| Message ID | 20180205093958.GH6265@brain |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [SRU,artful/linux] switch Spectre V2 mitigation to retpoline | expand |
On 02/05/18 10:39, Andy Whitcroft wrote: > Now that retpoline has made it to stable it is appropriate we switch > over to this for mitigation of Spectre V2. This form is meant to have a > significantly lower performance penalty, and also does not require > microcode support from the processor. > > This is a large patchset as it has to revert the existing mitigations for > Spectre V1 and V2 as these are intertwined. We take advantage of this > to reapply a slightly updated Spectre V1 mitigation and to more clearly > identify those patches for when they are themselves replaced by final > upstream versions. Finally testing of this set threw up a procfs bug > (LP: #1747263) which though not actuall a regression I am including as > it breaks ADT testing. > > The patches are split into 4 sections, each set has been marked up such > that they fall out separatly in the Ubuntu change (which is included in > the pull request at the end of this email). > > * CVE-2017-5715 (revert embargoed) // CVE-2017-5753 (revert embargoed) > * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline) > * CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel) > * [artful] panic in update_stack_state when reading /proc/<pid>/stack on i386 > > Full pull-request is below. Proposing for SRU to artful/linux. > > -apw > > The following changes since commit b9f7706e18abb6276a87776e15596fa898cbafa4: > > x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP (2018-02-02 17:14:07 +0100) > > are available in the Git repository at: > > https://git.launchpad.net/~apw/ubuntu/+source/linux/+git/pti pti/artful-retpoline-intelv1--pull > > for you to fetch changes up to c50da22ff258fea6938eda9b3fc0475288b3ee7d: > > x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer (2018-02-04 14:47:15 +0000) There's a remaining fixup commit (3918407522d27d0394f9376e37615f5477997bd1 - fix! x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps) which can be fixed when applying. Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > * [artful] panic in update_stack_state when reading /proc/<pid>/stack on i386 > (LP: #1747263) > - x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer > > * CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel) > - x86/cpu/AMD: Remove now unused definition of MFENCE_RDTSC feature > - SAUCE: reinstate MFENCE_RDTSC feature definition > - locking/barriers: introduce new observable speculation barrier > - bpf: prevent speculative execution in eBPF interpreter > - x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is enabled > - SAUCE: FIX: x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is enabled > - uvcvideo: prevent speculative execution > - carl9170: prevent speculative execution > - p54: prevent speculative execution > - qla2xxx: prevent speculative execution > - cw1200: prevent speculative execution > - Thermal/int340x: prevent speculative execution > - ipv4: prevent speculative execution > - ipv6: prevent speculative execution > - fs: prevent speculative execution > - net: mpls: prevent speculative execution > - udf: prevent speculative execution > - userns: prevent speculative execution > - powerpc: add osb barrier > - s390/spinlock: add osb memory barrier > - SAUCE: claim mitigation via observable speculation barrier > > * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline) > - x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang > - kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit > - sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder > - x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions > - x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled > - objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks > - objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored > - x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support > - x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation > - x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps > - fix! x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit > - selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall > - x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines > - security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI > - x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI > - x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning > - [Config] enable CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES > - [Config] enable CONFIG_RETPOLINE > - [Packaging] retpoline -- add call site validation > - [Config] disable retpoline checks for first upload > > * CVE-2017-5715 (revert embargoed) // CVE-2017-5753 (revert embargoed) > - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/entry: Fix up retpoline assembler labels" > - Revert "kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit" > - Revert "Revert "x86/svm: Add code to clear registers on VM exit"" > - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/microcode: Extend post microcode reload to > support IBPB feature -- repair missmerge" > - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/kvm: Fix stuff_RSB() for 32-bit" > - Revert "s390/spinlock: add gmb memory barrier" > - Revert "powerpc: add gmb barrier" > - Revert "x86/cpu/AMD: Remove now unused definition of MFENCE_RDTSC feature" > - Revert "x86/svm: Add code to clear registers on VM exit" > - Revert "x86/svm: Add code to clobber the RSB on VM exit" > - Revert "KVM: x86: Add speculative control CPUID support for guests" > - Revert "x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU" > - Revert "x86/svm: Set IBRS value on VM entry and exit" > - Revert "KVM: SVM: Do not intercept new speculative control MSRs" > - Revert "x86/microcode: Extend post microcode reload to support IBPB feature" > - Revert "x86/cpu/AMD: Add speculative control support for AMD" > - Revert "x86/entry: Use retpoline for syscall's indirect calls" > - Revert "x86/syscall: Clear unused extra registers on 32-bit compatible > syscall entrance" > - Revert "x86/syscall: Clear unused extra registers on syscall entrance" > - Revert "x86/spec_ctrl: Add lock to serialize changes to ibrs and ibpb > control" > - Revert "x86/spec_ctrl: Add sysctl knobs to enable/disable SPEC_CTRL feature" > - Revert "x86/kvm: Pad RSB on VM transition" > - Revert "x86/kvm: Toggle IBRS on VM entry and exit" > - Revert "x86/kvm: Set IBPB when switching VM" > - Revert "x86/kvm: add MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD to kvm" > - Revert "x86/entry: Stuff RSB for entry to kernel for non-SMEP platform" > - Revert "x86/mm: Only set IBPB when the new thread cannot ptrace current > thread" > - Revert "x86/mm: Set IBPB upon context switch" > - Revert "x86/idle: Disable IBRS when offlining cpu and re-enable on wakeup" > - Revert "x86/idle: Disable IBRS entering idle and enable it on wakeup" > - Revert "x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts" > - Revert "x86/enter: MACROS to set/clear IBRS and set IBPB" > - Revert "x86/feature: Report presence of IBPB and IBRS control" > - Revert "x86/feature: Enable the x86 feature to control Speculation" > - Revert "udf: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "net: mpls: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "fs: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "ipv6: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "userns: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "Thermal/int340x: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "cw1200: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "qla2xxx: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "p54: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "carl9170: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "uvcvideo: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is enabled" > - Revert "bpf: prevent speculative execution in eBPF interpreter" > - Revert "locking/barriers: introduce new memory barrier gmb()" >
On Mon, Feb 05, 2018 at 04:14:32PM +0100, Kleber Souza wrote: > On 02/05/18 10:39, Andy Whitcroft wrote: > > Now that retpoline has made it to stable it is appropriate we switch > > over to this for mitigation of Spectre V2. This form is meant to have a > > significantly lower performance penalty, and also does not require > > microcode support from the processor. > > > > This is a large patchset as it has to revert the existing mitigations for > > Spectre V1 and V2 as these are intertwined. We take advantage of this > > to reapply a slightly updated Spectre V1 mitigation and to more clearly > > identify those patches for when they are themselves replaced by final > > upstream versions. Finally testing of this set threw up a procfs bug > > (LP: #1747263) which though not actuall a regression I am including as > > it breaks ADT testing. > > > > The patches are split into 4 sections, each set has been marked up such > > that they fall out separatly in the Ubuntu change (which is included in > > the pull request at the end of this email). > > > > * CVE-2017-5715 (revert embargoed) // CVE-2017-5753 (revert embargoed) > > * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline) > > * CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel) > > * [artful] panic in update_stack_state when reading /proc/<pid>/stack on i386 > > > > Full pull-request is below. Proposing for SRU to artful/linux. > > > > -apw > > > > The following changes since commit b9f7706e18abb6276a87776e15596fa898cbafa4: > > > > x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP (2018-02-02 17:14:07 +0100) > > > > are available in the Git repository at: > > > > https://git.launchpad.net/~apw/ubuntu/+source/linux/+git/pti pti/artful-retpoline-intelv1--pull > > > > for you to fetch changes up to c50da22ff258fea6938eda9b3fc0475288b3ee7d: > > > > x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer (2018-02-04 14:47:15 +0000) > > There's a remaining fixup commit > (3918407522d27d0394f9376e37615f5477997bd1 - fix! x86/retpoline/hyperv: > Convert assembler indirect jumps) which can be fixed when applying. > > > Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Yes, please merge that into its associated commit. Derp. -apw
