diff --git a/doc/secvar/secboot_tpm.rst b/doc/secvar/secboot_tpm.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8da0c2f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/secvar/secboot_tpm.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+.. _secvar/secboot_tpm:
+
+secboot_tpm secvar storage driver for P9 platforms
+==================================================
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+This storage driver utilizes the SECBOOT PNOR partition and TPM NV space to
+persist secure variables across reboots in a tamper-resistant manner. While
+writes to PNOR cannot be completely prevented, writes CAN be prevented to TPM
+NV. On the other hand, there is limited available space in TPM NV.
+
+Therefore, this driver uses both in conjunction: large variable data is written
+to SECBOOT, and a hash of the variable data is stored in TPM NV. When the
+variables are loaded from SECBOOT, this hash is recalculated and compared
+against the value stored in the TPM. If they do not match, then the variables
+must have been altered and are not loaded.
+
+See the following sections for more information on the internals of the driver.
+
+
+Storage Layouts
+---------------
+
+At a high-level, there are a few major logical components:
+
+ - (PNOR) Variable storage (split in half, active/staging)
+ - (PNOR) Update storage
+ - (TPM)  Protected variable storage
+ - (TPM)  Bank hashes & active bit
+
+Variable storage consists of two smaller banks, variable bank 0 and variable
+bank 1. Either of the banks may be designated "active" by setting the active
+bank bit to either 0 or 1, indicating that the corresponding bank is now
+"active". The other bank is then considered "staging". See the "Persisting
+Variable Bank Updates" for more on the active/staging bank logic.
+
+Protected variable storage is stored in ``VARS`` TPM NV index. Unlike the other
+variable storage, there is only one bank due to limited storage space. See the
+TPM NV Indices section for more.
+
+
+Persisting the Variable Bank
+----------------------------
+
+When writing a new variable bank to storage, this is (roughly) the procedure the
+driver will follow:
+
+1. write variables to the staging bank
+2. calculate hash of the staging bank
+3. store the staging bank hash in the TPM NV
+4. flip the active bank bit
+
+This procedure ensures that the switch-over from the old variables to the
+new variables is as atomic as possible. This should prevent any possible
+issues caused by an interruption during the writing process, such as power loss.
+
+The bank hashes are a SHA256 hash calculated over the whole region of
+storage space allocated to the bank, including unused storage. For consistency,
+unused space is always written as zeroes. Like the active/staging variable
+banks, there are also two corresponding active/staging bank hashes stored in
+the TPM.
+
+
+TPM NV Indices
+--------------
+
+The driver utilizes two TPM NV indices:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+  # size). datadefine SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX	0x01c10190
+  #define SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX	0x01c10191
+
+The ``VARS`` index stores variables flagged with ``SECVAR_FLAG_PROTECTED``.
+These variables are critical to the state of OS secure boot, and therefore
+cannot be safely stored in the SECBOOT partition. This index is defined to be
+1024 bytes in size, which is enough for the current implementation on P9. It
+is kept small by default to preserve the very limited NV index space.
+
+The ``CONTROL`` index stores the bank hashes, and the bit to determine which
+bank is active. See the Active/Staging Bank Swapping section for more.
+
+Both indices are defined on first boot with the same set of attributes. If the
+indices are already defined but not in the expected state, (different
+attributes, size, etc), then the driver will halt the boot. Asserting physical
+presence will redefine the indices in the correct state.
+
+
+Locking
+-------
+
+PNOR cannot be locked, however the TPM can be. The TPM NV indices are double
+protected via two locking mechanisms:
+
+ - The driver's ``.lock()`` hook sends the ``TSS_NV_WriteLock`` TPM command.
+This sets the ``WRITELOCKED`` attribute, which is cleared on the next
+TPM reset.
+
+ - The TPM NV indices are defined under the platform hierarchy. Skiboot will add
+a global lock to all the NV indices under this hierarchy prior to loading a
+kernel. This is also reset on the next TPM reset.
+
+NOTE: The TPM is only reset during a cold reboot. Fast reboots or kexecs will
+NOT unlock the TPM.
+
+
+Resetting Storage / Physical Presence
+-------------------------------------
+
+In the case that secure boot/secvar has been rendered unusable, (for example:
+corrupted data, lost/compromised private key, improperly defined NV indices, etc)
+this storage driver responds to physical presence assertion as a last-resort
+method to recover the system.
