diff --git a/doc/secvar/edk2.rst b/doc/secvar/edk2.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e0c29457
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/secvar/edk2.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+.. _secvar/edk2:
+
+Skiboot edk2-compatible Secure Variable Backend
+===============================================
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+The edk2 secure variable backend for skiboot borrows from edk2 concepts
+such as the three key hierarchy (PK, KEK, and db), and a similar 
+structure. In general, variable updates must be signed with a key
+of a higher level. So, updates to the db must be signed with a key stored
+in the KEK; updates to the KEK must be signed with the PK. Updates to the
+PK must be signed with the previous PK (if any).
+
+Variables are stored in the efi signature list format, and updates are a
+signed variant that includes an authentication header.
+
+If no PK is currently enrolled, the system is considered to be in "Setup
+Mode". Any key can be enrolled without signature checks. However, once a
+PK is enrolled, the system switches to "User Mode", and each update must
+now be signed according to the hierarchy. Furthermore, when in "User 
+Mode", the backend initialized the ``os-secure-mode`` device tree flag,
+signaling to the kernel that we are in secure mode.
+
+Updates are processed sequentially, in the order that they were provided
+in the update queue. If any update fails to validate, appears to be
+malformed, or any other error occurs, NO updates will not be applied.
+This includes updates that may have successfully applied prior to the
+error. The system will continue in an error state, reporting the error
+reason via the ``update-status`` device tree property. 
+
+P9 Special Case for the Platform Key
+------------------------------------
+
+Due to the powerful nature of the platform key and the lack of lockable
+flash, the edk2 backend will store the PK in TPM NV rather than PNOR on
+P9 systems. (TODO expand on this)
+
+Update Status Return Codes
+--------------------------
+
+TODO, edk2 driver needs to actually return these properly first
+
+
+Device Tree Bindings
+--------------------
+
+TODO
diff --git a/include/secvar.h b/include/secvar.h
index 2875c700..8b701e00 100644
--- a/include/secvar.h
+++ b/include/secvar.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct secvar_backend_driver {
 };
 
 extern struct secvar_storage_driver secboot_tpm_driver;
+extern struct secvar_backend_driver edk2_compatible_v1;
 
 int secvar_main(struct secvar_storage_driver, struct secvar_backend_driver);
 
diff --git a/libstb/secvar/backend/Makefile.inc b/libstb/secvar/backend/Makefile.inc
index cc1a49fa..1c1896ab 100644
--- a/libstb/secvar/backend/Makefile.inc
+++ b/libstb/secvar/backend/Makefile.inc
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 # -*-Makefile-*-
 
-SECVAR_BACKEND_DIR = libstb/secvar/backend
+SECVAR_BACKEND_DIR = $(SRC)/libstb/secvar/backend
 
 SUBDIRS += $(SECVAR_BACKEND_DIR)
 
-SECVAR_BACKEND_SRCS =
+SECVAR_BACKEND_SRCS = edk2-compat.c
 SECVAR_BACKEND_OBJS = $(SECVAR_BACKEND_SRCS:%.c=%.o)
 SECVAR_BACKEND = $(SECVAR_BACKEND_DIR)/built-in.a
 
diff --git a/libstb/secvar/backend/edk2-compat.c b/libstb/secvar/backend/edk2-compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b99738b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libstb/secvar/backend/edk2-compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,877 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+/* Copyright 2019 IBM Corp. */
+#ifndef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EDK2_COMPAT: " fmt
+#endif
+
+#include <opal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <ccan/endian/endian.h>
+#include "libstb/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h"
+#include "edk2.h"
+#include "opal-api.h"
+#include "../secvar.h"
+#include "../secvar_devtree.h"
+#include "../secvar_tpmnv.h"
+#include <mbedtls/error.h>
+
+#define TPMNV_ID_EDK2_PK	0x4532504b // E2PK
+
+static bool setup_mode;
+
+//struct efi_time *timestamp_list;
+
+/*
+ * Converts utf8 string to ucs2
+ */
+static char *utf8_to_ucs2(const char *key, const char keylen)
+{
+	int i;
+	char *str;
+	str = zalloc(keylen * 2);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < keylen*2; key++) {
