diff mbox

[stable-0.15,01/36] ccid: Fix buffer overrun in handling of VSC_ATR message

Message ID 1332939159-16434-2-git-send-email-afaerber@suse.de
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Andreas Färber March 28, 2012, 12:52 p.m. UTC 
From: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>

ATR size exceeding the limit is diagnosed, but then we merrily use it
anyway, overrunning card->atr[].

The message is read from a character device.  Obvious security
implications unless the other end of the character device is trusted.

Spotted by Coverity.  CVE-2011-4111.

Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7e62255a4b3e0e2ab84a3ec7398640e8ed58620a)

Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
[AF: Fixes BNC#731086.]
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
---
 hw/ccid-card-passthru.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c b/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c
index 28eb9d1..0505663 100644
--- a/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c
+++ b/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@  static void ccid_card_vscard_handle_message(PassthruState *card,
             error_report("ATR size exceeds spec, ignoring");
             ccid_card_vscard_send_error(card, scr_msg_header->reader_id,
                                         VSC_GENERAL_ERROR);
+            break;
         }
         memcpy(card->atr, data, scr_msg_header->length);
         card->atr_length = scr_msg_header->length;