| Message ID | 1287845294.13882.4.camel@bzorp.lan |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted, archived |
| Delegated to: | David Miller |
| Headers | show |
On 2010-10-23, Balazs Scheidler wrote: > On Fri, 2010-10-22 at 06:24 +0900, YOSHIFUJI Hideaki wrote: > > Hello. > > > > 2010-10-20, Balazs Scheidler wrote: > > > On Wed, 2010-10-20 at 21:45 +0900, YOSHIFUJI Hideaki wrote: > > > > (2010/10/20 20:21), KOVACS Krisztian wrote: > > > > > From: Balazs Scheidler<bazsi@balabit.hu> > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Balazs Scheidler<bazsi@balabit.hu> > > > > > Signed-off-by: KOVACS Krisztian<hidden@balabit.hu> > > > > > --- > > > > > net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 2 +- > > > > > 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c > > > > > index 6022098..9480572 100644 > > > > > --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c > > > > > +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c > > > > > @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) > > > > > */ > > > > > v4addr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6; > > > > > if (!(addr_type& IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) { > > > > > - if (!ipv6_chk_addr(net,&addr->sin6_addr, > > > > > + if (!inet->transparent&& !ipv6_chk_addr(net,&addr->sin6_addr, > > > > > dev, 0)) { > > > > > err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL; > > > > > goto out_unlock; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As I wrote before in other thread, this does not seem sufficient -- > > > > well, it is sufficient to allow non-local bind, but before we're > > > > allowing this, we need add checks of source address in sending side. > > > > > > Can you please elaborate or point us to the other thread? Is it some > > > kind of address-type check that we miss? > > > > Please see my comment at: > > <http://kerneltrap.org/mailarchive/linux-netdev/2010/7/5/6280572> > > > > This will result in allowing non-privileged users easily sending from > > non-local / unauthorized address, which is not good, and which should > > not be allowed from security aspects. > > IP_TRANSPARENT requires root (more precisely CAP_NET_ADMIN privielges) > for IPV6. > > However as I see right now this check was missed from the IPv6 > implementation. > > Is that enough as a safeguard? e.g. something like this: > > diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c > index 0553867..f683d2c 100644 > --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c > +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c > @@ -343,6 +343,10 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, > break; > > case IPV6_TRANSPARENT: > + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { > + retv = -EPERM; > + break; > + } > if (optlen < sizeof(int)) > goto e_inval; > /* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the one in the IPv4 socket */ > > > I think it is the thing we must to have. Thanks. Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> --yoshfuji -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
From: Balazs Scheidler <bazsi@balabit.hu> Date: Sat, 23 Oct 2010 16:48:14 +0200 > IP_TRANSPARENT requires root (more precisely CAP_NET_ADMIN privielges) > for IPV6. > > However as I see right now this check was missed from the IPv6 > implementation. > > Is that enough as a safeguard? e.g. something like this: Applied, thanks everyone. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c index 0553867..f683d2c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c @@ -343,6 +343,10 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, break; case IPV6_TRANSPARENT: + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { + retv = -EPERM; + break; + } if (optlen < sizeof(int)) goto e_inval; /* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the one in the IPv4 socket */