+		str[i++] = *key;
+		str[i++] = '\0';
+	}
+	return str;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if key1 = key2
+ */
+static bool key_equals(const char *key1, const char *key2)
+{
+	if (memcmp(key1, key2, strlen(key2)+1) == 0)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns the authority that can sign the given key update
+ */
+static void get_key_authority(const char *ret[3], const char *key)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	memset(ret, 0, sizeof(char *) * 3);
+	if (key_equals(key, "PK"))
+		ret[i++] = "PK";
+	if (key_equals(key, "KEK"))
+		ret[i++] = "PK";
+	if (key_equals(key, "db") || key_equals(key, "dbx")) {
+		ret[i++] = "KEK";
+		ret[i++] = "PK";
+	}
+	ret[i] = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PK needs to be stored in the TPMNV space if on p9
+ * We store it using the form <u64:esl size><esl data>, the
+ * extra secvar headers are unnecessary
+ */
+static int edk2_p9_load_pk(void)
+{
+	struct secvar_node *pkvar;
+	uint64_t size;
+	int rc;
+
+	// Ensure it exists
+	rc = secvar_tpmnv_alloc(TPMNV_ID_EDK2_PK, -1);
+
+	// Peek to get the size
+	rc = secvar_tpmnv_read(TPMNV_ID_EDK2_PK, &size, sizeof(size), 0);
+	if (rc == OPAL_EMPTY)
+		return 0;
+	else if (rc)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (size > secvar_storage.max_var_size)
+		return OPAL_RESOURCE;
+
+	pkvar = alloc_secvar(size);
+	memcpy(pkvar->var->key, "PK", 3);
+	pkvar->var->key_len = 3;
+	pkvar->var->data_size = size;
+	pkvar->flags |= SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE;
+
+	rc = secvar_tpmnv_read(TPMNV_ID_EDK2_PK, pkvar->var->data, pkvar->var->data_size, sizeof(pkvar->var->data_size));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	list_add_tail(&variable_bank, &pkvar->link);
+
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Writes the PK to the TPM.
+ */
+static int edk2_p9_write_pk(void)
+{
+	char *tmp;
+	int32_t tmpsize;
+	struct secvar_node *pkvar;
+	int rc;
+
+	pkvar = find_secvar("PK", 3, &variable_bank);
+
+	// Should not happen
+	if (!pkvar)
+		return OPAL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	// Reset the pk flag to volatile on p9
+	pkvar->flags |= SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE;
+
+	tmpsize = secvar_tpmnv_size(TPMNV_ID_EDK2_PK);
+	if (tmpsize < 0) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "TPMNV space for PK was not allocated properly\n");
+		return OPAL_RESOURCE;
+	}
+	if (tmpsize < pkvar->var->data_size + sizeof(pkvar->var->data_size)) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "TPMNV PK space is insufficient, %d < %llu\n", tmpsize,
+			// Cast needed because x86 compiler complains building the test
+			(long long unsigned) pkvar->var->data_size + sizeof(pkvar->var->data_size));
+		return OPAL_RESOURCE;
+	}
+
+	tmp = zalloc(tmpsize);
+	if (!tmp)
+		return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+	memcpy(tmp, &pkvar->var->data_size, sizeof(pkvar->var->data_size));
+	memcpy(tmp + sizeof(pkvar->var->data_size),
+		pkvar->var->data,
+		pkvar->var->data_size);
+
+	tmpsize = pkvar->var->data_size + sizeof(pkvar->var->data_size);
+
+	rc = secvar_tpmnv_write(TPMNV_ID_EDK2_PK, tmp, tmpsize, 0);
+
+	free(tmp);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the size of the ESL.
+ */
+static int get_esl_signature_list_size(char *buf)
+{
+	EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST list;
+
+	memcpy(&list, buf, sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+
+	prlog(PR_DEBUG, "size of signature list size is %u\n", le32_to_cpu(list.SignatureListSize));
+
+	return le32_to_cpu(list.SignatureListSize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the size of the certificate contained in the ESL.
+ */
+static int get_esl_cert_size(char *buf)
+{
+	EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST list;
+	uint32_t sigsize;
+
+	memcpy(&list, buf, sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+
+	sigsize = le32_to_cpu(list.SignatureListSize) - sizeof(list)
+		- le32_to_cpu(list.SignatureHeaderSize) - sizeof(uuid_t); 
+
+	prlog(PR_DEBUG, "sig size is %u\n", sigsize);
+	return sigsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the certificate from the ESL into cert buffer.
