| Message ID | 1566400103-18201-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace | expand |
| Context | Check | Description |
|---|---|---|
| snowpatch_ozlabs/apply_patch | warning | Failed to apply on branch next (0e4523c0b4f64eaf7abe59e143e6bdf8f972acff) |
| snowpatch_ozlabs/apply_patch | fail | Failed to apply to any branch |
On Wed, Aug 21, 2019 at 11:08:23AM -0400, Nayna Jain wrote: > The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by OPAL as secure > variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform > keyring and revocation keys into .blacklist keyring. This enables > verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which > are trusted by firmware. > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> > --- > security/integrity/Kconfig | 9 ++ > security/integrity/Makefile | 3 + > .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c > > diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig > index 0bae6adb63a9..2b4109c157e2 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig > +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig > @@ -72,6 +72,15 @@ config LOAD_IPL_KEYS > depends on S390 > def_bool y > > +config LOAD_PPC_KEYS > + bool "Enable loading of platform and revocation keys for POWER" > + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING > + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT > + def_bool y def_bool y only for things that the system will not boot if it is not enabled because you added a new feature. Otherwise just do not set the default. > + help > + Enable loading of db keys to the .platform keyring and dbx keys to > + the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms. > + > config INTEGRITY_AUDIT > bool "Enables integrity auditing support " > depends on AUDIT > diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile > index 525bf1d6e0db..9eeb6b053de3 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/Makefile > +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile > @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ > platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ > platform_certs/keyring_handler.o > integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o > +integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ > + platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \ > + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o > $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar > subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima > diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..f4d869171062 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c > @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation > + * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> > + * > + * load_powernv.c That's not the name of this file :( And the perfect example of why you NEVER have the name of the file in the file itself, as it's not needed and easy to get wrong :) thanks, greg k-h
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 0bae6adb63a9..2b4109c157e2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -72,6 +72,15 @@ config LOAD_IPL_KEYS depends on S390 def_bool y +config LOAD_PPC_KEYS + bool "Enable loading of platform and revocation keys for POWER" + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + def_bool y + help + Enable loading of db keys to the .platform keyring and dbx keys to + the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms. + config INTEGRITY_AUDIT bool "Enables integrity auditing support " depends on AUDIT diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 525bf1d6e0db..9eeb6b053de3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o +integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ + platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f4d869171062 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> + * + * load_powernv.c + * - loads keys and certs stored and controlled + * by the firmware. + */ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <asm/secboot.h> +#include <asm/secvar.h> +#include "keyring_handler.h" + +static struct secvar_operations *secvarops; + +/* + * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. + */ +static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, + unsigned long *size) +{ + int rc; + void *db; + + rc = secvarops->get_variable(key, keylen, NULL, size); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Couldn't get size: %d\n", rc); + return NULL; + } + + db = kmalloc(*size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!db) + return NULL; + + rc = secvarops->get_variable(key, keylen, db, size); + if (rc) { + kfree(db); + pr_err("Error reading db var: %d\n", rc); + return NULL; + } + + return db; +} + +/* + * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted + * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist + * keyring. + */ +static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) +{ + void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; + unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0; + int rc = 0; + + secvarops = get_secvar_ops(); + if (!secvarops) + return -ENOENT; + + /* Get db, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't + * an error if we can't get them. + */ + db = get_cert_list("db", 3, &dbsize); + if (!db) { + pr_err("Couldn't get db list from OPAL\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("OPAL:db", + db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", + rc); + kfree(db); + } + + dbx = get_cert_list("dbx", 3, &dbxsize); + if (!dbx) { + pr_info("Couldn't get dbx list from OPAL\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("OPAL:dbx", + dbx, dbxsize, + get_handler_for_dbx); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc); + kfree(dbx); + } + + return rc; +} +late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by OPAL as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation keys into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> --- security/integrity/Kconfig | 9 ++ security/integrity/Makefile | 3 + .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c