| Message ID | cover.1601060620.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | Qemu SEV-ES guest support | expand |
Patchew URL: https://patchew.org/QEMU/cover.1601060620.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com/
Hi,
This series failed the docker-quick@centos7 build test. Please find the testing commands and
their output below. If you have Docker installed, you can probably reproduce it
locally.
=== TEST SCRIPT BEGIN ===
#!/bin/bash
make docker-image-centos7 V=1 NETWORK=1
time make docker-test-quick@centos7 SHOW_ENV=1 J=14 NETWORK=1
=== TEST SCRIPT END ===
C linker for the host machine: cc ld.bfd 2.27-43
Host machine cpu family: x86_64
Host machine cpu: x86_64
../src/meson.build:10: WARNING: Module unstable-keyval has no backwards or forwards compatibility and might not exist in future releases.
Program sh found: YES
Program python3 found: YES (/usr/bin/python3)
Configuring ninjatool using configuration
---
TEST iotest-qcow2: 029
socket_accept failed: Resource temporarily unavailable
**
ERROR:../src/tests/qtest/libqtest.c:301:qtest_init_without_qmp_handshake: assertion failed: (s->fd >= 0 && s->qmp_fd >= 0)
../src/tests/qtest/libqtest.c:166: kill_qemu() tried to terminate QEMU process but encountered exit status 1 (expected 0)
ERROR qtest-x86_64: bios-tables-test - Bail out! ERROR:../src/tests/qtest/libqtest.c:301:qtest_init_without_qmp_handshake: assertion failed: (s->fd >= 0 && s->qmp_fd >= 0)
make: *** [run-test-138] Error 1
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
Could not access KVM kernel module: No such file or directory
qemu-system-x86_64: -accel kvm: failed to initialize kvm: No such file or directory
---
raise CalledProcessError(retcode, cmd)
subprocess.CalledProcessError: Command '['sudo', '-n', 'docker', 'run', '--rm', '--label', 'com.qemu.instance.uuid=ac8de816386f43fbbd35e8eef7710385', '-u', '1001', '--security-opt', 'seccomp=unconfined', '-e', 'TARGET_LIST=', '-e', 'EXTRA_CONFIGURE_OPTS=', '-e', 'V=', '-e', 'J=14', '-e', 'DEBUG=', '-e', 'SHOW_ENV=1', '-e', 'CCACHE_DIR=/var/tmp/ccache', '-v', '/home/patchew/.cache/qemu-docker-ccache:/var/tmp/ccache:z', '-v', '/var/tmp/patchew-tester-tmp-hmf8po3g/src/docker-src.2020-09-25-18.40.32.24005:/var/tmp/qemu:z,ro', 'qemu/centos7', '/var/tmp/qemu/run', 'test-quick']' returned non-zero exit status 2.
filter=--filter=label=com.qemu.instance.uuid=ac8de816386f43fbbd35e8eef7710385
make[1]: *** [docker-run] Error 1
make[1]: Leaving directory `/var/tmp/patchew-tester-tmp-hmf8po3g/src'
make: *** [docker-run-test-quick@centos7] Error 2
real 17m23.414s
user 0m21.953s
The full log is available at
http://patchew.org/logs/cover.1601060620.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com/testing.docker-quick@centos7/?type=message.
---
Email generated automatically by Patchew [https://patchew.org/].
