From patchwork Wed Feb 1 09:35:57 2012 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Andy Whitcroft X-Patchwork-Id: 138929 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@bilbo.ozlabs.org Received: from chlorine.canonical.com (chlorine.canonical.com [91.189.94.204]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F8B31007D1 for ; Wed, 1 Feb 2012 20:36:16 +1100 (EST) Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=chlorine.canonical.com) by chlorine.canonical.com with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1RsWbi-0002vP-BR; Wed, 01 Feb 2012 09:36:02 +0000 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]) by chlorine.canonical.com with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1RsWbg-0002uN-67 for kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com; Wed, 01 Feb 2012 09:36:00 +0000 Received: from [85.210.149.110] (helo=localhost.localdomain) by youngberry.canonical.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1RsWbg-0008Tn-1o; Wed, 01 Feb 2012 09:36:00 +0000 From: Andy Whitcroft To: kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Subject: [maverick/ti-omap4 CVE 1/1] ima: fix add LSM rule bug Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2012 09:35:57 +0000 Message-Id: <1328088957-27506-2-git-send-email-apw@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.5.4 In-Reply-To: <1328088957-27506-1-git-send-email-apw@canonical.com> References: <1328088957-27506-1-git-send-email-apw@canonical.com> Cc: Andy Whitcroft X-BeenThere: kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.13 Precedence: list List-Id: Kernel team discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com Errors-To: kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com From: Mimi Zohar If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything is as fine as the return code implies. This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime. Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed, ignoring any remaining rules. default IMA TCB policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 # SYSFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 # DEBUGFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 # TMPFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 # SECURITYFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 < LSM specific rule > dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t measure func=BPRM_CHECK measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: James Morris Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Cc: David Safford Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds (cherry picked from commit 867c20265459d30a01b021a9c1e81fb4c5832aa9) CVE-2011-0006 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/917808 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft Acked-by: Stefan Bader --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index aef8c0a..d661afb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, args, &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) + return -EINVAL; return result; }