| Message ID | 20220516073225.112875-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [-next,v2] powerpc: add support for syscall stack randomization | expand |
| Context | Check | Description |
|---|---|---|
| snowpatch_ozlabs/github-powerpc_ppctests | success | Successfully ran 10 jobs. |
| snowpatch_ozlabs/github-powerpc_selftests | success | Successfully ran 10 jobs. |
| snowpatch_ozlabs/github-powerpc_kernel_qemu | success | Successfully ran 24 jobs. |
| snowpatch_ozlabs/github-powerpc_clang | success | Successfully ran 7 jobs. |
| snowpatch_ozlabs/github-powerpc_sparse | warning | Found 16 issues from 4 of 4 jobs. |
friendly ping.... 在 2022/5/16 15:32, Xiu Jianfeng 写道: > Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling > syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better > performance. > > In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to > the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering > needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general > way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this > must be disabled at the compilation unit level. > > Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> > > --- > Changes in v2: > -move choose choose_random_kstack_offset() to the end of system_call_exception > -allow full 6 (10) bits of entropy > -disable stack-protector for interrupt.c > --- > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 7 +++++++ > arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- > 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > index 98309eeae09c..2f0019a0054e 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ config PPC > select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 > select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 > select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_8xx || 40x > + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB > select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS > select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > index 4ddd161aef32..5c5e85b8229b 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ CFLAGS_cputable.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING > CFLAGS_btext.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING > endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > +# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary > +# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset. > +CFLAGS_REMOVE_interrupt.o = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong > +CFLAGS_interrupt.o += -fno-stack-protector > +#endif > + > obj-y := cputable.o syscalls.o \ > irq.o align.o signal_$(BITS).o pmc.o vdso.o \ > process.o systbl.o idle.o \ > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c > index 784ea3289c84..d7cdcb6fc336 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > #include <linux/err.h> > #include <linux/compat.h> > #include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* for show_regs */ > +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> > > #include <asm/kup.h> > #include <asm/cputime.h> > @@ -78,10 +79,12 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, > long r6, long r7, long r8, > unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) > { > + long ret; > syscall_fn f; > > kuap_lock(); > > + add_random_kstack_offset(); > regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; > > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) > @@ -229,7 +232,21 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, > f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; > } > > - return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); > + ret = f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); > + /* > + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), > + * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes(10 bits). > + * > + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when > + * applying stack alignment constraints: the powerpc architecture > + * may have two kinds of stack alignment(16-bytes and 8-bytes). > + * > + * So the resulting 6 or 7 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4] or SP[9:3]. > + * > + */ > + choose_random_kstack_offset(mftb()); > + > + return ret; > } > > static notrace void booke_load_dbcr0(void)
xiujianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> writes: > friendly ping.... I will consider this for v5.20 once the merge window has closed (after v5.19-rc1 is release). cheers > 在 2022/5/16 15:32, Xiu Jianfeng 写道: >> Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling >> syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better >> performance. >> >> In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to >> the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering >> needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general >> way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this >> must be disabled at the compilation unit level. >> >> Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> >> >> --- >> Changes in v2: >> -move choose choose_random_kstack_offset() to the end of system_call_exception >> -allow full 6 (10) bits of entropy >> -disable stack-protector for interrupt.c >> --- >> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + >> arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 7 +++++++ >> arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- >> 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> index 98309eeae09c..2f0019a0054e 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ config PPC >> select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 >> select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 >> select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_8xx || 40x >> + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET >> select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> index 4ddd161aef32..5c5e85b8229b 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ CFLAGS_cputable.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING >> CFLAGS_btext.