| Message ID | 1554128362-12274-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp |
|---|---|
| State | Changes Requested |
| Delegated to: | David Miller |
| Headers | show |
| Series | net: socket: Always initialize family field at move_addr_to_kernel(). | expand |
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 23:19:22 +0900 > syzbot is reporting uninitialized value at rds_connect [1] and > rds_bind [2]. This is because syzbot is passing ulen == 0 whereas > these functions expects that it is safe to access sockaddr->family field > in order to determine minimal ulen size for validation. I noticed that > the same problem also exists in tomoyo_check_inet_address() function. > > Although the right fix might be to scatter around > > if (ulen < sizeof(__kernel_sa_family_t)) > return 0; > > if the function wants to become no-op when the address is too short or > > if (ulen < sizeof(__kernel_sa_family_t)) > return -EINVAL; > > if the function wants to reject when the address is too short, we can > avoid duplication (at e.g. LSM layer and protocol layer) if we make sure > that sockaddr->family field is always accessible. > > [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f4e61c010416c1e6f0fa3ffe247561b60a50ad71 > [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4bf9e41b7e055c3823fdcd83e8c58ca7270e38f > > Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0049bebbf3042dbd2e8f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> > Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+915c9f99f3dbc4bd6cd1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> > Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> I do not think at all that it is wise to be OK with the socket address interpreation code ignoring the length. Please fix RDS and other protocols to examine the length properly instead. Thank you.
On 2019/04/03 5:23, David Miller wrote: > From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 23:19:22 +0900 > >> syzbot is reporting uninitialized value at rds_connect [1] and >> rds_bind [2]. This is because syzbot is passing ulen == 0 whereas >> these functions expects that it is safe to access sockaddr->family field >> in order to determine minimal ulen size for validation. I noticed that >> the same problem also exists in tomoyo_check_inet_address() function. >> >> Although the right fix might be to scatter around >> >> if (ulen < sizeof(__kernel_sa_family_t)) >> return 0; >> >> if the function wants to become no-op when the address is too short or >> >> if (ulen < sizeof(__kernel_sa_family_t)) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> if the function wants to reject when the address is too short, we can >> avoid duplication (at e.g. LSM layer and protocol layer) if we make sure >> that sockaddr->family field is always accessible. >> >> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f4e61c010416c1e6f0fa3ffe247561b60a50ad71 >> [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4bf9e41b7e055c3823fdcd83e8c58ca7270e38f >> >> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0049bebbf3042dbd2e8f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> >> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+915c9f99f3dbc4bd6cd1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> >> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> > > I do not think at all that it is wise to be OK with the socket address > interpreation code ignoring the length. They do check the length of socket address based on the family of socket address. This patch tries to avoid branches by making sure that it is safe to read the family of socket address (as if sockaddr->family and sockkaddr->addr are passed separately). > > Please fix RDS and other protocols to examine the length properly > instead. Do you prefer adding branches only for allow reading the family of socket address? > > Thank you. >
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 06:07:40 +0900 > On 2019/04/03 5:23, David Miller wrote: >> Please fix RDS and other protocols to examine the length properly >> instead. > > Do you prefer adding branches only for allow reading the family of socket address? If the length is zero, there is no point in reading the family.