+ */
+static int get_esl_cert(char *buf, char **cert)
+{
+	int sig_data_offset;
+	int size;
+	EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST list;
+
+	memset(&list, 0, sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+	memcpy(&list, buf, sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+
+	prlog(PR_DEBUG,"size of signature list size is %u\n", le32_to_cpu(list.SignatureListSize));
+	prlog(PR_DEBUG, "size of signature header size is %u\n", le32_to_cpu(list.SignatureHeaderSize));
+	prlog(PR_DEBUG, "size of signature size is %u\n", le32_to_cpu(list.SignatureSize));
+	sig_data_offset = sizeof(list.SignatureType)
+		+ sizeof(list.SignatureListSize)
+		+ sizeof(list.SignatureHeaderSize)
+		+ sizeof(list.SignatureSize)
+		+ le32_to_cpu(list.SignatureHeaderSize)
+		+ 16 * sizeof(uint8_t);
+
+	size = le32_to_cpu(list.SignatureSize) - sizeof(uuid_t);
+	
+	memcpy(*cert, buf + sig_data_offset, size);
+
+	return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extracts size of the PKCS7 signed data embedded in the
+ * struct Authentication 2 Descriptor Header.
+ */
+static int get_pkcs7_len(struct efi_variable_authentication_2 *auth)
+{
+	uint32_t dw_length = le32_to_cpu(auth->auth_info.hdr.dw_length);
+	int size;
+
+	size = dw_length - (sizeof(auth->auth_info.hdr.dw_length)
+			+ sizeof(auth->auth_info.hdr.w_revision)
+			+ sizeof(auth->auth_info.hdr.w_certificate_type)
+			+ sizeof(auth->auth_info.cert_type));
+
+	return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the timestamp from the Authentication 2 Descriptor.
+ */
+static int get_timestamp_from_auth(char *data, struct efi_time **timestamp)
+{
+	*timestamp = (struct efi_time *) data;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function outputs the Authentication 2 Descriptor in the
+ * auth_buffer and returns the size of the buffer.
+ */
+static int get_auth_descriptor2(void *data, char **auth_buffer)
+{
+	struct efi_variable_authentication_2 *auth = data;
+	uint64_t auth_buffer_size;
+	int len;
+
+	if (!auth_buffer)
+		return OPAL_PARAMETER;
+
+	len = get_pkcs7_len(auth);
+	if (len < 0)
+		return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+	auth_buffer_size = sizeof(auth->timestamp) + sizeof(auth->auth_info.hdr)
+			   + sizeof(auth->auth_info.cert_type) + len;
+
+	*auth_buffer = zalloc(auth_buffer_size);
+	if (!(*auth_buffer))
+		return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+	memcpy(*auth_buffer, data, auth_buffer_size);
+
+	return auth_buffer_size;
+}
+
+/* Check that PK has single ESL */
+static bool is_single_pk(char *data, uint64_t data_size)
+{
+	char *auth_buffer = NULL;
+	uint64_t auth_buffer_size = 0;
+	char *newesl = NULL;
+	uint64_t new_data_size = 0;
+	int esllistsize;
+
+	auth_buffer_size = get_auth_descriptor2(data, &auth_buffer);
+	printf("auth buffer size is %d\n", (int)auth_buffer_size);
+	free(auth_buffer);
+	if (auth_buffer_size <= 0)
+		return false;
+
+	/* Calculate the size of new ESL data */
+	new_data_size = data_size - auth_buffer_size;
+	printf("new data size is %d\n", (int)new_data_size);
+
+	if (!new_data_size)
+		return true;
+
+	newesl = zalloc(new_data_size);
+	memcpy(newesl, data + auth_buffer_size, new_data_size);
+
+	esllistsize = get_esl_signature_list_size(newesl);
+	printf("esl list size is %d\n", esllistsize);
+	free(newesl);
+	if (new_data_size > esllistsize)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initializes supported variables as empty if not loaded from
+ * storage. Variables are initialized as volatile if not found.
+ * Updates should clear this flag.
+ec*
+ * Returns OPAL Error if anything fails in initialization
+ */
+static int edk2_compat_pre_process(void)
+{
+	struct secvar_node *pkvar;
+	struct secvar_node *kekvar;
+	struct secvar_node *dbvar;
+	struct secvar_node *dbxvar;
+	struct secvar_node *tsvar;
+
+	// If we are on p9, we need to store the PK in write-lockable
+	//  TPMNV space, as we determine our secure mode based on if this
+	//  variable exists.
+	// NOTE: Activation of this behavior is subject to change in a later
+	//  patch version, ideally the platform should be able to configure
+	//  whether it wants this extra protection, or to instead store
+	//  everything via the storage driver.