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING >> endif >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET >> +# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary >> +# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset. >> +CFLAGS_REMOVE_interrupt.o = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong >> +CFLAGS_interrupt.o += -fno-stack-protector >> +#endif >> + >> obj-y := cputable.o syscalls.o \ >> irq.o align.o signal_$(BITS).o pmc.o vdso.o \ >> process.o systbl.o idle.o \ >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c >> index 784ea3289c84..d7cdcb6fc336 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c >> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ >> #include <linux/err.h> >> #include <linux/compat.h> >> #include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* for show_regs */ >> +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> >> >> #include <asm/kup.h> >> #include <asm/cputime.h> >> @@ -78,10 +79,12 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, >> long r6, long r7, long r8, >> unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) >> { >> + long ret; >> syscall_fn f; >> >> kuap_lock(); >> >> + add_random_kstack_offset(); >> regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; >> >> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) >> @@ -229,7 +232,21 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, >> f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; >> } >> >> - return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); >> + ret = f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); >> + /* >> + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), >> + * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes(10 bits). >> + * >> + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when >> + * applying stack alignment constraints: the powerpc architecture >> + * may have two kinds of stack alignment(16-bytes and 8-bytes). >> + * >> + * So the resulting 6 or 7 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4] or SP[9:3]. >> + * >> + */ >> + choose_random_kstack_offset(mftb()); >> + >> + return ret; >> } >> >> static notrace void booke_load_dbcr0(void)
在 2022/5/28 20:21, Michael Ellerman 写道: > xiujianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> writes: >> friendly ping.... > I will consider this for v5.20 once the merge window has closed (after > v5.19-rc1 is release). Hi, Michael, thanks for your feedback, and anything needed about this patch please let me know :) > > cheers > >> 在 2022/5/16 15:32, Xiu Jianfeng 写道: >>> Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling >>> syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better >>> performance. >>> >>> In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to >>> the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering >>> needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general >>> way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this >>> must be disabled at the compilation unit level. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> >>> >>> --- >>> Changes in v2: >>> -move choose choose_random_kstack_offset() to the end of system_call_exception >>> -allow full 6 (10) bits of entropy >>> -disable stack-protector for interrupt.c >>> --- >>> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + >>> arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 7 +++++++ >>> arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- >>> 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >>> index 98309eeae09c..2f0019a0054e 100644 >>> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >>> @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ config PPC >>> select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 >>> select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 >>> select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_8xx || 40x >>> + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET >>> select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB >>> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS >>> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT >>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >>> index 4ddd161aef32..5c5e85b8229b 100644 >>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >>> @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ CFLAGS_cputable.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING >>> CFLAGS_btext.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING >>> endif >>> >>> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET >>> +# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary >>> +# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset. >>> +CFLAGS_REMOVE_interrupt.o = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong >>> +CFLAGS_interrupt.o += -fno-stack-protector >>> +#endif >>> + >>> obj-y := cputable.o syscalls.o \ >>> irq.o align.o signal_$(BITS).o pmc.o vdso.o \ >>> process.o systbl.o idle.o \ >>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c >>> index 784ea3289c84..d7cdcb6fc336 100644 >>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c >>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c >>> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ >>> #include <linux/err.h> >>> #include <linux/compat.h> >>> #include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* for show_regs */ >>> +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> >>> >>> #include <asm/kup.h> >>> #include <asm/cputime.h> >>> @@ -78,10 +79,12 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, >>> long r6, long r7, long r8, >>> unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) >>> { >>> + long ret; >>> syscall_fn f; >>> >>> kuap_lock(); >>> >>> + add_random_kstack_offset(); >>> regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; >>> >>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) >>> @@ -229,7 +232,21 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, >>> f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; >>> } >>> >>> - return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); >>> + ret = f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); >>> + /* >>> + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), >>> + * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes(10 bits). >>> + * >>> + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when >>> + * applying stack alignment constraints: the powerpc architecture >>> + * may have two kinds of stack alignment(16-bytes and 8-bytes). >>> + * >>> + * So the resulting 6 or 7 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4] or SP[9:3]. >>> + * >>> + */ >>> + choose_random_kstack_offset(mftb()); >>> + >>> + return ret; >>> } >>> >>> static notrace void booke_load_dbcr0(void) > .
