@@ -15,3 +15,12 @@ nf_log_all_netns - BOOLEAN
with LOG target; this aims to prevent containers from flooding host
kernel log. If enabled, this target also works in other network
namespaces. This variable is only accessible from init_net.
+
+nf_max_table_jumps_netns - INTEGER (count)
+ default 65536
+
+ The maximum numbers of jumps a table family (+ netdev) can
+ have. This only applies to non-init_net namespaces, and is read
+ only for non-init_user_ns namespaces. Meeting or exceeding this
+ value will cause additional rules to not be added, with EMLINK being
+ return to the user.
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static inline void nft_data_copy(u32 *dst, const struct nft_data *src,
* @nla: netlink attributes
* @portid: netlink portID of the original message
* @seq: netlink sequence number
+ * @total_jump_count: Found jumps for family set + netdev
* @flags: modifiers to new request
* @family: protocol family
* @level: depth of the chains
@@ -218,6 +219,7 @@ struct nft_ctx {
const struct nlattr * const *nla;
u32 portid;
u32 seq;
+ u32 total_jump_count;
u16 flags;
u8 family;
u8 level;
@@ -1275,6 +1277,7 @@ static inline void nft_use_inc_restore(u32 *use)
* @hgenerator: handle generator state
* @handle: table handle
* @use: number of chain references to this table
+ * @total_jump_count: jumps as per last validate
* @family:address family
* @flags: table flag (see enum nft_table_flags)
* @genmask: generation mask
@@ -1294,6 +1297,7 @@ struct nft_table {
u64 hgenerator;
u64 handle;
u32 use;
+ u32 total_jump_count;
u16 family:6,
flags:8,
genmask:2;
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ struct netns_nf {
const struct nf_logger __rcu *nf_loggers[NFPROTO_NUMPROTO];
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
struct ctl_table_header *nf_log_dir_header;
+ struct ctl_table_header *nf_limit_control_dir_header;
#ifdef CONFIG_LWTUNNEL
struct ctl_table_header *nf_lwtnl_dir_header;
#endif
@@ -33,5 +34,8 @@ struct netns_nf {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_DEFRAG_IPV6)
unsigned int defrag_ipv6_users;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ u32 nf_max_table_jumps_netns;
+#endif
};
#endif
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_flow_table.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
@@ -25,10 +26,13 @@
#define NFT_MODULE_AUTOLOAD_LIMIT (MODULE_NAME_LEN - sizeof("nft-expr-255-"))
#define NFT_SET_MAX_ANONLEN 16
+#define NFT_DEFAULT_MAX_TABLE_JUMPS 65536
/* limit compaction to avoid huge kmalloc/krealloc sizes. */
#define NFT_MAX_SET_NELEMS ((2048 - sizeof(struct nft_trans_elem)) / sizeof(struct nft_trans_one_elem))
+u32 nf_max_table_jumps_netns __read_mostly = NFT_DEFAULT_MAX_TABLE_JUMPS;
+
unsigned int nf_tables_net_id __read_mostly;
static LIST_HEAD(nf_tables_expressions);
@@ -4011,8 +4015,16 @@ int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_chain *chain)
struct nft_expr *expr, *last;
struct nft_rule *rule;
int err;
+ u32 jump_check = nf_max_table_jumps_netns;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYSCTL)) {
+ if (!net_eq(ctx->net, &init_net))
+ jump_check = ctx->net->nf.nf_max_table_jumps_netns;
+ }
- if (ctx->level == NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE)
+ if (ctx->level == NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE ||
+ (!net_eq(ctx->net, &init_net) &&
+ ctx->total_jump_count >= jump_check))
return -EMLINK;
list_for_each_entry(rule, &chain->rules, list) {
@@ -4039,14 +4051,33 @@ int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_chain *chain)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nft_chain_validate);
-static int nft_table_validate(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table)
+static int nft_table_validate(struct net *net, struct nft_table *table)
{
struct nft_chain *chain;
+ struct nftables_pernet *nft_net;
struct nft_ctx ctx = {
.net = net,
.family = table->family,
+ .total_jump_count = 0,
};
int err;
+ u32 total_jumps_before_validate;
+ struct nft_table *sibling_table; /* or netdev */
+
+ nft_net = nft_pernet(net);
+
+ if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
+ list_for_each_entry(sibling_table, &nft_net->tables, list) {
+ if (sibling_table == table) /* ourselves */
+ continue;
+ if (sibling_table->family == table->family ||
+ sibling_table->family == NFPROTO_NETDEV){
+ ctx.total_jump_count += sibling_table->total_jump_count;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ total_jumps_before_validate = ctx.total_jump_count;
list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) {
if (!nft_is_base_chain(chain))
@@ -4060,6 +4091,8 @@ static int nft_table_validate(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table)
cond_resched();
}
+ table->total_jump_count = ctx.total_jump_count - total_jumps_before_validate;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -4084,6 +4117,7 @@ int nft_setelem_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
case NFT_JUMP:
case NFT_GOTO:
pctx->level++;
+ pctx->total_jump_count++;
err = nft_chain_validate(ctx, data->verdict.chain);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -11916,6 +11950,78 @@ static struct notifier_block nft_nl_notifier = {
.notifier_call = nft_rcv_nl_event,
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static struct ctl_table nf_limit_control_sysctl_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "nf_max_table_jumps_netns",
+ .data = &nf_max_table_jumps_netns,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(nf_max_table_jumps_netns),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ },
+};
+
+static int netfilter_limit_control_sysctl_init(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct ctl_table *tbl;