+
+Asserting physical presence undefines, and immediately redefines the TPM NV
+indices. Defining the NV indices then causes a cascading set of reformats for
+the remaining components of storage, similar to a first-boot scenario.
+
+This driver considers physical presence to be asserted if any of the following
+device tree nodes are present in ``ibm,secureboot``:
+ - ``clear-os-keys``
+ - ``clear-all-keys``
+ - ``clear-mfg-keys``
+
+
+Storage Formats/Layouts
+=======================
+
+SECBOOT (PNOR)
+--------------
+
+Partition Format:
+ - 8b secboot header
+   - 4b: u32. magic number, always 0x5053424b
+   - 1b: u8. version, always 1
+   - 3b: unused padding
+ - 32k: secvars. variable bank 0
+ - 32k: secvars. variable bank 1
+ - 32k: secvars. update bank
+
+Variable Format (secvar):
+ - 8b: u64. key length
+ - 8b: u64. data size
+ - 1k: string. key
+ - (data size). data
+
+TPM VARS (NV)
+-------------
+
+NV Index Format:
+ - 8b secboot header
+   - 4b: u32. magic number, always 0x5053424b
+   - 1b: u8. version, always 1
+   - 3b: unused padding
+ - 1016b: packed secvars. protected variable storage
+
+Variable Format (packed secvar):
+ - 8b: u64. key length
+ - 8b: u64. data size
+ - (key length): string. key
+ - (data size). data
+
+TPM CONTROL (NV)
+----------------
+
+ - 8b secboot header
+   - 4b: u32. magic number, always 0x5053424b
+   - 1b: u8. version, always 1
+   - 3b: unused padding
+ - 1b: u8. active bit, 0 or 1
+ - 32b: sha256 hash of variable bank 0
+ - 32b: sha256 hash of variable bank 1
+
diff --git a/include/secvar.h b/include/secvar.h
index db103953..21210277 100644
--- a/include/secvar.h
+++ b/include/secvar.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct secvar_backend_driver {
 	const char *compatible;
 };
 
+extern struct secvar_storage_driver secboot_tpm_driver;
 
 int secvar_main(struct secvar_storage_driver, struct secvar_backend_driver);
 
diff --git a/libstb/secvar/secvar.h b/libstb/secvar/secvar.h
index fe660217..33cd0a08 100644
--- a/libstb/secvar/secvar.h
+++ b/libstb/secvar/secvar.h
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ enum {
 };
 
 
-#define SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE		0x1 // Instructs storage driver to ignore variable on writes
-#define SECVAR_FLAG_SECURE_STORAGE	0x2 // Hint for storage driver to select storage location
+#define SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE	0x1 /* Instructs storage driver to ignore variable on writes */
+#define SECVAR_FLAG_PROTECTED	0x2 /* Instructs storage driver to store in lockable flash */
 
 struct secvar {
 	struct list_node link;
diff --git a/libstb/secvar/storage/Makefile.inc b/libstb/secvar/storage/Makefile.inc
index 3fd9543a..35fba723 100644
--- a/libstb/secvar/storage/Makefile.inc
+++ b/libstb/secvar/storage/Makefile.inc
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
 # -*-Makefile-*-
 
-SECVAR_STORAGE_DIR = libstb/secvar/storage
+SECVAR_STORAGE_DIR = $(SRC)/libstb/secvar/storage
 
 SUBDIRS += $(SECVAR_STORAGE_DIR)
 
-SECVAR_STORAGE_SRCS =
+SECVAR_STORAGE_SRCS = secboot_tpm.c tpmnv_ops.c
+#SECVAR_STORAGE_SRCS = secboot_tpm.c fakenv_ops.c
 SECVAR_STORAGE_OBJS = $(SECVAR_STORAGE_SRCS:%.c=%.o)
 SECVAR_STORAGE = $(SECVAR_STORAGE_DIR)/built-in.a
 
diff --git a/libstb/secvar/storage/secboot_tpm.c b/libstb/secvar/storage/secboot_tpm.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b6a294b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libstb/secvar/storage/secboot_tpm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,737 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Copyright 2020 IBM Corp. */
+#ifndef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SECBOOT_TPM: " fmt
+#endif
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <skiboot.h>
+#include <opal.h>
+#include <mbedtls/sha256.h>
+#include "../secvar.h"
+#include "../secvar_devtree.h"
+#include "secboot_tpm.h"
+#include <tssskiboot.h>
+#include <ibmtss/TPM_Types.h>
+
+#define CYCLE_BIT(b) (b^0x1)
+
+#define SECBOOT_TPM_MAX_VAR_SIZE	8192
+
+struct secboot *secboot_image = NULL;
+struct tpmnv_vars *tpmnv_vars_image = NULL;
+struct tpmnv_control *tpmnv_control_image = NULL;
+
+const size_t tpmnv_vars_size = 1024;
+
+/* Expected TPM NV index name field from NV_ReadPublic given our known
+ * set of attributes (see tss_nv_define_space).
