| Message ID | 20230419032725.29721-7-liweiwei@iscas.ac.cn |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | target/riscv: Fix PMP related problem | expand |
On 2023/4/19 11:27, Weiwei Li wrote: > We needn't check the PMP entries if there is no PMP rules. This commit doesn't give much information. If you are fixing a bug, you should point it out why the original implementation is wrong. > > Signed-off-by: Weiwei Li <liweiwei@iscas.ac.cn> > Signed-off-by: Junqiang Wang <wangjunqiang@iscas.ac.cn> > --- > target/riscv/pmp.c | 251 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- Have we changed all the logic of this function? It's really a lot of code change. I am not sure if there is a git option to reduce the code move in the patch. Zhiwei > 1 file changed, 123 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/target/riscv/pmp.c b/target/riscv/pmp.c > index 7feaddd7eb..755ed2b963 100644 > --- a/target/riscv/pmp.c > +++ b/target/riscv/pmp.c > @@ -314,149 +314,144 @@ int pmp_hart_has_privs(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr, > target_ulong e = 0; > > /* Short cut if no rules */ > - if (0 == pmp_get_num_rules(env)) { > - if (pmp_hart_has_privs_default(env, addr, size, privs, > - allowed_privs, mode)) { > - ret = MAX_RISCV_PMPS; > - } > - } > - > - if (size == 0) { > - if (riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->mmu) { > - /* > - * If size is unknown (0), assume that all bytes > - * from addr to the end of the page will be accessed. > - */ > - pmp_size = -(addr | TARGET_PAGE_MASK); > + if (pmp_get_num_rules(env) != 0) { > + if (size == 0) { > + if (riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->mmu) { > + /* > + * If size is unknown (0), assume that all bytes > + * from addr to the end of the page will be accessed. > + */ > + pmp_size = -(addr | TARGET_PAGE_MASK); > + } else { > + pmp_size = sizeof(target_ulong); > + } > } else { > - pmp_size = sizeof(target_ulong); > - } > - } else { > - pmp_size = size; > - } > - > - /* > - * 1.10 draft priv spec states there is an implicit order > - * from low to high > - */ > - for (i = 0; i < MAX_RISCV_PMPS; i++) { > - s = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr); > - e = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr + pmp_size - 1); > - > - /* partially inside */ > - if ((s + e) == 1) { > - qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, > - "pmp violation - access is partially inside\n"); > - ret = -1; > - break; > + pmp_size = size; > } > > - /* fully inside */ > - const uint8_t a_field = > - pmp_get_a_field(env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg); > - > /* > - * Convert the PMP permissions to match the truth table in the > - * ePMP spec. > + * 1.10 draft priv spec states there is an implicit order > + * from low to high > */ > - const uint8_t epmp_operation = > - ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_LOCK) >> 4) | > - ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_READ) << 2) | > - (env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_WRITE) | > - ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_EXEC) >> 2); > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_RISCV_PMPS; i++) { > + s = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr); > + e = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr + pmp_size - 1); > + > + /* partially inside */ > + if ((s + e) == 1) { > + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, > + "pmp violation - access is partially inside\n"); > + ret = -1; > + break; > + } > + > + /* fully inside */ > + const uint8_t a_field = > + pmp_get_a_field(env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg); > > - if (((s + e) == 2) && (PMP_AMATCH_OFF != a_field)) { > /* > - * If the PMP entry is not off and the address is in range, > - * do the priv check > + * Convert the PMP permissions to match the truth table in the > + * ePMP spec. > */ > - if (!MSECCFG_MML_ISSET(env)) { > - /* > - * If mseccfg.MML Bit is not set, do pmp priv check > - * This will always apply to regular PMP. > - */ > - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; > - if ((mode != PRV_M) || pmp_is_locked(env, i)) { > - *allowed_privs &= env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg; > - } > - } else { > + const uint8_t epmp_operation = > + ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_LOCK) >> 4) | > + ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_READ) << 2) | > + (env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_WRITE) | > + ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_EXEC) >> 2); > + > + if (((s + e) == 2) && (PMP_AMATCH_OFF != a_field)) { > /* > - * If mseccfg.MML Bit set, do the enhanced pmp priv check > + * If the PMP entry is not off and the