diff mbox series

[11/13] x86/bhi: Mitigate KVM by default

Message ID 20240416145325.535615-12-stefan.bader@canonical.com
State New
Headers show
Series CVE-2024-2201 | expand

Commit Message

Stefan Bader April 16, 2024, 2:53 p.m. UTC
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>

commit 95a6ccbdc7199a14b71ad8901cb788ba7fb5167b upstream.

BHI mitigation mode spectre_bhi=auto does not deploy the software
mitigation by default. In a cloud environment, it is a likely scenario
where userspace is trusted but the guests are not trusted. Deploying
system wide mitigation in such cases is not desirable.

Update the auto mode to unconditionally mitigate against malicious
guests. Deploy the software sequence at VMexit in auto mode also, when
hardware mitigation is not available. Unlike the force =on mode,
software sequence is not deployed at syscalls in auto mode.

Suggested-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

CVE-2024-2201
(cherry picked from commit c2b9e038896f01ba4bec87cfc97573b7f1b736d6 linux-5.15.y)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst   | 7 +++++--
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h              | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            | 5 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 9 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S                      | 2 +-
 6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 7e2761f15c9d..18904b1b6bed 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -439,10 +439,12 @@  The possible values in this file are:
    - System is protected by retpoline
  * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
    - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
- * - BHI: SW loop
+ * - BHI: SW loop; KVM SW loop
    - System is protected by software clearing sequence
  * - BHI: Syscall hardening
    - Syscalls are hardened against BHI
+ * - BHI: Syscall hardening; KVM: SW loop
+   - System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
 
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
@@ -714,7 +716,8 @@  For user space mitigation:
 			unconditionally disable.
 		auto
 			enable if hardware mitigation
-			control(BHI_DIS_S) is available.
+			control(BHI_DIS_S) is available, otherwise
+			enable alternate mitigation in KVM.
 
 For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index bc55c1b56295..a1b25a73519e 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5402,8 +5402,9 @@ 
 
 			on   - unconditionally enable.
 			off  - unconditionally disable.
-			auto - (default) enable only if hardware mitigation
-			       control(BHI_DIS_S) is available.
+			auto - (default) enable hardware mitigation
+			       (BHI_DIS_S) if available, otherwise enable
+			       alternate mitigation in KVM.
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 3140a9c543cc..9ff8e613ee36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ 
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP	(21*32+ 1) /* "" Clear branch history at syscall entry using SW loop */
 #define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL		(21*32+ 2) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control available */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW	(21*32+ 3) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT (21*32+ 4) /* "" Clear branch history at vmexit using SW loop */
 
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index b1496b96ee52..f16fb9f06355 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -186,8 +186,13 @@ 
 .macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
 	ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP
 .endm
+
+.macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT
+.endm
 #else
 #define CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
+#define CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT
 #endif
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index cd03cfcd10d3..f3b97102a4d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1577,9 +1577,14 @@  static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
 		return;
 
+	/* Mitigate KVM by default */
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
+	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n");
+
 	if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO)
 		return;
 
+	/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP);
 	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n");
 }
@@ -2712,10 +2717,12 @@  static const char * const spectre_bhi_state(void)
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW))
 		return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S";
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
-		return "; BHI: SW loop";
+		return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
 		 !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
 		return "; BHI: Retpoline";
+	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
+		return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";
 
 	return "; BHI: Vulnerable (Syscall hardening enabled)";
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index 5d8e1b01d6bf..b2e78e6d1e5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@  SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 
 	call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host
 
-	CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
+	CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT
 
 	/* Put return value in AX */
 	mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX