATE = 0x21, /**< Invalid certificate. */
+ HAB_INV_COMMAND = 0x06, /**< Invalid command: command malformed. */
+ HAB_INV_CSF = 0x11, /**< Invalid @ref csf. */
+ HAB_INV_DCD = 0x27, /**< Invalid @ref dcd. */
+ HAB_INV_INDEX = 0x0f, /**< Invalid index: access denied. */
+ HAB_INV_IVT = 0x05, /**< Invalid @ref ivt. */
+ HAB_INV_KEY = 0x1d, /**< Invalid key. */
+ HAB_INV_RETURN = 0x1e, /**< Failed callback function. */
+ HAB_INV_SIGNATURE = 0x18, /**< Invalid signature. */
+ HAB_INV_SIZE = 0x17, /**< Invalid data size. */
+ HAB_MEM_FAIL = 0x2e, /**< Memory failure. */
+ HAB_OVR_COUNT = 0x2b, /**< Expired poll count. */
+ HAB_OVR_STORAGE = 0x2d, /**< Exhausted storage region. */
+ HAB_UNS_ALGORITHM = 0x12, /**< Unsupported algorithm. */
+ HAB_UNS_COMMAND = 0x03, /**< Unsupported command. */
+ HAB_UNS_ENGINE = 0x0a, /**< Unsupported engine. */
+ HAB_UNS_ITEM = 0x24, /**< Unsupported configuration item. */
+ HAB_UNS_KEY = 0x1b, /**< Unsupported key type or parameters. */
+ HAB_UNS_PROTOCOL = 0x14, /**< Unsupported protocol. */
+ HAB_UNS_STATE = 0x09, /**< Unsuitable state. */
+ HAB_RSN_MAX
+} hab_reason_t;
+/* Available values: 33, 35, 36, 39, 3a, 3c, 3f, 41, 42, 44,
+ * 47, 48, 4b, 4d, 4e, 50, 53, 55, 56, 59, 5a, 5c, 5f, 60, 63, 65, 66, 69, 6a,
+ * 6c, 6f, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 7b, 7d, 7e
+ */
+
+/** Audit logging contexts.
+ * @ingroup evt
+ *
+ * This list is sorted in order of increasing priority: where two contexts
+ * might apply, the latter one is used.
+ *
+ * Values 0x40 .. 0x5f are reserved for internal use.
+ */
+typedef enum hab_context {
+ HAB_CTX_ANY = 0x00, /**< Match any context in
+ * hab_rvt.report_event()
+ */
+/** @cond rom */
+ HAB_CTX_FAB = 0xff, /**< @rom Event logged in hab_fab_test() */
+/** @endcond */
+ HAB_CTX_ENTRY = 0xe1, /**< Event logged in hab_rvt.entry() */
+ HAB_CTX_TARGET = 0x33, /**< Event logged in hab_rvt.check_target() */
+ HAB_CTX_AUTHENTICATE = 0x0a, /**< Event logged in
+ * hab_rvt.authenticate_image()
+ */
+ HAB_CTX_DCD = 0xdd, /**< Event logged in hab_rvt.run_dcd() */
+ HAB_CTX_CSF = 0xcf, /**< Event logged in hab_rvt.run_csf() */
+ HAB_CTX_COMMAND = 0xc0, /**< Event logged executing @ref csf or @ref
+ * dcd command
+ */
+ HAB_CTX_AUT_DAT = 0xdb, /**< Authenticated data block */
+ HAB_CTX_ASSERT = 0xa0, /**< Event logged in hab_rvt.assert() */
+ HAB_CTX_EXIT = 0xee, /**< Event logged in hab_rvt.exit() */
+ HAB_CTX_MAX
+} hab_context_t;
+
+/** Assertion types.
+ * @ingroup assert
+ */
+typedef enum hab_assertion {
+ HAB_ASSERT_BLOCK = 0, /**< Assert that a memory block was authenticated */
+ HAB_ASSERT_MAX
+} hab_assertion_t;
+
+/** RTIC configuration flags
+ * @ingroup rtic
+ */
+typedef enum hab_rtic_config {
+ HAB_RTIC_IN_SWAP8 = 0x01, /**< Set BYTE SWAP bit (reverse bytes within
+ * word on input to RTIC) */
+ HAB_RTIC_IN_SWAP16 = 0x02, /**< Set HALF WORD SWAP bit (reverse
+ * half-words within word on input to
+ * RTIC) */
+ HAB_RTIC_OUT_SWAP8 = 0x08, /**< Set HASH RESULT BYTE SWAP bit (reverse
+ * bytes within word on output from RTIC) */
+ HAB_RTIC_KEEP = 0x80 /**< Retain reference hash value for later
+ * monitoring */
+} hab_rtic_config_t;
+
+/** SAHARA configuration flags
+ * @ingroup sah
+ */
+typedef enum hab_sahara_config {
+ HAB_SAHARA_IN_SWAP8 = 0x01, /**< Set MESS BYTE SWAP bit (reverse message
+ * bytes within word on input to
+ * SAHARA) */
+ HAB_SAHARA_IN_SWAP16 = 0x02, /**< Set MESS HALF WORD SWAP bit (reverse
+ * message half-words within word on input
+ * to SAHARA) */
+ /* no SWAP32 for SAHARA message - leave 0x04 value unassigned */
+ /* no SWAP8 for SAHARA descriptors/links - leave 0x08 value unassigned */
+ HAB_SAHARA_DSC_BE8_16 = 0x10, /**< Interpret descriptors and links as for
+ * BE-8 16-bit memory. */
+ HAB_SAHARA_DSC_BE8_32 = 0x20 /**< Interpret descriptors and links as for
+ * BE-8 32-bit memory. */
+} hab_sahara_config_t;
+
+/** DCP configuration flags
+ * @ingroup dcp
+ *
+ * @warning The byte-swapping controls produce unpredictable results unless
+ * the input data block lengths are multiples of 4 bytes.