+
+ tbl = nf_limit_control_sysctl_table;
+ if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
+ tbl = kmemdup(tbl, sizeof(nf_limit_control_sysctl_table), GFP_KERNEL);
+ net->nf.nf_max_table_jumps_netns = nf_max_table_jumps_netns;
+ tbl->data = &net->nf.nf_max_table_jumps_netns;
+ if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns)
+ tbl->mode &= ~0222;
+ }
+
+ net->nf.nf_limit_control_dir_header = register_net_sysctl_sz(
+ net, "net/netfilter", tbl, ARRAY_SIZE(nf_limit_control_sysctl_table));
+
+ if (!net->nf.nf_limit_control_dir_header)
+ goto err_alloc;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_alloc:
+ if (tbl != nf_limit_control_sysctl_table)
+ kfree(tbl);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static void netfilter_limit_control_sysctl_exit(struct net *net)
+{
+ unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->nf.nf_limit_control_dir_header);
+}
+#else
+static int netfilter_limit_control_sysctl_init(struct net *net)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void netfilter_limit_control_sysctl_exit(struct net *net)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+static int __net_init nf_limit_control_net_init(struct net *net)
+{
+ int ret = netfilter_limit_control_sysctl_init(net);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __net_exit nf_limit_control_net_exit(struct net *net)
+{
+ netfilter_limit_control_sysctl_exit(net);
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations nf_limit_control_net_ops = {
+ .init = nf_limit_control_net_init,
+ .exit = nf_limit_control_net_exit,
+};
+
static int __net_init nf_tables_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(net);
@@ -12003,6 +12109,10 @@ static int __init nf_tables_module_init(void)
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ err = register_pernet_subsys(&nf_limit_control_net_ops);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
err = nft_chain_filter_init();
if (err < 0)
goto err_chain_filter;
@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ static int nft_immediate_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
case NFT_JUMP:
case NFT_GOTO:
pctx->level++;
+ pctx->total_jump_count++;
err = nft_chain_validate(ctx, data->verdict.chain);
if (err < 0)
return err;
Observing https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1665, I was able to reproduce the bug using linux-stable. Summarized, when adding large/repeated jump chains, while still staying under the NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE (currently 16), the kernel soons locks up. From the bug report: table='loop-test' nft add table inet $table nft add chain inet $table test0 '{type filter hook input priority 0; policy accept;}' for((i=1;i<16;i++));do nft add chain inet $table test$i;done nft add rule inet $table test0 jump test1 for((i=1;i<15;i++));do nft add rule inet $table test$i jump test$((i+1));done nft add rule inet $table test15 tcp dport 8080 drop After the jump rule is added for 3 to 5 times, the system freezes and even softlockup occurs. for((i=1;i<15;i++));do nft add rule inet $table test$i jump test$((i+1));done for((i=1;i<15;i++));do nft add rule inet $table test$i jump test$((i+1));done for((i=1;i<15;i++));do nft add rule inet $table test$i jump test$((i+1));done This patch is a different approach than the original proposed approach found in the bug report. Additionally, the limit, namespace specific, is only applied to non-init-net namespaces, with the common use case being to protect against rogue containers. Add a new counter, total_jump_counter, to nft_ctx. On every call to nft_table_validate() (rule addition time, versus packet inspection time) start the counter at the current sum of all jump counts in all other tables with the same family, as well as netdev. Increment said counter for every jump encountered during table validation. If the counter ever exceeds the namespaces jump limit *during validation*, gracefully reject the rule with -EMLINK (the same behavior as exceeding NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE). This allows immediate feedback to the user about a bad chain, versus the original idea (from the bug report) of allowing the addition to the table. It keeps the in memory ruleset consistent, versus catching the failure during packet inspection at some unknown point in the future and arbitrarily denying the packet. Most importantly, it removes the original problem of a kernel crash. The compile time limit NFT_DEFAULT_MAX_TABLE_JUMPS of 65536 was chosen to account for any normal use case, and when this value (and associated stressing loop table) was tested against a 1CPU/256MB machine, the system remained functional. A sysctl entry net/netfilter/nf_max_table_jumps_netns for the limit was also added for any use cases that may exceed this limit. It is network namespace specific. As it is a control limit, for namespaces with an owner that is non-init_user_ns, this sysctl is read only. Example output of nft when patch is applied (and count is reached): Error: Could not process rule: Too many links add rule inet loop-test test14 jump test15 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ v2: nf_max_table_jumps renamed to nf_max_table_jumps_netns; Limit namespace specific, only applies to non-init netns; Limit raised to 16k Signed-off-by: Shaun Brady <brady.1345@gmail.com> --- Documentation/networking/netfilter-sysctl.rst | 9 ++ include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 4 + include/net/netns/netfilter.h | 4 + net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++- net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)