+	if (proc_gen == proc_gen_p9)
+		edk2_p9_load_pk();
+
+	pkvar = find_secvar("PK", 3, &variable_bank);
+	if (!pkvar) {
+		pkvar = alloc_secvar(0);
+		if (!pkvar)
+			return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+		memcpy(pkvar->var->key, "PK", 3);
+		pkvar->var->key_len = 3;
+		pkvar->flags |= SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE;
+		list_add_tail(&variable_bank, &pkvar->link);
+	}
+	if (pkvar->var->data_size == 0)
+		setup_mode = true;
+	else
+		setup_mode = false;
+
+	kekvar = find_secvar("KEK", 4, &variable_bank);
+	if (!kekvar) {
+		kekvar = alloc_secvar(0);
+		if (!kekvar)
+			return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+		memcpy(kekvar->var->key, "KEK", 4);
+		kekvar->var->key_len = 4;
+		kekvar->flags |= SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE;
+		list_add_tail(&variable_bank, &kekvar->link);
+	}
+
+	dbvar = find_secvar("db", 3, &variable_bank);
+	if (!dbvar) {
+		dbvar = alloc_secvar(0);
+		if (!dbvar)
+			return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+		memcpy(dbvar->var->key, "db", 3);
+		dbvar->var->key_len = 3;
+		dbvar->flags |= SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE;
+		list_add_tail(&variable_bank, &dbvar->link);
+	}
+
+	dbxvar = find_secvar("dbx", 4, &variable_bank);
+	if (!dbxvar) {
+		dbxvar = alloc_secvar(0);
+		if (!dbxvar)
+			return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+		memcpy(dbxvar->var->key, "dbx", 4);
+		dbxvar->var->key_len = 4;
+		dbxvar->flags |= SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE;
+		list_add_tail(&variable_bank, &dbxvar->link);
+	}
+
+	tsvar = find_secvar("TS", 3, &variable_bank);
+	// Should only ever happen on first boot
+	if (!tsvar) {
+		tsvar = alloc_secvar(sizeof(struct efi_time) * 4);
+		if (!tsvar)
+			return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+		memcpy(tsvar->var->key, "TS", 3);
+		tsvar->var->key_len = 3;
+		tsvar->var->data_size = sizeof(struct efi_time) * 4;
+		memset(tsvar->var->data, 0, tsvar->var->data_size);
+		//tsvar->flags |= SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE;
+		list_add_tail(&variable_bank, &tsvar->link);
+	}
+
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if we are in Setup Mode
+ *
+ * Setup Mode is active if we have no PK.
+ * Otherwise, we are in user mode.
+ */
+/**
+static int is_setup_mode(void)
+{
+	struct secvar_node *setup;
+
+	setup = find_secvar((char *)"PK", 3, &variable_bank);
+
+	// Not sure why this wouldn't exist
+	if (!setup)
+		return 1;
+
+	return !setup->var->data_size;
+}
+**/
+
+/**
+ * Update the variable with the new value.
+ */
+static int add_to_variable_bank(struct secvar *secvar, void *data, uint64_t dsize)
+{
+	struct secvar_node *node;
+
+	node = find_secvar(secvar->key, secvar->key_len, &variable_bank);
+	if (!node)
+		return OPAL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	// Expand the secvar allocated memory if needed
+	if (node->size < dsize)
+		if (realloc_secvar(node, dsize))
+			return OPAL_NO_MEM;
+
+	node->var->data_size = dsize;
+	memcpy(node->var->data, data, dsize);
+	node->flags &= ~SECVAR_FLAG_VOLATILE; // Clear the volatile bit when updated
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct efi_time *get_last_timestamp(char *key)
+{
+	struct secvar_node *node;
+	struct efi_time *prev;
+	char *timestamp_list;
+	u8 off;
+
+	node = find_secvar("TS", 3, &variable_bank);
+	if (!strncmp(key, "PK", 3))
+		off = 0;
+	else if (!strncmp(key, "KEK", 4))
+		off = 1;
+	else if (!strncmp(key, "db", 3))
+		off = 2;
+	else if (!strncmp(key, "dbx", 4))
+		off = 3;
+	else
+		return NULL;	// unexpected variable name?
+
+	timestamp_list = node->var->data;
+	if (!timestamp_list)
+		return NULL;
+
+	prev = (struct efi_time *) (timestamp_list + (off * sizeof(struct efi_time)));
+
+	return prev;
+}
+
+// Update the TS variable with the new timestamp
+static int update_timestamp(char *key, struct efi_time *timestamp)
+{
+	struct efi_time *prev;
+
+	prev = get_last_timestamp(key);
+	if (prev == NULL)
+		return OPAL_PARAMETER;
+
+	memcpy(prev, timestamp, sizeof(struct efi_time));
+
+	printf("updated prev year is %d month %d day %d\n", le16_to_cpu(prev->year), prev->month, prev->day);
+//	add_to_variable_bank(node->var, timestamp_list, node->var->data_size); 
+
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static int check_timestamp(char *key, struct efi_time *timestamp)
+{
+	struct efi_time *prev;
+	char *current = NULL;
+	char *last =NULL;
+	int s1 = 0;
+
+	prev = get_last_timestamp(key);
+	if (prev == NULL)
+		return OPAL_PARAMETER;
+
+	printf("timestamp year is %d month %d day %d\n", le16_to_cpu(timestamp->year), timestamp->month, timestamp->day);
+	printf("prev year is %d month %d day %d\n", le16_to_cpu(prev->year), prev->month, prev->day);
+	if (le16_to_cpu(timestamp->year) > le16_to_cpu(prev->year))
+		return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+	if (le16_to_cpu(timestamp->year) < le16_to_cpu(prev->year))
+		return OPAL_PERMISSION;
+
+	current = &(timestamp->month);
+	last = &(prev->month);
+
+	s1 = memcmp(current, last, 5);
+	if (s1 <= 0) {
+		printf("s1 is %d\n", s1);
+		return OPAL_PERMISSION;
+	}
+
+	return OPAL_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the PKCS7 signature on the signed data.