+ * See Part 1 Section 16, and Part 2 Section 13.5 of the TPM Specification
+ * for how this is calculated
+ *
+ * These hashes are calculated and checked BEFORE TPM2_NV_WriteLock is called,
+ * which alters the hash slightly as it sets TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED
+ */
+const uint8_t tpmnv_vars_name[] = {
+	0x00, 0x0b, 0x94, 0x64, 0x36, 0x25, 0xfc, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0x0e, 0x28, 0xe7,
+	0xac, 0xaf, 0xc6, 0x08, 0x8e, 0xda, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x43, 0xd2, 0x77, 0xe7, 0x2d,
+	0x83, 0x39, 0x0f, 0xa6, 0xdf, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x37,
+};
+
+const uint8_t tpmnv_control_name[] = {
+	0x00, 0x0b, 0xad, 0x47, 0x6b, 0xa5, 0xdf, 0xb1, 0xe2, 0x18, 0x50, 0xf6, 0x05,
+	0x67, 0xe8, 0x8b, 0xa9, 0x0f, 0x86, 0x1f, 0x06, 0xab, 0x43, 0x96, 0x7f, 0x6e,
+	0x85, 0x33, 0x5b, 0xa6, 0xf0, 0x63, 0x73, 0xd0,
+};
+
+const uint8_t tpmnv_vars_prov_name[] = {
+	0x00, 0x0b, 0x58, 0x36, 0x2c, 0xbf, 0xec, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0xbf, 0xa9, 0x41, 0x94,
+	0xe9, 0x95, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xd7, 0x8b, 0x52, 0xac, 0x61, 0x6f, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x93,
+	0xbb, 0x5a, 0x79, 0x9f, 0xcc, 0x60, 0x5e, 0x8d,
+};
+
+const uint8_t tpmnv_control_prov_name[] = {
+	0x00, 0x0b, 0x7b, 0xd6, 0x02, 0xac, 0xf5, 0x34, 0x54, 0x5c, 0x3e, 0xda, 0xe5,
+	0xb2, 0xe4, 0x93, 0x4f, 0x36, 0xfb, 0x7f, 0xea, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0x3c, 0xfe, 0xed,
+	0x6a, 0x12, 0xfb, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x92, 0x0e, 0xd3,
+};
+
+/* Calculate a SHA256 hash over the supplied buffer */
+static int calc_bank_hash(char *target_hash, const char *source_buf, uint64_t size)
+{
+	mbedtls_sha256_context ctx;
+	int rc;
+
+	mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx);
+
+	rc = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, source_buf, size);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&ctx, target_hash);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+out:
+	mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Reformat the TPMNV space */
+static int tpmnv_format(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(tpmnv_vars_image, 0x00, tpmnv_vars_size);
+	memset(tpmnv_control_image, 0x00, sizeof(struct tpmnv_control));
+
+	tpmnv_vars_image->header.magic_number = SECBOOT_MAGIC_NUMBER;
+	tpmnv_vars_image->header.version = SECBOOT_VERSION;
+	tpmnv_control_image->header.magic_number = SECBOOT_MAGIC_NUMBER;
+	tpmnv_control_image->header.version = SECBOOT_VERSION;
+
+	/* Counts as first write to the TPM NV, which sets the
+	 *  TPMA_NVA_WRITTEN attribute */
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.write(SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX,
+			     tpmnv_vars_image,
+			     tpmnv_vars_size, 0);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Could not write new formatted data to VARS index, rc=%d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.write(SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX,
+			     tpmnv_control_image,
+			     sizeof(struct tpmnv_control), 0);
+	if (rc)
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Could not write new formatted data to CONTROL index, rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Reformat the secboot PNOR space */
+static int secboot_format(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(secboot_image, 0x00, sizeof(struct secboot));
+
+	secboot_image->header.magic_number = SECBOOT_MAGIC_NUMBER;
+	secboot_image->header.version = SECBOOT_VERSION;
+
+	/* Write the hash of the empty bank to the tpm so future loads work */
+	rc = calc_bank_hash(tpmnv_control_image->bank_hash[0],
+			    secboot_image->bank[0],
+			    SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Bank hash failed to calculate somehow\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.write(SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX,
+			     tpmnv_control_image->bank_hash[0],
+			     SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			     offsetof(struct tpmnv_control,
+			     bank_hash[0]));
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Could not write fresh formatted bank hashes to CONTROL index, rc=%d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = flash_secboot_write(0, secboot_image, sizeof(struct secboot));
+	if (rc)
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Could not write formatted data to PNOR, rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Serialize one variable to a target memory location.