Applied to artful/master-next branch, folding the fixup commit into its patch. Thanks, Kleber On 02/05/18 10:39, Andy Whitcroft wrote: > Now that retpoline has made it to stable it is appropriate we switch > over to this for mitigation of Spectre V2. This form is meant to have a > significantly lower performance penalty, and also does not require > microcode support from the processor. > > This is a large patchset as it has to revert the existing mitigations for > Spectre V1 and V2 as these are intertwined. We take advantage of this > to reapply a slightly updated Spectre V1 mitigation and to more clearly > identify those patches for when they are themselves replaced by final > upstream versions. Finally testing of this set threw up a procfs bug > (LP: #1747263) which though not actuall a regression I am including as > it breaks ADT testing. > > The patches are split into 4 sections, each set has been marked up such > that they fall out separatly in the Ubuntu change (which is included in > the pull request at the end of this email). > > * CVE-2017-5715 (revert embargoed) // CVE-2017-5753 (revert embargoed) > * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline) > * CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel) > * [artful] panic in update_stack_state when reading /proc/<pid>/stack on i386 > > Full pull-request is below. Proposing for SRU to artful/linux. > > -apw > > The following changes since commit b9f7706e18abb6276a87776e15596fa898cbafa4: > > x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP (2018-02-02 17:14:07 +0100) > > are available in the Git repository at: > > https://git.launchpad.net/~apw/ubuntu/+source/linux/+git/pti pti/artful-retpoline-intelv1--pull > > for you to fetch changes up to c50da22ff258fea6938eda9b3fc0475288b3ee7d: > > x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer (2018-02-04 14:47:15 +0000) > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > * [artful] panic in update_stack_state when reading /proc/<pid>/stack on i386 > (LP: #1747263) > - x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer > > * CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel) > - x86/cpu/AMD: Remove now unused definition of MFENCE_RDTSC feature > - SAUCE: reinstate MFENCE_RDTSC feature definition > - locking/barriers: introduce new observable speculation barrier > - bpf: prevent speculative execution in eBPF interpreter > - x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is enabled > - SAUCE: FIX: x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is enabled > - uvcvideo: prevent speculative execution > - carl9170: prevent speculative execution > - p54: prevent speculative execution > - qla2xxx: prevent speculative execution > - cw1200: prevent speculative execution > - Thermal/int340x: prevent speculative execution > - ipv4: prevent speculative execution > - ipv6: prevent speculative execution > - fs: prevent speculative execution > - net: mpls: prevent speculative execution > - udf: prevent speculative execution > - userns: prevent speculative execution > - powerpc: add osb barrier > - s390/spinlock: add osb memory barrier > - SAUCE: claim mitigation via observable speculation barrier > > * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline) > - x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang > - kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit > - sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder > - x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions > - x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled > - objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks > - objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored > - x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support > - x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation > - x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps > - fix! x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps > - x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit > - selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall > - x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines > - security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI > - x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI > - x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning > - [Config] enable CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES > - [Config] enable CONFIG_RETPOLINE > - [Packaging] retpoline -- add call site validation > - [Config] disable retpoline checks for first upload > > * CVE-2017-5715 (revert embargoed) // CVE-2017-5753 (revert embargoed) > - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/entry: Fix up retpoline assembler labels" > - Revert "kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit" > - Revert "Revert "x86/svm: Add code to clear registers on VM exit"" > - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/microcode: Extend post microcode reload to > support IBPB feature -- repair missmerge" > - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/kvm: Fix stuff_RSB() for 32-bit" > - Revert "s390/spinlock: add gmb memory barrier" > - Revert "powerpc: add gmb barrier" > - Revert "x86/cpu/AMD: Remove now unused definition of MFENCE_RDTSC feature" > - Revert "x86/svm: Add code to clear registers on VM exit" > - Revert "x86/svm: Add code to clobber the RSB on VM exit" > - Revert "KVM: x86: Add speculative control CPUID support for guests" > - Revert "x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU" > - Revert "x86/svm: Set IBRS value on VM entry and exit" > - Revert "KVM: SVM: Do not intercept new speculative control MSRs" > - Revert "x86/microcode: Extend post microcode reload to support IBPB feature" > - Revert "x86/cpu/AMD: Add speculative control support for AMD" > - Revert "x86/entry: Use retpoline for syscall's indirect calls" > - Revert "x86/syscall: Clear unused extra registers on 32-bit compatible > syscall entrance" > - Revert "x86/syscall: Clear unused extra registers on syscall entrance" > - Revert "x86/spec_ctrl: Add lock to serialize changes to ibrs and ibpb > control" > - Revert "x86/spec_ctrl: Add sysctl knobs to enable/disable SPEC_CTRL feature" > - Revert "x86/kvm: Pad RSB on VM transition" > - Revert "x86/kvm: Toggle IBRS on VM entry and exit" > - Revert "x86/kvm: Set IBPB when switching VM" > - Revert "x86/kvm: add MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD to kvm" > - Revert "x86/entry: Stuff RSB for entry to kernel for non-SMEP platform" > - Revert "x86/mm: Only set IBPB when the new thread cannot ptrace current > thread" > - Revert "x86/mm: Set IBPB upon context switch" > - Revert "x86/idle: Disable IBRS when offlining cpu and re-enable on wakeup" > - Revert "x86/idle: Disable IBRS entering idle and enable it on wakeup" > - Revert "x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts" > - Revert "x86/enter: MACROS to set/clear IBRS and set IBPB" > - Revert "x86/feature: Report presence of IBPB and IBRS control" > - Revert "x86/feature: Enable the x86 feature to control Speculation" > - Revert "udf: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "net: mpls: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "fs: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "ipv6: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "userns: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "Thermal/int340x: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "cw1200: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "qla2xxx: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "p54: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "carl9170: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "uvcvideo: prevent speculative execution" > - Revert "x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is enabled" > - Revert "bpf: prevent speculative execution in eBPF interpreter" > - Revert "locking/barriers: introduce new memory barrier gmb()" >
Now that retpoline has made it to stable it is appropriate we switch over to this for mitigation of Spectre V2. This form is meant to have a significantly lower performance penalty, and also does not require microcode support from the processor. This is a large patchset as it has to revert the existing mitigations for Spectre V1 and V2 as these are intertwined. We take advantage of this to reapply a slightly updated Spectre V1 mitigation and to more clearly identify those patches for when they are themselves replaced by final upstream versions. Finally testing of this set threw up a procfs bug (LP: #1747263) which though not actuall a regression I am including as it breaks ADT testing. The patches are split into 4 sections, each set has been marked up such that they fall out separatly in the Ubuntu change (which is included in the pull request at the end of this email). * CVE-2017-5715 (revert embargoed) // CVE-2017-5753 (revert embargoed) * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline) * CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel) * [artful] panic in update_stack_state when reading /proc/<pid>/stack on i386 Full pull-request is below. Proposing for SRU to artful/linux. -apw The following changes since commit b9f7706e18abb6276a87776e15596fa898cbafa4: x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP (2018-02-02 17:14:07 +0100) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.launchpad.net/~apw/ubuntu/+source/linux/+git/pti pti/artful-retpoline-intelv1--pull for you to fetch changes up to c50da22ff258fea6938eda9b3fc0475288b3ee7d: x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer (2018-02-04 14:47:15 +0000) ---------------------------------------------------------------- * [artful] panic in update_stack_state when reading /proc/<pid>/stack on i386 (LP: #1747263) - x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer * CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel) - x86/cpu/AMD: Remove now unused definition of MFENCE_RDTSC feature - SAUCE: reinstate MFENCE_RDTSC feature definition - locking/barriers: introduce new observable speculation barrier - bpf: prevent speculative execution in eBPF interpreter - x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is enabled - SAUCE: FIX: x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is enabled - uvcvideo: prevent speculative execution - carl9170: prevent speculative execution - p54: prevent speculative execution - qla2xxx: prevent speculative execution - cw1200: prevent speculative execution - Thermal/int340x: prevent speculative execution - ipv4: prevent speculative execution - ipv6: prevent speculative execution - fs: prevent speculative