Le 16/05/2022 à 09:32, Xiu Jianfeng a écrit : > Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling > syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better > performance. > > In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to > the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering > needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general > way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this > must be disabled at the compilation unit level. > > Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> > Did you see this patch generates sparse warnings ? See https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linuxppc-dev/patch/20220516073225.112875-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com/ It is not directly related to this patch but that's worth a patch to fix it. > --- > Changes in v2: > -move choose choose_random_kstack_offset() to the end of system_call_exception > -allow full 6 (10) bits of entropy > -disable stack-protector for interrupt.c > --- > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 7 +++++++ > arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- > 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > index 98309eeae09c..2f0019a0054e 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ config PPC > select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 > select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 > select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_8xx || 40x > + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB > select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS > select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > index 4ddd161aef32..5c5e85b8229b 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ CFLAGS_cputable.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING > CFLAGS_btext.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING > endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > +# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary > +# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset. > +CFLAGS_REMOVE_interrupt.o = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong > +CFLAGS_interrupt.o += -fno-stack-protector > +#endif > + > obj-y := cputable.o syscalls.o \ > irq.o align.o signal_$(BITS).o pmc.o vdso.o \ > process.o systbl.o idle.o \ > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c > index 784ea3289c84..d7cdcb6fc336 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > #include <linux/err.h> > #include <linux/compat.h> > #include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* for show_regs */ > +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> > > #include <asm/kup.h> > #include <asm/cputime.h> > @@ -78,10 +79,12 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, > long r6, long r7, long r8, > unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) > { > + long ret; > syscall_fn f; > > kuap_lock(); > > + add_random_kstack_offset(); > regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; > > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) > @@ -229,7 +232,21 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, > f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; > } > > - return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); > + ret = f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); > + /* > + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), > + * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes(10 bits). > + * > + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when > + * applying stack alignment constraints: the powerpc architecture > + * may have two kinds of stack alignment(16-bytes and 8-bytes). > + * > + * So the resulting 6 or 7 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4] or SP[9:3]. > + * > + */ > + choose_random_kstack_offset(mftb()); > + > + return ret; > } > > static notrace void booke_load_dbcr0(void)
Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> writes: > Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling > syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better > performance. > > In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to > the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering > needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general > way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this > must be disabled at the compilation unit level. > > Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> > > --- > Changes in v2: > -move choose choose_random_kstack_offset() to the end of system_call_exception > -allow full 6 (10) bits of entropy > -disable stack-protector for interrupt.c > --- > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 7 +++++++ > arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- > 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > index 98309eeae09c..2f0019a0054e 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ config PPC > select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 > select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 > select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_8xx || 40x > + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB > select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS > select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > index 4ddd161aef32..5c5e85b8229b 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ CFLAGS_cputable.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING > CFLAGS_btext.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING > endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > +# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary > +# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset. > +CFLAGS_REMOVE_interrupt.o = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong > +CFLAGS_interrupt.o += -fno-stack-protector > +#endif I'm a bit reluctant to remove stack protection from all of interrupt.c just for this feature. It's true that none of the functions in interrupt.c currently trigger stack protection, but that could change in future. What about splitting system_call_exception() into a separate file as a lead-up patch, example below. Then we can just exclude stack protection from that one function. cheers diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index f91f0f29a566..ecfd333b95d1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ obj-y := cputable.o syscalls.o \ udbg.o misc.o io.o misc_$(BITS).o \ of_platform.o prom_parse.o firmware.o \ hw_breakpoint_constraints.o interrupt.o \ - kdebugfs.o stacktrace.o + kdebugfs.o stacktrace.o syscall.o obj-y += ptrace/ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += setup_64.o \ paca.o nvram_64.o note.o diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c index 784ea3289c84..0e75cb03244a 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c @@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ unsigned long global_dbcr0[NR_CPUS]; #endif -typedef long (*syscall_fn)(long, long, long, long, long, long); - #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(interrupt_exit_not_reentrant); static inline bool exit_must_hard_disable(void) @@ -73,165 +71,6 @@ static notrace __always_inline bool prep_irq_for_enabled_exit(bool restartable) return true; } -/* Has to run notrace because it is entered not completely "reconciled" */ -notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, - long r6, long r7, long r8, - unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - syscall_fn f; - - kuap_lock(); - - regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) - BUG_ON(irq_soft_mask_return() != IRQS_ALL_DISABLED); - - trace_hardirqs_off(); /* finish reconciling */ - - CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() == CONTEXT_KERNEL); - user_exit_irqoff(); - - BUG_ON(regs_is_unrecoverable(regs)); - BUG_ON(!