+ */
+static int verify_signature(void *auth_buffer, char *newcert,
+		uint64_t new_data_size, struct secvar *avar)
+{
+	struct efi_variable_authentication_2 *auth;
+	mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7;
+	mbedtls_x509_crt x509;
+	char *checkpkcs7cert;
+	char *signing_cert = NULL;
+	char *x509_buf;
+	int len;
+	int signing_cert_size;
+	int rc;
+	char *errbuf;
+	int eslvarsize;
+	int offset = 0;
+
+	auth = auth_buffer;
+	len  = get_pkcs7_len(auth);
+	pkcs7 = malloc(sizeof(struct mbedtls_pkcs7));
+	mbedtls_pkcs7_init(pkcs7);
+
+	rc = mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der(
+			(const unsigned char *)auth->auth_info.cert_data,
+			(const unsigned int)len, pkcs7);
+	if (rc) {
+		prlog(PR_ERR, "Parsing pkcs7 failed %04x\n", rc);
+		goto pkcs7out;
+	}
+
+	checkpkcs7cert = zalloc(2048);
+	mbedtls_x509_crt_info(checkpkcs7cert, 2048, "CRT:", &(pkcs7->signed_data.certs));	
+	prlog(PR_DEBUG, "%s \n", checkpkcs7cert);
+	free(checkpkcs7cert);
+
+	prlog(PR_INFO, "Load the signing certificate from the keystore");
+
+	eslvarsize = avar->data_size;
+
+	while (eslvarsize > 0) {
+		prlog(PR_DEBUG, "esl var size size is %d offset is %d\n", eslvarsize, offset);
+		if (eslvarsize < sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST))
+			break;
+
+		signing_cert_size = get_esl_cert_size(avar->data + offset);
+		if (!signing_cert_size) {
+			rc = OPAL_PERMISSION;
+			break;	
+		}
+
+		signing_cert = zalloc(signing_cert_size);
+		get_esl_cert(avar->data + offset, &signing_cert);
+
+		mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&x509);
+		rc = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&x509, signing_cert, signing_cert_size);
+
+		/* If failure in parsing the certificate, try next */
+		if(rc) {
+			prlog(PR_INFO, "X509 certificate parsing failed %04x\n", rc);
+			goto next;
+		}
+
+		x509_buf = zalloc(2048);
+		mbedtls_x509_crt_info(x509_buf, 2048, "CRT:", &x509);
+		prlog(PR_INFO, "%s \n", x509_buf);
+		free(x509_buf);
+		rc = mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify(pkcs7, &x509, newcert, new_data_size);
+
+		/* If find a signing certificate, you are done */
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			if (signing_cert)
+				free(signing_cert);
+			mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&x509);
+			prlog(PR_INFO, "Signature Verification passed\n");
+			break;
+		}
+
+		errbuf = zalloc(1024);
+		mbedtls_strerror(rc, errbuf, 1024);
+		prlog(PR_INFO, "Signature Verification failed %02x %s\n", rc, errbuf);
+		free(errbuf);
+
+next:
+		offset += get_esl_signature_list_size(avar->data + offset);
+		eslvarsize = eslvarsize - offset;
+		mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&x509);
+		if (signing_cert)
+			free(signing_cert);
+
+	}
+
+pkcs7out:
+	mbedtls_pkcs7_free(pkcs7);
+	free(pkcs7);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Create the single buffer
+ * name || vendor guid || attributes || timestamp || newcontent 
+ * which is submitted as signed by the user.
