| Message ID | 20221025151344.3784230-3-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM | expand |
On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 4:18 PM Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> wrote: > > In memory encryption usage, guest memory may be encrypted with special > key and can be accessed only by the guest itself. We call such memory > private memory. It's valueless and sometimes can cause problem to allow > userspace to access guest private memory. This new KVM memslot extension > allows guest private memory being provided though a restrictedmem > backed file descriptor(fd) and userspace is restricted to access the > bookmarked memory in the fd. > > This new extension, indicated by the new flag KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, adds two > additional KVM memslot fields restricted_fd/restricted_offset to allow > userspace to instruct KVM to provide guest memory through restricted_fd. > 'guest_phys_addr' is mapped at the restricted_offset of restricted_fd > and the size is 'memory_size'. > > The extended memslot can still have the userspace_addr(hva). When use, a > single memslot can maintain both private memory through restricted_fd > and shared memory through userspace_addr. Whether the private or shared > part is visible to guest is maintained by other KVM code. > > A restrictedmem_notifier field is also added to the memslot structure to > allow the restricted_fd's backing store to notify KVM the memory change, > KVM then can invalidate its page table entries. > > Together with the change, a new config HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM is added > and right now it is selected on X86_64 only. A KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM is > also introduced to indicate KVM support for KVM_MEM_PRIVATE. > > To make code maintenance easy, internally we use a binary compatible > alias struct kvm_user_mem_region to handle both the normal and the > '_ext' variants. > > Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com> I have tested the V8 version of this patch on arm64/qemu (which has the fix to copy_from_user included in this patch), and considering this hasn't changed much: Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com> Cheers, /fuad > --- > Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 2 ++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- > include/linux/kvm_host.h | 13 +++++++-- > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++ > virt/kvm/Kconfig | 3 +++ > virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > 7 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst > index eee9f857a986..f3fa75649a78 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst > @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry. > :Capability: KVM_CAP_USER_MEMORY > :Architectures: all > :Type: vm ioctl > -:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region (in) > +:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region(_ext) (in) > :Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error > > :: > @@ -1332,9 +1332,18 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry. > __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */ > }; > > + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext { > + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; > + __u64 restricted_offset; > + __u32 restricted_fd; > + __u32 pad1; > + __u64 pad2[14]; > + }; > + > /* for kvm_memory_region::flags */ > #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0) > #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1) > + #define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2) > > This ioctl allows the user to create, modify or delete a guest physical > memory slot. Bits 0-15 of "slot" specify the slot id and this value > @@ -1365,12 +1374,27 @@ It is recommended that the lower 21 bits of guest_phys_addr and userspace_addr > be identical. This allows large pages in the guest to be backed by large > pages in the host. > > -The flags field supports two flags: KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES and > -KVM_MEM_READONLY. The former can be set to instruct KVM to keep track of > -writes to memory within the slot. See KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl to know how to > -use it. The latter can be set, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM capability allows it, > -to make a new slot read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be > -posted to userspace as KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits. > +kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext struct includes all fields of > +kvm_userspace_memory_region struct, while also adds additional fields for some > +other features. See below description of flags field for more information. > +It's recommended to use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext in new userspace code. > + > +The flags field supports following flags: > + > +- KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES to instruct KVM to keep track of writes to memory > + within the slot. For more details, see KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl. > + > +- KVM_MEM_READONLY, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM allows, to make a new slot > + read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be posted to userspace as > + KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits. > + > +- KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, if KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM allows, to indicate a new slot has > + private memory backed by a file descriptor(fd) and userspace access to the > + fd may be restricted. Userspace should use restricted_fd/restricted_offset in > + kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext to instruct KVM to provide private memory > + to guest. Userspace should guarantee not to map the same pfn indicated by > + restricted_fd/restricted_offset to different gfns with multiple memslots. > + Failed to do this may result undefined behavior. > > When the KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU capability is available, changes in the backing of > the memory region are automatically reflected into the guest. For example, an > @@ -8215,6 +8239,16 @@ structure. > When getting the Modified Change Topology Report value, the attr->addr > must point to a byte where the value will be stored or retrieved from. > > +8.36 KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM > +------------------------ > + > +:Architectures: x86 > + > +This capability indicates that private memory is supported and userspace can > +set KVM_MEM_PRIVATE flag for KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION ioctl. See > +KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION for details on the usage of KVM_MEM_PRIVATE and > +kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext fields. > + > 9. Known KVM API problems > ========================= > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig > index 67be7f217e37..8d2bd455c0cd 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig > @@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ config KVM > select SRCU > select INTERVAL_TREE > select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM > + select HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM if X86_64 > + select RESTRICTEDMEM if HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM > help > Support hosting fully virtualized guest machines using hardware > virtualization extensions. You will need a fairly recent > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > index 