(regs->msr & MSR_PR)); - BUG_ON(arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs)); - -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PKEY - if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY)) { - unsigned long amr, iamr; - bool flush_needed = false; - /* - * When entering from userspace we mostly have the AMR/IAMR - * different from kernel default values. Hence don't compare. - */ - amr = mfspr(SPRN_AMR); - iamr = mfspr(SPRN_IAMR); - regs->amr = amr; - regs->iamr = iamr; - if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUAP)) { - mtspr(SPRN_AMR, AMR_KUAP_BLOCKED); - flush_needed = true; - } - if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUEP)) { - mtspr(SPRN_IAMR, AMR_KUEP_BLOCKED); - flush_needed = true; - } - if (flush_needed) - isync(); - } else -#endif - kuap_assert_locked(); - - booke_restore_dbcr0(); - - account_cpu_user_entry(); - - account_stolen_time(); - - /* - * This is not required for the syscall exit path, but makes the - * stack frame look nicer. If this was initialised in the first stack - * frame, or if the unwinder was taught the first stack frame always - * returns to user with IRQS_ENABLED, this store could be avoided! - */ - irq_soft_mask_regs_set_state(regs, IRQS_ENABLED); - - /* - * If system call is called with TM active, set _TIF_RESTOREALL to - * prevent RFSCV being used to return to userspace, because POWER9 - * TM implementation has problems with this instruction returning to - * transactional state. Final register values are not relevant because - * the transaction will be aborted upon return anyway. Or in the case - * of unsupported_scv SIGILL fault, the return state does not much - * matter because it's an edge case. - */ - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM) && - unlikely(MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr))) - set_bits(_TIF_RESTOREALL, ¤t_thread_info()->flags); - - /* - * If the system call was made with a transaction active, doom it and - * return without performing the system call. Unless it was an - * unsupported scv vector, in which case it's treated like an illegal - * instruction. - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM - if (unlikely(MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr)) && - !trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs)) { - /* Enable TM in the kernel, and disable EE (for scv) */ - hard_irq_disable(); - mtmsr(mfmsr() | MSR_TM); - - /* tabort, this dooms the transaction, nothing else */ - asm volatile(".long 0x7c00071d | ((%0) << 16)" - :: "r"(TM_CAUSE_SYSCALL|TM_CAUSE_PERSISTENT)); - - /* - * Userspace will never see the return value. Execution will - * resume after the tbegin. of the aborted transaction with the - * checkpointed register state. A context switch could occur - * or signal delivered to the process before resuming the - * doomed transaction context, but that should all be handled - * as expected. - */ - return -ENOSYS; - } -#endif // CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM - - local_irq_enable(); - - if (unlikely(read_thread_flags() & _TIF_SYSCALL_DOTRACE)) { - if (unlikely(trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs))) { - /* Unsupported scv vector */ - _exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip); - return regs->gpr[3]; - } - /* - * We use the return value of do_syscall_trace_enter() as the - * syscall number. If the syscall was rejected for any reason - * do_syscall_trace_enter() returns an invalid syscall number - * and the test against NR_syscalls will fail and the return - * value to be used is in regs->gpr[3]. - */ - r0 = do_syscall_trace_enter(regs); - if (unlikely(r0 >= NR_syscalls)) - return regs->gpr[3]; - r3 = regs->gpr[3]; - r4 = regs->gpr[4]; - r5 = regs->gpr[5]; - r6 = regs->gpr[6]; - r7 = regs->gpr[7]; - r8 = regs->gpr[8]; - - } else if (unlikely(r0 >= NR_syscalls)) { - if (unlikely(trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs))) { - /* Unsupported scv vector */ - _exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip); - return regs->gpr[3]; - } - return -ENOSYS; - } - - /* May be faster to do array_index_nospec? */ - barrier_nospec(); - - if (unlikely(is_compat_task())) { - f = (void *)compat_sys_call_table[r0]; - - r3 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; - r4 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; - r5 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; - r6 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; - r7 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; - r8 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; - - } else { - f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; - } - - return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); -} - static notrace void booke_load_dbcr0(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4d5689eeaf25 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +#include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/context_tracking.h> + +#include <asm/interrupt.h> +#include <asm/kup.h> +#include <asm/syscall.h> +#include <asm/time.h> +#include <asm/tm.h> +#include <asm/unistd.h> + + +typedef long (*syscall_fn)(long, long, long, long, long, long); + +/* Has to run notrace because it is entered not completely "reconciled" */ +notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, + long r6, long r7, long r8, + unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + syscall_fn f; + + kuap_lock(); + + regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) + BUG_ON(irq_soft_mask_return() != IRQS_ALL_DISABLED); + + trace_hardirqs_off(); /* finish reconciling */ + + CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() == CONTEXT_KERNEL); + user_exit_irqoff(); + + BUG_ON(regs_is_unrecoverable(regs)); + BUG_ON(!