| Message ID | 20141221110217.GA14555@vostro |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
On Sun, 12/21 13:02, Alex Suykov wrote: > When passing ancillary data through a unix socket, handle > credentials properly instead of doing a simple copy and > issuing a warning. > > Signed-off-by: Alex Suykov <alex.suykov@gmail.com> > --- > linux-user/syscall.c | 15 +++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c > index aaac6a2..b067c5c 100644 > --- a/linux-user/syscall.c > +++ b/linux-user/syscall.c > @@ -1214,16 +1214,23 @@ static inline abi_long target_to_host_cmsg(struct msghdr *msgh, > cmsg->cmsg_type = tswap32(target_cmsg->cmsg_type); > cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(len); > > - if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) { > - gemu_log("Unsupported ancillary data: %d/%d\n", cmsg->cmsg_level, cmsg->cmsg_type); > - memcpy(data, target_data, len); > - } else { > + if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) { > int *fd = (int *)data; > int *target_fd = (int *)target_data; > int i, numfds = len / sizeof(int); > > for (i = 0; i < numfds; i++) > fd[i] = tswap32(target_fd[i]); > + } else if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_CREDENTIALS) { > + struct ucred *cred = (struct ucred *)data; > + struct target_ucred *target_cred = (struct target_ucred *)target_data; > + > + __put_user(target_cred->pid, &cred->pid); > + __put_user(target_cred->uid, &cred->uid); > + __put_user(target_cred->gid, &cred->gid); > + } else { > + gemu_log("Unsupported ancillary data: %d/%d\n", cmsg->cmsg_level, cmsg->cmsg_type); > + memcpy(data, target_data, len); > } > > cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msgh, cmsg); > -- > 2.0.3 > > I didn't review the code but checkpatch.pl complains about a few lines over 80 characters. Fam
Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 09:59:57AM +0800, Fam Zheng wrote: > On Sun, 12/21 13:02, Alex Suykov wrote: > > When passing ancillary data through a unix socket, handle > > credentials properly instead of doing a simple copy and > > issuing a warning. > > > > Signed-off-by: Alex Suykov <alex.suykov@gmail.com> > > --- ... > > - gemu_log("Unsupported ancillary data: %d/%d\n", cmsg->cmsg_level, cmsg->cmsg_type); ... > > + gemu_log("Unsupported ancillary data: %d/%d\n", cmsg->cmsg_level, cmsg->cmsg_type); ... > > I didn't review the code but checkpatch.pl complains about a few lines over 80 > characters. The patch does not change the length of the longest line in that function, just moves it around. So my guess was that mixing semantic changes and reformatting is not a good idea. Sending checkpatch-compliant v2.
diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c index aaac6a2..b067c5c 100644 --- a/linux-user/syscall.c +++ b/linux-user/syscall.c @@ -1214,16 +1214,23 @@ static inline abi_long target_to_host_cmsg(struct msghdr *msgh, cmsg->cmsg_type = tswap32(target_cmsg->cmsg_type); cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(len); - if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) { - gemu_log("Unsupported ancillary data: %d/%d\n", cmsg->cmsg_level, cmsg->cmsg_type); - memcpy(data, target_data, len); - } else { + if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) { int *fd = (int *)data; int *target_fd = (int *)target_data; int i, numfds = len / sizeof(int); for (i = 0; i < numfds; i++) fd[i] = tswap32(target_fd[i]); + } else if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_CREDENTIALS) { + struct ucred *cred = (struct ucred *)data; + struct target_ucred *target_cred = (struct target_ucred *)target_data; + + __put_user(target_cred->pid, &cred->pid); + __put_user(target_cred->uid, &cred->uid); + __put_user(target_cred->gid, &cred->gid); + } else { + gemu_log("Unsupported ancillary data: %d/%d\n", cmsg->cmsg_level, cmsg->cmsg_type); + memcpy(data, target_data, len); } cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msgh, cmsg);
When passing ancillary data through a unix socket, handle credentials properly instead of doing a simple copy and issuing a warning. Signed-off-by: Alex Suykov <alex.suykov@gmail.com> --- linux-user/syscall.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)