4bd5f8a751de..02ad31f46dd7 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > @@ -12425,7 +12425,7 @@ void __user * __x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa, > } > > for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) { > - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region m; > + struct kvm_user_mem_region m; > > m.slot = id | (i << 16); > m.flags = 0; > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h > index 32f259fa5801..739a7562a1f3 100644 > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h > @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ > > #include <asm/kvm_host.h> > #include <linux/kvm_dirty_ring.h> > +#include <linux/restrictedmem.h> > > #ifndef KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS > #define KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS KVM_MAX_VCPUS > @@ -575,8 +576,16 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot { > u32 flags; > short id; > u16 as_id; > + struct file *restricted_file; > + loff_t restricted_offset; > + struct restrictedmem_notifier notifier; > }; > > +static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) > +{ > + return slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE); > +} > + > static inline bool kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) > { > return slot->flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; > @@ -1103,9 +1112,9 @@ enum kvm_mr_change { > }; > > int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem); > + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem); > int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem); > + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem); > void kvm_arch_free_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot); > void kvm_arch_memslots_updated(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen); > int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index 0d5d4419139a..f1ae45c10c94 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -103,6 +103,33 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region { > __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */ > }; > > +struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext { > + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; > + __u64 restricted_offset; > + __u32 restricted_fd; > + __u32 pad1; > + __u64 pad2[14]; > +}; > + > +#ifdef __KERNEL__ > +/* > + * kvm_user_mem_region is a kernel-only alias of kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext > + * that "unpacks" kvm_userspace_memory_region so that KVM can directly access > + * all fields from the top-level "extended" region. > + */ > +struct kvm_user_mem_region { > + __u32 slot; > + __u32 flags; > + __u64 guest_phys_addr; > + __u64 memory_size; > + __u64 userspace_addr; > + __u64 restricted_offset; > + __u32 restricted_fd; > + __u32 pad1; > + __u64 pad2[14]; > +}; > +#endif > + > /* > * The bit 0 ~ bit 15 of kvm_memory_region::flags are visible for userspace, > * other bits are reserved for kvm internal use which are defined in > @@ -110,6 +137,7 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region { > */ > #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0) > #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1) > +#define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2) > > /* for KVM_IRQ_LINE */ > struct kvm_irq_level { > @@ -1178,6 +1206,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { > #define KVM_CAP_S390_ZPCI_OP 221 > #define KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY 222 > #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL 223 > +#define KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM 224 > > #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING > > diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig > index 800f9470e36b..9ff164c7e0cc 100644 > --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig > +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig > @@ -86,3 +86,6 @@ config KVM_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK > > config HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER > bool > + > +config HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM > + bool > diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > index e30f1b4ecfa5..8dace78a0278 100644 > --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > @@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ static void kvm_replace_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, > } > } > > -static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > +static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > { > u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; > > @@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ static bool kvm_check_memslot_overlap(struct kvm_memslots *slots, int id, > * Must be called holding kvm->slots_lock for write. > */ > int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > { > struct kvm_memory_slot *old, *new; > struct kvm_memslots *slots; > @@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_set_memory_region); > > int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > { > int r; > > @@ -2036,7 +2036,7 @@ int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_memory_region); > > static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > + struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > { > if ((u16)mem->slot >= KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS) > return -EINVAL; > @@ -4627,6 +4627,33 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_stats_fd(struct kvm *kvm) > return fd; > } > > +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(field) \ > +do { \ > + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \ > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \ > +} while (0) > + > +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(field) \ > +do { \ > + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \ > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \ > +} while (0) > + > +static void kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias(void) > +{ > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(slot); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(flags); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(guest_phys_addr); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(memory_size); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(userspace_addr); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_offset); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_fd); > +} > + > static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, > unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg) > { > @@ -4650,14 +4677,20 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, > break; > } > case KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION: { > - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem; > + struct kvm_user_mem_region mem; > + unsigned long size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region); > + > + kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias(); > > r = -EFAULT; > - if (copy_from_user(&kvm_userspace_mem, argp, > - sizeof(kvm_userspace_mem))) > + if (copy_from_user(&mem, argp, size)) > + goto out; > + > + r = -EINVAL; > + if (mem.flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE) > goto out; > > - r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &kvm_userspace_mem); > + r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &mem); > break; > } > case KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG: { > -- > 2.25.1 >