address is in range, > + * do the priv check > */ > - if (mode == PRV_M) { > - switch (epmp_operation) { > - case 0: > - case 1: > - case 4: > - case 5: > - case 6: > - case 7: > - case 8: > - *allowed_privs = 0; > - break; > - case 2: > - case 3: > - case 14: > - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; > - break; > - case 9: > - case 10: > - *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; > - break; > - case 11: > - case 13: > - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; > - break; > - case 12: > - case 15: > - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; > - break; > - default: > - g_assert_not_reached(); > + if (!MSECCFG_MML_ISSET(env)) { > + /* > + * If mseccfg.MML Bit is not set, do pmp priv check > + * This will always apply to regular PMP. > + */ > + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; > + if ((mode != PRV_M) || pmp_is_locked(env, i)) { > + *allowed_privs &= env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg; > } > } else { > - switch (epmp_operation) { > - case 0: > - case 8: > - case 9: > - case 12: > - case 13: > - case 14: > - *allowed_privs = 0; > - break; > - case 1: > - case 10: > - case 11: > - *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; > - break; > - case 2: > - case 4: > - case 15: > - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; > - break; > - case 3: > - case 6: > - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; > - break; > - case 5: > - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; > - break; > - case 7: > - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; > - break; > - default: > - g_assert_not_reached(); > + /* > + * If mseccfg.MML Bit set, do the enhanced pmp priv check > + */ > + if (mode == PRV_M) { > + switch (epmp_operation) { > + case 0: > + case 1: > + case 4: > + case 5: > + case 6: > + case 7: > + case 8: > + *allowed_privs = 0; > + break; > + case 2: > + case 3: > + case 14: > + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; > + break; > + case 9: > + case 10: > + *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; > + break; > + case 11: > + case 13: > + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; > + break; > + case 12: > + case 15: > + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; > + break; > + default: > + g_assert_not_reached(); > + } > + } else { > + switch (epmp_operation) { > + case 0: > + case 8: > + case 9: > + case 12: > + case 13: > + case 14: > + *allowed_privs = 0; > + break; > + case 1: > + case 10: > + case 11: > + *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; > + break; > + case 2: > + case 4: > + case 15: > + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; > + break; > + case 3: > + case 6: > + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; > + break; > + case 5: > + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; > + break; > + case 7: > + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; > + break; > + default: > + g_assert_not_reached(); > + } > } > } > - } > > - /* > - * If matching address range was found, the protection bits > - * defined with PMP must be used. We shouldn't fallback on > - * finding default privileges. > - */ > - ret = i; > - break; > + /* > + * If matching address range was found, the protection bits > + * defined with PMP must be used. We shouldn't fallback on > + * finding default privileges. > + */ > + ret = i; > + break; > + } > } > } >
On 2023/4/20 21:33, LIU Zhiwei wrote: > > On 2023/4/19 11:27, Weiwei Li wrote: >> We needn't check the PMP entries if there is no PMP rules. > This commit doesn't give much information. If you are fixing a bug, > you should point it out why the original implementation is wrong. This patch is not to fix bug , but to improve the original implementation. I'll add more description in the commit message. >> >> Signed-off-by: Weiwei Li <liweiwei@iscas.ac.cn> >> Signed-off-by: Junqiang Wang <wangjunqiang@iscas.ac.cn> >> --- >> target/riscv/pmp.c | 251 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- > > Have we changed all the logic of this function? It's really a lot of > code change. I am not sure if there is a git option to reduce the code > move in the patch. > > Zhiwei > >> 1 file changed, 123 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/target/riscv/pmp.c b/target/riscv/pmp.c >> index 7feaddd7eb..755ed2b963 100644 >> --- a/target/riscv/pmp.c >> +++ b/target/riscv/pmp.c >> @@ -314,149 +314,144 @@ int pmp_hart_has_privs(CPURISCVState *env, >> target_ulong addr, >> target_ulong e = 0; >> /* Short cut if no rules */ >> - if (0 == pmp_get_num_rules(env)) { >> - if (pmp_hart_has_privs_default(env, addr, size, privs, >> - allowed_privs, mode)) { >> - ret = MAX_RISCV_PMPS; >> - } >> - } >> - In original