On 2019/04/04 13:49, David Miller wrote: > From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> > Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 06:07:40 +0900 > >> On 2019/04/03 5:23, David Miller wrote: >>> Please fix RDS and other protocols to examine the length properly >>> instead. >> >> Do you prefer adding branches only for allow reading the family of socket address? > > If the length is zero, there is no point in reading the family. > (Adding LSM people.) syzbot is reporting that RDS is not checking valid length of address given from userspace. It turned out that there are several users who access "struct sockaddr"->family without checking valid length (which will be reported by KMSAN). Unfortunately, since tipc_bind() in net/tipc/socket.c accepts length == 0 as a valid input, we can't reject length < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family) with -EINVAL at move_addr_to_kernel() which are called from bind()/connect() system calls. I proposed always setting "struct sockaddr"->family at move_addr_to_kernel() but David does not like such trick. Therefore, LSM modules which checks address and/or port have to check valid length before accessing "struct sockaddr"->family in order to determine IPv4 or IPv6 or UNIX. Below is all-in-one change (for x86_64 allmodconfig). Well, I've just realized that move_addr_to_kernel() is also called by sendmsg() system call and for now added changes for only security/ directory. Is this change appropriate for you? (I wish we could simplify this by automatically initializing "struct sockaddr_storage" with 0 at move_addr_to_kernel()...) --- drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c | 4 ++-- net/bluetooth/sco.c | 4 ++-- net/core/filter.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/udp.c | 2 ++ net/llc/af_llc.c | 3 +-- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 3 ++- net/rds/af_rds.c | 3 +++ net/rds/bind.c | 2 ++ net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 3 ++- net/sctp/socket.c | 3 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 ++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/tomoyo/network.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 14 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c b/drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c index 4ab8b1b..a14e35d 100644 --- a/drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c +++ b/drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c @@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ static int data_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, struct sock *sk = sock->sk; int err = 0; - if (!maddr || maddr->family != AF_ISDN) + if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_mISDN)) return -EINVAL; - if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_mISDN)) + if (!maddr || maddr->family != AF_ISDN) return -EINVAL; lock_sock(sk); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/sco.c b/net/bluetooth/sco.c index 9a58099..d892b7c 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/sco.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/sco.c @@ -523,12 +523,12 @@ static int sco_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, struct sock *sk = sock->sk; int err = 0; - BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa->sco_bdaddr); - if (!addr || addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_sco) || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH) return -EINVAL; + BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa->sco_bdaddr); + lock_sock(sk); if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) { diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 41f633c..b9089fd 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -4458,6 +4458,8 @@ static unsigned long bpf_xdp_copy(void *dst_buff, const void *src_buff, * Only binding to IP is supported. */ err = -EINVAL; + if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) + return err; if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET) { if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) return err; diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c index d538faf..2464fba 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c @@ -1045,6 +1045,8 @@ static void udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(struct sock *sk) static int udpv6_pre_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) { + if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) + return -EINVAL; /* The following checks are replicated from __ip6_datagram_connect() * and intended to prevent BPF program called below from accessing * bytes that are out of the bound specified by user in addr_len. diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index b99e73a..2017b7d 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -320,14 +320,13 @@ static int llc_ui_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addrlen) struct llc_sap *sap; int rc = -EINVAL; - dprintk("%s: binding %02X\n", __func__, addr->sllc_sap); - lock_sock(sk); if (unlikely(!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || addrlen != sizeof(*addr))) goto out; rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT; if (unlikely(addr->sllc_family != AF_LLC)) goto out; + dprintk("%s: binding %02X\n", __func__, addr->sllc_sap); rc = -ENODEV; rcu_read_lock(); if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) { diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c index f28e937..216ab91 100644 --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk); struct sockaddr_nl *nladdr = (struct sockaddr_nl *)addr; int err = 0; - unsigned long groups = nladdr->nl_groups; + unsigned long groups; bool bound; if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_nl)) @@ -996,6 +996,7 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, if (nladdr->nl_family != AF_NETLINK) return -EINVAL; + groups = nladdr->nl_groups; /* Only superuser is allowed to listen multicasts */ if (groups) { diff --git a/net/rds/af_rds.c b/net/rds/af_rds.c index d6cc97f..2b969f9 100644 --- a/net/rds/af_rds.c +++ b/net/rds/af_rds.c @@ -543,6 +543,9 @@ static int rds_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, struct rds_sock *rs = rds_sk_to_rs(sk); int ret = 0; + if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) + return -EINVAL; + lock_sock(sk); switch (uaddr->sa_family) { diff --git a/net/rds/bind.c b/net/rds/bind.c index 17c9d9f..0f4398e 100644 --- a/net/rds/bind.c +++ b/net/rds/bind.c @@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ int rds_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) /* We allow an RDS socket to be bound to either IPv4 or IPv6 * address. */ + if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) + return -EINVAL; if (uaddr->sa_family == AF_INET) { struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c index 96f2952..c54dce3 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static int rxrpc_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *saddr, int len) struct sockaddr_rxrpc *srx = (struct sockaddr_rxrpc *)saddr; struct rxrpc_local *local; struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sock->sk); - u16 service_id = srx->srx_service; + u16 service_id; int ret; _enter("%p,%p,%d", rx, saddr, len); @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int rxrpc_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *saddr, int len) ret = rxrpc_validate_address(rx, srx, len); if (ret < 0) goto error; + service_id = srx->srx_service; lock_sock(&rx->sk); diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 9874e60..4583fa9 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -4847,7 +4847,8 @@ static int sctp_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr, } /* Validate addr_len before calling common connect/connectx routine. */ - af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa_family); + af = addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family) ? NULL : + sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa_family); if (!af || addr_len < af->sockaddr_len) { err = -EINVAL; } else { diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index e338359..e8b2163 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -866,6 +866,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, AA_BUG(!address); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + /* No need to check addrlen because bind_perm() is not evaluated. */ return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen), aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk)); @@ -882,6 +883,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, AA_BUG(!address); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + /* No need to check addrlen because connect_perm() is not evaluated. */ return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen), aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk)); @@ -927,6 +929,10 @@ static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, AA_BUG(!msg); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + /* + * No need to check msg->msg_namelen because msg_perm() is not + * evaluated. + */ return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size), aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index d5fdcb0..710d386 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4503,6 +4503,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND); if (err) goto out; + /* + * Nothing more to do if valid length is too short to check + * address->sa_family. + */ + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) + goto out; /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */ family = sk->sk_family; @@ -4634,6 +4640,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); if (err) return err; + /* + * Nothing more to do if valid length is too short to check + * address->sa_family. + */ + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) + return 0; /* * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 5c16135..7c19c04 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2805,13 +2805,21 @@ static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, * * Records the label bound to a port. * - * Returns 0 + * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise */ static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { - if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) + if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) { + /* + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv6 address or + * address family is not IPv6. + */ + if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 || + address->sa_family != AF_INET6) + return -EINVAL; smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address); + } return 0; } #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */ @@ -2847,12 +2855,21 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, switch (sock->sk->sk_family) { case PF_INET: - if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + /* + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv4 address or + * address family is not IPv4. + */ + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) || + sap->sa_family != AF_INET) return -EINVAL; rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap); break; case PF_INET6: - if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) + /* + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv6 address or + * address family is not IPv6. + */ + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 || sap->sa_family != AF_INET6) return -EINVAL; #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip); @@ -3682,9 +3699,23 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, switch (sock->sk->sk_family) { case AF_INET: + /* + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv4 address or + * address family is not IPv4. + */ + if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) || + sip->sin_family != AF_INET) + return -EINVAL; rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip); break; case AF_INET6: + /* + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv6 address or + * address family is not IPv6. + */ + if (msg->msg_namelen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 || + sap->sin6_family != AF_INET6) + return -EINVAL; #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap); if (rsp != NULL) diff --git a/security/tomoyo/network.c b/security/tomoyo/network.c index 9094f4b..3cbd6bd 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/network.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/network.c @@ -505,6 +505,12 @@ static int tomoyo_check_inet_address(const struct sockaddr *addr, { struct tomoyo_inet_addr_info *i = &address->inet; + /* + * Nothing more to do if valid length is too short to check + * address->sa_family. + */ + if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) + return 0; switch (addr->sa_family) { case AF_INET6: if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) @@ -594,6 +600,12 @@ static int tomoyo_check_unix_address(struct sockaddr *addr, { struct tomoyo_unix_addr_info *u = &address->unix0; + /* + * Nothing more to do if valid length is too short to check + * address->sa_family. + */ + if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) + return 0; if (addr->sa_family != AF_UNIX) return 0; u->addr = ((struct sockaddr_un *) addr)->sun_path;