On 10/25/2022 11:13 PM, Chao Peng wrote: > In memory encryption usage, guest memory may be encrypted with special > key and can be accessed only by the guest itself. We call such memory > private memory. It's valueless and sometimes can cause problem to allow > userspace to access guest private memory. This new KVM memslot extension > allows guest private memory being provided though a restrictedmem ^ typo > backed file descriptor(fd) and userspace is restricted to access the > bookmarked memory in the fd. > > This new extension, indicated by the new flag KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, adds two > additional KVM memslot fields restricted_fd/restricted_offset to allow > userspace to instruct KVM to provide guest memory through restricted_fd. > 'guest_phys_addr' is mapped at the restricted_offset of restricted_fd > and the size is 'memory_size'. > > The extended memslot can still have the userspace_addr(hva). When use, a > single memslot can maintain both private memory through restricted_fd > and shared memory through userspace_addr. Whether the private or shared > part is visible to guest is maintained by other KVM code. > > A restrictedmem_notifier field is also added to the memslot structure to > allow the restricted_fd's backing store to notify KVM the memory change, > KVM then can invalidate its page table entries. > > Together with the change, a new config HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM is added > and right now it is selected on X86_64 only. A KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM is > also introduced to indicate KVM support for KVM_MEM_PRIVATE. > > To make code maintenance easy, internally we use a binary compatible > alias struct kvm_user_mem_region to handle both the normal and the > '_ext' variants. > > Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> > --- > Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 2 ++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- > include/linux/kvm_host.h | 13 +++++++-- > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++ > virt/kvm/Kconfig | 3 +++ > virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > 7 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst > index eee9f857a986..f3fa75649a78 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst > @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry. > :Capability: KVM_CAP_USER_MEMORY > :Architectures: all > :Type: vm ioctl > -:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region (in) > +:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region(_ext) (in) > :Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error > > :: > @@ -1332,9 +1332,18 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry. > __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */ > }; > > + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext { > + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; > + __u64 restricted_offset; > + __u32 restricted_fd; > + __u32 pad1; > + __u64 pad2[14]; > + }; > + > /* for kvm_memory_region::flags */ > #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0) > #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1) > + #define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2) > > This ioctl allows the user to create, modify or delete a guest physical > memory slot. Bits 0-15 of "slot" specify the slot id and this value > @@ -1365,12 +1374,27 @@ It is recommended that the lower 21 bits of guest_phys_addr and userspace_addr > be identical. This allows large pages in the guest to be backed by large > pages in the host. > > -The flags field supports two flags: KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES and > -KVM_MEM_READONLY. The former can be set to instruct KVM to keep track of > -writes to memory within the slot. See KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl to know how to > -use it. The latter can be set, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM capability allows it, > -to make a new slot read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be > -posted to userspace as KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits. > +kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext struct includes all fields of > +kvm_userspace_memory_region struct, while also adds additional fields for some > +other features. See below description of flags field for more information. > +It's recommended to use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext in new userspace code. > + > +The flags field supports following flags: > + > +- KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES to instruct KVM to keep track of writes to memory > + within the slot. For more details, see KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl. > + > +- KVM_MEM_READONLY, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM allows, to make a new slot > + read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be posted to userspace as > + KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits. > + > +- KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, if KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM allows, to indicate a new slot has > + private memory backed by a file descriptor(fd) and userspace access to the > + fd may be restricted. Userspace should use restricted_fd/restricted_offset in > + kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext to instruct KVM to provide private memory > + to guest. Userspace should guarantee not to map the same pfn indicated by > + restricted_fd/restricted_offset to different gfns with multiple memslots. > + Failed to do this may result undefined behavior. > > When the KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU capability is available, changes in the backing of > the memory region are automatically reflected into the guest. For example, an > @@ -8215,6 +8239,16 @@ structure. > When getting the Modified Change Topology Report value, the attr->addr > must point to a byte where the value will be stored or retrieved from. > > +8.36 KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM > +------------------------ > + > +:Architectures: x86 > + > +This capability indicates that private memory is supported and userspace can > +set KVM_MEM_PRIVATE flag for KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION ioctl. See > +KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION for details on the usage of KVM_MEM_PRIVATE and > +kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext fields. > + > 9. Known KVM API problems > ========================= > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig > index 67be7f217e37..8d2bd455c0cd 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig > @@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ config KVM > select SRCU > select INTERVAL_TREE > select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM > + select HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM if X86_64 > + select RESTRICTEDMEM if HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM > help > Support hosting fully virtualized guest machines using hardware > virtualization extensions. You will need a fairly recent > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > index 4bd5f8a751de..02ad31f46dd7 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > @@ -12425,7 +12425,7 @@ void __user * __x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa, > } > > for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) { > - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region m; > + struct kvm_user_mem_region m; > > m.slot = id | (i << 16); > m.flags = 0; > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h > index 32f259fa5801..739a7562a1f3 100644 > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h > @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ > > #include <asm/kvm_host.h> > #include <linux/kvm_dirty_ring.h> > +#include <linux/restrictedmem.h> > > #ifndef KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS > #define KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS KVM_MAX_VCPUS > @@ -575,8 +576,16 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot { > u32 flags; > short id; > u16 as_id; > + struct file *restricted_file; > + loff_t restricted_offset; > + struct restrictedmem_notifier notifier; > }; > > +static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) > +{ > + return slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE); > +} > + We can introduce this function in patch 6 when it's first used.