(regs->msr & MSR_PR)); + BUG_ON(arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs)); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PKEY + if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY)) { + unsigned long amr, iamr; + bool flush_needed = false; + /* + * When entering from userspace we mostly have the AMR/IAMR + * different from kernel default values. Hence don't compare. + */ + amr = mfspr(SPRN_AMR); + iamr = mfspr(SPRN_IAMR); + regs->amr = amr; + regs->iamr = iamr; + if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUAP)) { + mtspr(SPRN_AMR, AMR_KUAP_BLOCKED); + flush_needed = true; + } + if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUEP)) { + mtspr(SPRN_IAMR, AMR_KUEP_BLOCKED); + flush_needed = true; + } + if (flush_needed) + isync(); + } else +#endif + kuap_assert_locked(); + + booke_restore_dbcr0(); + + account_cpu_user_entry(); + + account_stolen_time(); + + /* + * This is not required for the syscall exit path, but makes the + * stack frame look nicer. If this was initialised in the first stack + * frame, or if the unwinder was taught the first stack frame always + * returns to user with IRQS_ENABLED, this store could be avoided! + */ + irq_soft_mask_regs_set_state(regs, IRQS_ENABLED); + + /* + * If system call is called with TM active, set _TIF_RESTOREALL to + * prevent RFSCV being used to return to userspace, because POWER9 + * TM implementation has problems with this instruction returning to + * transactional state. Final register values are not relevant because + * the transaction will be aborted upon return anyway. Or in the case + * of unsupported_scv SIGILL fault, the return state does not much + * matter because it's an edge case. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM) && + unlikely(MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr))) + set_bits(_TIF_RESTOREALL, ¤t_thread_info()->flags); + + /* + * If the system call was made with a transaction active, doom it and + * return without performing the system call. Unless it was an + * unsupported scv vector, in which case it's treated like an illegal + * instruction. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM + if (unlikely(MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr)) && + !trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs)) { + /* Enable TM in the kernel, and disable EE (for scv) */ + hard_irq_disable(); + mtmsr(mfmsr() | MSR_TM); + + /* tabort, this dooms the transaction, nothing else */ + asm volatile(".long 0x7c00071d | ((%0) << 16)" + :: "r"(TM_CAUSE_SYSCALL|TM_CAUSE_PERSISTENT)); + + /* + * Userspace will never see the return value. Execution will + * resume after the tbegin. of the aborted transaction with the + * checkpointed register state. A context switch could occur + * or signal delivered to the process before resuming the + * doomed transaction context, but that should all be handled + * as expected. + */ + return -ENOSYS; + } +#endif // CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM + + local_irq_enable(); + + if (unlikely(read_thread_flags() & _TIF_SYSCALL_DOTRACE)) { + if (unlikely(trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs))) { + /* Unsupported scv vector */ + _exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip); + return regs->gpr[3]; + } + /* + * We use the return value of do_syscall_trace_enter() as the + * syscall number. If the syscall was rejected for any reason + * do_syscall_trace_enter() returns an invalid syscall number + * and the test against NR_syscalls will fail and the return + * value to be used is in regs->gpr[3]. + */ + r0 = do_syscall_trace_enter(regs); + if (unlikely(r0 >= NR_syscalls)) + return regs->gpr[3]; + r3 = regs->gpr[3]; + r4 = regs->gpr[4]; + r5 = regs->gpr[5]; + r6 = regs->gpr[6]; + r7 = regs->gpr[7]; + r8 = regs->gpr[8]; + + } else if (unlikely(r0 >= NR_syscalls)) { + if (unlikely(trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs))) { + /* Unsupported scv vector */ + _exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip); + return regs->gpr[3]; + } + return -ENOSYS; + } + + /* May be faster to do array_index_nospec? */ + barrier_nospec(); + + if (unlikely(is_compat_task())) { + f = (void *)compat_sys_call_table[r0]; + + r3 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; + r4 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; + r5 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; + r6 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; + r7 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; + r8 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; + + } else { + f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; + } + + return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); +}
Hi, 在 2022/6/29 1:36, Christophe Leroy 写道: > > Le 16/05/2022 à 09:32, Xiu Jianfeng a écrit : >> Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling >> syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better >> performance. >> >> In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to >> the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering >> needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general >> way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this >> must be disabled at the compilation unit level. >> >> Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> >> > Did you see this patch generates sparse warnings ? > > See > https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linuxppc-dev/patch/20220516073225.112875-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com/ > > It is not directly related to this patch but that's worth a patch to fix it. Thanks for your reminder, the fix patch is here: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220629060423.2515693-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/ >> --- >> Changes in v2: >> -move choose choose_random_kstack_offset() to the end of system_call_exception >> -allow full 6 (10) bits of entropy >> -disable stack-protector for interrupt.c >> --- >> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + >> arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 7 +++++++ >> arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- >> 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> index 98309eeae09c..2f0019a0054e 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ config PPC >> select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 >> select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 >> select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_8xx || 40x >> + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET >> select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> index 4ddd161aef32..5c5e85b8229b 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ CFLAGS_cputable.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING >> CFLAGS_btext.