diff mbox series

[03/17] powerpc/perf: callchain validate kernel stack pointer bounds

Message ID 20221127124942.1665522-4-npiggin@gmail.com (mailing list archive)
State Accepted
Commit 32c5209214bd8d4f8c4e9d9b630ef4c671f58e79
Headers show
Series powerpc: Remove STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD | expand

Commit Message

Nicholas Piggin Nov. 27, 2022, 12:49 p.m. UTC 
The interrupt frame detection and loads from the hypothetical pt_regs
are not bounds-checked. The next-frame validation only bounds-checks
STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD, which does not include the pt_regs. Add another
test for this.

The user could set r1 to be equal to the address matching the first
interrupt frame - STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE, which is in the previous page
due to the kernel redzone, and induce the kernel to load the marker from
there. Possibly this could cause a crash at least. If the user could
induce the previous page to contain a valid marker, then it might be
able to direct perf to read specific memory addresses in a way that
could be transmitted back to the user in the perf data.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
---
Not sure if my attack scenario is actually valid, but I think there is
some concern here...

Thanks,
Nick

 arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c
index 082f6d0308a4..8718289c051d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@  perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *re
 		next_sp = fp[0];
 
 		if (next_sp == sp + STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE &&
+		    validate_sp(sp, current, STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE) &&
 		    fp[STACK_FRAME_MARKER] == STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER) {
 			/*
 			 * This looks like an interrupt frame for an