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[v2,6/7] ksmbd: fix invalid request buffer access in compound

Message ID 20210925131625.29617-7-linkinjeon@kernel.org
State New
Headers show
Series ksmbd: a bunch of patches | expand

Commit Message

Namjae Jeon Sept. 25, 2021, 1:16 p.m. UTC 
Ronnie reported invalid request buffer access in chained command when
inserting garbage value to NextCommand of compound request.
This patch add validation check to avoid this issue.

Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>
Cc: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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Patch

diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
index c463375b0a4a..713f861fdaad 100644
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
@@ -459,13 +459,22 @@  static void init_chained_smb2_rsp(struct ksmbd_work *work)
 bool is_chained_smb2_message(struct ksmbd_work *work)
 {
 	struct smb2_hdr *hdr = work->request_buf;
-	unsigned int len;
+	unsigned int len, next_cmd;
 
 	if (hdr->ProtocolId != SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER)
 		return false;
 
 	hdr = ksmbd_req_buf_next(work);
-	if (le32_to_cpu(hdr->NextCommand) > 0) {
+	next_cmd = le32_to_cpu(hdr->NextCommand);
+	if (next_cmd > 0) {
+		if ((u64)work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off + next_cmd +
+			__SMB2_HEADER_STRUCTURE_SIZE >
+		    get_rfc1002_len(work->request_buf)) {
+			pr_err("next command(%u) offset exceeds smb msg size\n",
+			       next_cmd);
+			return false;
+		}
+
 		ksmbd_debug(SMB, "got SMB2 chained command\n");
 		init_chained_smb2_rsp(work);
 		return true;