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING >> endif >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET >> +# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary >> +# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset. >> +CFLAGS_REMOVE_interrupt.o = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong >> +CFLAGS_interrupt.o += -fno-stack-protector >> +#endif >> + >> obj-y := cputable.o syscalls.o \ >> irq.o align.o signal_$(BITS).o pmc.o vdso.o \ >> process.o systbl.o idle.o \ >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c >> index 784ea3289c84..d7cdcb6fc336 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c >> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ >> #include <linux/err.h> >> #include <linux/compat.h> >> #include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* for show_regs */ >> +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> >> >> #include <asm/kup.h> >> #include <asm/cputime.h> >> @@ -78,10 +79,12 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, >> long r6, long r7, long r8, >> unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) >> { >> + long ret; >> syscall_fn f; >> >> kuap_lock(); >> >> + add_random_kstack_offset(); >> regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; >> >> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) >> @@ -229,7 +232,21 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, >> f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; >> } >> >> - return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); >> + ret = f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); >> + /* >> + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), >> + * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes(10 bits). >> + * >> + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when >> + * applying stack alignment constraints: the powerpc architecture >> + * may have two kinds of stack alignment(16-bytes and 8-bytes). >> + * >> + * So the resulting 6 or 7 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4] or SP[9:3]. >> + * >> + */ >> + choose_random_kstack_offset(mftb()); >> + >> + return ret; >> } >> >> static notrace void booke_load_dbcr0(void)
在 2022/6/29 14:04, Michael Ellerman 写道: > Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> writes: >> Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling >> syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better >> performance. >> >> In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to >> the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering >> needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general >> way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this >> must be disabled at the compilation unit level. >> >> Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> >> >> --- >> Changes in v2: >> -move choose choose_random_kstack_offset() to the end of system_call_exception >> -allow full 6 (10) bits of entropy >> -disable stack-protector for interrupt.c >> --- >> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + >> arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 7 +++++++ >> arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- >> 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> index 98309eeae09c..2f0019a0054e 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ config PPC >> select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 >> select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 >> select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_8xx || 40x >> + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET >> select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> index 4ddd161aef32..5c5e85b8229b 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ CFLAGS_cputable.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING >> CFLAGS_btext.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING >> endif >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET >> +# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary >> +# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset. >> +CFLAGS_REMOVE_interrupt.o = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong >> +CFLAGS_interrupt.o += -fno-stack-protector >> +#endif > I'm a bit reluctant to remove stack protection from all of interrupt.c > just for this feature. > > It's true that none of the functions in interrupt.c currently trigger > stack protection, but that could change in future. > > What about splitting system_call_exception() into a separate file as a > lead-up patch, example below. Then we can just exclude stack protection > from that one function. > > cheers Thanks, it's a good idea, I will do in v3. > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > index f91f0f29a566..ecfd333b95d1 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ obj-y := cputable.o syscalls.o \ > udbg.o misc.o io.o misc_$(BITS).o \ > of_platform.o prom_parse.o firmware.o \ > hw_breakpoint_constraints.o interrupt.o \ > - kdebugfs.o stacktrace.o > + kdebugfs.o stacktrace.o syscall.o > obj-y += ptrace/ > obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += setup_64.o \ > paca.o nvram_64.o note.o > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c > index 784ea3289c84..0e75cb03244a 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c > @@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ > unsigned long global_dbcr0[NR_CPUS]; > #endif > > -typedef long (*syscall_fn)(long, long, long, long, long, long); > - > #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 > DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(interrupt_exit_not_reentrant); > static inline bool exit_must_hard_disable(void) > @@ -73,165 +71,6 @@ static notrace __always_inline bool prep_irq_for_enabled_exit(bool restartable) > return true; > } > > -/* Has to run notrace because it is entered not completely "reconciled" */ > -notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, > - long r6, long r7, long r8, > - unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) > -{ > - syscall_fn f; > - > - kuap_lock(); > - > - regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; > - > - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) > - BUG_ON(irq_soft_mask_return() != IRQS_ALL_DISABLED); > - > - trace_hardirqs_off(); /* finish reconciling */ > - > - CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() == CONTEXT_KERNEL); > - user_exit_irqoff(); > - > - BUG_ON(regs_is_unrecoverable(regs)); > - BUG_ON(!