+ * Returns the advanced target pointer,
+ *   NULL if advanced pointer would exceed the supplied bound
+ */
+static char *secboot_serialize_secvar(char *target, const struct secvar *var, const char *end)
+{
+	if ((target + sizeof(uint64_t) + sizeof(uint64_t)
+		+ var->key_len + var->data_size) > end)
+		return NULL;
+
+	*((uint64_t*) target) = cpu_to_be64(var->key_len);
+	target += sizeof(var->key_len);
+	*((uint64_t*) target) = cpu_to_be64(var->data_size);
+	target += sizeof(var->data_size);
+	memcpy(target, var->key, var->key_len);
+	target += var->key_len;
+	memcpy(target, var->data, var->data_size);
+	target += var->data_size;
+
+	return target;
+}
+
+
+/* Flattens a linked-list bank into a contiguous buffer for writing */
+static int secboot_serialize_bank(const struct list_head *bank, char *target,
+				  size_t target_size, int flags)
+{
+	struct secvar *var;
+	char *end = target + target_size;
+
+	assert(bank);
+	assert(target);
+
+	memset(target, 0x00, target_size);
+
+	list_for_each(bank, var, link) {
+		if (var->flags != flags)
+			continue;
+
+		target = secboot_serialize_secvar(target, var, end);
+		if (!target) {
+			prlog(PR_ERR, "Ran out of %s space, giving up!",
+				(flags & SECVAR_FLAG_PROTECTED) ? "TPMNV" : "PNOR");
+			return OPAL_EMPTY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* Helper for the variable-bank specific writing logic */
+static int secboot_tpm_write_variable_bank(const struct list_head *bank)
+{
+	int rc;
+	uint64_t bit;
+
+	bit = CYCLE_BIT(tpmnv_control_image->active_bit);
+	/* Serialize TPMNV variables */
+	rc = secboot_serialize_bank(bank, tpmnv_vars_image->vars, tpmnv_vars_size - sizeof(struct tpmnv_vars), SECVAR_FLAG_PROTECTED);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+
+	/* Write TPMNV variables to actual NV */
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.write(SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX, tpmnv_vars_image, tpmnv_vars_size, 0);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Serialize the PNOR variables, but don't write to flash until after the bank hash */
+	rc = secboot_serialize_bank(bank, secboot_image->bank[bit], SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_SIZE, 0);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Calculate the bank hash, and write to TPM NV */
+	rc = calc_bank_hash(tpmnv_control_image->bank_hash[bit], secboot_image->bank[bit], SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_SIZE);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.write(SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX, tpmnv_control_image->bank_hash[bit],
+				SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, offsetof(struct tpmnv_control, bank_hash[bit]));
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Write new variable bank to pnor */
+	rc = flash_secboot_write(0, secboot_image, sizeof(struct secboot));
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Flip the bit, and write to TPM NV */
+	tpmnv_control_image->active_bit = bit;
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.write(SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX,
+			     &tpmnv_control_image->active_bit,
+			     sizeof(tpmnv_control_image->active_bit),
+			     offsetof(struct tpmnv_control, active_bit));
+out:
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int secboot_tpm_write_bank(struct list_head *bank, int section)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	switch (section) {
+	case SECVAR_VARIABLE_BANK:
+		rc = secboot_tpm_write_variable_bank(bank);
+		break;
+	case SECVAR_UPDATE_BANK:
+		memset(secboot_image->update, 0, SECBOOT_UPDATE_BANK_SIZE);
+		rc = secboot_serialize_bank(bank, secboot_image->update,
+					    SECBOOT_UPDATE_BANK_SIZE, 0);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+
+		rc = flash_secboot_write(0, secboot_image,
+					    sizeof(struct secboot));
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = OPAL_HARDWARE;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Deserialize a single secvar from a buffer.
+ * Returns an advanced pointer, and an allocated secvar in *var.
+ * Returns NULL if out of bounds reached, or out of memory.
+ */
+static int secboot_deserialize_secvar(struct secvar **var, char **src, const char *end)
+{
+	uint64_t key_len;
+	uint64_t data_size;
+	struct secvar *ret;
+
+	assert(var);
+
+	/* Load in the two header values */
+	key_len = be64_to_cpu(*((uint64_t *) *src));
+	*src += sizeof(uint64_t);
+	data_size = be64_to_cpu(*((uint64_t *) *src));
+	*src += sizeof(uint64_t);
+
+	/* Check if we've reached the last var to deserialize */
+	if ((key_len == 0) && (data_size == 0)) {
+		return OPAL_EMPTY;
+	}
+
+	if (key_len > SECVAR_MAX_KEY_LEN) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Deserialization failed: key length exceeded maximum value"
+			"%llu > %u", key_len, SECVAR_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+		return OPAL_RESOURCE;
+	}
+	if (data_size > SECBOOT_TPM_MAX_VAR_SIZE) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Deserialization failed: data size exceeded maximum value"
+			"%llu > %u", key_len, SECBOOT_TPM_MAX_VAR_SIZE);
+		return OPAL_RESOURCE;
+	}
+
+	/* Make sure these fields aren't oversized... */
+	if ((*src + key_len + data_size) > end) {
+		*var = NULL;
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "key_len or data_size exceeded the expected bounds");
+		return OPAL_RESOURCE;
+	}
+
+	ret = alloc_secvar(key_len, data_size);
+	if (!ret) {
+		*var = NULL;
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Out of memory, could not allocate new secvar");
+		return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+	}
+
+	/* Load in variable-sized data */
+	memcpy(ret->key, *src, ret->key_len);
+	*src += ret->key_len;
+	memcpy(ret->data, *src, ret->data_size);
+	*src += ret->data_size;
+
+	*var = ret;
+
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+/* Load variables from a flattened buffer into a bank list */
+static int secboot_tpm_deserialize_from_buffer(struct list_head *bank, char *src,
+					       uint64_t size, uint64_t flags)
+{
+	struct secvar *var;
+	char *cur;
+	char *end;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	cur = src;
+	end = src + size;
+
+	while (cur < end) {
+		/* Ensure there is enough space to even check for another var header */
+		if ((end - cur) < (sizeof(uint64_t) * 2))
+			break;
+
+		rc = secboot_deserialize_secvar(&var, &cur, end);
+		switch (rc) {
+			case OPAL_RESOURCE:
+			case OPAL_NO_MEM:
+				goto fail;
+			case OPAL_EMPTY:
+				goto done;
+			default: assert(1);
+		}
+
+		var->flags |= flags;
+
+		list_add_tail(bank, &var->link);
+	}
+done:
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+fail:
+	clear_bank_list(bank);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int secboot_tpm_load_variable_bank(struct list_head *bank)
+{
+	char bank_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	uint64_t bit = tpmnv_control_image->active_bit;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Check the hash of the bank we loaded from PNOR
+	 *  versus the expected hash in TPM NV */
+	rc = calc_bank_hash(bank_hash,
+			    secboot_image->bank[bit],
+			    SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_SIZE);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (memcmp(bank_hash,
+		   tpmnv_control_image->bank_hash[bit],
+		   SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+		/* Tampered pnor space detected, abandon ship */
+		return OPAL_PERMISSION;
+
+	rc = secboot_tpm_deserialize_from_buffer(bank, tpmnv_vars_image->vars, tpmnv_vars_size, SECVAR_FLAG_PROTECTED);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return secboot_tpm_deserialize_from_buffer(bank, secboot_image->bank[bit], SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_SIZE, 0);
+}
+
+
+static int secboot_tpm_load_bank(struct list_head *bank, int section)
+{
+	switch (section) {
+	case SECVAR_VARIABLE_BANK:
+		return secboot_tpm_load_variable_bank(bank);
+	case SECVAR_UPDATE_BANK:
+		return secboot_tpm_deserialize_from_buffer(bank, secboot_image->update, SECBOOT_UPDATE_BANK_SIZE, 0);
+	}
+
+	return OPAL_HARDWARE;
+}
+
+static int secboot_tpm_get_tpmnv_names(char *nv_vars_name, char *nv_control_name)
+{
+	TPMS_NV_PUBLIC nv_public; /* Throwaway, we only want the name field */
+	TPM2B_NAME vars_tmp;
+	TPM2B_NAME control_tmp;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.readpublic(SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX,
+				  &nv_public,
+				  &vars_tmp);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Failed to readpublic from the VARS index, rc=%d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.readpublic(SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX,
+				  &nv_public,
+				  &control_tmp);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Failed to readpublic from the CONTROL index, rc=%d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(nv_vars_name, vars_tmp.t.name, MIN(sizeof(tpmnv_vars_name), vars_tmp.t.size));
+	memcpy(nv_control_name, control_tmp.t.name, MIN(sizeof(tpmnv_control_name), control_tmp.t.size));
+
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+/* Ensure the NV indices were defined with the correct set of attributes */
+static int secboot_tpm_check_tpmnv_attrs(char *nv_vars_name, char *nv_control_name)
+{
+	if (memcmp(tpmnv_vars_name,
+		   nv_vars_name,
+		   sizeof(tpmnv_vars_name))) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "VARS index not defined with the correct attributes\n");
+		return OPAL_RESOURCE;
+	}
+	if (memcmp(tpmnv_control_name,
+		   nv_control_name,
+		   sizeof(tpmnv_control_name))) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "CONTROL index not defined with the correct attributes\n");
+		return OPAL_RESOURCE;
+	}
+
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static bool secboot_tpm_check_provisioned_indices(char *nv_vars_name, char *nv_control_name)
+{
+	/* Check for provisioned NV indices, redefine them if detected. */
+	if (!memcmp(tpmnv_vars_prov_name,
+			nv_vars_name,
+			sizeof(tpmnv_vars_prov_name))  &&
+		!memcmp(tpmnv_control_prov_name,
+			nv_control_name,
+			sizeof(tpmnv_control_prov_name))) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If one matches but the other doesn't, do NOT redefine.
+	 * The next step should detect they don't match the expected values
+	 * and fail the boot.
+	 */
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int secboot_tpm_define_indices(void)
+{
+	int rc = OPAL_SUCCESS;
+
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.definespace(SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX, tpmnv_vars_size);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Failed to define the VARS index, rc=%d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.definespace(SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX, sizeof(struct tpmnv_control));
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Failed to define the CONTROL index, rc=%d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpmnv_format();
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* TPM NV just got redefined, so unconditionally format the SECBOOT partition */
+	return secboot_format();
+}
+
+static int secboot_tpm_undefine_indices(bool *vars_defined, bool *control_defined)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (vars_defined) {
+		rc = tpmnv_ops.undefinespace(SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX);
+		if (rc) {
+			prlog(PR_ERR, "Failed to undefine VARS, something is seriously wrong\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (control_defined) {
+		rc = tpmnv_ops.undefinespace(SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX);
+		if (rc) {
+			prlog(PR_ERR, "Failed to undefine CONTROL, something is seriously wrong\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*vars_defined = *control_defined = false;
+
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+static int secboot_tpm_store_init(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int secboot_size;
+
+	TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX *indices = NULL;
+	char nv_vars_name[sizeof(tpmnv_vars_name)];
+	char nv_control_name[sizeof(tpmnv_control_name)];
+	size_t count = 0;
+	bool control_defined = false;
+	bool vars_defined = false;
+	int i;
+
+	if (secboot_image)
+		return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+
+	prlog(PR_DEBUG, "Initializing for pnor+tpm based platform\n");
+
+	/* Initialize SECBOOT first, we may need to format this later */
+	rc = flash_secboot_info(&secboot_size);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "error %d retrieving keystore info\n", rc);
+		goto error;
+	}
+	if (sizeof(struct secboot) > secboot_size) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "secboot partition %d KB too small. min=%ld\n",
+		      secboot_size >> 10, sizeof(struct secboot));
+		rc = OPAL_RESOURCE;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	secboot_image = memalign(0x1000, sizeof(struct secboot));
+	if (!secboot_image) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Failed to allocate space for the secboot image\n");
+		rc = OPAL_NO_MEM;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* Read in the PNOR data, bank hash is checked on call to .load_bank() */
+	rc = flash_secboot_read(secboot_image, 0, sizeof(struct secboot));
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "failed to read the secboot partition, rc=%d\n", rc);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate the tpmnv data buffers */
+	tpmnv_vars_image = zalloc(tpmnv_vars_size);
+	if (!tpmnv_vars_image)
+		return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+	tpmnv_control_image = zalloc(sizeof(struct tpmnv_control));
