| Message ID | 20260515030901.743078-1-Jason.Huang2@infineon.com |
|---|---|
| State | Rejected |
| Headers | show |
| Series | AP: Reject WPA-PSK AKM when PMF is required | expand |
On Fri, May 15, 2026 at 11:09:01AM +0800, Jason Huang wrote: > PMF required mode (ieee80211w=2) must not be combined with WPA-PSK AKM. Why? That combination is what the PMF program was initially launched with and I see no reason to suddenly start disallowing it. > That configuration is internally inconsistent and should be rejected during > configuration validation instead of being accepted at startup. What do you mean with being "internally inconsistent"? > Add a config-time check to fail when PMF is required and the selected AKM > set includes WPA-PSK. Use a bitmask-based test so this also catches mixed > AKM sets (for example, WPA-PSK + SAE), not only one specific AKM > combination. > > This makes hostapd fail fast with a clear error for invalid security policy > selection and prevents deployment of unsupported PMF-required PSK setups. This would disallow configurations that are valid and as such, I don't think this is going to be an acceptable change.
diff --git a/src/ap/ap_config.c b/src/ap/ap_config.c index 36a4dad65..0a7785cce 100644 --- a/src/ap/ap_config.c +++ b/src/ap/ap_config.c @@ -1536,6 +1536,13 @@ static int hostapd_config_check_bss(struct hostapd_bss_config *bss, WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 | WPA_CIPHER_GCMP))) bss->spp_amsdu = false; + if (full_config && (bss->ieee80211w == 2) && + (bss->wpa_key_mgmt & WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, + "Cannot set ieee80211w=2 along with the selected wpa_key_mgmt"); + return -1; + } + return 0; }