(regs->msr & MSR_PR)); > - BUG_ON(arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs)); > - > -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PKEY > - if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY)) { > - unsigned long amr, iamr; > - bool flush_needed = false; > - /* > - * When entering from userspace we mostly have the AMR/IAMR > - * different from kernel default values. Hence don't compare. > - */ > - amr = mfspr(SPRN_AMR); > - iamr = mfspr(SPRN_IAMR); > - regs->amr = amr; > - regs->iamr = iamr; > - if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUAP)) { > - mtspr(SPRN_AMR, AMR_KUAP_BLOCKED); > - flush_needed = true; > - } > - if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUEP)) { > - mtspr(SPRN_IAMR, AMR_KUEP_BLOCKED); > - flush_needed = true; > - } > - if (flush_needed) > - isync(); > - } else > -#endif > - kuap_assert_locked(); > - > - booke_restore_dbcr0(); > - > - account_cpu_user_entry(); > - > - account_stolen_time(); > - > - /* > - * This is not required for the syscall exit path, but makes the > - * stack frame look nicer. If this was initialised in the first stack > - * frame, or if the unwinder was taught the first stack frame always > - * returns to user with IRQS_ENABLED, this store could be avoided! > - */ > - irq_soft_mask_regs_set_state(regs, IRQS_ENABLED); > - > - /* > - * If system call is called with TM active, set _TIF_RESTOREALL to > - * prevent RFSCV being used to return to userspace, because POWER9 > - * TM implementation has problems with this instruction returning to > - * transactional state. Final register values are not relevant because > - * the transaction will be aborted upon return anyway. Or in the case > - * of unsupported_scv SIGILL fault, the return state does not much > - * matter because it's an edge case. > - */ > - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM) && > - unlikely(MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr))) > - set_bits(_TIF_RESTOREALL, ¤t_thread_info()->flags); > - > - /* > - * If the system call was made with a transaction active, doom it and > - * return without performing the system call. Unless it was an > - * unsupported scv vector, in which case it's treated like an illegal > - * instruction. > - */ > -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM > - if (unlikely(MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr)) && > - !trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs)) { > - /* Enable TM in the kernel, and disable EE (for scv) */ > - hard_irq_disable(); > - mtmsr(mfmsr() | MSR_TM); > - > - /* tabort, this dooms the transaction, nothing else */ > - asm volatile(".long 0x7c00071d | ((%0) << 16)" > - :: "r"(TM_CAUSE_SYSCALL|TM_CAUSE_PERSISTENT)); > - > - /* > - * Userspace will never see the return value. Execution will > - * resume after the tbegin. of the aborted transaction with the > - * checkpointed register state. A context switch could occur > - * or signal delivered to the process before resuming the > - * doomed transaction context, but that should all be handled > - * as expected. > - */ > - return -ENOSYS; > - } > -#endif // CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM > - > - local_irq_enable(); > - > - if (unlikely(read_thread_flags() & _TIF_SYSCALL_DOTRACE)) { > - if (unlikely(trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs))) { > - /* Unsupported scv vector */ > - _exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip); > - return regs->gpr[3]; > - } > - /* > - * We use the return value of do_syscall_trace_enter() as the > - * syscall number. If the syscall was rejected for any reason > - * do_syscall_trace_enter() returns an invalid syscall number > - * and the test against NR_syscalls will fail and the return > - * value to be used is in regs->gpr[3]. > - */ > - r0 = do_syscall_trace_enter(regs); > - if (unlikely(r0 >= NR_syscalls)) > - return regs->gpr[3]; > - r3 = regs->gpr[3]; > - r4 = regs->gpr[4]; > - r5 = regs->gpr[5]; > - r6 = regs->gpr[6]; > - r7 = regs->gpr[7]; > - r8 = regs->gpr[8]; > - > - } else if (unlikely(r0 >= NR_syscalls)) { > - if (unlikely(trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs))) { > - /* Unsupported scv vector */ > - _exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip); > - return regs->gpr[3]; > - } > - return -ENOSYS; > - } > - > - /* May be faster to do array_index_nospec? */ > - barrier_nospec(); > - > - if (unlikely(is_compat_task())) { > - f = (void *)compat_sys_call_table[r0]; > - > - r3 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > - r4 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > - r5 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > - r6 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > - r7 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > - r8 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > - > - } else { > - f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; > - } > - > - return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); > -} > - > static notrace void booke_load_dbcr0(void) > { > #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..4d5689eeaf25 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c > @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later > + > +#include <linux/compat.h> > +#include <linux/context_tracking.h> > + > +#include <asm/interrupt.h> > +#include <asm/kup.h> > +#include <asm/syscall.h> > +#include <asm/time.h> > +#include <asm/tm.h> > +#include <asm/unistd.h> > + > + > +typedef long (*syscall_fn)(long, long, long, long, long, long); > + > +/* Has to run notrace because it is entered not completely "reconciled" */ > +notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, > + long r6, long r7, long r8, > + unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) > +{ > + syscall_fn f; > + > + kuap_lock(); > + > + regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; > + > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) > + BUG_ON(irq_soft_mask_return() != IRQS_ALL_DISABLED); > + > + trace_hardirqs_off(); /* finish reconciling */ > + > + CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() == CONTEXT_KERNEL); > + user_exit_irqoff(); > + > + BUG_ON(regs_is_unrecoverable(regs)); > + BUG_ON(!(regs->msr & MSR_PR)); > + BUG_ON(arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs)); > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PKEY > + if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY)) { > + unsigned long amr, iamr; > + bool flush_needed = false; > + /* > + * When entering from userspace we mostly have the AMR/IAMR > + * different from kernel default values. Hence don't compare. > + */ > + amr = mfspr(SPRN_AMR); > + iamr = mfspr(SPRN_IAMR); > + regs->amr = amr; > + regs->iamr = iamr; > + if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUAP)) { > + mtspr(SPRN_AMR, AMR_KUAP_BLOCKED); > + flush_needed = true; > + } > + if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUEP)) { > + mtspr(SPRN_IAMR, AMR_KUEP_BLOCKED); > + flush_needed = true; > + } > + if (flush_needed) > + isync(); > + } else > +#endif > + kuap_assert_locked(); > + > + booke_restore_dbcr0(); > + > + account_cpu_user_entry(); > + > + account_stolen_time(); > + > + /* > + * This is not required for the syscall exit path, but makes the > + * stack frame look