Please send your feedback to patchew-devel@redhat.com
On 25/09/20 21:03, Tom Lendacky wrote: > From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > > This patch series provides support for launching an SEV-ES guest. > > Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State (SEV-ES) expands on the > SEV support to protect the guest register state from the hypervisor. See > "AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming", > section "15.35 Encrypted State (SEV-ES)" [1]. > > In order to allow a hypervisor to perform functions on behalf of a guest, > there is architectural support for notifying a guest's operating system > when certain types of VMEXITs are about to occur. This allows the guest to > selectively share information with the hypervisor to satisfy the requested > function. The notification is performed using a new exception, the VMM > Communication exception (#VC). The information is shared through the > Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block (GHCB) using the VMGEXIT instruction. > The GHCB format and the protocol for using it is documented in "SEV-ES > Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization" [2]. > > The main areas of the Qemu code that are updated to support SEV-ES are > around the SEV guest launch process and AP booting in order to support > booting multiple vCPUs. > > There are no new command line switches required. Instead, the desire for > SEV-ES is presented using the SEV policy object. Bit 2 of the SEV policy > object indicates that SEV-ES is required. > > The SEV launch process is updated in two ways. The first is that a the > KVM_SEV_ES_INIT ioctl is used to initialize the guest instead of the > standard KVM_SEV_INIT ioctl. The second is that before the SEV launch > measurement is calculated, the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA SEV API is invoked for > each vCPU that Qemu has created. Once the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA API has been > invoked, no direct changes to the guest register state can be made. > > AP booting poses some interesting challenges. The INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence > is typically used to boot the APs. However, the hypervisor is not allowed > to update the guest registers. For the APs, the reset vector must be known > in advance. An OVMF method to provide a known reset vector address exists > by providing an SEV information block, identified by UUID, near the end of > the firmware [3]. OVMF will program the jump to the actual reset vector in > this area of memory. Since the memory location is known in advance, an AP > can be created with the known reset vector address as its starting CS:IP. > The GHCB document [2] talks about how SMP booting under SEV-ES is > performed. SEV-ES also requires the use of the in-kernel irqchip support > in order to minimize the changes required to Qemu to support AP booting. > > [1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf > [2] https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf > [3] 30937f2f98c4 ("OvmfPkg: Use the SEV-ES work area for the SEV-ES AP reset vector") > https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/30937f2f98c42496f2f143fe8374ae7f7e684847 > > --- > > These patches are based on commit: > d0ed6a69d3 ("Update version for v5.1.0 release") > > (I tried basing on the latest Qemu commit, but I was having build issues > that level) > > A version of the tree can be found at: > https://github.com/AMDESE/qemu/tree/sev-es-v12 > > Changes since v3: > - Use the QemuUUID structure for GUID definitions > - Use SEV-ES policy bit definition from target/i386/sev_i386.h > - Update SMM support to a per-VM check in order to check SMM capability > at the VM level since SEV-ES guests don't currently support SMM > - Make the CPU resettable check an arch-specific check > > Changes since v2: > - Add in-kernel irqchip requirement for SEV-ES guests > > Changes since v1: > - Fixed checkpatch.pl errors/warnings > > Tom Lendacky (6): > sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES > sev/i386: Require in-kernel irqchip support for SEV-ES guests > sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES > sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest > kvm/i386: Use a per-VM check for SMM capability > sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy > > accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 5 ++ > hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 10 +++- > include/sysemu/cpus.h | 2 + > include/sysemu/hw_accel.h | 5 ++ > include/sysemu/kvm.h | 26 +++++++++ > include/sysemu/sev.h | 3 ++ > softmmu/cpus.c | 5 ++ > softmmu/vl.c | 5 +- > target/arm/kvm.c | 5 ++ > target/i386/cpu.c | 1 + > target/i386/kvm.c | 10 +++- > target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++ > target/i386/sev.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 + > target/mips/kvm.c | 5 ++ > target/ppc/kvm.c | 5 ++ > target/s390x/kvm.c | 5 ++ > 18 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > Looks good! Please fix the nit in patch 4 and rebase, I'll then apply it. Thanks, Paolo
On 1/26/21 10:21 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > On 25/09/20 21:03, Tom Lendacky wrote: >> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> >> >> This patch series provides support for launching an SEV-ES guest. >> ... >> > > Looks good! Please fix the nit in patch 4 and rebase, I'll then apply it. There's a v5 on the list that was rebased on the latest tree, but still has the patch 4 issue. I'm updating that now, so look for the v6 version for merging. Thanks, Tom > > Thanks, > > Paolo >
