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{ "id": 2231251, "url": "http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/api/1.2/covers/2231251/?format=api", "web_url": "http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ubuntu-kernel/cover/177754965576.503496.12142658280614619991@tuxedo-infinitybook.public/", "project": { "id": 15, "url": "http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/api/1.2/projects/15/?format=api", "name": "Ubuntu Kernel", "link_name": "ubuntu-kernel", "list_id": "kernel-team.lists.ubuntu.com", "list_email": "kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com", "web_url": null, "scm_url": null, "webscm_url": null, "list_archive_url": "", "list_archive_url_format": "", "commit_url_format": "" }, "msgid": "<177754965576.503496.12142658280614619991@tuxedo-infinitybook.public>", "list_archive_url": null, "date": "2026-04-30T12:30:12", "name": "[SRU,Q/N/J,0/3] CVE-2026-31431", "submitter": { "id": 89057, "url": "http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/api/1.2/people/89057/?format=api", "name": "Massimiliano Pellizzer", "email": "massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com" }, "mbox": "http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ubuntu-kernel/cover/177754965576.503496.12142658280614619991@tuxedo-infinitybook.public/mbox/", "series": [], "comments": "http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/api/covers/2231251/comments/", "headers": { "Return-Path": "<kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com>", "X-Original-To": "incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org", "Delivered-To": "patchwork-incoming@legolas.ozlabs.org", "Authentication-Results": [ "legolas.ozlabs.org;\n\tdkim=fail reason=\"signature verification failed\" (4096-bit key;\n unprotected) header.d=canonical.com header.i=@canonical.com\n header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20251003 header.b=q26UqKE/;\n\tdkim-atps=neutral", "legolas.ozlabs.org;\n spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=lists.ubuntu.com\n (client-ip=185.125.189.65; helo=lists.ubuntu.com;\n envelope-from=kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com;\n receiver=patchwork.ozlabs.org)" ], "Received": [ "from lists.ubuntu.com (lists.ubuntu.com [185.125.189.65])\n\t(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))\n\t(No client certificate requested)\n\tby legolas.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4g5tnw6mnsz1yHZ\n\tfor <incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org>; Thu, 30 Apr 2026 22:31:30 +1000 (AEST)", "from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.ubuntu.com)\n\tby lists.ubuntu.com with esmtp (Exim 4.86_2)\n\t(envelope-from <kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com>)\n\tid 1wIQY2-0004H8-1l; Thu, 30 Apr 2026 12:31:18 +0000", "from smtp-relay-internal-0.internal ([10.131.114.225]\n helo=smtp-relay-internal-0.canonical.com)\n by lists.ubuntu.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128)\n (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com>)\n id 1wIQY1-0004Gx-GO\n for kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com; Thu, 30 Apr 2026 12:31:17 +0000", "from mail-wr1-f72.google.com (mail-wr1-f72.google.com\n [209.85.221.72])\n (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)\n key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest\n SHA256)\n (No client certificate requested)\n by smtp-relay-internal-0.canonical.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5794B3F427\n for <kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com>; Thu, 30 Apr 2026 12:31:17 +0000 (UTC)", "by mail-wr1-f72.google.com with SMTP id\n ffacd0b85a97d-43d7757463eso1274576f8f.0\n for <kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com>; Thu, 30 Apr 2026 05:31:17 -0700 (PDT)", "from tuxedo-infinitybook.ts.net\n (net-93-71-66-38.cust.vodafonedsl.it. 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charset=\"utf-8\"", "Content-Transfer-Encoding": "base64", "Errors-To": "kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com", "Sender": "\"kernel-team\" <kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com>" }, "content": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-31431\n\n[ Impact ]\n\nCVE-2026-31431 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability\nin the Linux kernel's AF_ALG (Algorithm) socket subsystem.\n\nThe vulnerability allows an unprivileged local user to perform a deterministic,\ncontrolled 4-byte write into the kernel page cache of any file that the attacker\ncan read, including setuid-root binaries such as /usr/bin/su.\nBecause the page cache is what the kernel consults when executing a file,\nthe corrupted in-memory copy is immediately visible system-wide without the on-disk\nchecksum being altered.\n\n[ Fix ]\n\n* Questing, cherry pick the following patches from upstream:\n - a664bf3d603d crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place\n - 5aa58c3a572b crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests\n - e02494114ebf crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption\n - 1f48ad3b19a9 crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-place\n - 31d00156e50e crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl\n\n* Noble, cherry pick the following patches from linux-6.12.y:\n - 41c3aa511e6e crypto: scatterwalk - Backport memcpy_sglist()\n - 183137264401 crypto: algif_aead - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher\n - 8b88d99341f1 crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place\n - 46fdb39e8322 crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests\n - 7bc058a9b82b crypto: authenc - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher\n - 89fe118b6470 crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption\n - 129f12934401 crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-place\n - c8369a6d62f5 crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl\n\n* Jammy, cherry pick the following patches from linux-5.15.y:\n - 36435a56cd6b crypto: scatterwalk - Backport memcpy_sglist()\n - 17774d99bb43 crypto: algif_aead - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher\n - 19d43105a97b crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place\n - a920cabdb0b7 crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests\n - e416c41a96c8 crypto: authenc - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher\n - d589abd8b019 crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption\n - 723bb1b4a6dd crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-place\n - 2b781d1d4f93 crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl\n - fd427dd84f22 crypto: algif_aead - Fix minimum RX size check for decryption\n\n[ Test Plan ]\n\nCompiled and boot tested.\nTested using the publicly available exploit.\nTested using LTP crypto testsuite for regressions.\n\n[ Where Problems Could Occur ]\n\nThe fix reverts the 2017 in-place optimization entirely, restoring out-of-place\noperation in algif_aead. A bug in the new out-of-place TX SGL allocation\nor AAD copy path could produce corrupt ciphertext, failed tag verification,\nor memory mismanagement under edge-case input lengths, affecting every consumer\nof the AF_ALG AEAD interface kernel-wide." }