+	if (!tpmnv_control_image)
+		return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+	/* Check if the NV indices have been defined already */
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.getindices(&indices, &count);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Could not load defined indicies from TPM, rc=%d\n", rc);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		if (indices[i] == SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX)
+			vars_defined = true;
+		else if (indices[i] == SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX)
+			control_defined = true;
+	}
+	free(indices);
+
+	/* Undefine the NV indices if physical presence has been asserted */
+	if (secvar_check_physical_presence()) {
+		prlog(PR_INFO, "Physical presence asserted, redefining NV indices, and resetting keystore\n");
+		rc = secboot_tpm_undefine_indices(&vars_defined, &control_defined);
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+
+		rc = secboot_tpm_define_indices();
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+
+		/* Indices got defined and formatted, we're done here */
+		goto done;
+	}
+	/* Determine if we need to define the indices. These should BOTH be false or true */
+	if (!vars_defined && !control_defined) {
+		rc = secboot_tpm_define_indices();
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+
+		/* Indices got defined and formatted, we're done here */
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (vars_defined ^ control_defined) {
+		/* This should never happen. Both indices should be defined at the same
+		 * time. Otherwise something seriously went wrong. */
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "NV indices defined with unexpected attributes. Assert physical presence to clear\n");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* Both indices are defined, now need to validate their contents */
+
+	rc = secboot_tpm_get_tpmnv_names(nv_vars_name, nv_control_name);
+	if (rc)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* Check for provisioned TPMNV indices, redefine them if detected */
+	if (secboot_tpm_check_provisioned_indices(nv_vars_name, nv_control_name)) {
+		prlog(PR_INFO, "Provisioned TPM NV indices detected, redefining NV indices, and resetting keystore\n");
+		rc = secboot_tpm_undefine_indices(&vars_defined, &control_defined);
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+
+		rc = secboot_tpm_define_indices();
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+
+		/* Indices got defined and formatted, we're done here */
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Otherwise, ensure the NV indices were defined with the correct set of attributes */
+	rc = secboot_tpm_check_tpmnv_attrs(nv_vars_name, nv_control_name);
+	if (rc)
+		goto error;
+
+
+	/* TPMNV indices exist, are correct, and weren't just formatted, so read them in */
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.read(SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX,
+			    tpmnv_vars_image,
+			    tpmnv_vars_size, 0);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Failed to read from the VARS index\n");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.read(SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX,
+			    tpmnv_control_image,
+			    sizeof(struct tpmnv_control), 0);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Failed to read from the CONTROL index\n");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* Verify the header information is correct */
+	if (tpmnv_vars_image->header.magic_number != SECBOOT_MAGIC_NUMBER ||
+	    tpmnv_control_image->header.magic_number != SECBOOT_MAGIC_NUMBER ||
+	    tpmnv_vars_image->header.version != SECBOOT_VERSION ||
+	    tpmnv_control_image->header.version != SECBOOT_VERSION) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "TPMNV indices defined, but contain bad data. Assert physical presence to clear\n");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* Verify the secboot partition header information,
+	 *  reformat if incorrect
+	 * Note: Future variants should attempt to handle older versions safely
+	 */
+	if (secboot_image->header.magic_number != SECBOOT_MAGIC_NUMBER ||
+	    secboot_image->header.version != SECBOOT_VERSION) {
+		rc = secboot_format();
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
+done:
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+
+error:
+	free(secboot_image);
+	secboot_image = NULL;
+	free(tpmnv_vars_image);
+	tpmnv_vars_image = NULL;
+	free(tpmnv_control_image);
+	tpmnv_control_image = NULL;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void secboot_tpm_lockdown(void)
+{
+	/* Note: While write lock is called here on the two NV indices,
+	 * both indices are also defined on the platform hierarchy.