On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 03:04:27PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote: > On 10/25/2022 11:13 PM, Chao Peng wrote: > > In memory encryption usage, guest memory may be encrypted with special > > key and can be accessed only by the guest itself. We call such memory > > private memory. It's valueless and sometimes can cause problem to allow > > userspace to access guest private memory. This new KVM memslot extension > > allows guest private memory being provided though a restrictedmem > ^ > > typo Thanks! > > > backed file descriptor(fd) and userspace is restricted to access the > > bookmarked memory in the fd. > > > > This new extension, indicated by the new flag KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, adds two > > additional KVM memslot fields restricted_fd/restricted_offset to allow > > userspace to instruct KVM to provide guest memory through restricted_fd. > > 'guest_phys_addr' is mapped at the restricted_offset of restricted_fd > > and the size is 'memory_size'. > > > > The extended memslot can still have the userspace_addr(hva). When use, a > > single memslot can maintain both private memory through restricted_fd > > and shared memory through userspace_addr. Whether the private or shared > > part is visible to guest is maintained by other KVM code. > > > > A restrictedmem_notifier field is also added to the memslot structure to > > allow the restricted_fd's backing store to notify KVM the memory change, > > KVM then can invalidate its page table entries. > > > > Together with the change, a new config HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM is added > > and right now it is selected on X86_64 only. A KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM is > > also introduced to indicate KVM support for KVM_MEM_PRIVATE. > > > > To make code maintenance easy, internally we use a binary compatible > > alias struct kvm_user_mem_region to handle both the normal and the > > '_ext' variants. > > > > Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> > > Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> > > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> > > --- > > Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > > arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 2 ++ > > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- > > include/linux/kvm_host.h | 13 +++++++-- > > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++ > > virt/kvm/Kconfig | 3 +++ > > virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > > 7 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst > > index eee9f857a986..f3fa75649a78 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst > > @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry. > > :Capability: KVM_CAP_USER_MEMORY > > :Architectures: all > > :Type: vm ioctl > > -:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region (in) > > +:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region(_ext) (in) > > :Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error > > :: > > @@ -1332,9 +1332,18 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry. > > __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */ > > }; > > + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext { > > + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; > > + __u64 restricted_offset; > > + __u32 restricted_fd; > > + __u32 pad1; > > + __u64 pad2[14]; > > + }; > > + > > /* for kvm_memory_region::flags */ > > #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0) > > #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1) > > + #define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2) > > This ioctl allows the user to create, modify or delete a guest physical > > memory slot. Bits 0-15 of "slot" specify the slot id and this value > > @@ -1365,12 +1374,27 @@ It is recommended that the lower 21 bits of guest_phys_addr and userspace_addr > > be identical. This allows large pages in the guest to be backed by large > > pages in the host. > > -The flags field supports two flags: KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES and > > -KVM_MEM_READONLY. The former can be set to instruct KVM to keep track of > > -writes to memory within the slot. See KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl to know how to > > -use it. The latter can be set, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM capability allows it, > > -to make a new slot read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be > > -posted to userspace as KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits. > > +kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext struct includes all fields of > > +kvm_userspace_memory_region struct, while also adds additional fields for some > > +other features. See below description of flags field for more information. > > +It's recommended to use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext in new userspace code. > > + > > +The flags field supports following flags: > > + > > +- KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES to instruct KVM to keep track of writes to memory > > + within the slot. For more details, see KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl. > > + > > +- KVM_MEM_READONLY, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM allows, to make a new slot > > + read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be posted to userspace as > > + KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits. > > + > > +- KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, if KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM allows, to indicate a new slot has > > + private memory backed by a file descriptor(fd) and userspace access to the > > + fd may be restricted. Userspace should use restricted_fd/restricted_offset in > > + kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext to instruct KVM to provide private memory > > + to guest. Userspace should guarantee not to map the same pfn indicated by > > + restricted_fd/restricted_offset to different gfns with multiple memslots. > > + Failed to do this may result undefined behavior. > > When the KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU capability is available, changes in the backing of > > the memory region are automatically reflected into the guest. For example, an > > @@ -8215,6 +8239,16 @@ structure. > > When getting the Modified Change Topology Report value, the attr->addr > > must point to a byte where the value will be stored or retrieved from. > > +8.36 KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM > > +------------------------ > > + > > +:Architectures: x86 > > + > > +This capability indicates that private memory is supported and userspace can > > +set KVM_MEM_PRIVATE flag for KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION ioctl. See > > +KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION for details on the usage of KVM_MEM_PRIVATE and > > +kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext fields. > > + > > 9. Known KVM API problems > > ========================= > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig > > index 67be7f217e37..8d2bd455c0cd 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig > > @@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ config KVM > > select SRCU > > select INTERVAL_TREE > > select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM > > + select HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM if X86_64 > > + select RESTRICTEDMEM if HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM > > help > > Support hosting fully virtualized guest machines using hardware > > virtualization extensions. You will need a fairly recent > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > > index 4bd5f8a751de..02ad31f46dd7 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > > @@ -12425,7 +12425,7 @@ void __user * __x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa, > > } > > for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) { > > - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region m; > > + struct kvm_user_mem_region m; > > m.slot = id | (i << 16); > > m.flags = 0; > > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h > > index 32f259fa5801..739a7562a1f3 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h > > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h > > @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ > > #include <asm/kvm_host.h> > > #include <linux/kvm_dirty_ring.h> > > +#include <linux/restrictedmem.h> > > #ifndef KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS > > #define KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS KVM_MAX_VCPUS > > @@ -575,8 +576,16 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot { > > u32 flags; > > short id; > > u16 as_id; > > + struct file *restricted_file; > > + loff_t restricted_offset; > > + struct restrictedmem_notifier notifier; > > }; > > +static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) > > +{ > > + return slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE); > > +} > > + > > We can introduce this function in patch 6 when it's first used. Good to me. Chao > >
Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> writes: > In memory encryption usage, guest memory may be encrypted with special > key and can be accessed only by the guest itself. We call such memory > private memory. It's valueless and sometimes can cause problem to allow > userspace to access guest private memory. This new KVM memslot extension > allows guest private memory being provided though a restrictedmem > backed file descriptor(fd) and userspace is restricted to access the > bookmarked memory in the fd. > <snip> > To make code maintenance easy, internally we use a binary compatible > alias struct kvm_user_mem_region to handle both the normal and the > '_ext' variants. > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index 0d5d4419139a..f1ae45c10c94 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -103,6 +103,33 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region { > __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */ > }; > > +struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext { > + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; > + __u64 restricted_offset; > + __u32 restricted_fd; > + __u32 pad1; > + __u64 pad2[14]; > +}; > + > +#ifdef __KERNEL__ > +/* > + * kvm_user_mem_region is a kernel-only alias of kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext > + * that "unpacks" kvm_userspace_memory_region so that KVM can directly access > + * all fields from the top-level "extended" region. > + */ > +struct kvm_user_mem_region { > + __u32 slot; > + __u32 flags; > + __u64 guest_phys_addr; > + __u64 memory_size; > + __u64 userspace_addr; > + __u64 restricted_offset; > + __u32 restricted_fd; > + __u32 pad1; > + __u64 pad2[14]; > +}; > +#endif I'm not sure I buy the argument this makes the code maintenance easier because you now have multiple places to update if you extend the field. Was this simply to avoid changing: foo->slot to foo->region.slot in the underlying code? > + > /* > * The bit 0 ~ bit 15 of kvm_memory_region::flags are visible for userspace, > * other bits are reserved for kvm internal use which are defined in > @@ -110,6 +137,7 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region { > */ > #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0) > #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1) > +#define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2) > > /* for KVM_IRQ_LINE */ > struct kvm_irq_level { > @@ -1178,6 +1206,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { > #define KVM_CAP_S390_ZPCI_OP 221 > #define KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY 222 > #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL 223 > +#define KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM 224 > > #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING > > diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig > index 800f9470e36b..9ff164c7e0cc 100644 > --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig > +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig > @@ -86,3 +86,6 @@ config KVM_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK > > config HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER > bool > + > +config HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM > + bool > diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > index e30f1b4ecfa5..8dace78a0278 100644 > --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > @@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ static void kvm_replace_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, > } > } > > -static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > +static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > { > u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; > > @@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ static bool kvm_check_memslot_overlap(struct kvm_memslots *slots, int id, > * Must be called holding kvm->slots_lock for write. > */ > int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > { > struct kvm_memory_slot *old, *new; > struct kvm_memslots *slots; > @@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_set_memory_region); > > int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > { > int r; > > @@ -2036,7 +2036,7 @@ int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_memory_region); > > static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > + struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > { > if ((u16)mem->slot >= KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS) > return -EINVAL; > @@ -4627,6 +4627,33 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_stats_fd(struct kvm *kvm) > return fd; > } > > +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(field) \ > +do { \ > + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \ > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \ > +} while (0) > + > +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(field) \ > +do { \ > + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \ > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \ > +} while (0) > + > +static void kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias(void) > +{ > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(slot); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(flags); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(guest_phys_addr); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(memory_size); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(userspace_addr); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_offset); > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_fd); > +} Do we have other examples in the kernel that jump these hoops? > static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, > unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg) > { > @@ -4650,14 +4677,20 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, > break; > } > case KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION: { > - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem; > + struct kvm_user_mem_region mem; > + unsigned long size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region); > + > + kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias(); > > r = -EFAULT; > - if (copy_from_user(&kvm_userspace_mem, argp, > - sizeof(kvm_userspace_mem))) > + if (copy_from_user(&mem, argp, size)) > + goto out; > + > + r = -EINVAL; > + if (mem.flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE) > goto out; Hmm I can see in the later code you explicitly check for the KVM_MEM_PRIVATE flag with: if (get_user(flags, (u32 __user *)(argp + flags_offset))) goto out; if (flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE) size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext); else size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region); I think it would make sense to bring that sanity checking forward into this patch to avoid the validation logic working in two different ways over the series. > > - r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &kvm_userspace_mem); > + r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &mem); > break; > } > case KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG: {
On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 04:04:59PM +0000, Alex Bennée wrote: > > Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> writes: > > > In memory encryption usage, guest memory may be encrypted with special > > key and can be accessed only by the guest itself. We call such memory > > private memory. It's valueless and sometimes can cause problem to allow > > userspace to access guest private memory. This new KVM memslot extension > > allows guest private memory being provided though a restrictedmem > > backed file descriptor(fd) and userspace is restricted to access the > > bookmarked memory in the fd. > > > <snip> > > To make code maintenance easy, internally we use a binary compatible > > alias struct kvm_user_mem_region to handle both the normal and the > > '_ext' variants. > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > > index 0d5d4419139a..f1ae45c10c94 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > > @@ -103,6 +103,33 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region { > > __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */ > > }; > > > > +struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext { > > + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; > > + __u64 restricted_offset; > > + __u32 restricted_fd; > > + __u32 pad1; > > + __u64 pad2[14]; > > +}; > > + > > +#ifdef __KERNEL__ > > +/* > > + * kvm_user_mem_region is a kernel-only alias of kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext > > + * that "unpacks" kvm_userspace_memory_region so that KVM can directly access > > + * all fields from the top-level "extended" region. > > + */ > > +struct kvm_user_mem_region { > > + __u32 slot; > > + __u32 flags; > > + __u64 guest_phys_addr; > > + __u64 memory_size; > > + __u64 userspace_addr; > > + __u64 restricted_offset; > > + __u32 restricted_fd; > > + __u32 pad1; > > + __u64 pad2[14]; > > +}; > > +#endif > > I'm not sure I buy the argument this makes the code maintenance easier > because you now have multiple places to update if you extend the field. > Was this simply to avoid changing: > > foo->slot to foo->region.slot > > in the underlying code? That is one of the reasons, by doing this we can also avoid confusion to deal with '_ext' and the 'base' struct for different functions spread across KVM code. No doubt now I need update every places where the 'base' struct is being used, but that makes future maintenance easier, e.g. adding another new field or even extend the memslot structure again would just require changes to the flat struct here and the places where the new field is actually used. > > > + > > /* > > * The bit 0 ~ bit 15 of kvm_memory_region::flags are visible for userspace, > > * other bits are reserved for kvm internal use which are defined in > > @@ -110,6 +137,7 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region { > > */ > > #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0) > > #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1) > > +#define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2) > > > > /* for KVM_IRQ_LINE */ > > struct kvm_irq_level { > > @@ -1178,6 +1206,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { > > #define KVM_CAP_S390_ZPCI_OP 221 > > #define KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY 222 > > #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL 223 > > +#define KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM 224 > > > > #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING > > > > diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig > > index 800f9470e36b..9ff164c7e0cc 100644 > > --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig > > +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig > > @@ -86,3 +86,6 @@ config KVM_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK > > > > config HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER > > bool > > + > > +config HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM > > + bool > > diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > > index e30f1b4ecfa5..8dace78a0278 100644 > > --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > > +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > > @@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ static void kvm_replace_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, > > } > > } > > > > -static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > > +static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > > { > > u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; > > > > @@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ static bool kvm_check_memslot_overlap(struct kvm_memslots *slots, int id, > > * Must be called holding kvm->slots_lock for write. > > */ > > int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > > - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > > + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > > { > > struct kvm_memory_slot *old, *new; > > struct kvm_memslots *slots; > > @@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_set_memory_region); > > > > int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > > - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > > + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > > { > > int r; > > > > @@ -2036,7 +2036,7 @@ int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_memory_region); > > > > static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > > - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) > > + struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) > > { > > if ((u16)mem->slot >= KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS) > > return -EINVAL; > > @@ -4627,6 +4627,33 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_stats_fd(struct kvm *kvm) > > return fd; > > } > > > > +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(field) \ > > +do { \ > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > > + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \ > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > > + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \ > > +} while (0) > > + > > +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(field) \ > > +do { \ > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > > + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \ > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ > > + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \ > > +} while (0) > > + > > +static void kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias(void) > > +{ > > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(slot); > > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(flags); > > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(guest_phys_addr); > > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(memory_size); > > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(userspace_addr); > > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_offset); > > + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_fd); > > +} > > Do we have other examples in the kernel that jump these hoops? grep -rn 'BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof' can give you some hint on other usages in the kernel. But for a quick check you can look: siginfo_buildtime_checks() > > > static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, > > unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg) > > { > > @@ -4650,14 +4677,20 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, > > break; > > } > > case KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION: { > > - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem; > > + struct kvm_user_mem_region mem; > > + unsigned long size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region); > > + > > + kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias(); > > > > r = -EFAULT; > > - if (copy_from_user(&kvm_userspace_mem, argp, > > - sizeof(kvm_userspace_mem))) > > + if (copy_from_user(&mem, argp, size)) > > + goto out; > > + > > + r = -EINVAL; > > + if (mem.flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE) > > goto out; > > Hmm I can see in the later code you explicitly check for the > KVM_MEM_PRIVATE flag with: > > if (get_user(flags, (u32 __user *)(argp + flags_offset))) > goto out; > > if (flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE) > size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext); > else > size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region); > > I think it would make sense to bring that sanity checking forward into > this patch to avoid the validation logic working in two different ways > over the series. That is my original code actually, then Sean suggested to change to current code[*], the reason is these two pathes are for different purpose, this patch introduces the data structures but the later patch actually makes use of the '_ext' variant. [*] https://lkml.kernel.org/kvm/YuQ6QWcdZLdStkWl@google.com/ Chao > > > > > - r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &kvm_userspace_mem); > > + r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &mem); > > break; > > } > > case KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG: { > > > -- > Alex Bennée
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst index eee9f857a986..f3fa75649a78 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry. :Capability: KVM_CAP_USER_MEMORY :Architectures: all :Type: vm ioctl -:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region (in) +:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region(_ext) (in) :Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error :: @@ -1332,9 +1332,18 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry. __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */ }; + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext { + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; + __u64 restricted_offset; + __u32 restricted_fd; + __u32 pad1; + __u64 pad2[14]; + }; + /* for kvm_memory_region::flags */ #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0) #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1) + #define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2) This ioctl allows the user to create, modify or delete a guest physical memory slot. Bits 0-15 of "slot" specify the slot id and this value @@ -1365,12 +1374,27 @@ It is recommended that the lower 21 bits of guest_phys_addr and userspace_addr be identical. This allows large pages in the guest to be backed by large pages in the host. -The flags field supports two flags: KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES and -KVM_MEM_READONLY. The former can be set to instruct KVM to keep track of -writes to memory within the slot. See KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl to know how to -use it. The latter can be set, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM capability allows it, -to make a new slot read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be -posted to userspace as KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits. +kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext struct includes all fields of +kvm_userspace_memory_region struct, while also adds additional fields for some +other features. See below description of flags field for more information. +It's recommended to use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext in new userspace code. + +The flags field supports following flags: + +- KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES to instruct KVM to keep track of writes to memory + within the slot. For more details, see KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl. + +- KVM_MEM_READONLY, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM allows, to make a new slot + read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be posted to userspace as + KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits. + +- KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, if KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM allows, to indicate a new slot has + private memory backed by a file descriptor(fd) and userspace access to the + fd may be restricted. Userspace should use restricted_fd/restricted_offset in + kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext to instruct KVM to provide private memory + to guest. Userspace should guarantee not to map the same pfn indicated by + restricted_fd/restricted_offset to different gfns with multiple memslots. + Failed to do this may result undefined behavior. When the KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU capability is available, changes in the backing of the memory region are automatically reflected into the guest. For example, an @@ -8215,6 +8239,16 @@ structure. When getting the Modified Change Topology Report value, the attr->addr must point to a byte where the value will be stored or retrieved from. +8.36 KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM +------------------------ + +:Architectures: x86 + +This capability indicates that private memory is supported and userspace can +set KVM_MEM_PRIVATE flag for KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION ioctl. See +KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION for details on the usage of