From patchwork Wed Jan 13 23:57:58 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gibson X-Patchwork-Id: 1426074 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@bilbo.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=nongnu.org (client-ip=209.51.188.17; helo=lists.gnu.org; envelope-from=qemu-devel-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@nongnu.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=gibson.dropbear.id.au header.i=@gibson.dropbear.id.au header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=201602 header.b=Bik0qo1k; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4DGPZr0LFtz9sRR for ; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 11:00:20 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from localhost ([::1]:57286 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kzq3l-0008Uy-Qn for incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org; Wed, 13 Jan 2021 19:00:17 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:36392) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kzq1z-0006up-9j; Wed, 13 Jan 2021 18:58:27 -0500 Received: from ozlabs.org ([2401:3900:2:1::2]:51725) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kzq1v-0006ZY-NW; Wed, 13 Jan 2021 18:58:27 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DGPXQ1NRGz9sWL; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:58:13 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1610582294; bh=h0Jz0KuZ8QIYAmCIyloUz2Sh5gXanXPh5LhTODIVJMA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=Bik0qo1kJyZhlDCmIUoQ2eJgEuHr3HC4Dbmm/nI+EmnBqHp9GVas0MZbwrgMcXrQq pSply4yKPSi4sbSf2QWcb6kvr0XizbnZUyhYQbkDBo2NF7wqUsFHm0DE0H/TiyBCZ/ asMYLxxfl53WsAJxEPyyPXb4JYgh9tNohmaw3juA= From: David Gibson To: brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Subject: [PATCH v7 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:57:58 +1100 Message-Id: <20210113235811.1909610-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2401:3900:2:1::2; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-Spam_score_int: -17 X-Spam_score: -1.8 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.248, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, thuth@redhat.com, Marcelo Tosatti , berrange@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, David Hildenbrand , cohuck@redhat.com, Richard Henderson , Greg Kurz , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, mst@redhat.com, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, Paolo Bonzini , David Gibson , Eduardo Habkost Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be very helpful. Changes since v6: * Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros * Assorted minor fixes Changes since v5: * Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest support" * Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption * Added a bunch of documentation * Fixed some compile errors on POWER Changes since v4: * Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory", which I think is marginally more descriptive * Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at kvm_init didn't work for s390 * Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing (gitlab CI) only Changes since v3: * Rebased * Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization Changes since RFCv2: * Rebased * Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged) * Changed name to "host trust limitation" * Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version) Changes since RFCv1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert David Gibson (12): confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code confidential guest support: Update documentation spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support spapr: PEF: prevent migration confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option Greg Kurz (1): qom: Allow optional sugar props accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 38 ------- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 10 +- accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 10 -- backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 33 ++++++ backends/meson.build | 1 + docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 2 +- docs/confidential-guest-support.txt | 49 +++++++++ docs/papr-pef.txt | 30 ++++++ docs/system/s390x/protvirt.rst | 19 ++-- hw/core/machine.c | 71 ++++++++++-- hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 17 ++- hw/ppc/meson.build | 1 + hw/ppc/pef.c | 126 ++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/ppc/spapr.c | 6 ++ hw/s390x/pv.c | 62 +++++++++++ include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 40 +++++++ include/hw/boards.h | 2 +- include/hw/ppc/pef.h | 25 +++++ include/hw/s390x/pv.h | 1 + include/qemu/typedefs.h | 1 + include/qom/object.h | 3 +- include/sysemu/kvm.h | 16 --- include/sysemu/sev.h | 4 +- qom/object.c | 4 +- softmmu/rtc.c | 3 +- softmmu/vl.c | 17 +-- target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 12 +++ target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 + target/i386/sev.c | 93 +++++++--------- target/ppc/kvm.c | 18 ---- target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h | 6 -- target/s390x/kvm.c | 3 + 32 files changed, 539 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backends/confidential-guest-support.c create mode 100644 docs/confidential-guest-support.txt create mode 100644 docs/papr-pef.txt create mode 100644 hw/ppc/pef.c create mode 100644 include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h create mode 100644 include/hw/ppc/pef.h