From patchwork Mon Oct 9 17:30:09 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jakub Kicinski X-Patchwork-Id: 823379 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="jRR2yh9Z"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3y9nMH2sknz9t6C for ; Tue, 10 Oct 2017 04:30:35 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755008AbdJIRac (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Oct 2017 13:30:32 -0400 Received: from mail-pf0-f179.google.com ([209.85.192.179]:48874 "EHLO mail-pf0-f179.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754885AbdJIRa2 (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Oct 2017 13:30:28 -0400 Received: by mail-pf0-f179.google.com with SMTP id b79so2152247pfk.5 for ; Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:28 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=PsphdSLnugYD5dckrASNJGiaKDBTNnhFsG+zAM2QWSQ=; b=jRR2yh9ZBa1YRIk+NeCQIb73XrE+tDM7VzCiP8xRgEmn/mRdQ48Sopd+TRw4ZRl93T 5yOO8V+Ce/BLoqSTqEURb2f++9NDljXVJATgwJVwP9OUBjn8Hc0DLVPgP35VrYgrB1LM flonocl2MxIjX0m8ZpcQvoVzSL14yfEFD1SmBYzom/4/YBCUb5v3eK2QRPgOXkMGfv76 nU4FfGsK3S/zi1kdubEU/HAm6BPDuKaeyceiuOuy3AjsjHvPnlQzPHbWnZNEzZuBGvlv yw/fJP/SyEkmPeufO3rtilMsWKezI7M8NnI3ciEL9WZeMsd4BCaJWwG5XmOVRTWuA47n ZLnw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=PsphdSLnugYD5dckrASNJGiaKDBTNnhFsG+zAM2QWSQ=; b=fDpZ3oc/8osj62vkriaA9YVla7um+QNTain714tMhyakHJuyNtAU577l6dU6o6MP1F fb2tYF/q2SPKIUZ3fWvnNtnra66rCdQqhWmvCr2rlYRKD5UqLQxBGEjvPg9zcdKUJe6i eiKQPcNl/C78mHM3i7MqNCrWT5iAHLPi5aww0vgsqPJZKJPkdPgHqkDIonX7RJ8Zl3II xDNE9vUrD0twXhcjj8XvBS9CBuWEY5vanliIysxJ+XuaeZtSngMwSbCifiYSQMPZrfpJ dx7UR8qGms6Y8NxUWxPgWWlvYDrwDkguaQRsfvNWdlzcy2ujrzfnDLaF4zXE7yGJRBLr WsBQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AMCzsaXqDQYCNlqHapiV5SiLsSClBA71QMj5QYZpj2fwGcKbSG/9Mhzo VrRY5SqmAcLULyEaOVVVaAGRjA6g X-Google-Smtp-Source: AOwi7QBH8cfIeTF7l+xh04nxmT2lnTrilgmILIJUUE/Y8sd3/P+2JVfIkMXymdTorv6QV6eGHBSnBw== X-Received: by 10.98.101.132 with SMTP id z126mr10738546pfb.302.1507570227297; Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jkicinski-Precision-T1700.netronome.com ([75.53.12.129]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c185sm17342537pfb.57.2017.10.09.10.30.26 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:26 -0700 (PDT) From: Jakub Kicinski To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: oss-drivers@netronome.com, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, daniel@iogearbox.net, Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH net-next v2 1/7] selftests/bpf: add a test for verifier logs Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 10:30:09 -0700 Message-Id: <20171009173015.23520-2-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> References: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Add a test for verifier log handling. Check bad attr combinations but focus on cases when log is truncated. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier_log.c | 171 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier_log.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile index 924af8d79bde..2e7880ea0add 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 -I$(APIDIR) -I$(LIBDIR) -I$(GENDIR) $(GENFLAGS) -I../../../i LDLIBS += -lcap -lelf TEST_GEN_PROGS = test_verifier test_tag test_maps test_lru_map test_lpm_map test_progs \ - test_align + test_align test_verifier_log TEST_GEN_FILES = test_pkt_access.o test_xdp.o test_l4lb.o test_tcp_estats.o test_obj_id.o \ test_pkt_md_access.o test_xdp_redirect.o test_xdp_meta.o sockmap_parse_prog.o \ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier_log.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier_log.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3cc0b561489e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier_log.c @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#define LOG_SIZE (1 << 20) + +#define err(str...) printf("ERROR: " str) + +static const struct bpf_insn code_sample[] = { + /* We need a few instructions to pass the min log length */ + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, + BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), +}; + +static inline __u64 ptr_to_u64(const void *ptr) +{ + return (__u64) (unsigned long) ptr; +} + +static int load(char *log, size_t log_len, int log_level) +{ + union bpf_attr attr; + + bzero(&attr, sizeof(attr)); + attr.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER; + attr.insn_cnt = (__u32)(sizeof(code_sample) / sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); + attr.insns = ptr_to_u64(code_sample); + attr.license = ptr_to_u64("GPL"); + attr.log_buf = ptr_to_u64(log); + attr.log_size = log_len; + attr.log_level = log_level; + + return syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_PROG_LOAD, &attr, sizeof(attr)); +} + +static void check_ret(int ret, int exp_errno) +{ + if (ret > 0) { + close(ret); + err("broken sample loaded successfully!?\n"); + exit(1); + } + + if (!ret || errno != exp_errno) { + err("Program load returned: ret:%d/errno:%d, expected ret:%d/errno:%d\n", + ret, errno, -1, exp_errno); + exit(1); + } +} + +static void check_ones(const char *buf, size_t len, const char *msg) +{ + while (len--) + if (buf[len] != 1) { + err("%s", msg); + exit(1); + } +} + +static void test_log_good(char *log, size_t buf_len, size_t log_len, + size_t exp_len, int exp_errno, const char *full_log) +{ + size_t len; + int ret; + + memset(log, 1, buf_len); + + ret = load(log, log_len, 1); + check_ret(ret, exp_errno); + + len = strnlen(log, buf_len); + if (len == buf_len) { + err("verifier did not NULL terminate the log\n"); + exit(1); + } + if (exp_len && len != exp_len) { + err("incorrect log length expected:%zd have:%zd\n", + exp_len, len); + exit(1); + } + + if (strchr(log, 1)) { + err("verifier leaked a byte through\n"); + exit(1); + } + + check_ones(log + len + 1, buf_len - len - 1, + "verifier wrote bytes past NULL termination\n"); + + if (memcmp(full_log, log, LOG_SIZE)) { + err("log did not match expected output\n"); + exit(1); + } +} + +static void test_log_bad(char *log, size_t log_len, int log_level) +{ + int ret; + + ret = load(log, log_len, log_level); + check_ret(ret, EINVAL); + if (log) + check_ones(log, LOG_SIZE, + "verifier touched log with bad parameters\n"); +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char full_log[LOG_SIZE]; + char log[LOG_SIZE]; + size_t want_len; + int i; + + memset(log, 1, LOG_SIZE); + + /* Test incorrect attr */ + printf("Test log_level 0...\n"); + test_log_bad(log, LOG_SIZE, 0); + + printf("Test log_size < 128...\n"); + test_log_bad(log, 15, 1); + + printf("Test log_buff = NULL...\n"); + test_log_bad(NULL, LOG_SIZE, 1); + + /* Test with log big enough */ + printf("Test oversized buffer...\n"); + test_log_good(full_log, LOG_SIZE, LOG_SIZE, 0, EACCES, full_log); + + want_len = strlen(full_log); + + printf("Test exact buffer...\n"); + test_log_good(log, LOG_SIZE, want_len + 2, want_len, EACCES, full_log); + + printf("Test undersized buffers...\n"); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + full_log[want_len - i + 1] = 1; + full_log[want_len - i] = 0; + + test_log_good(log, LOG_SIZE, want_len + 1 - i, want_len - i, + ENOSPC, full_log); + } + + printf("test_verifier_log: OK\n"); + return 0; +} From patchwork Mon Oct 9 17:30:10 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jakub Kicinski X-Patchwork-Id: 823385 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="UxheRRer"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3y9nNK6CDxz9t6C for ; Tue, 10 Oct 2017 04:31:29 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755246AbdJIRb2 (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Oct 2017 13:31:28 -0400 Received: from mail-pf0-f173.google.com ([209.85.192.173]:50793 "EHLO mail-pf0-f173.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754831AbdJIRa3 (ORCPT ); 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Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jkicinski-Precision-T1700.netronome.com ([75.53.12.129]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c185sm17342537pfb.57.2017.10.09.10.30.27 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:27 -0700 (PDT) From: Jakub Kicinski To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: oss-drivers@netronome.com, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, daniel@iogearbox.net, Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH net-next v2 2/7] bpf: encapsulate verifier log state into a structure Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 10:30:10 -0700 Message-Id: <20171009173015.23520-3-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> References: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Put the loose log_* variables into a structure. This will make it simpler to remove the global verifier state in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 13 ++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index b8d200f60a40..163541ba70d9 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -115,6 +115,19 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data { #define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */ +struct bpf_verifer_log { + u32 level; + char *kbuf; + char __user *ubuf; + u32 len_used; + u32 len_total; +}; + +static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_full(const struct bpf_verifer_log *log) +{ + return log->len_used >= log->len_total - 1; +} + struct bpf_verifier_env; struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops { int (*insn_hook)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 590125e29161..4b95831dc409 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -156,8 +156,7 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta { /* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars */ -static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len; -static char *log_buf; +static struct bpf_verifer_log verifier_log; static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); @@ -167,13 +166,15 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); */ static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...) { + struct bpf_verifer_log *log = &verifier_log; va_list args; - if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1) + if (!log->level || bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) return; va_start(args, fmt); - log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args); + log->len_used += vscnprintf(log->kbuf + log->len_used, + log->len_total - log->len_used, fmt, args); va_end(args); } @@ -882,7 +883,7 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. */ - if (log_level) + if (verifier_log.level) print_verifier_state(state); /* The minimum value is only important with signed * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a @@ -2951,7 +2952,7 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg); return -EACCES; } - if (log_level) + if (verifier_log.level) print_verifier_state(this_branch); return 0; } @@ -3707,7 +3708,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return err; if (err == 1) { /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ - if (log_level) { + if (verifier_log.level) { if (do_print_state) verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n", prev_insn_idx, insn_idx); @@ -3720,8 +3721,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (need_resched()) cond_resched(); - if (log_level > 1 || (log_level && do_print_state)) { - if (log_level > 1) + if (verifier_log.level > 1 || + (verifier_log.level && do_print_state)) { + if (verifier_log.level > 1) verbose("%d:", insn_idx); else verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:", @@ -3730,7 +3732,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) do_print_state = false; } - if (log_level) { + if (verifier_log.level) { verbose("%d: ", insn_idx); print_bpf_insn(env, insn); } @@ -4384,7 +4386,7 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) { - char __user *log_ubuf = NULL; + struct bpf_verifer_log *log = &verifier_log; struct bpf_verifier_env *env; int ret = -EINVAL; @@ -4409,23 +4411,23 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) /* user requested verbose verifier output * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace */ - log_level = attr->log_level; - log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; - log_size = attr->log_size; - log_len = 0; + log->level = attr->log_level; + log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; + log->len_total = attr->log_size; + log->len_used = 0; ret = -EINVAL; - /* log_* values have to be sane */ - if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 || - log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL) + /* log attributes have to be sane */ + if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 8 || + !log->level || !log->ubuf) goto