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See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. X-Headers-End: 1c9bL1-0001iP-J2 Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v5 1/3] tpm: move event log init functions to tpm_eventlog_init.c X-BeenThere: tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Tpm Device Driver maintainance List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: tpmdd-devel-bounces@lists.sourceforge.net The device driver code for the event log has the init functions and TPM 1.2 parsing logic both defined in same file(tpm_eventlog.c). Since the initialization functions are common with the TPM 2.0 event log support, this patch splits tpm_eventlog.c to have only TPM 1.2 event log parsing logic and moves the init functions into tpm_eventlog_init.c. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c | 165 +----------------------------- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h | 3 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog_init.c | 189 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog_init.c diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index a05b1eb..1dc2671 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \ - tpm_eventlog.o + tpm_eventlog.o tpm_eventlog_init.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c index 2a15b86..86f7fe3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ * * Maintained by: * - * Access to the event log created by a system's firmware / BIOS + * Access to the TPM 1.2 event log created by a system's + * firmware / BIOS * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License @@ -260,17 +261,6 @@ static int tpm_binary_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } -static int tpm_bios_measurements_release(struct inode *inode, - struct file *file) -{ - struct seq_file *seq = (struct seq_file *)file->private_data; - struct tpm_chip *chip = (struct tpm_chip *)seq->private; - - put_device(&chip->dev); - - return seq_release(inode, file); -} - static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { int len = 0; @@ -304,163 +294,16 @@ static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } -static const struct seq_operations tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops = { +const struct seq_operations tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops = { .start = tpm_bios_measurements_start, .next = tpm_bios_measurements_next, .stop = tpm_bios_measurements_stop, .show = tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show, }; -static const struct seq_operations tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops = { +const struct seq_operations tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops = { .start = tpm_bios_measurements_start, .next = tpm_bios_measurements_next, .stop = tpm_bios_measurements_stop, .show = tpm_binary_bios_measurements_show, }; - -static int tpm_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, - struct file *file) -{ - int err; - struct seq_file *seq; - struct tpm_chip_seqops *chip_seqops; - const struct seq_operations *seqops; - struct tpm_chip *chip; - - inode_lock(inode); - if (!inode->i_private) { - inode_unlock(inode); - return -ENODEV; - } - chip_seqops = (struct tpm_chip_seqops *)inode->i_private; - seqops = chip_seqops->seqops; - chip = chip_seqops->chip; - get_device(&chip->dev); - inode_unlock(inode); - - /* now register seq file */ - err = seq_open(file, seqops); - if (!err) { - seq = file->private_data; - seq->private = chip; - } - - return err; -} - -static const struct file_operations tpm_bios_measurements_ops = { - .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .open = tpm_bios_measurements_open, - .read = seq_read, - .llseek = seq_lseek, - .release = tpm_bios_measurements_release, -}; - -static int is_bad(void *p) -{ - if (!p) - return 1; - if (IS_ERR(p) && (PTR_ERR(p) != -ENODEV)) - return 1; - return 0; -} - -static int tpm_read_log(struct tpm_chip *chip) -{ - int rc; - - if (chip->log.bios_event_log != NULL) { - dev_dbg(&chip->dev, - "%s: ERROR - event log already initialized\n", - __func__); - return -EFAULT; - } - - rc = tpm_read_log_acpi(chip); - if (rc != -ENODEV) - return rc; - - return tpm_read_log_of(chip); -} - -/* - * tpm_bios_log_setup() - Read the event log from the firmware - * @chip: TPM chip to use. - * - * If an event log is found then the securityfs files are setup to - * export it to userspace, otherwise nothing is done. - * - * Returns -ENODEV if the firmware has no event log. - */ -int tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip) -{ - const char *name = dev_name(&chip->dev); - unsigned int cnt; - int rc = 0; - - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) - return 0; - - rc = tpm_read_log(chip); - if (rc) - return rc; - - cnt = 0; - chip->bios_dir[cnt] = securityfs_create_dir(name, NULL); - if (is_bad(chip->bios_dir[cnt])) - goto err; - cnt++; - - chip->bin_log_seqops.chip = chip; - chip->bin_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops; - - chip->bios_dir[cnt] = - securityfs_create_file("binary_bios_measurements", - 0440, chip->bios_dir[0], - (void *)&chip->bin_log_seqops, - &tpm_bios_measurements_ops); - if (is_bad(chip->bios_dir[cnt])) - goto err; - cnt++; - - chip->ascii_log_seqops.chip = chip; - chip->ascii_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops; - - chip->bios_dir[cnt] = - securityfs_create_file("ascii_bios_measurements", - 0440, chip->bios_dir[0], - (void *)&chip->ascii_log_seqops, - &tpm_bios_measurements_ops); - if (is_bad(chip->bios_dir[cnt])) - goto err; - cnt++; - - return 0; - -err: - chip->bios_dir[cnt] = NULL; - tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip); - return -EIO; -} - -void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip) -{ - int i; - struct inode *inode; - - /* securityfs_remove currently doesn't take care of handling sync - * between removal and opening of pseudo files. To handle this, a - * workaround is added by making i_private = NULL here during removal - * and to check it during open(), both within inode_lock()/unlock(). - * This design ensures that open() either safely gets kref or fails. - */ - for (i = (TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES - 1); i >= 0; i--) { - if (chip->bios_dir[i]) { - inode = d_inode(chip->bios_dir[i]); - inode_lock(inode); - inode->i_private = NULL; - inode_unlock(inode); - securityfs_remove(chip->bios_dir[i]); - } - } -} diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h index 1660d74..155467d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h @@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ enum tcpa_pc_event_ids { HOST_TABLE_OF_DEVICES, }; +extern const struct seq_operations tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops; +extern const struct seq_operations tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops; + #if defined(CONFIG_ACPI) int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip); #else diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog_init.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog_init.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae42f46 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog_init.c @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005, 2012 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Kent Yoder + * Seiji Munetoh + * Stefan Berger + * Reiner Sailer + * Kylene Hall + * Nayna Jain + * + * Maintained by: + * + * Defines common initialization functions to access + * firmware event log for TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "tpm.h" +#include "tpm_eventlog.h" + +static int tpm_bios_measurements_release(struct inode *inode, + struct file *file) +{ + struct seq_file *seq = (struct seq_file *)file->private_data; + struct tpm_chip *chip = (struct tpm_chip *)seq->private; + + put_device(&chip->dev); + + return seq_release(inode, file); +} + +static int tpm_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, + struct file *file) +{ + int err; + struct seq_file *seq; + struct tpm_chip_seqops *chip_seqops; + const struct seq_operations *seqops; + struct tpm_chip *chip; + + inode_lock(inode); + if (!inode->i_private) { + inode_unlock(inode); + return -ENODEV; + } + chip_seqops = (struct tpm_chip_seqops *)inode->i_private; + seqops = chip_seqops->seqops; + chip = chip_seqops->chip; + get_device(&chip->dev); + inode_unlock(inode); + + /* now register seq file */ + err = seq_open(file, seqops); + if (!err) { + seq = file->private_data; + seq->private = chip; + } + + return err; +} + +static const struct file_operations tpm_bios_measurements_ops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = tpm_bios_measurements_open, + .read = seq_read, + .llseek = seq_lseek, + .release = tpm_bios_measurements_release, +}; + +static int is_bad(void *p) +{ + if (!p) + return 1; + if (IS_ERR(p) && (PTR_ERR(p) != -ENODEV)) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +static int tpm_read_log(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + int rc; + + if (chip->log.bios_event_log != NULL) { + dev_dbg(&chip->dev, + "%s: ERROR - event log already initialized\n", + __func__); + return -EFAULT; + } + + rc = tpm_read_log_acpi(chip); + if (rc != -ENODEV) + return rc; + + return tpm_read_log_of(chip); +} + +/* + * tpm_bios_log_setup() - Read the event log from the firmware + * @chip: TPM chip to use. + * + * If an event log is found then the securityfs files are setup to + * export it to userspace, otherwise nothing is done. + * + * Returns -ENODEV if the firmware has no event log. + */ +int tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + const char *name = dev_name(&chip->dev); + unsigned int cnt; + int rc = 0; + + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + return 0; + + rc = tpm_read_log(chip); + if (rc) + return rc; + + cnt = 0; + chip->bios_dir[cnt] = securityfs_create_dir(name, NULL); + if (is_bad(chip->bios_dir[cnt])) + goto err; + cnt++; + + chip->bin_log_seqops.chip = chip; + chip->bin_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops; + + chip->bios_dir[cnt] = + securityfs_create_file("binary_bios_measurements", + 0440, chip->bios_dir[0], + (void *)&chip->bin_log_seqops, + &tpm_bios_measurements_ops); + if (is_bad(chip->bios_dir[cnt])) + goto err; + cnt++; + + chip->ascii_log_seqops.chip = chip; + chip->ascii_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops; + + chip->bios_dir[cnt] = + securityfs_create_file("ascii_bios_measurements", + 0440, chip->bios_dir[0], + (void *)&chip->ascii_log_seqops, + &tpm_bios_measurements_ops); + if (is_bad(chip->bios_dir[cnt])) + goto err; + cnt++; + + return 0; + +err: + chip->bios_dir[cnt] = NULL; + tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip); + return -EIO; +} + +void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + int i; + struct inode *inode; + + /* securityfs_remove currently doesn't take care of handling sync + * between removal and opening of pseudo files. To handle this, a + * workaround is added by making i_private = NULL here during removal + * and to check it during open(), both within inode_lock()/unlock(). + * This design ensures that open() either safely gets kref or fails. + */ + for (i = (TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES - 1); i >= 0; i--) { + if (chip->bios_dir[i]) { + inode = d_inode(chip->bios_dir[i]); + inode_lock(inode); + inode->i_private = NULL; + inode_unlock(inode); + securityfs_remove(chip->bios_dir[i]); + } + } +}