diff mbox series

[eoan:linux-aws,focal:linux-aws,1/1] UBUNTU: SAUCE: overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking

Message ID 20200709181442.1299717-3-marcelo.cerri@canonical.com
State New
Headers show
Series [eoan:linux-aws,focal:linux-aws,1/1] UBUNTU: SAUCE: overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking | expand

Commit Message

Marcelo Henrique Cerri July 9, 2020, 6:14 p.m. UTC
From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1864669

Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit
(using __vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to
overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data.  This became
an issue for credential override off since sys_admin would have
been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently
present for the creator since it performed the mount.

This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new
ovl_do_vfs_getxattr function if the credential override is off or
not.  Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead,
especially since the check can be expensive.

Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that
underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate
sepolicy permissions and sys_admin capability.  Providing blanket
support for sys_admin would be bad for all possible callers.

For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter,
should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security
problem since mounting by definition has sys_admin capabilities,
but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.

It should be noted that there is precedence, __vfs_getxattr is used
in other filesystems for their own internal trusted xattr management.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org

v15 - revert to v13 as xattr_gs_args was rejected.
    - move ovl_do_wrapper from util.c to inline in overlayfs.h

v14 - rebase to use xattr_gs_args.

v13 - rebase to use __vfs_getxattr flags option

v12 - rebase

v11 - switch name to ovl_do_vfs_getxattr, fortify comment

v10 - added to patch series

[Based on v15: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1148514/]
[marcelo.cerri@canonical.com: Adjusted __vfs_getxattr() args and
 removed XATTR_NOSECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
 fs/overlayfs/namei.c     | 12 +++++++-----
 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h |  7 +++++++
 fs/overlayfs/util.c      | 18 +++++++++---------
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

Comments

Kelsey Skunberg Aug. 4, 2020, 12:54 a.m. UTC | #1
Applied to Focal/aws. thank you!

-Kelsey

On 2020-07-09 15:14:42 , Marcelo Henrique Cerri wrote:
> From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
> 
> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1864669
> 
> Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit
> (using __vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to
> overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data.  This became
> an issue for credential override off since sys_admin would have
> been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently
> present for the creator since it performed the mount.
> 
> This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new
> ovl_do_vfs_getxattr function if the credential override is off or
> not.  Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead,
> especially since the check can be expensive.
> 
> Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that
> underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate
> sepolicy permissions and sys_admin capability.  Providing blanket
> support for sys_admin would be bad for all possible callers.
> 
> For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter,
> should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security
> problem since mounting by definition has sys_admin capabilities,
> but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.
> 
> It should be noted that there is precedence, __vfs_getxattr is used
> in other filesystems for their own internal trusted xattr management.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kernel-team@android.com
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> 
> v15 - revert to v13 as xattr_gs_args was rejected.
>     - move ovl_do_wrapper from util.c to inline in overlayfs.h
> 
> v14 - rebase to use xattr_gs_args.
> 
> v13 - rebase to use __vfs_getxattr flags option
> 
> v12 - rebase
> 
> v11 - switch name to ovl_do_vfs_getxattr, fortify comment
> 
> v10 - added to patch series
> 
> [Based on v15: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1148514/]
> [marcelo.cerri@canonical.com: Adjusted __vfs_getxattr() args and
>  removed XATTR_NOSECURITY]
> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> ---
>  fs/overlayfs/namei.c     | 12 +++++++-----
>  fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h |  7 +++++++
>  fs/overlayfs/util.c      | 18 +++++++++---------
>  3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> index f47c591402d7..126a93d6a5ab 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> @@ -106,10 +106,11 @@ int ovl_check_fh_len(struct ovl_fh *fh, int fh_len)
>  
>  static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
>  {
> -	int res, err;
> +	ssize_t res;
> +	int err;
>  	struct ovl_fh *fh = NULL;
>  
> -	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
> +	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
>  	if (res < 0) {
>  		if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
>  			return NULL;
> @@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
>  	if (!fh)
>  		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>  
> -	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, fh, res);
> +	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, fh, res);
>  	if (res < 0)
>  		goto fail;
>  
> @@ -141,10 +142,11 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
>  	return NULL;
>  
>  fail:
> -	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get origin (%i)\n", res);
> +	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get origin (%zi)\n", res);
>  	goto out;
>  invalid:
> -	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: invalid origin (%*phN)\n", res, fh);
> +	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: invalid origin (%*phN)\n",
> +			    (int)res, fh);
>  	goto out;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
> index ca10974b9f44..94f840eb7d7d 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
> @@ -212,6 +212,13 @@ static inline bool ovl_open_flags_need_copy_up(int flags)
>  	return ((OPEN_FMODE(flags) & FMODE_WRITE) || (flags & O_TRUNC));
>  }
>  
> +static inline ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> +					  const char *name, void *buf,
> +					  size_t size)
> +{
> +	return __vfs_getxattr(dentry, d_inode(dentry), name, buf, size);
> +}
> +
>  /* util.c */
>  int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry);
>  void ovl_drop_write(struct dentry *dentry);
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> index e78d873acc3e..40b12d153c52 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> @@ -550,9 +550,9 @@ void ovl_copy_up_end(struct dentry *dentry)
>  
>  bool ovl_check_origin_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)
>  {
> -	int res;
> +	ssize_t res;
>  
> -	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN, NULL, 0);
> +	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN, NULL, 0);
>  
>  	/* Zero size value means "copied up but origin unknown" */
>  	if (res >= 0)
> @@ -563,13 +563,13 @@ bool ovl_check_origin_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)
>  
>  bool ovl_check_dir_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
>  {
> -	int res;
> +	ssize_t res;
>  	char val;
>  
>  	if (!d_is_dir(dentry))
>  		return false;
>  
> -	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, &val, 1);
> +	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, &val, 1);
>  	if (res == 1 && val == 'y')
>  		return true;
>  
> @@ -850,13 +850,13 @@ int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir)
>  /* err < 0, 0 if no metacopy xattr, 1 if metacopy xattr found */
>  int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)
>  {
> -	int res;
> +	ssize_t res;
>  
>  	/* Only regular files can have metacopy xattr */
>  	if (!S_ISREG(d_inode(dentry)->i_mode))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_METACOPY, NULL, 0);
> +	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_METACOPY, NULL, 0);
>  	if (res < 0) {
>  		if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
>  			return 0;
> @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)
>  
>  	return 1;
>  out:
> -	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get metacopy (%i)\n", res);
> +	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get metacopy (%zi)\n", res);
>  	return res;
>  }
>  
> @@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,
>  	ssize_t res;
>  	char *buf = NULL;
>  
> -	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
> +	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
>  	if (res < 0) {
>  		if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
>  			return -ENODATA;
> @@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,
>  		if (!buf)
>  			return -ENOMEM;
>  
> -		res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, buf, res);
> +		res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, buf, res);
>  		if (res < 0)
>  			goto fail;
>  	}
> -- 
> 2.25.1
> 
> 
> -- 
> kernel-team mailing list
> kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com
> https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/kernel-team
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
index f47c591402d7..126a93d6a5ab 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
@@ -106,10 +106,11 @@  int ovl_check_fh_len(struct ovl_fh *fh, int fh_len)
 
