| Message ID | 20190914122500.GA1425@darwi-home-pc |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [RFC] random: getrandom(2): don't block on non-initialized entropy pool | expand |
(resending without HTML this time, sorry for the duplicate) 14.09.2019 17:25, Ahmed S. Darwish пишет: > getrandom() has been created as a new and more secure interface for > pseudorandom data requests. Unlike /dev/urandom, it unconditionally > blocks until the entropy pool has been properly initialized. > > While getrandom() has no guaranteed upper bound for its waiting time, > user-space has been abusing it by issuing the syscall, from shared > libraries no less, during the main system boot sequence. > > Thus, on certain setups where there is no hwrng (embedded), or the > hwrng is not trusted by some users (intel RDRAND), or sometimes it's > just broken (amd RDRAND), the system boot can be *reliably* blocked. > > The issue is further exaggerated by recent file-system optimizations, > e.g. b03755ad6f33 (ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug), which > merges directory lookup code inode table IO, and thus minimizes the > number of disk interrupts and entropy during boot. After that commit, > a blocked boot can be reliably reproduced on a Thinkpad E480 laptop > with standard ArchLinux user-space. > > Thus, don't trust user-space on calling getrandom() from the right > context. Just never block, and return -EINVAL if entropy is not yet > available. > > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjyH910+JRBdZf_Y9G54c1M=LBF8NKXB6vJcm9XjLnRfg@mail.gmail.com > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190912034421.GA2085@darwi-home-pc > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190911173624.GI2740@mit.edu > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180514003034.GI14763@thunk.org Let me reword the commit message for a hopefully better historical perspective. === getrandom() has been created as a new and more secure interface for pseudorandom data requests. It attempted to solve two problems, as compared to /dev/{u,}random: the need to open a file descriptor (which can fail) and possibility to get not-so-random data from the incompletely initialized entropy pool. It has succeeded in the first improvement, but failed horribly in the second one: it blocks until the entropy pool has been properly initialized, if called without GRND_NONBLOCK, while none of these behaviors are suitable for the early boot stage. The issue is further exaggerated by recent file-system optimizations, e.g. b03755ad6f33 (ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug), which merges directory lookup code inode table IO, and thus minimizes the number of disk interrupts and entropy during boot. After that commit, a blocked boot can be reliably reproduced on a Thinkpad E480 laptop with standard ArchLinux user-space. Thus, on certain setups where there is no hwrng (embedded systems or non-KVM virtual machines), or the hwrng is not trusted by some users (intel RDRAND), or sometimes it's just broken (amd RDRAND), the system boot can be *reliably* blocked. It can be therefore argued that there is no way to use getrandom() on Linux correctly, especially from shared libraries: GRND_NONBLOCK has to be used, and a fallback to some other interface like /dev/urandom is required, thus making the net result no better than just using /dev/urandom unconditionally. While getrandom() has no guaranteed upper bound for its waiting time, user-space has been using it incorrectly by issuing the syscall, from shared libraries no less, during the main system boot sequence, without GRND_NONBLOCK. We can't trust user-space on calling getrandom() from the right context. Therefore, just never block, and return -EINVAL (with some entropy still in the buffer) if the requested amount of entropy is not yet available. Link: https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/edb2eeb7da8494998d0073f8aaeb8478cee5e00b Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjyH910+JRBdZf_Y9G54c1M=LBF8NKXB6vJcm9XjLnRfg@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190912034421.GA2085@darwi-home-pc Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190911173624.GI2740@mit.edu Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180514003034.GI14763@thunk.org === That said, I have an issue with the -EINVAL return code here: it is also returned in cases where the parameters passed are genuinely not understood by the kernel, and no entropy has been written to the buffer. Therefore, the caller has to assume that the call has failed, waste all the bytes in the buffer, and try some fallback strategy. Can we think of some other error code? The other part of me thinks that triggering a fallback, by returning an error code, is never the right thing to do. If the "uninitialized" state exists at all, applications and libraries have to care (and I would expect their authors who don't pass GRND_RANDOM to just fall back to /dev/urandom). Therefore, we are back to square one, except that the fallback code in the application is something that is only rarely exercised, and thus has higher chances to accumulate bugs. Because the only expected/reasonable fallback is to read from /dev/urandom, the whole result looks like shifting the responsibility/blame without achieving anything useful. As the issue is not really solvable, just give the application not-so-random data, as /dev/urandom does, without any indication - this would at least keep the benefit of not needing a file descriptor. It is simply not possible to do anything better without eliminating the userspace-visible "uninitialized" crng state, e.g. with the help of entropy input from the boot loader or a configurable config or command line option to trust the jitter entropy in-kernel. > > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> > Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> > --- > > Notes: > This feels very risky at the very end of -rc8, so only sending > this as an RFC. The system of course reliably boots with this, > and the log, as expected, powerfully warns all callers: > > $ dmesg | grep random > [0.236472] random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x30f/0x4d7 with crng_init=0 > [0.680263] random: fast init done > [2.500346] random: lvm: uninitialized urandom read (4 bytes read) > [2.595125] random: systemd-random-: invalid getrandom request (512 bytes): crng not ready > [2.595126] random: systemd-random-: uninitialized urandom read (512 bytes read) > [3.427699] random: dbus-daemon: uninitialized urandom read (12 bytes read) > [3.979425] urandom_read: 1 callbacks suppressed > [3.979426] random: polkitd: uninitialized urandom read (8 bytes read) > [3.979726] random: polkitd: uninitialized urandom read (8 bytes read) > [3.979752] random: polkitd: uninitialized urandom read (8 bytes read) > [4.473398] random: gnome-session-b: invalid getrandom request (16 bytes): crng not ready > [4.473404] random: gnome-session-b: invalid getrandom request (16 bytes): crng not ready > [4.473409] random: gnome-session-b: invalid getrandom request (16 bytes): crng not ready > [5.265636] random: crng init done > [5.265649] random: 3 urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting > [5.265652] random: 1 getrandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting > > drivers/char/random.