Message ID | 8c7ff567377f4a83edac48e962c1b5b824b523c8.1521179281.git.rgb@redhat.com |
---|---|
State | Not Applicable, archived |
Delegated to: | David Miller |
Headers | show |
Series | audit: implement container id | expand |
On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > Add container ID support to ptrace and signals. In particular, the "op" > field provides a way to label the auxiliary record to which it is > associated. > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > --- > include/linux/audit.h | 16 +++++++++++----- > kernel/audit.c | 12 ++++++++---- > kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ > kernel/auditsc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- > 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) ... > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index a12f21f..b238be5 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct audit_net { > kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; > pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; > u32 audit_sig_sid = 0; > +u64 audit_sig_cid = INVALID_CID; > > /* Records can be lost in several ways: > 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] > @@ -1438,6 +1439,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); > security_release_secctx(ctx, len); > } > + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid; > audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, > sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); > kfree(sig_data); > @@ -2051,20 +2053,22 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) > > /* > * audit_log_container_info - report container info > - * @tsk: task to be recorded > * @context: task or local context for record > + * @op: containerid string description > + * @containerid: container ID to report > */ > -int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *context) > +int audit_log_container_info(struct audit_context *context, > + char *op, u64 containerid) > { > struct audit_buffer *ab; > > - if (!audit_containerid_set(tsk)) > + if (!cid_valid(containerid)) > return 0; > /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO with container ID */ > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO); > if (!ab) > return -ENOMEM; > - audit_log_format(ab, "contid=%llu", audit_get_containerid(tsk)); > + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu", op, containerid); > audit_log_end(ab); > return 0; > } Let's get these changes into the first patch where audit_log_container_info() is defined. Why? This inserts a new field into the record which is a no-no. Yes, it is one single patchset, but they are still separate patches and who knows which patches a given distribution and/or tree may decide to backport. > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index 2bba324..2932ef1 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { > kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; > int pid_count; > }; > @@ -1422,21 +1423,27 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts > for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { > struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; > > - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) > + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { > + char axsn[sizeof("aux0xN ")]; > + > + sprintf(axsn, "aux0x%x", i); > if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], > axs->target_auid[i], > axs->target_uid[i], > axs->target_sessionid[i], > axs->target_sid[i], > - axs->target_comm[i])) > + axs->target_comm[i]) > + && audit_log_container_info(context, axsn, axs->target_cid[i])) Shouldn't this be an OR instead of an AND? > call_panic = 1; > + } > } > > if (context->target_pid && > audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > context->target_auid, context->target_uid, > context->target_sessionid, > - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) > + context->target_sid, context->target_comm) > + && audit_log_container_info(context, "target", context->target_cid)) Same question. > call_panic = 1; > > if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
On 2018-04-18 20:32, Paul Moore wrote: > On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > > Add container ID support to ptrace and signals. In particular, the "op" > > field provides a way to label the auxiliary record to which it is > > associated. > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > > --- > > include/linux/audit.h | 16 +++++++++++----- > > kernel/audit.c | 12 ++++++++---- > > kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ > > kernel/auditsc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- > > 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > ... > > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > > index a12f21f..b238be5 100644 > > --- a/kernel/audit.c > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > > @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct audit_net { > > kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; > > pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; > > u32 audit_sig_sid = 0; > > +u64 audit_sig_cid = INVALID_CID; > > > > /* Records can be lost in several ways: > > 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] > > @@ -1438,6 +1439,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > > memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); > > security_release_secctx(ctx, len); > > } > > + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid; > > audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, > > sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); > > kfree(sig_data); > > @@ -2051,20 +2053,22 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) > > > > /* > > * audit_log_container_info - report container info > > - * @tsk: task to be recorded > > * @context: task or local context for record > > + * @op: containerid string description > > + * @containerid: container ID to report > > */ > > -int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *context) > > +int audit_log_container_info(struct audit_context *context, > > + char *op, u64 containerid) > > { > > struct audit_buffer *ab; > > > > - if (!audit_containerid_set(tsk)) > > + if (!cid_valid(containerid)) > > return 0; > > /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO with container ID */ > > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO); > > if (!ab) > > return -ENOMEM; > > - audit_log_format(ab, "contid=%llu", audit_get_containerid(tsk)); > > + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu", op, containerid); > > audit_log_end(ab); > > return 0; > > } > > Let's get these changes into the first patch where > audit_log_container_info() is defined. Why? This inserts a new field > into the record which is a no-no. Yes, it is one single patchset, but > they are still separate patches and who knows which patches a given > distribution and/or tree may decide to backport. Fair enough. That first thought went through my mind... Would it be sufficient to move that field addition to the first patch and leave the rest here to support trace and signals? > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > > index 2bba324..2932ef1 100644 > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > > @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { > > kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; > > int pid_count; > > }; > > @@ -1422,21 +1423,27 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts > > for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { > > struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; > > > > - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) > > + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { > > + char axsn[sizeof("aux0xN ")]; > > + > > + sprintf(axsn, "aux0x%x", i); > > if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], > > axs->target_auid[i], > > axs->target_uid[i], > > axs->target_sessionid[i], > > axs->target_sid[i], > > - axs->target_comm[i])) > > + axs->target_comm[i]) > > + && audit_log_container_info(context, axsn, axs->target_cid[i])) > > Shouldn't