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[13/36] virtio: validate num_sg when mapping

Message ID 1399321834-31310-14-git-send-email-quintela@redhat.com
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Juan Quintela May 5, 2014, 8:30 p.m. UTC 
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4535
CVE-2013-4536

Both virtio-block and virtio-serial read,
VirtQueueElements are read in as buffers, and passed to
virtqueue_map_sg(), where num_sg is taken from the wire and can force
writes to indicies beyond VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE.

To fix, validate num_sg.

Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
---
 hw/virtio/virtio.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
index 0072542..a70169a 100644
--- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
@@ -430,6 +430,12 @@  void virtqueue_map_sg(struct iovec *sg, hwaddr *addr,
     unsigned int i;
     hwaddr len;

+    if (num_sg >= VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE) {
+        error_report("virtio: map attempt out of bounds: %zd > %d",
+                     num_sg, VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
     for (i = 0; i < num_sg; i++) {
         len = sg[i].iov_len;
         sg[i].iov_base = cpu_physical_memory_map(addr[i], &len, is_write);