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c > index 4a50ee2c230d..309dc5ddf370 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/random.c > +++ b/drivers/char/random.c > @@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning = > RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3); > static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning = > RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3); > +static struct ratelimit_state getrandom_warning = > + RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_getrandom_notavail", HZ, 3); > > static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly; > > @@ -1053,6 +1055,12 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) > urandom_warning.missed); > urandom_warning.missed = 0; > } > + if (getrandom_warning.missed) { > + pr_notice("random: %d getrandom warning(s) missed " > + "due to ratelimiting\n", > + getrandom_warning.missed); > + getrandom_warning.missed = 0; > + } > } > } > > @@ -1915,6 +1923,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) > crng_global_init_time = jiffies; > if (ratelimit_disable) { > urandom_warning.interval = 0; > + getrandom_warning.interval = 0; > unseeded_warning.interval = 0; > } > return 0; > @@ -2138,8 +2147,6 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { > SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, > unsigned int, flags) > { > - int ret; > - > if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM)) > return -EINVAL; > > @@ -2152,9 +2159,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, > if (!crng_ready()) { > if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) > return -EAGAIN; > - ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); > - if (unlikely(ret)) > - return ret; > + > + if (__ratelimit(&getrandom_warning)) > + pr_notice("random: %s: invalid getrandom request " > + "(%zd bytes): crng not ready", > + current->comm, count); > + > + return -EINVAL; > } > return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL); > } > -- > 2.23.0 >
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 4a50ee2c230d..309dc5ddf370 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning = RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3); static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning = RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3); +static struct ratelimit_state getrandom_warning = + RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_getrandom_notavail", HZ, 3); static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly; @@ -1053,6 +1055,12 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) urandom_warning.missed); urandom_warning.missed = 0; } + if (getrandom_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("random: %d getrandom warning(s) missed " + "due to ratelimiting\n", + getrandom_warning.missed); + getrandom_warning.missed = 0; + } } } @@ -1915,6 +1923,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) crng_global_init_time = jiffies; if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval = 0; + getrandom_warning.interval = 0; unseeded_warning.interval = 0; } return 0; @@ -2138,8 +2147,6 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, flags) { - int ret; - if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM)) return -EINVAL; @@ -2152,9 +2159,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, if (!crng_ready()) { if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) return -EAGAIN; - ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); - if (unlikely(ret)) - return ret; + + if (__ratelimit(&getrandom_warning)) + pr_notice("random: %s: invalid getrandom request " + "(%zd bytes): crng not ready", + current->comm, count); + + return -EINVAL; } return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL); }
getrandom() has been created as a new and more secure interface for pseudorandom data requests. Unlike /dev/urandom, it unconditionally blocks until the entropy pool has been properly initialized. While getrandom() has no guaranteed upper bound for its waiting time, user-space has been abusing it by issuing the syscall, from shared libraries no less, during the main system boot sequence. Thus, on certain setups where there is no hwrng (embedded), or the hwrng is not trusted by some users (intel RDRAND), or sometimes it's just broken (amd RDRAND), the system boot can be *reliably* blocked. The issue is further exaggerated by recent file-system optimizations, e.g. b03755ad6f33 (ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug), which merges directory lookup code inode table IO, and thus minimizes the number of disk interrupts and entropy during boot. After that commit, a blocked boot can be reliably reproduced on a Thinkpad E480 laptop with standard ArchLinux user-space. Thus, don't trust user-space on calling getrandom() from the right context. Just never block, and return -EINVAL if entropy is not yet available. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjyH910+JRBdZf_Y9G54c1M=LBF8NKXB6vJcm9XjLnRfg@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190912034421.GA2085@darwi-home-pc Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190911173624.GI2740@mit.edu Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180514003034.GI14763@thunk.org Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> --- Notes: This feels very risky at the very end of -rc8, so only sending this as an RFC. The system of course reliably boots with this, and the log, as expected, powerfully warns all callers: $ dmesg | grep random [0.236472] random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x30f/0x4d7 with crng_init=0 [0.680263] random: fast init done [2.500346] random: lvm: uninitialized urandom read (4 bytes read) [2.595125] random: systemd-random-: invalid getrandom request (512 bytes): crng not ready [2.595126] random: systemd-random-: uninitialized urandom read (512 bytes read) [3.427699] random: dbus-daemon: uninitialized urandom read (12 bytes read) [3.979425] urandom_read: 1 callbacks suppressed [3.979426] random: polkitd: uninitialized urandom read (8 bytes read) [3.979726] random: polkitd: uninitialized urandom read (8 bytes read) [3.979752] random: polkitd: uninitialized urandom read (8 bytes read) [4.473398] random: gnome-session-b: invalid getrandom request (16 bytes): crng not ready [4.473404] random: gnome-session-b: invalid getrandom request (16 bytes): crng not ready [4.473409] random: gnome-session-b: invalid getrandom request (16 bytes): crng not ready [5.265636] random: crng init done [5.265649] random: 3 urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting [5.265652] random: 1 getrandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting drivers/char/random.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.23.0