From patchwork Wed Dec 18 05:11:30 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Mackerras X-Patchwork-Id: 1211961 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@bilbo.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (no SPF record) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=kvm-ppc-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; secure) header.d=ozlabs.org header.i=@ozlabs.org header.b="Sf+V97fQ"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47d35T3hhSz9sS6 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 16:11:41 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725818AbfLRFLk (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 00:11:40 -0500 Received: from ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:51191 "EHLO ozlabs.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725797AbfLRFLk (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 00:11:40 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1003) id 47d35Q0Hx6z9sRl; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 16:11:37 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=ozlabs.org; s=201707; t=1576645898; bh=93N8VOo8SCifT0RoMTSN2PKiLco93mZr6cUDSYI7iGY=; h=Date:From:To:Subject:From; b=Sf+V97fQIP+xjVTfXjs7QkPY6KUzLk6WUv1oXQAOBYy6EjkoxncqrxBgGe8uyoqlO zOHjE/FaRl3eVq1L0RC82EYbBbDI3TSkYmR3ehw59Ux9gptGj06yuK8nepILjhsXQP OrplO34urCMEM1VWcqzH12kTWwvEP6YLzPguMCznTb4EDf5W7SKrI7n3QsZ/XJbBkS QkvYcuSYaiiUZAw3cPpQEwoVzFFaUYkunNGIMGAEqA0blCcrC5FtZZAj9B3vvvjGWy Xotr5chWd51m+6TB3oyyGN9jkq73n0jqo783Hk4dMccFwZtcoRG9/6/MbAaXllELIG mMvqpTcqK2dGA== Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 16:11:30 +1100 From: Paul Mackerras To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't do ultravisor calls on systems without ultravisor Message-ID: <20191218051130.GA29890@oak.ozlabs.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: kvm-ppc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org Commit 22945688acd4 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Support reset of secure guest") added a call to uv_svm_terminate, which is an ultravisor call, without any check that the guest is a secure guest or even that the system has an ultravisor. On a system without an ultravisor, the ultracall will degenerate to a hypercall, but since we are not in KVM guest context, the hypercall will get treated as a system call, which could have random effects depending on what happens to be in r0, and could also corrupt the current task's kernel stack. Hence this adds a test for the guest being a secure guest before doing uv_svm_terminate(). Fixes: 22945688acd4 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Support reset of secure guest") Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras --- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c index dc53578193ee..6ff3f896d908 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c @@ -4983,7 +4983,8 @@ static void kvmppc_core_destroy_vm_hv(struct kvm *kvm) if (nesting_enabled(kvm)) kvmhv_release_all_nested(kvm); kvm->arch.process_table = 0; - uv_svm_terminate(kvm->arch.lpid); + if (kvm->arch.secure_guest) + uv_svm_terminate(kvm->arch.lpid); kvmhv_set_ptbl_entry(kvm->arch.lpid, 0, 0); }