code, short cut if no rules didn't really work. all the following check also should be done when pmp_get_num_rules() == 0, and this is unneccessary. So I move the following check into the condition pmp_get_num_rules(env) != 0, and reuse the pmp_hart_has_privs_default() check at the end of this function for pmp_get_num_rules() == 0. Regards, Weiwei Li >> - if (size == 0) { >> - if (riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->mmu) { >> - /* >> - * If size is unknown (0), assume that all bytes >> - * from addr to the end of the page will be accessed. >> - */ >> - pmp_size = -(addr | TARGET_PAGE_MASK); >> + if (pmp_get_num_rules(env) != 0) { >> + if (size == 0) { >> + if (riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->mmu) { >> + /* >> + * If size is unknown (0), assume that all bytes >> + * from addr to the end of the page will be accessed. >> + */ >> + pmp_size = -(addr | TARGET_PAGE_MASK); >> + } else { >> + pmp_size = sizeof(target_ulong); >> + } >> } else { >> - pmp_size = sizeof(target_ulong); >> - } >> - } else { >> - pmp_size = size; >> - } >> - >> - /* >> - * 1.10 draft priv spec states there is an implicit order >> - * from low to high >> - */ >> - for (i = 0; i < MAX_RISCV_PMPS; i++) { >> - s = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr); >> - e = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr + pmp_size - 1); >> - >> - /* partially inside */ >> - if ((s + e) == 1) { >> - qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, >> - "pmp violation - access is partially >> inside\n"); >> - ret = -1; >> - break; >> + pmp_size = size; >> } >> - /* fully inside */ >> - const uint8_t a_field = >> - pmp_get_a_field(env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg); >> - >> /* >> - * Convert the PMP permissions to match the truth table in the >> - * ePMP spec. >> + * 1.10 draft priv spec states there is an implicit order >> + * from low to high >> */ >> - const uint8_t epmp_operation = >> - ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_LOCK) >> 4) | >> - ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_READ) << 2) | >> - (env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_WRITE) | >> - ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_EXEC) >> 2); >> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_RISCV_PMPS; i++) { >> + s = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr); >> + e = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr + pmp_size - 1); >> + >> + /* partially inside */ >> + if ((s + e) == 1) { >> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, >> + "pmp violation - access is partially >> inside\n"); >> + ret = -1; >> + break; >> + } >> + >> + /* fully inside */ >> + const uint8_t a_field = >> + pmp_get_a_field(env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg); >> - if (((s + e) == 2) && (PMP_AMATCH_OFF != a_field)) { >> /* >> - * If the PMP entry is not off and the address is in range, >> - * do the priv check >> + * Convert the PMP permissions to match the truth table >> in the >> + * ePMP spec. >> */ >> - if (!MSECCFG_MML_ISSET(env)) { >> - /* >> - * If mseccfg.MML Bit is not set, do pmp priv check >> - * This will always apply to regular PMP. >> - */ >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; >> - if ((mode != PRV_M) || pmp_is_locked(env, i)) { >> - *allowed_privs &= env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg; >> - } >> - } else { >> + const uint8_t epmp_operation = >> + ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_LOCK) >> 4) | >> + ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_READ) << 2) | >> + (env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_WRITE) | >> + ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_EXEC) >> 2); >> + >> + if (((s + e) == 2) && (PMP_AMATCH_OFF != a_field)) { >> /* >> - * If mseccfg.MML Bit set, do the enhanced pmp priv >> check >> + * If the PMP entry is not off and the address is in >> range, >> + * do the priv check >> */ >> - if (mode == PRV_M) { >> - switch (epmp_operation) { >> - case 0: >> - case 1: >> - case 4: >> - case 5: >> - case 6: >> - case 7: >> - case 8: >> - *allowed_privs = 0; >> - break; >> - case 2: >> - case 3: >> - case 14: >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; >> - break; >> - case 9: >> - case 10: >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; >> - break; >> - case 11: >> - case 13: >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; >> - break; >> - case 12: >> - case 15: >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; >> - break; >> - default: >> - g_assert_not_reached(); >> + if (!MSECCFG_MML_ISSET(env)) { >> + /* >> + * If mseccfg.MML Bit is not set, do pmp priv check >> + * This will always apply to regular PMP. >> + */ >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; >> + if ((mode != PRV_M) || pmp_is_locked(env, i)) { >> + *allowed_privs &= >> env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg; >> } >> } else { >> - switch (epmp_operation) { >> - case 0: >> - case 8: >> - case 9: >> - case 12: >> - case 13: >> - case 14: >> - *allowed_privs = 0; >> - break; >> - case 1: >> - case 10: >> - case 11: >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; >> - break; >> - case 2: >> - case 4: >> - case 15: >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; >> - break; >> - case 3: >> - case 6: >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; >> - break; >> - case 5: >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; >> - break; >> - case 7: >> - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | >> PMP_EXEC; >> - break; >> - default: >> - g_assert_not_reached(); >> + /* >> + * If mseccfg.MML Bit set, do the enhanced pmp >> priv check >> + */ >> + if (mode == PRV_M) { >> + switch (epmp_operation) { >> + case 0: >> + case 1: >> + case 4: >> + case 5: >> + case 6: >> + case 7: >> + case 8: >> + *allowed_privs = 0; >> + break; >> + case 2: >> + case 3: >> + case 14: >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; >> + break; >> + case 9: >> + case 10: >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; >> + break; >> + case 11: >> + case 13: >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; >> + break; >> + case 12: >> + case 15: >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; >> + break; >> + default: >> + g_assert_not_reached(); >> + } >> + } else { >> + switch (epmp_operation) { >> + case 0: >> + case 8: >> + case 9: >> + case 12: >> + case 13: >> + case 14: >> + *allowed_privs = 0; >> + break; >> + case 1: >> + case 10: >> + case 11: >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; >> + break; >> + case 2: >> + case 4: >> + case 15: >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; >> + break; >> + case 3: >> + case 6: >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; >> + break; >> + case 5: >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; >> + break; >> + case 7: >> + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | >> PMP_EXEC; >> + break; >> + default: >> + g_assert_not_reached(); >> + } >> } >> } >> - } >> - /* >> - * If matching address range was found, the protection bits >> - * defined with PMP must be used. We shouldn't fallback on >> - * finding default privileges. >> - */ >> - ret = i; >> - break; >> + /* >> + * If matching address range was found, the >> protection bits >> + * defined with PMP must be used. We shouldn't >> fallback on >> + * finding default privileges. >> + */ >> + ret = i; >> + break; >> + } >> } >> }
diff --git a/target/riscv/pmp.c b/target/riscv/pmp.c index 7feaddd7eb..755ed2b963 100644 --- a/target/riscv/pmp.c +++ b/target/riscv/pmp.c @@ -314,149 +314,144 @@ int pmp_hart_has_privs(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr, target_ulong e = 0; /* Short cut if no rules */ - if (0 == pmp_get_num_rules(env)) { - if (pmp_hart_has_privs_default(env, addr, size, privs, - allowed_privs, mode)) { - ret = MAX_RISCV_PMPS; - } - } - - if (size == 0) { - if (riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->mmu) { - /* - * If size is unknown (0), assume that all bytes - * from addr to the end of the page will be accessed. - */ - pmp_size = -(addr | TARGET_PAGE_MASK); + if (pmp_get_num_rules(env) != 0) { + if (size == 0) { + if (riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->mmu) { + /* + * If size is unknown (0), assume that all bytes + * from addr to the end of the page will be accessed. + */ + pmp_size = -(addr | TARGET_PAGE_MASK); + } else { + pmp_size = sizeof(target_ulong); + } } else { - pmp_size = sizeof(target_ulong); - } - } else { - pmp_size = size; - } - - /* - * 1.10 draft priv spec states there is an implicit order - * from low to high - */ - for (i = 0; i < MAX_RISCV_PMPS; i++) { - s = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr); - e = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr + pmp_size - 1); - - /* partially inside */ - if ((s + e) == 1) { - qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, - "pmp violation - access is partially inside\n"); - ret = -1; - break; + pmp_size = size; } - /* fully inside */ - const uint8_t a_field = - pmp_get_a_field(env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg); - /* - * Convert the PMP permissions to match the truth table in the - * ePMP spec. + * 1.10 draft priv spec states there is an implicit order + * from low to high */ - const uint8_t epmp_operation = - ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_LOCK) >> 4) | - ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_READ) << 