+ */
+static int get_data_to_verify(char *key, char *new_data,
+		uint64_t new_data_size,
+		char **buffer,
+		uint64_t *buffer_size, struct efi_time *timestamp)
+{
+	le32 attr = cpu_to_le32(SECVAR_ATTRIBUTES);
+	int size = 0;
+	int varlen;
+	char *wkey;
+	uuid_t guid;
+
+	if (key_equals(key, "PK")
+	    || key_equals(key, "KEK"))
+		guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+
+	if (key_equals(key, "db")
+	    || key_equals(key, "dbx"))
+		guid = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+		
+	// Convert utf8 name to ucs2 width
+	varlen = strlen(key) * 2;
+	wkey = utf8_to_ucs2(key, strlen(key));
+
+	// Prepare the single buffer
+	*buffer_size = varlen + UUID_SIZE + sizeof(attr)
+		       + sizeof(struct efi_time) + new_data_size;
+	*buffer = zalloc(*buffer_size);
+
+	memcpy(*buffer + size, wkey, varlen);
+	size = size + varlen;
+	memcpy(*buffer + size, &guid, sizeof(guid));
+	size = size + sizeof(guid);
+	memcpy(*buffer + size, &attr, sizeof(attr));
+	size = size + sizeof(attr);
+	memcpy(*buffer + size, timestamp , sizeof(struct efi_time));
+	size = size + sizeof(struct efi_time);
+
+	memcpy(*buffer + size, new_data, new_data_size);
+	size = size + new_data_size;
+
+	free(wkey);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int edk2_compat_process(void)
+{
+	char *auth_buffer = NULL;
+	uint64_t auth_buffer_size = 0;
+	struct efi_time *timestamp = NULL;
+	const char *key_authority[3];
+	char *newesl = NULL;
+	uint64_t new_data_size = 0;
+	char *tbhbuffer = NULL;
+	uint64_t tbhbuffersize = 0;
+	struct secvar_node *anode = NULL;
+	struct secvar_node *node = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+	int pk_updated = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	//setup_mode = is_setup_mode();
+	prlog(PR_INFO, "Setup mode = %d\n", setup_mode);
+
+	/* Loop through each command in the update bank.
+	 * If any command fails, it just loops out of the update bank.
+	 * It should also clear the update bank.
+	 */
+	list_for_each(&update_bank, node, link) {
+
+		/* Submitted data is auth_2 descriptor + new ESL data
+		 * Extract the auth_2 2 descriptor
+		 */
+ 		printf("setup mode is %d\n", setup_mode);		
+		prlog(PR_INFO, "update for %s\n", node->var->key);
+		auth_buffer_size = get_auth_descriptor2(node->var->data, &auth_buffer);
+		if (auth_buffer_size <= 0)
+			return OPAL_PARAMETER;
+
+		if (node->var->data_size < auth_buffer_size) {
+			rc = OPAL_PARAMETER;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = get_timestamp_from_auth(auth_buffer, &timestamp);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto out;	
+
+		rc = check_timestamp(node->var->key, timestamp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		/* Calculate the size of new ESL data */
+		new_data_size = node->var->data_size - auth_buffer_size;
+		newesl = zalloc(new_data_size);
+		memcpy(newesl, node->var->data + auth_buffer_size, new_data_size);
+
+		if (!setup_mode) {
+			/* Prepare the data to be verified */
+			rc = get_data_to_verify(node->var->key, newesl,
+						new_data_size, &tbhbuffer,
+						&tbhbuffersize, timestamp);
+		
+			/* Get the authority to verify the signature */
+			get_key_authority(key_authority, node->var->key);
+			i = 0;
+
+			/* Try for all the authorities that are allowed to sign.
