@@ -21,45 +21,17 @@
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6_tables.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
-static const struct {
- const char *name;
- u8 type;
-} table_to_chaintype[] = {
- { "filter", NFT_CHAIN_T_DEFAULT },
- { "raw", NFT_CHAIN_T_DEFAULT },
- { "security", NFT_CHAIN_T_DEFAULT },
- { "mangle", NFT_CHAIN_T_ROUTE },
- { "nat", NFT_CHAIN_T_NAT },
- { },
-};
-
-static int nft_compat_table_to_chaintype(const char *table)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; table_to_chaintype[i].name != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcmp(table_to_chaintype[i].name, table) == 0)
- return table_to_chaintype[i].type;
- }
-
- return -1;
-}
-
static int nft_compat_chain_validate_dependency(const char *tablename,
const struct nft_chain *chain)
{
- enum nft_chain_type type;
const struct nft_base_chain *basechain;
if (!tablename || !(chain->flags & NFT_BASE_CHAIN))
return 0;
- type = nft_compat_table_to_chaintype(tablename);
- if (type < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
-
basechain = nft_base_chain(chain);
- if (basechain->type->type != type)
+ if (strcmp(tablename, "nat") == 0 &&
+ basechain->type->type != NFT_CHAIN_T_NAT)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
Check for nat chain dependency only, which is the one that can actually crash the kernel. Don't care if mangle, filter and security specific match and targets are used out of their scope, they are harmless. This restores iptables-compat with mangle specific match/target when used out of the OUTPUT chain, that are actually emulated through filter chains, which broke when performing strict validation. Fixes: f3f5dde ("netfilter: nft_compat: validate chain type in match/target") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> --- net/netfilter/nft_compat.c | 32 ++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)