2) | - (env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_WRITE) | - ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_EXEC) >> 2); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_RISCV_PMPS; i++) { + s = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr); + e = pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr + pmp_size - 1); + + /* partially inside */ + if ((s + e) == 1) { + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, + "pmp violation - access is partially inside\n"); + ret = -1; + break; + } + + /* fully inside */ + const uint8_t a_field = + pmp_get_a_field(env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg); - if (((s + e) == 2) && (PMP_AMATCH_OFF != a_field)) { /* - * If the PMP entry is not off and the address is in range, - * do the priv check + * Convert the PMP permissions to match the truth table in the + * ePMP spec. */ - if (!MSECCFG_MML_ISSET(env)) { - /* - * If mseccfg.MML Bit is not set, do pmp priv check - * This will always apply to regular PMP. - */ - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; - if ((mode != PRV_M) || pmp_is_locked(env, i)) { - *allowed_privs &= env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg; - } - } else { + const uint8_t epmp_operation = + ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_LOCK) >> 4) | + ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_READ) << 2) | + (env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_WRITE) | + ((env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg & PMP_EXEC) >> 2); + + if (((s + e) == 2) && (PMP_AMATCH_OFF != a_field)) { /* - * If mseccfg.MML Bit set, do the enhanced pmp priv check + * If the PMP entry is not off and the address is in range, + * do the priv check */ - if (mode == PRV_M) { - switch (epmp_operation) { - case 0: - case 1: - case 4: - case 5: - case 6: - case 7: - case 8: - *allowed_privs = 0; - break; - case 2: - case 3: - case 14: - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; - break; - case 9: - case 10: - *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; - break; - case 11: - case 13: - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; - break; - case 12: - case 15: - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; - break; - default: - g_assert_not_reached(); + if (!MSECCFG_MML_ISSET(env)) { + /* + * If mseccfg.MML Bit is not set, do pmp priv check + * This will always apply to regular PMP. + */ + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; + if ((mode != PRV_M) || pmp_is_locked(env, i)) { + *allowed_privs &= env->pmp_state.pmp[i].cfg_reg; } } else { - switch (epmp_operation) { - case 0: - case 8: - case 9: - case 12: - case 13: - case 14: - *allowed_privs = 0; - break; - case 1: - case 10: - case 11: - *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; - break; - case 2: - case 4: - case 15: - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; - break; - case 3: - case 6: - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; - break; - case 5: - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; - break; - case 7: - *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; - break; - default: - g_assert_not_reached(); + /* + * If mseccfg.MML Bit set, do the enhanced pmp priv check + */ + if (mode == PRV_M) { + switch (epmp_operation) { + case 0: + case 1: + case 4: + case 5: + case 6: + case 7: + case 8: + *allowed_privs = 0; + break; + case 2: + case 3: + case 14: + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; + break; + case 9: + case 10: + *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; + break; + case 11: + case 13: + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; + break; + case 12: + case 15: + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; + break; + default: + g_assert_not_reached(); + } + } else { + switch (epmp_operation) { + case 0: + case 8: + case 9: + case 12: + case 13: + case 14: + *allowed_privs = 0; + break; + case 1: + case 10: + case 11: + *allowed_privs = PMP_EXEC; + break; + case 2: + case 4: + case 15: + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ; + break; + case 3: + case 6: + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE; + break; + case 5: + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_EXEC; + break; + case 7: + *allowed_privs = PMP_READ | PMP_WRITE | PMP_EXEC; + break; + default: + g_assert_not_reached(); + } } } - } - /* - * If matching address range was found, the protection bits - * defined with PMP must be used. We shouldn't fallback on - * finding default privileges. - */ - ret = i; - break; + /* + * If matching address range was found, the protection bits + * defined with PMP must be used. We shouldn't fallback on + * finding default privileges. + */ + ret = i; + break; + } } }