 static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
-	int res, err;
+	ssize_t res;
+	int err;
 	struct ovl_fh *fh = NULL;
 
-	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
+	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
 	if (res < 0) {
 		if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return NULL;
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@  static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	if (!fh)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
-	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, fh, res);
+	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, fh, res);
 	if (res < 0)
 		goto fail;
 
@@ -141,10 +142,11 @@  static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	return NULL;
 
 fail:
-	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get origin (%i)\n", res);
+	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get origin (%zi)\n", res);
 	goto out;
 invalid:
-	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: invalid origin (%*phN)\n", res, fh);
+	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: invalid origin (%*phN)\n",
+			    (int)res, fh);
 	goto out;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
index ca10974b9f44..94f840eb7d7d 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
@@ -212,6 +212,13 @@  static inline bool ovl_open_flags_need_copy_up(int flags)
 	return ((OPEN_FMODE(flags) & FMODE_WRITE) || (flags & O_TRUNC));
 }
 
+static inline ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					  const char *name, void *buf,
+					  size_t size)
+{
+	return __vfs_getxattr(dentry, d_inode(dentry), name, buf, size);
+}
+
 /* util.c */
 int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry);
 void ovl_drop_write(struct dentry *dentry);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
index e78d873acc3e..40b12d153c52 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
@@ -550,9 +550,9 @@  void ovl_copy_up_end(struct dentry *dentry)
 
 bool ovl_check_origin_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	int res;
+	ssize_t res;
 
-	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN, NULL, 0);
+	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN, NULL, 0);
 
 	/* Zero size value means "copied up but origin unknown" */
 	if (res >= 0)
@@ -563,13 +563,13 @@  bool ovl_check_origin_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 
 bool ovl_check_dir_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
-	int res;
+	ssize_t res;
 	char val;
 
 	if (!d_is_dir(dentry))
 		return false;
 
-	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, &val, 1);
+	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, &val, 1);
 	if (res == 1 && val == 'y')
 		return true;
 
@@ -850,13 +850,13 @@  int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir)
 /* err < 0, 0 if no metacopy xattr, 1 if metacopy xattr found */
 int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	int res;
+	ssize_t res;
 
 	/* Only regular files can have metacopy xattr */
 	if (!S_ISREG(d_inode(dentry)->i_mode))
 		return 0;
 
-	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_METACOPY, NULL, 0);
+	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_METACOPY, NULL, 0);
 	if (res < 0) {
 		if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@  int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 
 	return 1;
 out:
-	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get metacopy (%i)\n", res);
+	pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get metacopy (%zi)\n", res);
 	return res;
 }
 
@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@  ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,
 	ssize_t res;
 	char *buf = NULL;
 
-	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
+	res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
 	if (res < 0) {
 		if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return -ENODATA;
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@  ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,
 		if (!buf)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, buf, res);
+		res = ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, buf, res);
 		if (res < 0)
 			goto fail;
 	}