On 1/26/21 10:49 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 1/26/21 10:21 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: >> On 25/09/20 21:03, Tom Lendacky wrote: >>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> >>> >>> This patch series provides support for launching an SEV-ES guest. >>> > > ... > >>> >> >> Looks good! Please fix the nit in patch 4 and rebase, I'll then apply it. > > There's a v5 on the list that was rebased on the latest tree, but still > has the patch 4 issue. I'm updating that now, so look for the v6 version > for merging. Also, the new version will have a prereq against another patch series that has not been accepted yet: [PATCH v2 0/2] sev: enable secret injection to a self described area in OVMF https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20201214154429.11023-1-jejb@linux.ibm.com/ Thanks, Tom > > Thanks, > Tom > >> >> Thanks, >> >> Paolo >>
On 26/01/21 18:13, Tom Lendacky wrote: > Also, the new version will have a prereq against another patch series that > has not been accepted yet: > > [PATCH v2 0/2] sev: enable secret injection to a self described area in OVMF > > https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20201214154429.11023-1-jejb@linux.ibm.com/ David reviewed it today, so even if a v3 will be needed that shouldn't be a problem for SEV-ES itself. Paolo
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> This patch series provides support for launching an SEV-ES guest. Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State (SEV-ES) expands on the SEV support to protect the guest register state from the hypervisor. See "AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming", section "15.35 Encrypted State (SEV-ES)" [1]. In order to allow a hypervisor to perform functions on behalf of a guest, there is architectural support for notifying a guest's operating system when certain types of VMEXITs are about to occur. This allows the guest to selectively share information with the hypervisor to satisfy the requested function. The notification is performed using a new exception, the VMM Communication exception (#VC). The information is shared through the Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block (GHCB) using the VMGEXIT instruction. The GHCB format and the protocol for using it is documented in "SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization" [2]. The main areas of the Qemu code that are updated to support SEV-ES are around the SEV guest launch process and AP booting in order to support booting multiple vCPUs. There are no new command line switches required. Instead, the desire for SEV-ES is presented using the SEV policy object. Bit 2 of the SEV policy object indicates that SEV-ES is required. The SEV launch process is updated in two ways. The first is that a the KVM_SEV_ES_INIT ioctl is used to initialize the guest instead of the standard KVM_SEV_INIT ioctl. The second is that before the SEV launch measurement is calculated, the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA SEV API is invoked for each vCPU that Qemu has created. Once the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA API has been invoked, no direct changes to the guest register state can be made. AP booting poses some interesting challenges. The INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence is typically used to boot the APs. However, the hypervisor is not allowed to update the guest registers. For the APs, the reset vector must be known in advance. An OVMF method to provide a known reset vector address exists by providing an SEV information block, identified by UUID, near the end of the firmware [3]. OVMF will program the jump to the actual reset vector in this area of memory. Since the memory location is known in advance, an AP can be created with the known reset vector address as its starting CS:IP. The GHCB document [2] talks about how SMP booting under SEV-ES is performed. SEV-ES also requires the use of the in-kernel irqchip support in order to minimize the changes required to Qemu to support AP booting. [1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf [2] https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf [3] 30937f2f98c4 ("OvmfPkg: Use the SEV-ES work area for the SEV-ES AP reset vector") https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/30937f2f98c42496f2f143fe8374ae7f7e684847 --- These patches are based on commit: d0ed6a69d3 ("Update version for v5.1.0 release") (I tried basing on the latest Qemu commit, but I was having build issues that level) A version of the tree can be found at: https://github.com/AMDESE/qemu/tree/sev-es-v12 Changes since v3: - Use the QemuUUID structure for GUID definitions - Use SEV-ES policy bit definition from target/i386/sev_i386.h - Update SMM support to a per-VM check in order to check SMM capability at the VM level since SEV-ES guests don't currently support SMM - Make the CPU resettable check an arch-specific check Changes since v2: - Add in-kernel irqchip requirement for SEV-ES guests Changes since v1: - Fixed checkpatch.pl errors/warnings Tom Lendacky (6): sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES sev/i386: Require in-kernel irqchip support for SEV-ES guests sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest kvm/i386: Use a per-VM check for SMM capability sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 5 ++ hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 10 +++- include/sysemu/cpus.h | 2 + include/sysemu/hw_accel.h | 5 ++ include/sysemu/kvm.h | 26 +++++++++ include/sysemu/sev.h | 3 ++ softmmu/cpus.c | 5 ++ softmmu/vl.c | 5 +- target/arm/kvm.c | 5 ++ target/i386/cpu.c | 1 + target/i386/kvm.c | 10 +++- target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++ target/i386/sev.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 + target/mips/kvm.c | 5 ++ target/ppc/kvm.c | 5 ++ target/s390x/kvm.c | 5 ++ 18 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)