err_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; - log_buf = vmalloc(log_size); - if (!log_buf) + log->kbuf = vmalloc(log->len_total); + if (!log->kbuf) goto err_unlock; } else { - log_level = 0; + log->level = 0; } env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); @@ -4462,15 +4464,16 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) if (ret == 0) ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env); - if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) { - BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size); + if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) { + BUG_ON(log->len_used >= log->len_total); /* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */ ret = -ENOSPC; /* fall through to return what was recorded */ } /* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */ - if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) { + if (log->level && copy_to_user(log->ubuf, log->kbuf, + log->len_used + 1) != 0) { ret = -EFAULT; goto free_log_buf; } @@ -4497,8 +4500,8 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) } free_log_buf: - if (log_level) - vfree(log_buf); + if (log->level) + vfree(log->kbuf); if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release * them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them. @@ -4535,7 +4538,7 @@ int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops, /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); - log_level = 0; + verifier_log.level = 0; env->strict_alignment = false; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) From patchwork Mon Oct 9 17:30:11 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jakub Kicinski X-Patchwork-Id: 823383 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="Vc3GdeKl"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3y9nMb4Mf0z9tXl for ; Tue, 10 Oct 2017 04:30:51 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755149AbdJIRat (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Oct 2017 13:30:49 -0400 Received: from mail-pf0-f175.google.com ([209.85.192.175]:43914 "EHLO mail-pf0-f175.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754898AbdJIRab (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Oct 2017 13:30:31 -0400 Received: by mail-pf0-f175.google.com with SMTP id d2so11247817pfh.0 for ; Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:30 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=o9BoSP878Wz4yK6Jh75UmT4cZU40Byz+yZo0o8qbb2I=; b=Vc3GdeKlZJzL1X89fiMq7/Mxqvmv88n2yHSC4AzlFPP0U+JOe8nhICQn3PAZs4Ce/a +0Bjzd+x3Fmbr5tHv33fM9fyIe71x48IcAWRiWmU8i/qWHab1cr8i/JDXShqwNSpYAU1 Zyh6LY3FeD/H078uHNVqMDEj7Zby+0Eger2wH5+jG+ZRMNigr+yqkPmhUg9ToTLief2p R42QWph22q5BtgMGHwvY9gec3UY/oD42Y88iwfUPfJATTkdLXJJMctBXgwADyCLs2/jz bc78hQSCyeDlsXpOhj5bTTrf/lVeF78GXdNjZn+xdHqRHfhX7SzEw7nIL4N9hbTdSQuM RksA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=o9BoSP878Wz4yK6Jh75UmT4cZU40Byz+yZo0o8qbb2I=; b=B0xaBoblGTA0qvhtPxbmZtICuFuTqBMG12AfPr0jqEEAe1wqSSHgNqWp50Fej6roI3 C8o2A01kxIKuNdKRzFbgR+ppsOejOCjjdlz9sY//MvuvGS1GI8JP5dEU2KAZ2lZGM3h2 rM1uyGutgdipoqWk21twWl64DlxMkBjNXO7S0wGhUW1L9NfEhqf0NIzgikTIQ8wSPueA wUoO1Eiz0xswtK9xSsu9zxVhYSMbDpM+NZosKusL09Bt2qVpUSVNuGrcLU5Wyg/5fQ7b +GqqGs3N1S5GvIOGKuIe400jgpHfHeMwwX18Ww68Whq8LKafBldL2OfUBTavvzHvNolj I99Q== X-Gm-Message-State: AMCzsaU2Vn3FP+9mQEX1LXWShLnR9tjneiHuxCKvcSeif/DQ5SvK8t62 8a3yUMiUpDzWI7vIzdF1Ud+UIRvK X-Google-Smtp-Source: AOwi7QDxhSYJm5VisDPbnUhMB/d/M6zanM98VHQ1UmWgxqHvwdruWFmKZ5u8YFR0NMqPfuU+5URfMQ== X-Received: by 10.99.125.18 with SMTP id y18mr9664509pgc.428.1507570229338; Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jkicinski-Precision-T1700.netronome.com ([75.53.12.129]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c185sm17342537pfb.57.2017.10.09.10.30.28 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:28 -0700 (PDT) From: Jakub Kicinski To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: oss-drivers@netronome.com, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, daniel@iogearbox.net, Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH net-next v2 3/7] bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 10:30:11 -0700 Message-Id: <20171009173015.23520-4-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> References: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 491 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 261 insertions(+), 232 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 163541ba70d9..5ddb9a626a51 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env { bool allow_ptr_leaks; bool seen_direct_write; struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */ + + struct bpf_verifer_log log; }; int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 4b95831dc409..bddd84baf2b1 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -153,20 +153,16 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta { int access_size; }; -/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing - * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars - */ -static struct bpf_verifer_log verifier_log; - static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user * can figure out what's wrong with the program */ -static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...) +static __printf(2, 3) void verbose(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const char *fmt, ...) { - struct bpf_verifer_log *log = &verifier_log; + struct bpf_verifer_log *log = &env->log; va_list args; if (!log->level || bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) @@ -214,7 +210,8 @@ static const char *func_id_name(int id) return "unknown"; } -static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) +static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *state) { struct bpf_reg_state *reg; enum bpf_reg_type t; @@ -225,21 +222,21 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) t = reg->type; if (t == NOT_INIT) continue; - verbose(" R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]); + verbose(env, " R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]); if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ - verbose("%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); + verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); } else { - verbose("(id=%d", reg->id); + verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id); if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) - verbose(",off=%d", reg->off); + verbose(env, ",off=%d", reg->off); if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) - verbose(",r=%d", reg->range); + verbose(env, ",r=%d", reg->range); else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) - verbose(",ks=%d,vs=%d", + verbose(env, ",ks=%d,vs=%d", reg->map_ptr->key_size, reg->map_ptr->value_size); if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { @@ -247,38 +244,38 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) * could be a pointer whose offset is too big * for reg->off */ - verbose(",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); + verbose(env, ",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); } else { if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) - verbose(",smin_value=%lld", + verbose(env, ",smin_value=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value); if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) - verbose(",smax_value=%lld", + verbose(env, ",smax_value=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value); if (reg->umin_value != 0) - verbose(",umin_value=%llu", + verbose(env, ",umin_value=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) - verbose(",umax_value=%llu", + verbose(env, ",umax_value=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose(",var_off=%s", tn_buf); + verbose(env, ",var_off=%s", tn_buf); } } - verbose(")"); + verbose(env, ")"); } } for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { if (state->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL) - verbose(" fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i, + verbose(env, " fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i, reg_type_str[state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]); } - verbose("\n"); + verbose(env, "\n"); } static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = { @@ -333,15 +330,15 @@ static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = { [BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit", }; -static void print_bpf_end_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +static void print_bpf_end_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_insn *insn) { - verbose("(%02x) r%d = %s%d r%d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, + verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s%d r%d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_TO_BE ? "be" : "le", insn->imm, insn->dst_reg); } -static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_insn *insn) { u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); @@ -349,23 +346,23 @@ static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_END) { if (class == BPF_ALU64) - verbose("BUG_alu64_%02x\n", insn->code); + verbose(env, "BUG_alu64_%02x\n", insn->code); else print_bpf_end_insn(env, insn); } else if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_NEG) { - verbose("(%02x) r%d = %s-r%d\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s-r%d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", insn->dst_reg); } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { - verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n", insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", insn->dst_reg, bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", insn->src_reg); } else { - verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n", insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", insn->dst_reg, bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], @@ -374,46 +371,46 @@ static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } } else if (class == BPF_STX) { if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) - verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n", insn->code, bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], insn->dst_reg, insn->off, insn->src_reg); else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) - verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n", insn->code, bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], insn->dst_reg, insn->off, insn->src_reg); else - verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code); + verbose(env, "BUG_%02x\n", insn->code); } else if (class == BPF_ST) { if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { - verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code); + verbose(env, "BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code); return; } - verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n", insn->code, bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], insn->dst_reg, insn->off, insn->imm); } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { - verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code); + verbose(env, "BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code); return; } - verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], insn->src_reg, insn->off); } else if (class == BPF_LD) { if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) { - verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n", insn->code, bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], insn->imm); } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) { - verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n", insn->code, bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], insn->src_reg, insn->imm); @@ -428,36 +425,37 @@ static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks) imm = 0; - verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code, + verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm); } else { - verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code); + verbose(env, "BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code); return; } } else if (class == BPF_JMP) { u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { - verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code, + verbose(env, "(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code, func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { - verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) goto pc%+d\n", insn->code, insn->off); } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) { - verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code); + verbose(env, "(%02x) exit\n", insn->code); } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { - verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], insn->src_reg, insn->off); } else { - verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n", + verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], insn->imm, insn->off); } } else { - verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]); + verbose(env, "(%02x) %s\n", + insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]); } } @@ -496,7 +494,7 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, env->head = elem; env->stack_size++; if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) { - verbose("BPF program is too complex\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF program is too complex\n"); goto err; } return &elem->st; @@ -534,10 +532,11 @@ static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); } -static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) +static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) { if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { - verbose("mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); + verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); @@ -647,10 +646,11 @@ static void __mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); } -static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) +static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) { if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { - verbose("mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); + verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); @@ -665,10 +665,11 @@ static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) reg->type = NOT_INIT; } -static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) +static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) { if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { - verbose("mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); + verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); @@ -677,22 +678,23 @@ static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); } -static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_reg_state *regs) +static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *regs) { int i; for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { - mark_reg_not_init(regs, i); + mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; } /* frame pointer */ regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; - mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_FP); + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); /* 1st arg to a function */ regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; - mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_1); + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); } enum reg_arg_type { @@ -722,26 +724,26 @@ static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs; if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { - verbose("R%d is invalid\n", regno); + verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); return -EINVAL; } if (t == SRC_OP) { /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) { - verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno); + verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); return -EACCES; } mark_reg_read(&env->cur_state, regno); } else { /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { - verbose("frame pointer is read only\n"); + verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); return -EACCES; } regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; if (t == DST_OP) - mark_reg_unknown(regs, regno); + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); } return 0; } @@ -766,7 +768,8 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) /* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers, * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() */ -static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, +static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size, int value_regno) { int i, spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE; @@ -779,7 +782,7 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { - verbose("invalid size of register spill\n"); + verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); return -EACCES; } @@ -814,7 +817,8 @@ static void mark_stack_slot_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int slo } } -static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size, +static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size, int value_regno) { u8 *slot_type; @@ -824,12 +828,12 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size, if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) { if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { - verbose("invalid size of register spill\n"); + verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); return -EACCES; } for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) { - verbose("corrupted spill memory\n"); + verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n"); return -EACCES; } } @@ -845,14 +849,14 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size, } else { for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) { - verbose("invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", + verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", off, i, size); return -EACCES; } } if (value_regno >= 0) /* have read misc data from the stack */ - mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno); + mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); return 0; } } @@ -864,7 +868,7 @@ static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr; if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > map->value_size) { - verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", + verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", map->value_size, off, size); return -EACCES; } @@ -883,8 +887,8 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. */ - if (verifier_log.level) - print_verifier_state(state); + if (env->log.level) + print_verifier_state(env, state); /* The minimum value is only important with signed * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our @@ -892,13 +896,14 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, * will have a set floor within our range. */ if (reg->smin_value < 0) { - verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", + verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", regno); return -EACCES; } err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size); if (err) { - verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n", regno); + verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the array range\n", + regno); return err; } @@ -907,13 +912,14 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. */ if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { - verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n", + verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n", regno); return -EACCES; } err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size); if (err) - verbose("R%d max value is outside of the array range\n", regno); + verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the array range\n", + regno); return err; } @@ -952,7 +958,7 @@ static int __check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || (u64)off + size > reg->range) { - verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", + verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range); return -EACCES; } @@ -975,13 +981,13 @@ static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, * detail to prove they're safe. */ if (reg->smin_value < 0) { - verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", + verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", regno); return -EACCES; } err = __check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size); if (err) { - verbose("R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); + verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); return err; } return err; @@ -1017,7 +1023,7 @@ static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, return 0; } - verbose("invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); + verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); return -EACCES; } @@ -1035,7 +1041,8 @@ static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, &env->cur_state.regs[regno]); } -static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, +static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size, bool strict) { struct tnum reg_off; @@ -1060,7 +1067,8 @@ static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", + verbose(env, + "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); return -EACCES; } @@ -1068,7 +1076,8 @@ static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, return 0; } -static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, +static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, const char *pointer_desc, int off, int size, bool strict) { @@ -1083,7 +1092,7 @@ static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose("misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", + verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); return -EACCES; } @@ -1104,7 +1113,7 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits * right in front, treat it the very same way. */ - return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size, strict); + return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: pointer_desc = "value "; break; @@ -1117,7 +1126,8 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, default: break; } - return check_generic_ptr_alignment(reg, pointer_desc, off, size, strict); + return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, + strict); } /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) @@ -1149,20 +1159,20 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { - verbose("R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); + verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); return -EACCES; } err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size); if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) - mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno); + mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { - verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); + verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); return -EACCES; } /* ctx accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can @@ -1172,7 +1182,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose("variable ctx access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d", + verbose(env, + "variable ctx access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d", tn_buf, off, size); return -EACCES; } @@ -1184,9 +1195,10 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn * case, we know the offset is zero. */ if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) - mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno); + mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); else - mark_reg_known_zero(state->regs, value_regno); + mark_reg_known_zero(env, state->regs, + value_regno); state->regs[value_regno].id = 0; state->regs[value_regno].off = 0; state->regs[value_regno].range = 0; @@ -1202,13 +1214,14 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose("variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d", + verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d", tn_buf, off, size); return -EACCES; } off += reg->var_off.value; if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { - verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); + verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, + size); return -EACCES; } @@ -1219,29 +1232,32 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off] == STACK_SPILL && size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { - verbose("attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); + verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); return -EACCES; } - err = check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno); + err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size, + value_regno); } else { - err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno); + err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size, + value_regno); } } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { - verbose("cannot write into packet\n"); + verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); return -EACCES; } if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { - verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno); + verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", + value_regno); return -EACCES; } err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size); if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) - mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno); + mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); } else { - verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", - regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]); + verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, + reg_type_str[reg->type]); return -EACCES; } @@ -1261,7 +1277,7 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) || insn->imm != 0) { - verbose("BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1276,7 +1292,7 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins return err; if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { - verbose("R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); + verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); return -EACCES; } @@ -1317,7 +1333,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, register_is_null(regs[regno])) return 0; - verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, + verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, reg_type_str[regs[regno].type], reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]); return -EACCES; @@ -1328,13 +1344,13 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off); - verbose("invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n", + verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n", regno, tn_buf); } off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value; if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 || access_size <= 0) { - verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n", + verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n", regno, off, access_size); return -EACCES; } @@ -1350,7 +1366,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) { if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) { - verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", + verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", off, i, access_size); return -EACCES; } @@ -1393,7 +1409,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { - verbose("R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", regno); + verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", + regno); return -EACCES; } return 0; @@ -1401,7 +1418,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { - verbose("helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); + verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); return -EACCES; } @@ -1439,7 +1456,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, goto err_type; meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM; } else { - verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type); + verbose(env, "unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type); return -EFAULT; } @@ -1457,7 +1474,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ - verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); + verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); return -EACCES; } if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type)) @@ -1473,7 +1490,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, */ if (!meta->map_ptr) { /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ - verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); + verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); return -EACCES; } if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type)) @@ -1493,7 +1510,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, */ if (regno == 0) { /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ - verbose("ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n"); + verbose(env, + "ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n"); return -EACCES; } @@ -1510,7 +1528,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, meta = NULL; if (reg->smin_value < 0) { - verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", + verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", regno); return -EACCES; } @@ -1524,7 +1542,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, } if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { - verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", + verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", regno); return -EACCES; } @@ -1535,12 +1553,13 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, return err; err_type: - verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, + verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]); return -EACCES; } -static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) +static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) { if (!map) return 0; @@ -1628,7 +1647,7 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) return 0; error: - verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", + verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1662,7 +1681,7 @@ static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(®s[i])) - mark_reg_unknown(regs, i); + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) @@ -1684,7 +1703,8 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) /* find function prototype */ if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { - verbose("invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); + verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), + func_id); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1692,13 +1712,14 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id); if (!fn) { - verbose("unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); + verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), + func_id); return -EINVAL; } /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { - verbose("cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n"); + verbose(env, "cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1712,7 +1733,7 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) */ err = check_raw_mode(fn); if (err) { - verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", + verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); return err; } @@ -1745,14 +1766,14 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) /* reset caller saved regs */ for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { - mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]); + mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); } /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) { /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ - mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0); + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) { regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { @@ -1760,14 +1781,15 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL; /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ - mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_0); + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0; /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */ if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { - verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); + verbose(env, + "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); return -EINVAL; } regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; @@ -1778,12 +1800,12 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr) insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; } else { - verbose("unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n", + verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n", fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); return -EINVAL; } - err = check_map_func_compatibility(meta.map_ptr, func_id); + err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); if (err) return err; @@ -1842,39 +1864,42 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, dst_reg = ®s[dst]; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (smin_val != smax_val))) { - print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); - verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n"); + print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state); + verbose(env, + "verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (umin_val != umax_val))) { - print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); - verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n"); + print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state); + verbose(env, + "verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) - verbose("R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", + verbose(env, + "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", dst); return -EACCES; } if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) - verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n", + verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n", dst); return -EACCES; } if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) - verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n", + verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n", dst); return -EACCES; } if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) - verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n", + verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n", dst); return -EACCES; } @@ -1939,7 +1964,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (dst_reg == off_reg) { /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) - verbose("R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", + verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", dst); return -EACCES; } @@ -1949,7 +1974,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, */ if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) - verbose("R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", + verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", dst); return -EACCES; } @@ -2004,13 +2029,13 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.) */ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) - verbose("R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", + verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); return -EACCES; default: /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) - verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", + verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); return -EACCES; } @@ -2176,7 +2201,7 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes * shifts by a negative number. */ - mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); break; } /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick @@ -2204,7 +2229,7 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes * shifts by a negative number. */ - mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); break; } /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts */ @@ -2232,7 +2257,7 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); break; default: - mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); break; } @@ -2264,12 +2289,12 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * an arbitrary scalar. */ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { - verbose("R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", + verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); return -EACCES; } - mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); return 0; } else { /* scalar += pointer @@ -2321,13 +2346,13 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { - print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); - verbose("verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); + print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state); + verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { - print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); - verbose("verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); + print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state); + verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); return -EINVAL; } return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); @@ -2345,14 +2370,14 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 || insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { - verbose("BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } } else { if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { - verbose("BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } } @@ -2363,7 +2388,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return err; if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { - verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", + verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg); return -EACCES; } @@ -2377,7 +2402,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { - verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -2387,7 +2412,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return err; } else { if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { - verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } } @@ -2406,11 +2431,12 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) } else { /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { - verbose("R%d partial copy of pointer\n", + verbose(env, + "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", insn->src_reg); return -EACCES; } - mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); /* high 32 bits are known zero. */ regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast( regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4); @@ -2425,14 +2451,14 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) } } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { - verbose("invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); + verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); return -EINVAL; } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { - verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } /* check src1 operand */ @@ -2441,7 +2467,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return err; } else { if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { - verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } } @@ -2453,7 +2479,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { - verbose("div by zero\n"); + verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -2462,7 +2488,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { - verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); + verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); return -EINVAL; } } @@ -2815,13 +2841,13 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int err; if (opcode > BPF_JSLE) { - verbose("invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode); + verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode); return -EINVAL; } if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { if (insn->imm != 0) { - verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -2831,13 +2857,13 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return err; if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { - verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", + verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->src_reg); return -EACCES; } } else { if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { - verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } } @@ -2949,11 +2975,12 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, ®s[insn->src_reg], PTR_TO_PACKET_META); } else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { - verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg); + verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", + insn->dst_reg); return -EACCES; } - if (verifier_log.level) - print_verifier_state(this_branch); + if (env->log.level) + print_verifier_state(env, this_branch); return 0; } @@ -2972,11 +2999,11 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) int err; if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { - verbose("invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); + verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (insn->off != 0) { - verbose("BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -3034,14 +3061,14 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) int i, err; if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) { - verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { - verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -3051,7 +3078,8 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return err; if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { - verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); + verbose(env, + "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -3064,7 +3092,7 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { - mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]); + mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); } @@ -3072,7 +3100,7 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) * the value fetched from the packet. * Already marked as written above. */ - mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0); + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); return 0; } @@ -3092,22 +3120,22 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) reg = &env->cur_state.regs[BPF_REG_0]; if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { - verbose("At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", + verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", reg_type_str[reg->type]); return -EINVAL; } if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { - verbose("At program exit the register R0 "); + verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 "); if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose("has value %s", tn_buf); + verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); } else { - verbose("has unknown scalar value"); + verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); } - verbose(" should have been 0 or 1\n"); + verbose(env, " should have been 0 or 1\n"); return -EINVAL; } return 0; @@ -3173,7 +3201,7 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return 0; if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { - verbose("jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); + verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); return -EINVAL; } @@ -3190,13 +3218,13 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w; return 1; } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { - verbose("back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); + verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); return -EINVAL; } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { /* forward- or cross-edge */ insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; } else { - verbose("insn state internal bug\n"); + verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); return -EFAULT; } return 0; @@ -3290,7 +3318,7 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) mark_explored: insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; if (cur_stack-- <= 0) { - verbose("pop stack internal bug\n"); + verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); ret = -EFAULT; goto err_free; } @@ -3299,7 +3327,7 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) check_state: for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { - verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i); + verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); ret = -EINVAL; goto err_free; } @@ -3680,7 +3708,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) int insn_processed = 0; bool do_print_state = false; - init_reg_state(regs); + init_reg_state(env, regs); state->parent = NULL; insn_idx = 0; for (;;) { @@ -3689,7 +3717,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) int err; if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { - verbose("invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", + verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", insn_idx, insn_cnt); return -EFAULT; } @@ -3698,7 +3726,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { - verbose("BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", + verbose(env, + "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", insn_processed); return -E2BIG; } @@ -3708,12 +3737,12 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return err; if (err == 1) { /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ - if (verifier_log.level) { + if (env->log.level) { if (do_print_state) - verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n", + verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n", prev_insn_idx, insn_idx); else - verbose("%d: safe\n", insn_idx); + verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", insn_idx); } goto process_bpf_exit; } @@ -3721,19 +3750,18 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (need_resched()) cond_resched(); - if (verifier_log.level > 1 || - (verifier_log.level && do_print_state)) { - if (verifier_log.level > 1) - verbose("%d:", insn_idx); + if (env->log.level > 1 || (env->log.level && do_print_state)) { + if (env->log.level > 1) + verbose(env, "%d:", insn_idx); else - verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:", + verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d:", prev_insn_idx, insn_idx); - print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); + print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state); do_print_state = false; } - if (verifier_log.level) { - verbose("%d: ", insn_idx); + if (env->log.level) { + verbose(env, "%d: ", insn_idx); print_bpf_insn(env, insn); } @@ -3790,7 +3818,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. * Reject it. */ - verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); + verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -3830,14 +3858,14 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type && (dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX || *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) { - verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); + verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); return -EINVAL; } } else if (class == BPF_ST) { if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { - verbose("BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } /* check src operand */ @@ -3860,7 +3888,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn->off != 0 || insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) { - verbose("BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -3873,7 +3901,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn->imm != 0 || insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) { - verbose("BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -3885,7 +3913,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn->imm != 0 || insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) { - verbose("BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -3900,7 +3928,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return err; if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { - verbose("R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); + verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); return -EACCES; } @@ -3935,19 +3963,19 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn_idx++; } else { - verbose("invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); + verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); return -EINVAL; } } else { - verbose("unknown insn class %d\n", class); + verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); return -EINVAL; } insn_idx++; } - verbose("processed %d insns, stack depth %d\n", - insn_processed, env->prog->aux->stack_depth); + verbose(env, "processed %d insns, stack depth %d\n", insn_processed, + env->prog->aux->stack_depth); return 0; } @@ -3959,7 +3987,8 @@ static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map) !(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); } -static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, +static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_prog *prog) { @@ -3970,12 +3999,12 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, */ if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) { if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) { - verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); + verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (map->inner_map_meta && !