+ */
+typedef enum hab_dcp_config {
+ HAB_DCP_IN_SWAP8 = 0x01, /**< Set INPUT BYTE SWAP bit (reverse bytes
+ * within words on input to DCP) */
+ /* no SWAP16 for DCP - leave 0x02 value unassigned */
+ HAB_DCP_IN_SWAP32 = 0x04, /**< Set INPUT WORD SWAP bit (ignored for
+ * hashing) */
+ HAB_DCP_OUT_SWAP8 = 0x08, /**< Set OUPUT BYTE SWAP bit (reverse bytes
+ * within words on output from DCP) */
+ /* no SWAP16 for DCP - leave 0x10 value unassigned */
+ HAB_DCP_OUT_SWAP32 = 0x20 /**< Set OUTPUT WORD SWAP bit (ignored for
+ * hashing) */
+} hab_dcp_config_t;
+
+#ifdef HAB_FUTURE
+/** EC key specification types.
+ * @ingroup key_ecdsa
+ */
+typedef enum hab_ec_spec {
+ /** Named curve specification. The curve specification is a DER-encoded
+ * object identifier. Supported object identifiers are listed under @ref
+ * key_ecdsa_profile "ECDSA key profile".
+ */
+ HAB_EC_SPEC_NAMED_CURVE = 0x01
+} hab_ec_spec_t;
+#endif
+
+/** Variable configuration items
+ * @ingroup cmd_set
+ */
+typedef enum hab_var_cfg_itm {
+ HAB_VAR_CFG_ITM_MID = 0x01, /**< Manufacturing ID (MID) fuse locations */
+ HAB_VAR_CFG_ITM_ENG = 0x03 /**< Preferred engine for a given algorithm */
+} hab_var_cfg_itm_t;
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ STRUCTURES AND OTHER TYPEDEFS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+/** Header field components
+ * @ingroup hdr
+ */
+typedef struct hab_hdr {
+ uint8_t tag; /**< Tag field */
+ uint8_t len[2]; /**< Length field in bytes (big-endian) */
+ uint8_t par; /**< Parameters field */
+} hab_hdr_t;
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ GLOBAL VARIABLE DECLARATIONS
+=============================================================================*/
+
+/*===========================================================================
+ FUNCTION PROTOTYPES
+=============================================================================*/
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAB_TYPES_H */
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <miiphy.h>
#include <netdev.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include "hab.h"
DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
@@ -57,6 +58,54 @@ int board_early_init_f(void)
return 0;
}
+void display_event(uint8_t *event_data, size_t bytes)
+{
+ uint32_t i;
+ if ((event_data) && (bytes > 0))
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
+ {
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ printf(" 0x%02x", event_data[i]);
+ }
+ else if ((i % 8) == 0)
+ {
+ printf("\n 0x%02x", event_data[i]);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printf(" 0x%02x", event_data[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void get_hab_status(void)
+{
+ hab_rvt_t* my_hab_functions = (hab_rvt_t*) 0xFFFF8AF8;
+ uint32_t index = 0;
+ uint8_t event_data[128];
+ size_t bytes = sizeof(event_data);
+ uint8_t no_events = 1;
+ hab_status_t g_hab_status;
+ while ((g_hab_status = my_hab_functions->report_event(HAB_FAILURE, index, event_data, &bytes)) == HAB_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ no_events = 0;
+ printf("\n");
+ printf("--------- HAB Event %d -----------------\n", index + 1);
+ printf("event data:\n");
+ display_event(event_data, bytes);
+ printf("\n");
+ bytes = sizeof(event_data);
+ index++;
+ }
+ if(no_events)
+ {
+ printf("HAB: No HAB Events Found!\n");
+ }
+}
+
int dram_init(void)
{
return mxs_dram_init();
@@ -67,6 +116,9 @@ int board_init(void)
/* Adress of boot parameters */
gd->bd->bi_boot_params = PHYS_SDRAM_1 + 0x100;
+ // print HAB failures if present
+ get_hab_status();
+
return 0;
}
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+[Header]
+ Version = 4.0
+ Hash Algorithm = sha256
+ Engine = ANY
+ Engine Configuration = 0
+ Certificate Format = X509
+ Signature Format = CMS
+
+[Install SRK]
+ File = "srk_table.bin"
+ Source index = 0
+
+[Install CSFK]
+ File = "CSF1_1_sha256_1024_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem"
+
+[Authenticate CSF]
+
+[Install Key]
+ File = "IMG1_1_sha256_1024_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem"
+ Verification Index = 0
+ Target Index = 2
+
+[Authenticate Data]
+ Blocks = 0x1000 0x0 0x0 "spl/u-boot-spl.bin"
+ Engine = DCP
+ Verification Index = 2
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+[Header]
+ Version = 4.0
+ Hash Algorithm = sha256
+ Engine = ANY
+ Engine Configuration = 0
