diff mbox series

Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow

Message ID 1555053870-31588-1-git-send-email-92siuyang@gmail.com
State Awaiting Upstream
Delegated to: David Miller
Headers show
Series Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow | expand

Commit Message

Young Xiao April 12, 2019, 7:24 a.m. UTC 
From: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>

Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.

This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.

Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
---
 net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

Comments

Marcel Holtmann April 23, 2019, 5:04 p.m. UTC | #1 
Hi Young,


> Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
> field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
> sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
> 
> This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
> ---
> net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

patch has been applied to bluetooth-next tree.

Regards

Marcel
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
index 9f85a19..2151913 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@  static int do_hidp_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, void __user
 			sockfd_put(csock);
 			return err;
 		}
+		ca.name[sizeof(ca.name)-1] = 0;
 
 		err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
 		if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))