+	 * The platform hierarchy auth is set later in the skiboot
+	 * initialization process, and not by any secvar-related code.
+	 */
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.writelock(SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_EMERG, "TSS Write Lock failed on VARS index, halting.\n");
+		abort();
+	}
+
+	rc = tpmnv_ops.writelock(SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_EMERG, "TSS Write Lock failed on CONTROL index, halting.\n");
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
+struct secvar_storage_driver secboot_tpm_driver = {
+	.load_bank = secboot_tpm_load_bank,
+	.write_bank = secboot_tpm_write_bank,
+	.store_init = secboot_tpm_store_init,
+	.lockdown = secboot_tpm_lockdown,
+	.max_var_size = SECBOOT_TPM_MAX_VAR_SIZE,
+};
diff --git a/libstb/secvar/storage/secboot_tpm.h b/libstb/secvar/storage/secboot_tpm.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..30a747a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libstb/secvar/storage/secboot_tpm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Copyright 2020 IBM Corp. */
+#ifndef _SECBOOT_TPM_H_
+#define _SECBOOT_TPM_H_
+
+#include <ibmtss/tss.h>
+
+#define SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_SIZE	32000
+#define SECBOOT_UPDATE_BANK_SIZE	32000
+
+#define SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_NUM	2
+
+/* Because mbedtls doesn't define this? */
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH	32
+
+/* 0x5053424b = "PSBK" or Power Secure Boot Keystore */
+#define SECBOOT_MAGIC_NUMBER	0x5053424b
+#define SECBOOT_VERSION		1
+
+#define SECBOOT_TPMNV_VARS_INDEX	0x01c10190
+#define SECBOOT_TPMNV_CONTROL_INDEX	0x01c10191
+
+struct secboot_header {
+	uint32_t magic_number;
+	uint8_t version;
+	uint8_t reserved[3];	/* Fix alignment */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+struct secboot {
+	struct secboot_header header;
+	char bank[SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_NUM][SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_SIZE];
+	char update[SECBOOT_UPDATE_BANK_SIZE];
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpmnv_vars {
+	struct secboot_header header;
+	char vars[0];
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpmnv_control {
+	struct secboot_header header;
+	uint8_t active_bit;
+	char bank_hash[SECBOOT_VARIABLE_BANK_NUM][SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpmnv_ops_s {
+	int (*read)(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX nv, void*, size_t, uint16_t);
+	int (*write)(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX nv, void*, size_t, uint16_t);
+	int (*writelock)(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX);
+	int (*definespace)(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX, uint16_t);
+	int (*getindices)(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX**, size_t*);
+	int (*undefinespace)(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX);
+	int (*readpublic)(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX, TPMS_NV_PUBLIC*, TPM2B_NAME*);
+};
+
+extern struct tpmnv_ops_s tpmnv_ops;
+
+extern const uint8_t tpmnv_vars_name[];
+extern const uint8_t tpmnv_control_name[];
+
+#endif
diff --git a/libstb/secvar/storage/tpmnv_ops.c b/libstb/secvar/storage/tpmnv_ops.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d6135c31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libstb/secvar/storage/tpmnv_ops.c
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Copyright 2020 IBM Corp. */
+#include <tssskiboot.h>
+#include "secboot_tpm.h"
+
+struct tpmnv_ops_s tpmnv_ops = {
+	.read = tss_nv_read,
+	.write = tss_nv_write,
+	.writelock = tss_nv_write_lock,
+	.definespace = tss_nv_define_space,
+	.getindices = tss_get_defined_nv_indices,
+	.undefinespace = tss_nv_undefine_space,
+	.readpublic = tss_nv_read_public,
+};
+
