Message ID | 20130326001740.GB29705@order.stressinduktion.org |
---|---|
State | RFC, archived |
Delegated to: | David Miller |
Headers | show |
On Tue, 2013-03-26 at 01:17 +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote: > This is the newest version of this patch. I only stripped out the setting > of the SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE socket flag (I was unsure if otherwise > sock_wfree needed the socket lock but I am pretty confident that is > is not needed). Perhaps someone finds some time to have a look at this > patch. Also, if you come up with things my test case does not cover yet > please let me know and I will catch up with the tests. > > Patch is based on net-next. > > Thanks! > > [PATCH RFC] unix: account skb memory to receiving socket's sk_rmem_alloc on sending > > In case of unix datagram sockets, skb memory was only accounted in the > sending socket's sk_wmem_alloc. Hence, if one receiver would stop to > receive frames on its socket, the sending socket's send buffer space > could get exhausted and the socket would block sending datagrams to > other destionations, too. > > This patch places the refcounted peer's unix address for AF_UNIX > SOCK_DGRAM sockets into the skb's UNIXCB. So a reference from the skb > to the receiving struct sock can be set and so enables to do proper skb > destructor handling for rmem and wmem. Buffer memory is then accounted > to the receiving socket. If the socket rmem is exhausted the normal > blocking and timeout behaviour kicks in. > > Resource exhausion protection for unix dgram sockets is now based > only on sockets rmem checking. Unix dgram sockets do not rely on > sk_max_ack_backlog anymore. The controls for this are > /proc/sys/net/core/{r,w}mem_{default,max}. > > This patch also changes the reporting of unix dgram rqueue size, as it > now reports not only the size of the first fragment but the amount of > readable memory for the socket. > > Based on the patches from Yannick Koehler and Cong Wang. This opens the possibility of a sender to flood a receiver, instead of being blocked by its own sndbuf. Do we want such regression ? How many applications might rely on existing behavior ? Its not clear what is the appropriate way to handle this. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 08:53:38AM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote: > > This patch also changes the reporting of unix dgram rqueue size, as it > > now reports not only the size of the first fragment but the amount of > > readable memory for the socket. > > > > Based on the patches from Yannick Koehler and Cong Wang. > > This opens the possibility of a sender to flood a receiver, instead of > being blocked by its own sndbuf. Hm, the sender should get blocked by the receiver's rcvbuf. This opens the possiblity to flood many receivers at once. But somehow this is the purpose of this patch. Or am I missing something? > Do we want such regression ? How many applications might rely on > existing behavior ? I tried to not break existing applications. The only way I can think about how problems could arise would be by applications redoing the buffer calculations in userspace? I think it is a bug that a unix dgram socket can trick another dgram socket into a situation where it cannot accept frames anymore (in case of a ping-pong protocol). -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
I am still unsure if I should just drop this patch from my todo list. Eric, may I ask you for additional input again? I try to specifically answer your question now with code samples. If you do think it is not worth the effort I will finally drop the patch from my queue. Thanks a lot! On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 08:53:38AM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote: > This opens the possibility of a sender to flood a receiver, instead of > being blocked by its own sndbuf. In unix_dgram_sendmsg there are two points where the sending process could be prevented from delivery of the unix dgram msg: a) The first one is at sock_alloc_send_pskb and checks if the sk_sndbuf is smaller than the maximum buffer size. I didn't change anything here, so it only blocks if sndbuf filled up. b) The second one is where we check if the receiving sockets has less than sk_max_ack_backlog of outstanding datagrams. This was checked by unix_recvq_full. I changed the code that it does now check the status of the other socket's receive buffer instead of the number of outstanding datagrams in the receiver's queue. If the rcvbuf is full, it stops the delivery of the message to the receiver (unchanged blocking/o_nonblock behaviour): | @@ -1559,7 +1601,7 @@ restart: | goto out_unlock; | } | | - if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) { | + if (unix_rmem_full(other, skb)) { | if (!timeo) { | err = -EAGAIN; | goto out_unlock; | This is unix_recvq_full: | +static inline bool unix_rmem_full(struct sock const *sk, | + struct sk_buff const *skb) | +{ | + return sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk) + skb->truesize > sk->sk_rcvbuf; | +} | + These checks ensure that a sending socket can not flood a receiver with messages but instead has to back down. The maximum rcvbuf size is taken from /proc/sys/net/core/rmem_{default,max}, so we already have a safe default setting (we could actually add seperate net/unix/rmem_{default,max} knobs). This patch would help to prevent that a server socket in a request/response kind of protocol could be stopped to answer to furhter requests because its send buffer has filled up because other clients did not read their messages yet. Instead it could handle this situation for each client properly. I also implemented the necessary changes for ->poll(). I tried to come up with a list what could change for user-space applications but actually found this one only: a) the SIOCOUTQ ioctl will report a different value: it won't report the number of not yet received bytes by the other socket but the number of not yet delivered bytes. I think this is rather harmless As the memory overhead is accounted too and an application which does rely on this feature would also have problems as soon as the kernel internal data structures grow. I hope I did not forget an important aspect of this change. Thanks again, Hannes -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h index 0a996a3..3855fcc 100644 --- a/include/net/af_unix.h +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms { struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */ const struct