On 4/11/2019 4:31 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2019/04/04 13:49, David Miller wrote: >> From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> >> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 06:07:40 +0900 >> >>> On 2019/04/03 5:23, David Miller wrote: >>>> Please fix RDS and other protocols to examine the length properly >>>> instead. >>> Do you prefer adding branches only for allow reading the family of socket address? >> If the length is zero, there is no point in reading the family. >> > (Adding LSM people.) > > syzbot is reporting that RDS is not checking valid length of address given from userspace. > It turned out that there are several users who access "struct sockaddr"->family without > checking valid length (which will be reported by KMSAN). > > Unfortunately, since tipc_bind() in net/tipc/socket.c accepts length == 0 as a valid input, > we can't reject length < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family) with -EINVAL at > move_addr_to_kernel() which are called from bind()/connect() system calls. I proposed > always setting "struct sockaddr"->family at move_addr_to_kernel() but David does not > like such trick. > > Therefore, LSM modules which checks address and/or port have to check valid length > before accessing "struct sockaddr"->family in order to determine IPv4 or IPv6 or UNIX. > > Below is all-in-one change (for x86_64 allmodconfig). Well, I've just realized that > move_addr_to_kernel() is also called by sendmsg() system call and for now added changes > for only security/ directory. Is this change appropriate for you? (I wish we could > simplify this by automatically initializing "struct sockaddr_storage" with 0 at > move_addr_to_kernel()...) > --- > drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c | 4 ++-- > net/bluetooth/sco.c | 4 ++-- > net/core/filter.c | 2 ++ > net/ipv6/udp.c | 2 ++ > net/llc/af_llc.c | 3 +-- > net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 3 ++- > net/rds/af_rds.c | 3 +++ > net/rds/bind.c | 2 ++ > net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 3 ++- > net/sctp/socket.c | 3 ++- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 ++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > security/tomoyo/network.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > 14 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) Except as noted below this looks fine for Smack. > ... > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 5c16135..7c19c04 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2805,13 +2805,21 @@ static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, > * > * Records the label bound to a port. > * > - * Returns 0 > + * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise > */ > static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, > int addrlen) > { > - if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) > + if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) { > + /* > + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv6 address or > + * address family is not IPv6. > + */ > + if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 || + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 || > + address->sa_family != AF_INET6) > + return -EINVAL; > smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address); > + } > return 0; > } > #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */ > @@ -2847,12 +2855,21 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, > > switch (sock->sk->sk_family) { > case PF_INET: > - if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) > + /* > + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv4 address or > + * address family is not IPv4. > + */ > + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) || > + sap->sa_family != AF_INET) > return -EINVAL; > rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap); > break; > case PF_INET6: > - if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) > + /* > + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv6 address or > + * address family is not IPv6. > + */ > + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 || sap->sa_family != AF_INET6) > return -EINVAL; > #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING > rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip); > @@ -3682,9 +3699,23 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, > > switch (sock->sk->sk_family) { > case AF_INET: > + /* > + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv4 address or > + * address family is not IPv4. > + */ > + if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) || > + sip->sin_family != AF_INET) > + return -EINVAL; > rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip); > break; > case AF_INET6: > + /* > + * Reject if valid length is too short for IPv6 address or > + * address family is not IPv6. > + */ > + if (msg->msg_namelen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 || > + sap->sin6_family != AF_INET6) > + return -EINVAL; > #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING > rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap); > if (rsp != NULL) > diff --git a/security/tomoyo/network.c b/security/tomoyo/network.c > index 9094f4b..3cbd6bd 100644 > --- a/security/tomoyo/network.c > +++ b/security/tomoyo/network.c > @@ -505,6 +505,12 @@ static int tomoyo_check_inet_address(const struct sockaddr *addr, > { > struct tomoyo_inet_addr_info *i = &address->inet; > > + /* > + * Nothing more to do if valid length is too short to check > + * address->sa_family. > + */ > + if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) > + return 0; > switch (addr->sa_family) { > case AF_INET6: > if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) > @@ -594,6 +600,12 @@ static int tomoyo_check_unix_address(struct sockaddr *addr, > { > struct tomoyo_unix_addr_info *u = &address->unix0; > > + /* > + * Nothing more to do if valid length is too short to check > + * address->sa_family. > + */ > + if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) > + return 0; > if (addr->sa_family != AF_UNIX) > return 0; > u->addr = ((struct sockaddr_un *) addr)->sun_path;