KVM_MEM_PRIVATE and +kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext fields. + 9. Known KVM API problems ========================= diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig index 67be7f217e37..8d2bd455c0cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig @@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ config KVM select SRCU select INTERVAL_TREE select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM + select HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM if X86_64 + select RESTRICTEDMEM if HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM help Support hosting fully virtualized guest machines using hardware virtualization extensions. You will need a fairly recent diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 4bd5f8a751de..02ad31f46dd7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -12425,7 +12425,7 @@ void __user * __x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa, } for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) { - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region m; + struct kvm_user_mem_region m; m.slot = id | (i << 16); m.flags = 0; diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index 32f259fa5801..739a7562a1f3 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ #include <asm/kvm_host.h> #include <linux/kvm_dirty_ring.h> +#include <linux/restrictedmem.h> #ifndef KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS #define KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS KVM_MAX_VCPUS @@ -575,8 +576,16 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot { u32 flags; short id; u16 as_id; + struct file *restricted_file; + loff_t restricted_offset; + struct restrictedmem_notifier notifier; }; +static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) +{ + return slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE); +} + static inline bool kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) { return slot->flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; @@ -1103,9 +1112,9 @@ enum kvm_mr_change { }; int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem); + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem); int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem); + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem); void kvm_arch_free_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot); void kvm_arch_memslots_updated(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen); int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 0d5d4419139a..f1ae45c10c94 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -103,6 +103,33 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region { __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */ }; +struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext { + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; + __u64 restricted_offset; + __u32 restricted_fd; + __u32 pad1; + __u64 pad2[14]; +}; + +#ifdef __KERNEL__ +/* + * kvm_user_mem_region is a kernel-only alias of kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext + * that "unpacks" kvm_userspace_memory_region so that KVM can directly access + * all fields from the top-level "extended" region. + */ +struct kvm_user_mem_region { + __u32 slot; + __u32 flags; + __u64 guest_phys_addr; + __u64 memory_size; + __u64 userspace_addr; + __u64 restricted_offset; + __u32 restricted_fd; + __u32 pad1; + __u64 pad2[14]; +}; +#endif + /* * The bit 0 ~ bit 15 of kvm_memory_region::flags are visible for userspace, * other bits are reserved for kvm internal use which are defined in @@ -110,6 +137,7 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region { */ #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0) #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1) +#define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2) /* for KVM_IRQ_LINE */ struct kvm_irq_level { @@ -1178,6 +1206,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { #define KVM_CAP_S390_ZPCI_OP 221 #define KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY 222 #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL 223 +#define KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM 224 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig index 800f9470e36b..9ff164c7e0cc 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig @@ -86,3 +86,6 @@ config KVM_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK config HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER bool + +config HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM + bool diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index e30f1b4ecfa5..8dace78a0278 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ static void kvm_replace_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, } } -static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) +static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) { u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; @@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ static bool kvm_check_memslot_overlap(struct kvm_memslots *slots, int id, * Must be called holding kvm->slots_lock for write. */ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) { struct kvm_memory_slot *old, *new; struct kvm_memslots *slots; @@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_set_memory_region); int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) { int r; @@ -2036,7 +2036,7 @@ int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_memory_region); static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem) + struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem) { if ((u16)mem->slot >= KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS) return -EINVAL; @@ -4627,6 +4627,33 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_stats_fd(struct kvm *kvm) return fd; } +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(field) \ +do { \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \ +} while (0) + +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(field) \ +do { \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \ + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \ +} while (0) + +static void kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias(void) +{ + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(slot); + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(flags); + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(guest_phys_addr); + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(memory_size); + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(userspace_addr); + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_offset); + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_fd); +} + static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg) { @@ -4650,14 +4677,20 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, break; } case KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION: { - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem; + struct kvm_user_mem_region mem; + unsigned long size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region); + + kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias(); r = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(&kvm_userspace_mem, argp, - sizeof(kvm_userspace_mem))) + if (copy_from_user(&mem, argp, size)) + goto out; + + r = -EINVAL; + if (mem.flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE) goto out; - r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &kvm_userspace_mem); + r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &mem); break; } case KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG: {