cred *cred; struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */ + struct unix_address *peer_address; /* only used for dgram */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK u32 secid; /* Security ID */ #endif diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 51be64f..741c88c 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -184,6 +184,12 @@ static inline int unix_recvq_full(struct sock const *sk) return skb_queue_len(&sk->sk_receive_queue) > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog; } +static inline bool unix_rmem_full(struct sock const *sk, + struct sk_buff const *skb) +{ + return sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk) + skb->truesize > sk->sk_rcvbuf; +} + struct sock *unix_peer_get(struct sock *s) { struct sock *peer; @@ -316,7 +322,12 @@ found: static inline int unix_writable(struct sock *sk) { - return (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf; + return (sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf; +} + +static inline bool unix_other_writable(struct sock *sk) +{ + return (sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk) << 2) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf; } static void unix_write_space(struct sock *sk) @@ -1032,14 +1043,18 @@ out: static long unix_wait_for_peer(struct sock *other, long timeo) { struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(other); - int sched; + bool sched; DEFINE_WAIT(wait); prepare_to_wait_exclusive(&u->peer_wait, &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); sched = !sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) && - !(other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) && - unix_recvq_full(other); + !(other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN); + + if (other->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM || other->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) + sched = sched && unix_other_writable(other); + else + sched = sched && unix_recvq_full(other); unix_state_unlock(other); @@ -1336,7 +1351,7 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]); } -static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb) +static inline void __unix_skb_destruct(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct scm_cookie scm; memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm)); @@ -1348,6 +1363,19 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb) /* Alas, it calls VFS */ /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */ scm_destroy(&scm); + if (UNIXCB(skb).peer_address) + unix_release_addr(UNIXCB(skb).peer_address); +} + +static void unix_skb_destruct_r(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + __unix_skb_destruct(skb); + sock_rfree(skb); +} + +static void unix_skb_destruct_w(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + __unix_skb_destruct(skb); sock_wfree(skb); } @@ -1398,7 +1426,7 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen if (scm->fp && send_fds) err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb); - skb->destructor = unix_destruct_scm; + skb->destructor = unix_skb_destruct_w; return err; } @@ -1420,6 +1448,15 @@ static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock, } } +static void unix_skb_set_owner_r(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *oldsk, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + sock_wfree(skb); + skb->sk = newsk; + skb->destructor = unix_skb_destruct_r; + atomic_add(skb->truesize, &newsk->sk_rmem_alloc); +} + /* * Send AF_UNIX data. */ @@ -1484,6 +1521,11 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock, if (skb == NULL) goto out; + if (u->addr) { + UNIXCB(skb).peer_address = u->addr; + atomic_inc(&UNIXCB(skb).peer_address->refcnt); + } + err = unix_scm_to_skb(siocb->scm, skb, true); if (err < 0) goto out_free; @@ -1559,7 +1601,7 @@ restart: goto out_unlock; } - if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) { + if (unix_rmem_full(other, skb)) { if (!timeo) { err = -EAGAIN; goto out_unlock; @@ -1577,6 +1619,7 @@ restart: if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP)) __net_timestamp(skb); maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other); + unix_skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk, other); skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb); if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level) unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level; @@ -1749,14 +1792,12 @@ static int unix_seqpacket_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, return unix_dgram_recvmsg(iocb, sock, msg, size, flags); } -static void unix_copy_addr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk) +static void unix_copy_addr(struct msghdr *msg, struct unix_address *ua) { - struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk); - msg->msg_namelen = 0; - if (u->addr) { - msg->msg_namelen = u->addr->len; - memcpy(msg->msg_name, u->addr->name, u->addr->len); + if (ua) { + msg->msg_namelen = ua->len; + memcpy(msg->msg_name, ua->name, ua->len); } } @@ -1802,7 +1843,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND); if (msg->msg_name) - unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk); + unix_copy_addr(msg, UNIXCB(skb).peer_address); if (size > skb->len - skip) size = skb->len - skip; @@ -2002,7 +2043,7 @@ again: /* Copy address just once */ if (sunaddr) { - unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk); + unix_copy_addr(msg, unix_sk(skb->sk)->addr); sunaddr = NULL; } @@ -2223,11 +2264,9 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, writable = unix_writable(sk); other = unix_peer_get(sk); if (other) { - if (unix_peer(other) != sk) { - sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait); - if (unix_recvq_full(other)) - writable = 0; - } + sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait); + if (!unix_other_writable(other)) + writable = 0; sock_put(other); } diff --git a/net/unix/diag.c b/net/unix/diag.c index d591091..41a38ec 100644 --- a/net/unix/diag.c +++ b/net/unix/diag.c @@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ static int sk_diag_show_rqlen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *nlskb) rql.udiag_rqueue = sk->sk_receive_queue.qlen; rql.udiag_wqueue = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog; } else { - rql.udiag_rqueue = (u32) unix_inq_len(sk); + rql.udiag_rqueue = (u32) (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM ? + sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk) : + unix_inq_len(sk)); rql.udiag_wqueue = (u32) unix_outq_len(sk); }