nicer. If this was initialised in the first stack > + * frame, or if the unwinder was taught the first stack frame always > + * returns to user with IRQS_ENABLED, this store could be avoided! > + */ > + irq_soft_mask_regs_set_state(regs, IRQS_ENABLED); > + > + /* > + * If system call is called with TM active, set _TIF_RESTOREALL to > + * prevent RFSCV being used to return to userspace, because POWER9 > + * TM implementation has problems with this instruction returning to > + * transactional state. Final register values are not relevant because > + * the transaction will be aborted upon return anyway. Or in the case > + * of unsupported_scv SIGILL fault, the return state does not much > + * matter because it's an edge case. > + */ > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM) && > + unlikely(MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr))) > + set_bits(_TIF_RESTOREALL, ¤t_thread_info()->flags); > + > + /* > + * If the system call was made with a transaction active, doom it and > + * return without performing the system call. Unless it was an > + * unsupported scv vector, in which case it's treated like an illegal > + * instruction. > + */ > +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM > + if (unlikely(MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr)) && > + !trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs)) { > + /* Enable TM in the kernel, and disable EE (for scv) */ > + hard_irq_disable(); > + mtmsr(mfmsr() | MSR_TM); > + > + /* tabort, this dooms the transaction, nothing else */ > + asm volatile(".long 0x7c00071d | ((%0) << 16)" > + :: "r"(TM_CAUSE_SYSCALL|TM_CAUSE_PERSISTENT)); > + > + /* > + * Userspace will never see the return value. Execution will > + * resume after the tbegin. of the aborted transaction with the > + * checkpointed register state. A context switch could occur > + * or signal delivered to the process before resuming the > + * doomed transaction context, but that should all be handled > + * as expected. > + */ > + return -ENOSYS; > + } > +#endif // CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM > + > + local_irq_enable(); > + > + if (unlikely(read_thread_flags() & _TIF_SYSCALL_DOTRACE)) { > + if (unlikely(trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs))) { > + /* Unsupported scv vector */ > + _exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip); > + return regs->gpr[3]; > + } > + /* > + * We use the return value of do_syscall_trace_enter() as the > + * syscall number. If the syscall was rejected for any reason > + * do_syscall_trace_enter() returns an invalid syscall number > + * and the test against NR_syscalls will fail and the return > + * value to be used is in regs->gpr[3]. > + */ > + r0 = do_syscall_trace_enter(regs); > + if (unlikely(r0 >= NR_syscalls)) > + return regs->gpr[3]; > + r3 = regs->gpr[3]; > + r4 = regs->gpr[4]; > + r5 = regs->gpr[5]; > + r6 = regs->gpr[6]; > + r7 = regs->gpr[7]; > + r8 = regs->gpr[8]; > + > + } else if (unlikely(r0 >= NR_syscalls)) { > + if (unlikely(trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs))) { > + /* Unsupported scv vector */ > + _exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip); > + return regs->gpr[3]; > + } > + return -ENOSYS; > + } > + > + /* May be faster to do array_index_nospec? */ > + barrier_nospec(); > + > + if (unlikely(is_compat_task())) { > + f = (void *)compat_sys_call_table[r0]; > + > + r3 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > + r4 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > + r5 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > + r6 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > + r7 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > + r8 &= 0x00000000ffffffffULL; > + > + } else { > + f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; > + } > + > + return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); > +}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index 98309eeae09c..2f0019a0054e 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ config PPC select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if PPC32 && PPC_PAGE_SHIFT <= 14 select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_8xx || 40x + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index 4ddd161aef32..5c5e85b8229b 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ CFLAGS_cputable.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING CFLAGS_btext.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET +# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary +# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset. +CFLAGS_REMOVE_interrupt.o = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong +CFLAGS_interrupt.o += -fno-stack-protector +#endif + obj-y := cputable.o syscalls.o \ irq.o align.o signal_$(BITS).o pmc.o vdso.o \ process.o systbl.o idle.o \ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c index 784ea3289c84..d7cdcb6fc336 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* for show_regs */ +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> #include <asm/kup.h> #include <asm/cputime.h> @@ -78,10 +79,12 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, long r6, long r7, long r8, unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs) { + long ret; syscall_fn f; kuap_lock(); + add_random_kstack_offset(); regs->orig_gpr3 = r3; if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG)) @@ -229,7 +232,21 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5, f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0]; } - return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); + ret = f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8); + /* + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), + * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes(10 bits). + * + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when + * applying stack alignment constraints: the powerpc architecture + * may have two kinds of stack alignment(16-bytes and 8-bytes). + * + * So the resulting 6 or 7 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4] or SP[9:3]. + * + */ + choose_random_kstack_offset(mftb()); + + return ret; } static notrace void booke_load_dbcr0(void)
Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better performance. In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this must be disabled at the compilation unit level. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> --- Changes in v2: -move choose choose_random_kstack_offset() to the end of system_call_exception -allow full 6 (10) bits of entropy -disable stack-protector for interrupt.c --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 7 +++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)