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) { - verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n"); + verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n"); return -EINVAL; } } @@ -3998,14 +4027,14 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { - verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) { - verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); + verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -4016,7 +4045,7 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || insn[1].off != 0) { - verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); + verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -4025,19 +4054,20 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) goto next_insn; if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) { - verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); + verbose(env, + "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); return -EINVAL; } f = fdget(insn->imm); map = __bpf_map_get(f); if (IS_ERR(map)) { - verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", + verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", insn->imm); return PTR_ERR(map); } - err = check_map_prog_compatibility(map, env->prog); + err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); if (err) { fdput(f); return err; @@ -4159,7 +4189,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, env->prog); if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { - verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); + verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); return -EINVAL; } else if (cnt) { new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); @@ -4207,7 +4237,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) u8 size_code; if (type == BPF_WRITE) { - verbose("bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); + verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -4226,7 +4256,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) &target_size); if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { - verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); + verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -4308,7 +4338,7 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) cnt = map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { - verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); + verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -4352,7 +4382,8 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions */ if (!fn->func) { - verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", + verbose(env, + "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); return -EFAULT; } @@ -4386,8 +4417,8 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) { - struct bpf_verifer_log *log = &verifier_log; struct bpf_verifier_env *env; + struct bpf_verifer_log *log; int ret = -EINVAL; /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, @@ -4396,6 +4427,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); if (!env) return -ENOMEM; + log = &env->log; env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (*prog)->len); @@ -4414,7 +4446,6 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) log->level = attr->log_level; log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; log->len_total = attr->log_size; - log->len_used = 0; ret = -EINVAL; /* log attributes have to be sane */ @@ -4426,8 +4457,6 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) log->kbuf = vmalloc(log->len_total); if (!log->kbuf) goto err_unlock; - } else { - log->level = 0; } env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); @@ -4538,8 +4567,6 @@ int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops, /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); - verifier_log.level = 0; - env->strict_alignment = false; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) env->strict_alignment = true; From patchwork Mon Oct 9 17:30:12 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jakub Kicinski X-Patchwork-Id: 823382 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; 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Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jkicinski-Precision-T1700.netronome.com ([75.53.12.129]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c185sm17342537pfb.57.2017.10.09.10.30.29 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Jakub Kicinski To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: oss-drivers@netronome.com, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, daniel@iogearbox.net, Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH net-next v2 4/7] bpf: move instruction printing into a separate file Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 10:30:12 -0700 Message-Id: <20171009173015.23520-5-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> References: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Separate the instruction printing into a standalone source file. This way sneaky code from tools/ can compile it in directly. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann --- kernel/bpf/Makefile | 1 + kernel/bpf/disasm.c | 214 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/disasm.h | 32 ++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 202 +---------------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 251 insertions(+), 198 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/disasm.c create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/disasm.h diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/Makefile index 897daa005b23..53fb09f92e3f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/Makefile +++ b/kernel/bpf/Makefile @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ obj-y := core.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += syscall.o verifier.o inode.o helpers.o tnum.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += hashtab.o arraymap.o percpu_freelist.o bpf_lru_list.o lpm_trie.o map_in_map.o +obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += disasm.o ifeq ($(CONFIG_NET),y) obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += devmap.o ifeq ($(CONFIG_STREAM_PARSER),y) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/disasm.c b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e682850c9715 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com + * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * General Public License for more details. + */ + +#include + +#include "disasm.h" + +#define __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN(x) [BPF_FUNC_ ## x] = __stringify(bpf_ ## x) +static const char * const func_id_str[] = { + __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(__BPF_FUNC_STR_FN) +}; +#undef __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN + +const char *func_id_name(int id) +{ + BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(func_id_str) != __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID); + + if (id >= 0 && id < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID && func_id_str[id]) + return func_id_str[id]; + else + return "unknown"; +} + +const char *const bpf_class_string[8] = { + [BPF_LD] = "ld", + [BPF_LDX] = "ldx", + [BPF_ST] = "st", + [BPF_STX] = "stx", + [BPF_ALU] = "alu", + [BPF_JMP] = "jmp", + [BPF_RET] = "BUG", + [BPF_ALU64] = "alu64", +}; + +const char *const bpf_alu_string[16] = { + [BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=", + [BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=", + [BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=", + [BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=", + [BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=", + [BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=", + [BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=", + [BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=", + [BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg", + [BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=", + [BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=", + [BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=", + [BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=", + [BPF_END >> 4] = "endian", +}; + +static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = { + [BPF_W >> 3] = "u32", + [BPF_H >> 3] = "u16", + [BPF_B >> 3] = "u8", + [BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64", +}; + +static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = { + [BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp", + [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==", + [BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">", + [BPF_JLT >> 4] = "<", + [BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=", + [BPF_JLE >> 4] = "<=", + [BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&", + [BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=", + [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>", + [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = "s<", + [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=", + [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = "s<=", + [BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call", + [BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit", +}; + +static void print_bpf_end_insn(bpf_insn_print_cb verbose, + struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s%d r%d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, + BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_TO_BE ? "be" : "le", + insn->imm, insn->dst_reg); +} + +void print_bpf_insn(bpf_insn_print_cb verbose, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_insn *insn, bool allow_ptr_leaks) +{ + u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); + + if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { + if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_END) { + if (class == BPF_ALU64) + verbose(env, "BUG_alu64_%02x\n", insn->code); + else + print_bpf_end_insn(verbose, env, insn); + } else if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_NEG) { + verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s-r%d\n", + insn->code, insn->dst_reg, + class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", + insn->dst_reg); + } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { + verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n", + insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", + insn->dst_reg, + bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], + class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", + insn->src_reg); + } else { + verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n", + insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", + insn->dst_reg, + bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], + class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", + insn->imm); + } + } else if (class == BPF_STX) { + if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) + verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n", + insn->code, + bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], + insn->dst_reg, + insn->off, insn->src_reg); + else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) + verbose(env, "(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n", + insn->code, + bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], + insn->dst_reg, insn->off, + insn->src_reg); + else + verbose(env, "BUG_%02x\n", insn->code); + } else if (class == BPF_ST) { + if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { + verbose(env, "BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code); + return; + } + verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n", + insn->code, + bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], + insn->dst_reg, + insn->off, insn->imm); + } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { + if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { + verbose(env, "BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code); + return; + } + verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n", + insn->code, insn->dst_reg, + bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], + insn->src_reg, insn->off); + } else if (class == BPF_LD) { + if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) { + verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n", + insn->code, + bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], + insn->imm); + } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) { + verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n", + insn->code, + bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], + insn->src_reg, insn->imm); + } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM && + BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) { + /* At this point, we already made sure that the second + * part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible. + */ + u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; + bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD; + + if (map_ptr && !allow_ptr_leaks) + imm = 0; + + verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code, + insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm); + } else { + verbose(env, "BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code); + return; + } + } else if (class == BPF_JMP) { + u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); + + if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { + verbose(env, "(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code, + func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); + } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { + verbose(env, "(%02x) goto pc%+d\n", + insn->code, insn->off); + } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) { + verbose(env, "(%02x) exit\n", insn->code); + } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { + verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n", + insn->code, insn->dst_reg, + bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], + insn->src_reg, insn->off); + } else { + verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n", + insn->code, insn->dst_reg, + bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], + insn->imm, insn->off); + } + } else { + verbose(env, "(%02x) %s\n", + insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]); + } +} diff --git a/kernel/bpf/disasm.h b/kernel/bpf/disasm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8de977e420b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/bpf/disasm.