+			 * For eg. db/dbx can be signed by both PK or KEK
+			 */
+			while (key_authority[i] != NULL) {
+				prlog(PR_DEBUG, "key is %s\n", node->var->key);
+				prlog(PR_DEBUG, "key authority is %s\n", key_authority[i]);
+				anode = find_secvar(key_authority[i], strlen(key_authority[i]) + 1,
+						    &variable_bank);
+				if (!anode) {
+					rc = OPAL_PERMISSION;
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (anode->var->data_size == 0) {
+					rc = OPAL_PERMISSION;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				/* Verify the signature */
+				rc = verify_signature(auth_buffer, tbhbuffer,
+						      tbhbuffersize, anode->var);
+
+				/* Break if signature verification is successful */
+				if (!rc)
+					break;
+				i++;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		/*
+		 * If reached here means, signature is verified so update the
+		 * value in the variable bank
+		 */
+		add_to_variable_bank(node->var, newesl, new_data_size);
+		// Update the TS variable with the new timestamp
+		update_timestamp(node->var->key, timestamp);
+
+		/* If the PK is updated, update the secure boot state of the
+		 * system at the end of processing */
+		if (key_equals(node->var->key, "PK")) {
+			pk_updated = 1;
+			if(new_data_size == 0)
+				setup_mode = true;
+			else
+				setup_mode = false;
+			printf("setup mode is %d\n", setup_mode);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pk_updated) {
+		// Store the updated pk in TPMNV on p9
+		if (proc_gen == proc_gen_p9) {
+			rc = edk2_p9_write_pk();
+			prlog(PR_INFO, "edk2_p9_write rc=%d\n", rc);
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (auth_buffer)
+		free(auth_buffer);
+	if (newesl)
+		free(newesl);
+	if (tbhbuffer)
+		free(tbhbuffer);
+
+	clear_bank_list(&update_bank);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int edk2_compat_post_process(void)
+{
+	printf("setup mode is %d\n", setup_mode);
+	if (!setup_mode) {
+		secvar_set_secure_mode();
+		prlog(PR_INFO, "Enforcing OS secure mode\n");
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_pkcs7_sig_format(void *data)
+{
+	struct efi_variable_authentication_2 *auth = data;
+	uuid_t pkcs7_guid = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
+
+	if(!(memcmp(&auth->auth_info.cert_type, &pkcs7_guid, 16) == 0))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int edk2_compat_validate(struct secvar *var)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks if the update is for supported
+	 * Non-volatile secure variales
+	 */
+	if (!key_equals(var->key, "PK")
+	    && !key_equals(var->key, "KEK")
+	    && !key_equals(var->key, "db")
+	    && !key_equals(var->key, "dbx"))
+		return -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * PK update should contain single ESL.
+	 */
+	//Not sure if we need to restrict it but, am adding as of now.
+	//Feel free to remove it if you don't it as good idea
+	if (key_equals(var->key, "PK")) {
+		printf("check if single PK\n");
+		if (!is_single_pk(var->data, var->data_size)) {
+			printf("not single pk\n");
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that signature type is PKCS7
+	 */
+	if (!is_pkcs7_sig_format(var->data))
+		return -1;
+	//Some more checks needs to be added:
+	// - check guid
+	// - check auth struct
+	// - possibly check signature? can't add but can validate
+
+	return 0;
+};
+
+struct secvar_backend_driver edk2_compatible_v1 = {
+	.pre_process = edk2_compat_pre_process,
+	.process = edk2_compat_process,
+	.post_process = edk2_compat_post_process,
+	.validate = edk2_compat_validate,
+	.compatible = "ibm,edk2-compat-v1",
+};
diff --git a/libstb/secvar/backend/edk2.h b/libstb/secvar/backend/edk2.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..29874ef7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libstb/secvar/backend/edk2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2006 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. This
+ * program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available
+ * under the terms and conditions of the 2-Clause BSD License which
+ * accompanies this distribution.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * This file is derived from the following files referred from edk2-staging[1] repo
+ * of tianocore
+ *
+ * MdePkg/Include/Guid/GlobalVariable.h
+ * MdePkg/Include/Guid/WinCertificate.h
+ * MdePkg/Include/Uefi/UefiMultiPhase.h
+ * MdePkg/Include/Uefi/UefiBaseType.h
+ * MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging
+ *
+ * Copyright 2019 IBM Corp.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __EDK2_H__
+#define __EDK2_H__
+
+#define UUID_SIZE 16
+
+typedef struct {
+        u8 b[UUID_SIZE];
+} uuid_t;
+
+#define EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID (uuid_t){{0x61, 0xDF, 0xe4, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x93, 0xd2, 0x11, 0xaa, \
+			 0x0d, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x98, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x8c}}
+
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID (uuid_t){{0xcb, 0xb2, 0x19, 0xd7, 0x3a, 0x3d, 0x96, 0x45, \
+					   0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f}}
+
+#define SECVAR_ATTRIBUTES	39	
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature based on an X.509 certificate. If the signature is an X.509
+/// certificate then verification of the signature of an image should validate the public
+/// key certificate in the image using certificate path verification, up to this X.509
+/// certificate as a trusted root.  The SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The
+/// SignatureSize may vary but shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner component) +
+/// the size of the certificate itself.
+/// Note: This means that each certificate will normally be in a separate EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
+///
+
+#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID \
+  (UUID_INIT) (0x3c5766e8, 0x269c, 0x4e34, 0xaa, 0x14, 0xed, 0x77, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xb3, 0xb6)
+
+#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID (uuid_t){{0x9d, 0xd2, 0xaf, 0x4a, 0xdf, 0x68, 0xee, 0x49, \
+					   0x8a, 0xa9, 0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65, 0xa7}}
+
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE				0x00000001
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS				0x00000002
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS				0x00000004
+
+/*
+ * Attributes of Authenticated Variable
+ */
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS	0x00000020
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE				0x00000040
+/*
+ * NOTE: EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is deprecated and should be
+ * considered reserved.