this be an OR instead of an AND? Yes. Bash-brain... > > call_panic = 1; > > + } > > } > > > > if (context->target_pid && > > audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > > context->target_auid, context->target_uid, > > context->target_sessionid, > > - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) > > + context->target_sid, context->target_comm) > > + && audit_log_container_info(context, "target", context->target_cid)) > > Same question. Yes. > > call_panic = 1; > > > > if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { > > -- > paul moore > www.paul-moore.com - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On Thu, Apr 19, 2018 at 9:03 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > On 2018-04-18 20:32, Paul Moore wrote: >> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: ... >> > /* >> > * audit_log_container_info - report container info >> > - * @tsk: task to be recorded >> > * @context: task or local context for record >> > + * @op: containerid string description >> > + * @containerid: container ID to report >> > */ >> > -int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *context) >> > +int audit_log_container_info(struct audit_context *context, >> > + char *op, u64 containerid) >> > { >> > struct audit_buffer *ab; >> > >> > - if (!audit_containerid_set(tsk)) >> > + if (!cid_valid(containerid)) >> > return 0; >> > /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO with container ID */ >> > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO); >> > if (!ab) >> > return -ENOMEM; >> > - audit_log_format(ab, "contid=%llu", audit_get_containerid(tsk)); >> > + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu", op, containerid); >> > audit_log_end(ab); >> > return 0; >> > } >> >> Let's get these changes into the first patch where >> audit_log_container_info() is defined. Why? This inserts a new field >> into the record which is a no-no. Yes, it is one single patchset, but >> they are still separate patches and who knows which patches a given >> distribution and/or tree may decide to backport. > > Fair enough. That first thought went through my mind... Would it be > sufficient to move that field addition to the first patch and leave the > rest here to support trace and signals? I should have been more clear ... yes, that's what I was thinking; the record format is the important part as it's user visible.
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index f10ca1b..ed16bb6 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info { uid_t uid; pid_t pid; char ctx[0]; + u64 cid; }; struct audit_buffer; @@ -155,8 +156,8 @@ extern void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation, extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab); extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk); -extern int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct audit_context *context); +extern int audit_log_container_info(struct audit_context *context, + char *op, u64 containerid); extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void); @@ -208,8 +209,8 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk) { } -static inline int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct audit_context *context); +static inline int audit_log_container_info(struct audit_context *context, + char *op, u64 containerid); { } #define audit_enabled 0 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ @@ -598,9 +599,14 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); } +static inline bool cid_valid(u64 containerid) +{ + return containerid != INVALID_CID; +} + static inline bool audit_containerid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) { - return audit_get_containerid(tsk) != INVALID_CID; + return cid_valid(audit_get_containerid(tsk)); } static inline void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index a12f21f..b238be5 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct audit_net { kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; u32 audit_sig_sid = 0; +u64 audit_sig_cid = INVALID_CID; /* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] @@ -1438,6 +1439,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); security_release_secctx(ctx, len); } + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid; audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); kfree(sig_data); @@ -2051,20 +2053,22 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) /* * audit_log_container_info - report container info - * @tsk: task to be recorded * @context: task or local context for record + * @op: containerid string description + * @containerid: container ID to report */ -int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *context) +int audit_log_container_info(struct audit_context *context, + char *op, u64 containerid) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - if (!audit_containerid_set(tsk)) + if (!cid_valid(containerid)) return 0; /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO with container ID */ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO); if (!ab) return -ENOMEM; - audit_log_format(ab, "contid=%llu", audit_get_containerid(tsk)); + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu", op, containerid); audit_log_end(ab); return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index aaa651a..743d445 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct audit_context { kuid_t target_uid; unsigned int target_sessionid; u32 target_sid; + u64 target_cid; char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; @@ -330,6 +331,7 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab, extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; extern u32 audit_sig_sid; +extern u64 audit_sig_cid; extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 2bba324..2932ef1 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; int pid_count; }; @@ -1422,21 +1423,27 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { + char axsn[sizeof("aux0xN ")]; + + sprintf(axsn, "aux0x%x", i); if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], axs->target_sid[i], - axs->target_comm[i])) + axs->target_comm[i]) + && audit_log_container_info(context, axsn, axs->target_cid[i])) call_panic = 1; + } } if (context->target_pid && audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) + context->target_sid, context->target_comm) + && audit_log_container_info(context, "target", context->target_cid)) call_panic = 1; if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { @@ -1456,7 +1463,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context); - audit_log_container_info(tsk, context); + audit_log_container_info(context, "task", audit_get_containerid(tsk)); /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); @@ -2356,6 +2363,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); + context->target_cid = audit_get_containerid(t); memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2383,6 +2391,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) else audit_sig_uid = uid; security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); + audit_sig_cid = audit_get_containerid(tsk); } if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) @@ -2396,6 +2405,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); + ctx->target_cid = audit_get_containerid(t); memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2417,6 +2427,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + axp->target_cid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_containerid(t); memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++;
Add container ID support to ptrace and signals. In particular, the "op" field provides a way to label the auxiliary record to which it is associated. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> --- include/linux/audit.h | 16 +++++++++++----- kernel/audit.c | 12 ++++++++---- kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)