On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 7:32 AM Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote: > On 2019/04/04 13:49, David Miller wrote: > > From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> > > Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 06:07:40 +0900 > > > >> On 2019/04/03 5:23, David Miller wrote: > >>> Please fix RDS and other protocols to examine the length properly > >>> instead. > >> > >> Do you prefer adding branches only for allow reading the family of socket address? > > > > If the length is zero, there is no point in reading the family. > > > > (Adding LSM people.) > > syzbot is reporting that RDS is not checking valid length of address given from userspace. > It turned out that there are several users who access "struct sockaddr"->family without > checking valid length (which will be reported by KMSAN). > > Unfortunately, since tipc_bind() in net/tipc/socket.c accepts length == 0 as a valid input, > we can't reject length < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family) with -EINVAL at > move_addr_to_kernel() which are called from bind()/connect() system calls. I proposed > always setting "struct sockaddr"->family at move_addr_to_kernel() but David does not > like such trick. > > Therefore, LSM modules which checks address and/or port have to check valid length > before accessing "struct sockaddr"->family in order to determine IPv4 or IPv6 or UNIX. > > Below is all-in-one change (for x86_64 allmodconfig). Well, I've just realized that > move_addr_to_kernel() is also called by sendmsg() system call and for now added changes > for only security/ directory. Is this change appropriate for you? (I wish we could > simplify this by automatically initializing "struct sockaddr_storage" with 0 at > move_addr_to_kernel()...) > --- > drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c | 4 ++-- > net/bluetooth/sco.c | 4 ++-- > net/core/filter.c | 2 ++ > net/ipv6/udp.c | 2 ++ > net/llc/af_llc.c | 3 +-- > net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 3 ++- > net/rds/af_rds.c | 3 +++ > net/rds/bind.c | 2 ++ > net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 3 ++- > net/sctp/socket.c | 3 ++- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 ++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > security/tomoyo/network.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > 14 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) Some minor nits/comments below, but I think this is still okay as-is from a SELinux perspective. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index d5fdcb0..710d386 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -4503,6 +4503,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in > err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND); > if (err) > goto out; > + /* > + * Nothing more to do if valid length is too short to check > + * address->sa_family. > + */ > + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) > + goto out; SELinux already checks the address length further down in selinux_socket_bind() for the address families it care about, although it does read sa_family before the address length check so no unfortunately it's of no help. I imagine you could move this new length check inside the PF_INET/PF_INET6 if-then code block to minimize the impact to other address families, but I suppose there is some value in keeping it where it is too. > /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */ > family = sk->sk_family; > @@ -4634,6 +4640,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, > err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); > if (err) > return err; > + /* > + * Nothing more to do if valid length is too short to check > + * address->sa_family. > + */ > + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) > + return 0; Similar comments as above, including moving the check inside the if-then block. > /* > * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
Paul Moore wrote: > > + /* > > + * Nothing more to do if valid length is too short to check > > + * address->sa_family. > > + */ > > + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) > > + goto out; > > SELinux already checks the address length further down in > selinux_socket_bind() for the address families it care about, although > it does read sa_family before the address length check so no > unfortunately it's of no help. Exactly. Since we will anyway have to check valid length after sa_family is checked, reading a stale sa_family is harmless except KMSAN complains uninit-value. Therefore, --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static ssize_t sock_splice_read(struct file *file, loff_t *ppos, int move_addr_to_kernel(void __user *uaddr, int ulen, struct sockaddr_storage *kaddr) { + kaddr->ss_family = 0; if (ulen < 0 || ulen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)) return -EINVAL; if (ulen == 0) or --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static ssize_t sock_splice_read(struct file *file, loff_t *ppos, int move_addr_to_kernel(void __user *uaddr, int ulen, struct sockaddr_storage *kaddr) { + memset(kaddr, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); if (ulen < 0 || ulen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)) return -EINVAL; if (ulen == 0) will avoid adding this "addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)" check to every LSM module. It is a bit pity that while it is guaranteed that sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) bytes are accessible, it is not guaranteed that reading "struct sockaddr_storage"->family is safe. (Thus, I wanted to hear comments from LSM people.) > > I imagine you could move this new length check inside the > PF_INET/PF_INET6 if-then code block to minimize the impact to other > address families, but I suppose there is some value in keeping it > where it is too. I guess that since PF_INET/PF_INET6/PF_UNIX will be most frequently used protocols, the impact to non-PF_INET/PF_INET6 protocols is negligible.
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index 8255f5b..10a780b 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static ssize_t sock_splice_read(struct file *file, loff_t *ppos, int move_addr_to_kernel(void __user *uaddr, int ulen, struct sockaddr_storage *kaddr) { + kaddr->ss_family = 0; if (ulen < 0 || ulen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)) return -EINVAL; if (ulen == 0)
syzbot is reporting uninitialized value at rds_connect [1] and rds_bind [2]. This is because syzbot is passing ulen == 0 whereas these functions expects that it is safe to access sockaddr->family field in order to determine minimal ulen size for validation. I noticed that the same problem also exists in tomoyo_check_inet_address() function. Although the right fix might be to scatter around if (ulen < sizeof(__kernel_sa_family_t)) return 0; if the function wants to become no-op when the address is too short or if (ulen < sizeof(__kernel_sa_family_t)) return -EINVAL; if the function wants to reject when the address is too short, we can avoid duplication (at e.g. LSM layer and protocol layer) if we make sure that sockaddr->family field is always accessible. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f4e61c010416c1e6f0fa3ffe247561b60a50ad71 [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4bf9e41b7e055c3823fdcd83e8c58ca7270e38f Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0049bebbf3042dbd2e8f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+915c9f99f3dbc4bd6cd1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> --- net/socket.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)