+ */
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS			0x00000010
+
+/*
+ * win_certificate.w_certificate_type
+ */
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA	0x0002
+
+#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE           1
+#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE          0
+///
+/// Depricated value definition for SetupMode variable
+///
+#define SETUP_MODE                        1
+#define USER_MODE                         0
+
+/*
+ * EFI Time Abstraction:
+ *   Year:       1900 - 9999
+ *   Month:      1 - 12
+ *   Day:        1 - 31
+ *   Hour:       0 - 23
+ *   Minute:     0 - 59
+ *   Second:     0 - 59
+ *   Nanosecond: 0 - 999,999,999
+ *   TimeZone:   -1440 to 1440 or 2047
+ */
+struct efi_time {
+	u16 year;
+	u8 month;
+	u8 day;
+	u8 hour;
+	u8 minute;
+	u8 second;
+	u8 pad1;
+	u32 nanosecond;
+	s16 timezone;
+	u8 daylight;
+	u8 pad2;
+};
+//***********************************************************************
+// Signature Database
+//***********************************************************************
+///
+/// The format of a signature database.
+///
+#pragma pack(1)
+
+typedef struct {
+  ///
+  /// An identifier which identifies the agent which added the signature to the list.
+  ///
+  uuid_t SignatureOwner;
+  ///
+  /// The format of the signature is defined by the SignatureType.
+  ///
+  unsigned char SignatureData[0];
+} EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA;
+
+typedef struct {
+  ///
+  /// Type of the signature. GUID signature types are defined in below.
+  ///
+  uuid_t SignatureType;
+  ///
+  /// Total size of the signature list, including this header.
+  ///
+  uint32_t	SignatureListSize;
+  ///
+  /// Size of the signature header which precedes the array of signatures.
+  ///
+  uint32_t	SignatureHeaderSize;
+  ///
+  /// Size of each signature.
+  ///
+  uint32_t	SignatureSize;
+  ///
+  /// Header before the array of signatures. The format of this header is specified
+  /// by the SignatureType.
+  /// UINT8           SignatureHeader[SignatureHeaderSize];
+  ///
+  /// An array of signatures. Each signature is SignatureSize bytes in length.
+  /// EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA Signatures[][SignatureSize];
+  ///
+} EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST;
+
+
+/*
+ * The win_certificate structure is part of the PE/COFF specification.
+ */
+struct win_certificate {
+	/*
+	 * The length of the entire certificate, including the length of the
+	 * header, in bytes.
+	 */
+	u32  dw_length;
+	/*
+	 * The revision level of the WIN_CERTIFICATE structure. The current
+	 * revision level is 0x0200.
+	 */
+	u16  w_revision;
+	/*
+	 * The certificate type. See WIN_CERT_TYPE_xxx for the UEFI certificate
+	 * types. The UEFI specification reserves the range of certificate type
+	 * values from 0x0EF0 to 0x0EFF.
+	 */
+	u16  w_certificate_type;
+	/*
+	 * The following is the actual certificate. The format of
+	 * the certificate depends on wCertificateType.
+	 */
+	/// UINT8 bCertificate[ANYSIZE_ARRAY];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Certificate which encapsulates a GUID-specific digital signature
+ */
+struct win_certificate_uefi_guid {
+	/*
+	 * This is the standard win_certificate header, where w_certificate_type
+	 * is set to WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.
+	 */
+	struct win_certificate hdr;
+	/*
+	 * This is the unique id which determines the format of the cert_data.
+	 */
+	uuid_t cert_type;
+	/*
+	 * The following is the certificate data. The format of the data is
+	 * determined by the @cert_type. If @cert_type is
+	 * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, the @cert_data will be
+	 * EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 structure.
+	 */
+	u8 cert_data[1];
+};
+/*
+ * When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is set,
+ * then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and
+ * serialized) EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be
+ * followed by the new variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined
+ * size of the descriptor and the new variable value. The authentication
+ * descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not returned by subsequent
+ * calls to GetVariable().
+ */
+struct efi_variable_authentication_2 {
+	/*
+	 * For the TimeStamp value, components Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and
+	 * Pad2 shall be set to 0. This means that the time shall always be expressed in GMT.
+	 */
+	struct efi_time timestamp;
+	/*
+	 * Only a CertType of  EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID is accepted.
+	 */
+	struct win_certificate_uefi_guid auth_info;
+};
+
+#endif
