From patchwork Tue Dec 18 15:06:19 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?b?SsO8cmdlbiBHcm/Dnw==?= X-Patchwork-Id: 1015422 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming-netdev@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming-netdev@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=suse.com Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43K1ZD59GSz9sCr for ; Wed, 19 Dec 2018 02:06:28 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726836AbeLRPGY (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Dec 2018 10:06:24 -0500 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:35184 "EHLO mx1.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726685AbeLRPGX (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Dec 2018 10:06:23 -0500 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.254]) by mx1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88DE4AC4E; Tue, 18 Dec 2018 15:06:21 +0000 (UTC) From: Juergen Gross To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: davem@davemloft.net, sstabellini@kernel.org, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, Juergen Gross , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] xen/netfront: tolerate frags with no data Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 16:06:19 +0100 Message-Id: <20181218150619.6964-1-jgross@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org At least old Xen net backends seem to send frags with no real data sometimes. In case such a fragment happens to occur with the frag limit already reached the frontend will BUG currently even if this situation is easily recoverable. Modify the BUG_ON() condition accordingly. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross --- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c index f17f602e6171..5b97cc946d70 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue, if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) { unsigned int pull_to = NETFRONT_SKB_CB(skb)->pull_to; - BUG_ON(pull_to <= skb_headlen(skb)); + BUG_ON(pull_to < skb_headlen(skb)); __pskb_pull_tail(skb, pull_to - skb_headlen(skb)); } if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {