Message ID | 20181014150025.6477-1-nicholas.clark@gmail.com |
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Return-Path: <linux-ext4-owner@vger.kernel.org> X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=linux-ext4-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=<UNKNOWN>) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="NgjPdSE4"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42Y4WK1C78z9s2P for <patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org>; Mon, 15 Oct 2018 02:00:29 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726346AbeJNWll (ORCPT <rfc822;patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org>); Sun, 14 Oct 2018 18:41:41 -0400 Received: from mail-it1-f194.google.com ([209.85.166.194]:35642 "EHLO mail-it1-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726309AbeJNWll (ORCPT <rfc822; linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>); Sun, 14 Oct 2018 18:41:41 -0400 Received: by mail-it1-f194.google.com with SMTP id p64-v6so24221668itp.0 for <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>; Sun, 14 Oct 2018 08:00:27 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=lv+dzXqS2joKpLc8LEHaoc+chirYTncWA2NlD1vqErA=; b=NgjPdSE4AP1mkTDDFgTGdnLUHLmXuSpuXzpIvGLdMX/iafKrIIiRB5lT5sDO4AbgY5 a/1O2aECXHIfdeqOwHoXSGG6aaD+g6h8tOuKoaognjz/PY9biDeldNF0BicoKzbg6Knh jouMaEMK2RFbYotCxHyulzzs2maCARx6aUz0A9rdqM4/cSzHWxRefGloFjZKef9+jxsZ HjHbOeuDSNF4SPknGAbouH1Xn/qSogFuSQdKbPS2LmnjLRWBCxNHUS6RrS+PTZ7INxRa Jrz/3EVmtydx+iPvX1gMlJPkjeQo59mZi6d0jJANd+rQIBH9JKnmIAhlXDLU4fMVe3AL /EjA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=lv+dzXqS2joKpLc8LEHaoc+chirYTncWA2NlD1vqErA=; b=U0AEfOFvU1wxUWlxWg/II7xD7TvcjeJe6mZz3a1viItl8UqdXkFpGOu1HGmtOBz+0U cyNtfgJtfHjqPKN9KmYqbSaUVW0LZLX0+n4/MwRphwe5cLrcB3CYnFlhKWMb814aliri Jst3vhIdpfQqUmitnQF91DKCCohIimshj4TxRVSyeTo8gtTu55LS25ABUYLk3y5r46BL c0YO8p7dMW2LMCLa+7mGAKiIrPQcr2MbXmn7Nx/GbQ6M0yNg+ZttLXGqkU9aHNc1aisx I0ez1uwdECv58fwXTZWbRQ1198qSm9kEPPvxZMX9ckognK/5+pFIJtznknJxtq5PVerJ H7rQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ABuFfogBwTVLBVF0V78u0PkWMy5ShQ3ShBkuof7TKVfHJxVvnBmasbfi 4tR675dvlZ8HtDS07OxFsSAhnQtG X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACcGV61k4w6kDVdJoF0M3WyNVkh+ZhfmjMDs1M14Umb2GsurGEYpn4Usy7qbK5WuqxPkOR0/5IWZYQ== X-Received: by 2002:a24:3c0a:: with SMTP id m10-v6mr10041290ita.15.1539529227083; Sun, 14 Oct 2018 08:00:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain.localdomain (174-16-227-95.hlrn.qwest.net. [174.16.227.95]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n187-v6sm3067463itb.17.2018.10.14.08.00.26 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Sun, 14 Oct 2018 08:00:26 -0700 (PDT) From: nicholas.clark@gmail.com To: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nick Clark <nicholas.clark@gmail.com> Subject: [PATCH RESEND 0/2] e2fsprogs: fuse2fs bugfix and new 'fakeroot' feature Date: Sun, 14 Oct 2018 09:00:23 -0600 Message-Id: <20181014150025.6477-1-nicholas.clark@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 Sender: linux-ext4-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: <linux-ext4.vger.kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org |
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e2fsprogs: fuse2fs bugfix and new 'fakeroot' feature
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From: Nick Clark <nicholas.clark@gmail.com> Hi all, I wrote a couple of patches for fuse2fs (from the e2fsprogs collection). One is a minor bugfix to the displayed name in the mount command's output, and the other is a new 'fakeroot' mount option, as described below. When building cross-compiled Linux systems (for use on routers, consumer devices, etc), it's often necessary to build rootfs filesystem images. This commit adds a new 'fakeroot' mount option that gives a user full control over the mounted filesystem, within the confines of FUSE. When used, the new option allows treats allowed users as uid 0 for the purposes of permission checks (within the mounted filesystem). This allows the owner of a .img file to mount the file and make whatever changes they want to any files inside of the image. If the option is left disabled at mount-time, fuse2fs acts the same as before - only root can edit "root"-owned files inside of the image. But when enabled, fuse2fs becomes a powerful tool to build/modify filesystem images. What do you all think? -Nick Nicholas Clark (2): Fuse2fs: fix 'mount' entry in some cases. Fuse2fs: add fakeroot option. acinclude.m4 | 47 ++++++++++++++++ configure | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ configure.ac | 4 ++ lib/config.h.in | 6 +++ misc/fuse2fs.1.in | 3 ++ misc/fuse2fs.c | 31 ++++++++--- 6 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)