+ Certificate Format = X509
+ Signature Format = CMS
+
+[Install SRK]
+ File = "srk_table.bin"
+ Source index = 0
+
+[Install CSFK]
+ File = "CSF1_1_sha256_1024_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem"
+
+[Authenticate CSF]
+
+[Install Key]
+ File = "IMG1_1_sha256_1024_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem"
+ Verification Index = 0
+ Target Index = 2
+
+[Authenticate Data]
+ Blocks = 0x40002000 0x0 0x0 "u-boot.bin"
+ Engine = DCP
+ Verification Index = 2
--
2.5.0
Hi everyone I am having a problem with a Freescale imx28 to get HAB (High Assurance Boot) working with U-Boot. I understand that this is a question regarding one specific processor model but since I have seen several patches from Marek Vasut which deal with this specific processor I am taking a chance that I can get some help here. What I have done is that I have started with a mainline U-Boot (v2016.01) and I have added/modified a few hab-related items. * board/freescale/mx28evk/sign/u-boot-spl.csf * board/freescale/mx28evk/sign/u-boot.csf * board/freescale/mx28evk/hab.h * board/freescale/mx28evk/hab_types.h * board/freescale/mx28evk/mx28evk.c A complete patch of these files is included. I am also not certain that my csf files are correct but I get HAB errors even before I get to that point so it should be irrelevant at the moment. The following files have been copied from the cst tool to the u-boot root directory. * CSF1_1_sha256_1024_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem * CSF1_1_sha256_1024_65537_v3_usr_key.pem * IMG1_1_sha256_1024_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem * IMG1_1_sha256_1024_65537_v3_usr_key.pem * srk_table.bin * srk_fuses.bin * key_pass.txt The certificates are generated with the CST tool downloaded from Freescale. The above example uses a 1024 bit RSA key but I have also tested with 2048 bits without any luck. The srk_table is generated using the Freescale srktool $ srktool -h 4 -t srk_table.bin -e srk_fuses.bin -d sha256 -c crts/SRK1_sha256_1024_65537_v3_ca_crt.pem -f 1 Once all this was in placed I built and ran it using $ make mrproper $ make mx28evk_nand_config $ make u-boot-signed.sb $ sudo mxsldr u-boot-signed.sb I get the following result: --------- HAB Event 1 ----------------- event data: 0xdb 0x00 0x14 0x40 0x33 0x21 0xc0 0x00 0xbe 0x00 0x0c 0x00 0x03 0x17 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x50 (HAB_INV_CERTIFICATE 0x21) --------- HAB Event 2 ----------------- event data: 0xdb 0x00 0x14 0x40 0x33 0x0c 0xa0 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x80 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x20 (HAB_INV_ASSERTION 0x0C) --------- HAB Event 3 ----------------- event data: 0xdb 0x00 0x14 0x40 0x33 0x0c 0xa0 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x10 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x04 (HAB_INV_ASSERTION 0x0C) --------- HAB Event 4 ----------------- event data: 0xdb 0x00 0x14 0x40 0x33 0x21 0xc0 0x00 0xbe 0x00 0x0c 0x00 0x03 0x17 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x50 (HAB_INV_CERTIFICATE 0x21) --------- HAB Event 5 ----------------- event data: 0xdb 0x00 0x14 0x40 0x33 0x0c 0xa0 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x40 0x00 0x10 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x20 (HAB_INV_ASSERTION 0x0C) --------- HAB Event 6 ----------------- event data: 0xdb 0x00 0x14 0x40 0x33 0x0c 0xa0 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x40 0x00 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x04 (HAB_INV_ASSERTION 0x0C) We get two invalid certificates. These are from u-boot-spl and u-boot. The asserts are the execution of the unverified code. I'm at a loss what I might have done wrong and I am hoping Marek perhaps can help me with this issue. As I mentioned before I am not certain my csf files are correct. I suspect the Authenticate Data part might be wrong but if I get a signature error it would be another error code indicating a CSF verification error (HAB_INV_CSF 0x11). Another issue I also have is that I am not certain I have burned the fuses properly in the hardware but yet again that should cause a verification error and not an invalid certificate error. At least that is what I believe but now when typing this I am getting uncertain. If Marek or anyone can shed any light on this I am thankful for any assistance. Many thanks in advance, Per Smitt