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[v9,18/51] powerpc: implementation for arch_vma_access_permitted()

Message ID 1509958663-18737-19-git-send-email-linuxram@us.ibm.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Headers show
Series powerpc, mm: Memory Protection Keys | expand

Commit Message

Ram Pai Nov. 6, 2017, 8:57 a.m. UTC
This patch provides the implementation for
arch_vma_access_permitted(). Returns true if the
requested access is allowed by pkey associated with the
vma.

Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h |    5 +++-
 arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c                |   34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index a557735..95a3288 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@  static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm,
 {
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS
+bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write,
+			       bool execute, bool foreign);
+#else /* CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS */
 static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		bool write, bool execute, bool foreign)
 {
@@ -143,7 +147,6 @@  static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	return true;
 }
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS
 #define pkey_initialize()
 #define pkey_mm_init(mm)
 #define thread_pkey_regs_save(thread)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
index 13902be..3b221bd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -375,3 +375,37 @@  bool arch_pte_access_permitted(u64 pte, bool write, bool execute)
 
 	return pkey_access_permitted(pte_to_pkey_bits(pte), write, execute);
 }
+
+/*
+ * We only want to enforce protection keys on the current thread because we
+ * effectively have no access to AMR/IAMR for other threads or any way to tell
+ * which AMR/IAMR in a threaded process we could use.
+ *
+ * So do not enforce things if the VMA is not from the current mm, or if we are
+ * in a kernel thread.
+ */
+static inline bool vma_is_foreign(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (!current->mm)
+		return true;
+
+	/* if it is not our ->mm, it has to be foreign */
+	if (current->mm != vma->vm_mm)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write,
+			       bool execute, bool foreign)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return true;
+	/*
+	 * Do not enforce our key-permissions on a foreign vma.
+	 */
+	if (foreign || vma_is_foreign(vma))
+		return true;
+
+	return pkey_access_permitted(vma_pkey(vma), write, execute);
+}