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com + * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * General Public License for more details. + */ + +#ifndef __BPF_DISASM_H__ +#define __BPF_DISASM_H__ + +#include +#include +#include + +extern const char *const bpf_alu_string[16]; +extern const char *const bpf_class_string[8]; + +const char *func_id_name(int id); + +struct bpf_verifier_env; +typedef void (*bpf_insn_print_cb)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const char *, ...); +void print_bpf_insn(bpf_insn_print_cb verbose, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_insn *insn, bool allow_ptr_leaks); + +#endif diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index bddd84baf2b1..511602969c5e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ #include #include +#include "disasm.h" + /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. @@ -194,22 +196,6 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", }; -#define __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN(x) [BPF_FUNC_ ## x] = __stringify(bpf_ ## x) -static const char * const func_id_str[] = { - __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(__BPF_FUNC_STR_FN) -}; -#undef __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN - -static const char *func_id_name(int id) -{ - BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(func_id_str) != __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID); - - if (id >= 0 && id < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID && func_id_str[id]) - return func_id_str[id]; - else - return "unknown"; -} - static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *state) { @@ -278,187 +264,6 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, verbose(env, "\n"); } -static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = { - [BPF_LD] = "ld", - [BPF_LDX] = "ldx", - [BPF_ST] = "st", - [BPF_STX] = "stx", - [BPF_ALU] = "alu", - [BPF_JMP] = "jmp", - [BPF_RET] = "BUG", - [BPF_ALU64] = "alu64", -}; - -static const char *const bpf_alu_string[16] = { - [BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=", - [BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=", - [BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=", - [BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=", - [BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=", - [BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=", - [BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=", - [BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=", - [BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg", - [BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=", - [BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=", - [BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=", - [BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=", - [BPF_END >> 4] = "endian", -}; - -static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = { - [BPF_W >> 3] = "u32", - [BPF_H >> 3] = "u16", - [BPF_B >> 3] = "u8", - [BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64", -}; - -static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = { - [BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp", - [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==", - [BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">", - [BPF_JLT >> 4] = "<", - [BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=", - [BPF_JLE >> 4] = "<=", - [BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&", - [BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=", - [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>", - [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = "s<", - [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=", - [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = "s<=", - [BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call", - [BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit", -}; - -static void print_bpf_end_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - const struct bpf_insn *insn) -{ - verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s%d r%d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, - BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_TO_BE ? "be" : "le", - insn->imm, insn->dst_reg); -} - -static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - const struct bpf_insn *insn) -{ - u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); - - if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { - if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_END) { - if (class == BPF_ALU64) - verbose(env, "BUG_alu64_%02x\n", insn->code); - else - print_bpf_end_insn(env, insn); - } else if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_NEG) { - verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s-r%d\n", - insn->code, insn->dst_reg, - class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", - insn->dst_reg); - } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { - verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n", - insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", - insn->dst_reg, - bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], - class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", - insn->src_reg); - } else { - verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n", - insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", - insn->dst_reg, - bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], - class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", - insn->imm); - } - } else if (class == BPF_STX) { - if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) - verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n", - insn->code, - bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], - insn->dst_reg, - insn->off, insn->src_reg); - else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) - verbose(env, "(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n", - insn->code, - bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], - insn->dst_reg, insn->off, - insn->src_reg); - else - verbose(env, "BUG_%02x\n", insn->code); - } else if (class == BPF_ST) { - if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { - verbose(env, "BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code); - return; - } - verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n", - insn->code, - bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], - insn->dst_reg, - insn->off, insn->imm); - } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { - if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { - verbose(env, "BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code); - return; - } - verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n", - insn->code, insn->dst_reg, - bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], - insn->src_reg, insn->off); - } else if (class == BPF_LD) { - if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) { - verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n", - insn->code, - bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], - insn->imm); - } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) { - verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n", - insn->code, - bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], - insn->src_reg, insn->imm); - } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM && - BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) { - /* At this point, we already made sure that the second - * part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible. - */ - u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; - bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD; - - if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks) - imm = 0; - - verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code, - insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm); - } else { - verbose(env, "BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code); - return; - } - } else if (class == BPF_JMP) { - u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); - - if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { - verbose(env, "(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code, - func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); - } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { - verbose(env, "(%02x) goto pc%+d\n", - insn->code, insn->off); - } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) { - verbose(env, "(%02x) exit\n", insn->code); - } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { - verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n", - insn->code, insn->dst_reg, - bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], - insn->src_reg, insn->off); - } else { - verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n", - insn->code, insn->dst_reg, - bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], - insn->imm, insn->off); - } - } else { - verbose(env, "(%02x) %s\n", - insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]); - } -} - static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx) { struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; @@ -3762,7 +3567,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (env->log.level) { verbose(env, "%d: ", insn_idx); - print_bpf_insn(env, insn); + print_bpf_insn(verbose, env, insn, + env->allow_ptr_leaks); } err = ext_analyzer_insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx); From patchwork Mon Oct 9 17:30:13 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jakub Kicinski X-Patchwork-Id: 823380 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="yCBPMuky"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3y9nMM1Qqtz9t6C for ; Tue, 10 Oct 2017 04:30:39 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755041AbdJIRag (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Oct 2017 13:30:36 -0400 Received: from mail-pf0-f181.google.com ([209.85.192.181]:54864 "EHLO mail-pf0-f181.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751952AbdJIRac (ORCPT ); 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Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jkicinski-Precision-T1700.netronome.com ([75.53.12.129]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c185sm17342537pfb.57.2017.10.09.10.30.30 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:30 -0700 (PDT) From: Jakub Kicinski To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: oss-drivers@netronome.com, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, daniel@iogearbox.net, Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH net-next v2 5/7] tools: bpftool: use the kernel's instruction printer Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 10:30:13 -0700 Message-Id: <20171009173015.23520-6-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> References: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Compile the instruction printer from kernel/bpf and use it for disassembling "translated" eBPF code. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann --- tools/bpf/bpftool/Documentation/bpftool-prog.rst | 11 +++--- tools/bpf/bpftool/Makefile | 7 ++-- tools/bpf/bpftool/main.h | 10 ++---- tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/Documentation/bpftool-prog.rst b/tools/bpf/bpftool/Documentation/bpftool-prog.rst index 57fc4b9924ea..04d12f768f06 100644 --- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/Documentation/bpftool-prog.rst +++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/Documentation/bpftool-prog.rst @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ SYNOPSIS ======== | **bpftool** prog show [*PROG*] -| **bpftool** prog dump xlated *PROG* file *FILE* +| **bpftool** prog dump xlated *PROG* [file *FILE*] [opcodes] | **bpftool** prog dump jited *PROG* [file *FILE*] [opcodes] | **bpftool** prog pin *PROG* *FILE* | **bpftool** prog help @@ -28,9 +28,12 @@ DESCRIPTION Output will start with program ID followed by program type and zero or more named attributes (depending on kernel version). - **bpftool prog dump xlated** *PROG* **file** *FILE* - Dump eBPF instructions of the program from the kernel to a - file. + **bpftool prog dump xlated** *PROG* [**file** *FILE*] [**opcodes**] + Dump eBPF instructions of the program from the kernel. + If *FILE* is specified image will be written to a file, + otherwise it will be disassembled and printed to stdout. + + **opcodes** controls if raw opcodes will be printed. **bpftool prog dump jited** *PROG* [**file** *FILE*] [**opcodes**] Dump jited image (host machine code) of the program. diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/Makefile b/tools/bpf/bpftool/Makefile index 8705ee44664d..4f339824ca57 100644 --- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/Makefile +++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/Makefile @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ CC = gcc CFLAGS += -O2 CFLAGS += -W -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wshadow -CFLAGS += -D__EXPORTED_HEADERS__ -I$(srctree)/tools/include/uapi -I$(srctree)/tools/include -I$(srctree)/tools/lib/bpf +CFLAGS += -D__EXPORTED_HEADERS__ -I$(srctree)/tools/include/uapi -I$(srctree)/tools/include -I$(srctree)/tools/lib/bpf -I$(srctree)/kernel/bpf/ LIBS = -lelf -lbfd -lopcodes $(LIBBPF) include $(wildcard *.d) @@ -59,7 +59,10 @@ include $(wildcard *.d) all: $(OUTPUT)bpftool SRCS=$(wildcard *.c) -OBJS=$(patsubst %.c,$(OUTPUT)%.o,$(SRCS)) +OBJS=$(patsubst %.c,$(OUTPUT)%.o,$(SRCS)) $(OUTPUT)disasm.o + +$(OUTPUT)disasm.o: $(srctree)/kernel/bpf/disasm.c + $(QUIET_CC)$(COMPILE.c) -MMD -o $@ $< $(OUTPUT)bpftool: $(OBJS) $(LIBBPF) $(QUIET_LINK)$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $^ $(LIBS) diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/main.h b/tools/bpf/bpftool/main.h index 85d2d7870a58..8e809b2bb311 100644 --- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/main.h +++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/main.h @@ -36,11 +36,12 @@ #ifndef __BPF_TOOL_H #define __BPF_TOOL_H +/* BFD and kernel.h both define GCC_VERSION, differently */ +#undef GCC_VERSION #include #include #include - -#define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof(a[0])) +#include #define err(msg...) fprintf(stderr, "Error: " msg) #define warn(msg...) fprintf(stderr, "Warning: " msg) @@ -48,11 +49,6 @@ #define ptr_to_u64(ptr) ((__u64)(unsigned long)(ptr)) -#define min(a, b) \ - ({ typeof(a) _a = (a); typeof(b) _b = (b); _a > _b ? _b : _a; }) -#define max(a, b) \ - ({ typeof(a) _a = (a); typeof(b) _b = (b); _a < _b ? _b : _a; }) - #define NEXT_ARG() ({ argc--; argv++; if (argc < 0) usage(); }) #define NEXT_ARGP() ({ (*argc)--; (*argv)++; if (*argc < 0) usage(); }) #define BAD_ARG() ({ err("what is '%s'?\n", *argv); -1; }) diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c b/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c index 421ba89ce86a..9e2681c83717 100644 --- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c +++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ #include #include "main.h" +#include "disasm.h" static const char * const prog_type_name[] = { [BPF_PROG_TYPE_UNSPEC] = "unspec", @@ -297,11 +299,39 @@ static int do_show(int argc, char **argv) return 0; } +static void print_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vprintf(fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +static void dump_xlated(void *buf, unsigned int len, bool opcodes) +{ + struct bpf_insn *insn = buf; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len / sizeof(*insn); i++) { + printf("% 4d: ", i); + print_bpf_insn(print_insn, NULL, insn + i, true); + + if (opcodes) { + printf(" "); + print_hex(insn + i, 8, " "); + printf("\n"); + } + + if (insn[i].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) + i++; + } +} + static int do_dump(int argc, char **argv) { struct bpf_prog_info info = {}; __u32 len = sizeof(info); - bool can_disasm = false; unsigned int buf_size; char *filepath = NULL; bool opcodes = false; @@ -315,7 +345,6 @@ static int do_dump(int argc, char **argv) if (is_prefix(*argv, "jited")) { member_len = &info.jited_prog_len; member_ptr = &info.jited_prog_insns; - can_disasm = true; } else if (is_prefix(*argv, "xlated")) { member_len = &info.xlated_prog_len; member_ptr = &info.xlated_prog_insns; @@ -346,10 +375,6 @@ static int do_dump(int argc, char **argv) NEXT_ARG(); } - if (!filepath && !can_disasm) { - err("expected 'file' got %s\n", *argv); - return -1; - } if (argc) { usage(); return -1; @@ -409,7 +434,10 @@ static int do_dump(int argc, char **argv) goto err_free; } } else { - disasm_print_insn(buf, *member_len, opcodes); + if (member_len == &info.jited_prog_len) + disasm_print_insn(buf, *member_len, opcodes); + else + dump_xlated(buf, *member_len, opcodes); } free(buf); @@ -430,7 +458,7 @@ static int do_help(int argc, char **argv) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s %s show [PROG]\n" - " %s %s dump xlated PROG file FILE\n" + " %s %s dump xlated PROG [file FILE] [opcodes]\n" " %s %s dump jited PROG [file FILE] [opcodes]\n" " %s %s pin PROG FILE\n" " %s %s help\n" From patchwork Mon Oct 9 17:30:14 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jakub Kicinski X-Patchwork-Id: 823381 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; 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Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jkicinski-Precision-T1700.netronome.com ([75.53.12.129]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c185sm17342537pfb.57.2017.10.09.10.30.31 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:31 -0700 (PDT) From: Jakub Kicinski To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: oss-drivers@netronome.com, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, daniel@iogearbox.net, Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH net-next v2 6/7] bpf: don't rely on the verifier lock for metadata_dst allocation Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 10:30:14 -0700 Message-Id: <20171009173015.23520-7-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> References: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org bpf_skb_set_tunnel_*() functions require allocation of per-cpu metadata_dst. The allocation happens upon verification of the first program using those helpers. In preparation for removing the verifier lock, use cmpxchg() to make sure we only allocate the metadata_dsts once. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann --- include/net/dst_metadata.h | 1 + net/core/dst.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ net/core/filter.c | 16 +++++++++------- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/dst_metadata.h b/include/net/dst_metadata.h index 9fba2ebf6dda..87a0bb8d449f 100644 --- a/include/net/dst_metadata.h +++ b/include/net/dst_metadata.h @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static inline int skb_metadata_dst_cmp(const struct sk_buff *skb_a, void metadata_dst_free(struct metadata_dst *); struct metadata_dst *metadata_dst_alloc(u8 optslen, enum metadata_type type, gfp_t flags); +void metadata_dst_free_percpu(struct metadata_dst __percpu *md_dst); struct metadata_dst __percpu * metadata_dst_alloc_percpu(u8 optslen, enum metadata_type type, gfp_t flags); diff --git a/net/core/dst.c b/net/core/dst.c index a6c47da7d0f8..8b2eafac984d 100644 --- a/net/core/dst.c +++ b/net/core/dst.c @@ -322,3 +322,19 @@ metadata_dst_alloc_percpu(u8 optslen, enum metadata_type type, gfp_t flags) return md_dst; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(metadata_dst_alloc_percpu); + +void metadata_dst_free_percpu(struct metadata_dst __percpu *md_dst) +{ + int cpu; + +#ifdef CONFIG_DST_CACHE + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + struct metadata_dst *one_md_dst = per_cpu_ptr(md_dst, cpu); + + if (one_md_dst->type == METADATA_IP_TUNNEL) + dst_cache_destroy(&one_md_dst->u.tun_info.dst_cache); + } +#endif + free_percpu(md_dst); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(metadata_dst_free_percpu); diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index b7e8caa1e790..140fa9f9c0f4 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -2987,14 +2988,15 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto * bpf_get_skb_set_tunnel_proto(enum bpf_func_id which) { if (!md_dst) { - /* Race is not possible, since it's called from verifier - * that is holding verifier mutex. - */ - md_dst = metadata_dst_alloc_percpu(IP_TUNNEL_OPTS_MAX, - METADATA_IP_TUNNEL, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!md_dst) + struct metadata_dst __percpu *tmp; + + tmp = metadata_dst_alloc_percpu(IP_TUNNEL_OPTS_MAX, + METADATA_IP_TUNNEL, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tmp) return NULL; + if (cmpxchg(&md_dst, NULL, tmp)) + metadata_dst_free_percpu(tmp); } switch (which) { From patchwork Mon Oct 9 17:30:15 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jakub Kicinski X-Patchwork-Id: 823384 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@netronome-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="12hlH/G1"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3y9nMp04PPz9tXl for ; 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Mon, 09 Oct 2017 10:30:32 -0700 (PDT) From: Jakub Kicinski To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: oss-drivers@netronome.com, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, daniel@iogearbox.net, Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH net-next v2 7/7] bpf: write back the verifier log buffer as it gets filled Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 10:30:15 -0700 Message-Id: <20171009173015.23520-8-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> References: <20171009173015.23520-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Verifier log buffer can be quite large (up to 16MB currently). As Eric Dumazet points out if we allow multiple verification requests to proceed simultaneously, malicious user may use the verifier as a way of allocating large amounts of unswappable memory to OOM the host. Switch to a strategy of allocating a smaller buffer (1024B) and writing it out into the user buffer after every print. While at it remove the old BUG_ON(). This is in preparation of the global verifier lock removal. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 +++- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 5ddb9a626a51..f00ef751c1c5 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -115,9 +115,11 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data { #define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */ +#define BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE 1024 + struct bpf_verifer_log { u32 level; - char *kbuf; + char kbuf[BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE]; char __user *ubuf; u32 len_used; u32 len_total; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 511602969c5e..8d08a266aa42 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -165,15 +165,26 @@ static __printf(2, 3) void verbose(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const char *fmt, ...) { struct bpf_verifer_log *log = &env->log; + unsigned int n; va_list args; - if (!log->level || bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) + if (!log->level || !log->ubuf || bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) return; va_start(args, fmt); - log->len_used += vscnprintf(log->kbuf + log->len_used, - log->len_total - log->len_used, fmt, args); + n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args); va_end(args); + + WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1, + "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n"); + + n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n); + log->kbuf[n] = '\0'; + + if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1)) + log->len_used += n; + else + log->ubuf = NULL; } static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) @@ -4258,11 +4269,6 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 8 || !log->level || !log->ubuf) goto err_unlock; - - ret = -ENOMEM; - log->kbuf = vmalloc(log->len_total); - if (!log->kbuf) - goto err_unlock; } env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); @@ -4299,18 +4305,11 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) if (ret == 0) ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env); - if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) { - BUG_ON(log->len_used >= log->len_total); - /* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */ + if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) ret = -ENOSPC; - /* fall through to return what was recorded */ - } - - /* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */ - if (log->level && copy_to_user(log->ubuf, log->kbuf, - log->len_used + 1) != 0) { + if (log->level && !log->ubuf) { ret = -EFAULT; - goto free_log_buf; + goto err_release_maps; } if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) { @@ -4321,7 +4320,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto free_log_buf; + goto err_release_maps; } memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, @@ -4334,9 +4333,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); } -free_log_buf: - if (log->level) - vfree(log->kbuf); +err_release_maps: if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release * them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.