@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=wolfssl
-PKG_VERSION:=4.4.0-stable
-PKG_RELEASE:=2
+PKG_VERSION:=4.5.0-stable
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/archive/v$(PKG_VERSION)
-PKG_HASH:=7f854804c8ae0ca49cc77809e38e9a3b5a8c91ba7855ea928e6d6651b0d35f18
+PKG_HASH:=7de62300ce14daa0051bfefc7c4d6302f96cabc768b6ae49eda77523b118250c
PKG_FIXUP:=libtool
PKG_INSTALL:=1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
--- a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
+++ b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
-@@ -1930,7 +1930,7 @@ extern void uITRON4_free(void *p) ;
+@@ -2128,7 +2128,7 @@ extern void uITRON4_free(void *p) ;
#endif
/* warning for not using harden build options (default with ./configure) */
This fixes the following security problems: * In earlier versions of wolfSSL there exists a potential man in the middle attack on TLS 1.3 clients. * Denial of service attack on TLS 1.3 servers from repetitively sending ChangeCipherSpecs messages. (CVE-2020-12457) * Potential cache timing attacks on public key operations in builds that are not using SP (single precision). (CVE-2020-15309) * When using SGX with EC scalar multiplication the possibility of side- channel attacks are present. * Leak of private key in the case that PEM format private keys are bundled in with PEM certificates into a single file. * During the handshake, clear application_data messages in epoch 0 are processed and returned to the application. Full changelog: https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/wolfssl-changelog/ Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> --- package/libs/wolfssl/Makefile | 6 +++--- .../libs/wolfssl/patches/100-disable-hardening-check.patch | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)