execution - net: mpls: prevent speculative execution - udf: prevent speculative execution - userns: prevent speculative execution - powerpc: add osb barrier - s390/spinlock: add osb memory barrier - SAUCE: claim mitigation via observable speculation barrier * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline) - x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang - kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit - sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder - x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions - x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled - objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks - objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored - x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support - x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation - x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps - x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps - x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps - x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps - fix! x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps - x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps - x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps - x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps - x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit - selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall - x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines - security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI - x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI - x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning - [Config] enable CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES - [Config] enable CONFIG_RETPOLINE - [Packaging] retpoline -- add call site validation - [Config] disable retpoline checks for first upload * CVE-2017-5715 (revert embargoed) // CVE-2017-5753 (revert embargoed) - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/entry: Fix up retpoline assembler labels" - Revert "kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit" - Revert "Revert "x86/svm: Add code to clear registers on VM exit"" - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/microcode: Extend post microcode reload to support IBPB feature -- repair missmerge" - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/kvm: Fix stuff_RSB() for 32-bit" - Revert "s390/spinlock: add gmb memory barrier" - Revert "powerpc: add gmb barrier" - Revert "x86/cpu/AMD: Remove now unused definition of MFENCE_RDTSC feature" - Revert "x86/svm: Add code to clear registers on VM exit" - Revert "x86/svm: Add code to clobber the RSB on VM exit" - Revert "KVM: x86: Add speculative control CPUID support for guests" - Revert "x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU" - Revert "x86/svm: Set IBRS value on VM entry and exit" - Revert "KVM: SVM: Do not intercept new speculative control MSRs" - Revert "x86/microcode: Extend post microcode reload to support IBPB feature" - Revert "x86/cpu/AMD: Add speculative control support for AMD" - Revert "x86/entry: Use retpoline for syscall's indirect calls" - Revert "x86/syscall: Clear unused extra registers on 32-bit compatible syscall entrance" - Revert "x86/syscall: Clear unused extra registers on syscall entrance" - Revert "x86/spec_ctrl: Add lock to serialize changes to ibrs and ibpb control" - Revert "x86/spec_ctrl: Add sysctl knobs to enable/disable SPEC_CTRL feature" - Revert "x86/kvm: Pad RSB on VM transition" - Revert "x86/kvm: Toggle IBRS on VM entry and exit" - Revert "x86/kvm: Set IBPB when switching VM" - Revert "x86/kvm: add MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD to kvm" - Revert "x86/entry: Stuff RSB for entry to kernel for non-SMEP platform" - Revert "x86/mm: Only set IBPB when the new thread cannot ptrace current thread" - Revert "x86/mm: Set IBPB upon context switch" - Revert "x86/idle: Disable IBRS when offlining cpu and re-enable on wakeup" - Revert "x86/idle: Disable IBRS entering idle and enable it on wakeup" - Revert "x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts" - Revert "x86/enter: MACROS to set/clear IBRS and set IBPB" - Revert "x86/feature: Report presence of IBPB and IBRS control" - Revert "x86/feature: Enable the x86 feature to control Speculation" - Revert "udf: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "net: mpls: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "fs: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "ipv6: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "userns: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "Thermal/int340x: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "cw1200: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "qla2xxx: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "p54: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "carl9170: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "uvcvideo: prevent speculative execution" - Revert "x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is enabled" - Revert "bpf: prevent speculative execution in eBPF interpreter" - Revert "locking/barriers: introduce new memory barrier gmb()"