@@ -2692,6 +2692,15 @@ static struct wpabuf * fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY);
wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN,
wpabuf_put(plain, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN));
+
+ hdr[1] = 0;
+ if (sm->use_extended_key_id) {
+ hdr[0] = sm->keyidx_active & 0x01;
+ tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0);
+ tmp2 = wpa_add_kde(tmp, RSN_KEY_DATA_KEYID, hdr, 2, NULL, 0);
+ wpabuf_put(plain, tmp2 - tmp);
+ }
+
/* GTK KDE */
gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
@@ -2708,7 +2717,6 @@ static struct wpabuf * fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
gtk = dummy_gtk;
}
hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
- hdr[1] = 0;
tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0);
tmp2 = wpa_add_kde(tmp, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
gtk, gtk_len);
@@ -2754,6 +2762,7 @@ int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: No valid PTK available to set TK");
return -1;
}
+
if (sm->tk_already_set) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK already set to the driver");
return -1;
@@ -2763,7 +2772,7 @@ int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
- if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0,
+ if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, sm->keyidx_active,
sm->PTK.tk, klen, KEY_TYPE_PAIRWISE)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
return -1;
IEEE 802.11ai - 2016 is missing any instructions how Extended Key ID shall be handled combination with it. But there seem to be only two ways: 1) FILS can only use keyid 0 and the STAs only decide on rekey if they can use Extended Key ID. 2) FILS also checks is Extended Key ID can be used by both STAs and if so adds the KeyID KDE in addition to the GTK/IGTK KDEs. Since the later seems to be a closer to the intent of 802.11ai and there are no other implementations for Extended Key ID we could be incompatible to this patch implements 2) for now. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> --- Now this is a very free interpretation how to handle Extended Key ID in combination with FILS. Technically it's the same issue as we have for FT, so I'm using the same (arguable) solution here: We bypass the 4-way handshake and Extended Key ID is therefore mostly irrelevant. Neither FILS nor FT make any concession for Extended Key ID but have a mechanism to get the GTK ID. Which of course can also pass over the (unicast) KeyID required for Extended Key ID support... Now the new patch series is rigorously sticking to the key install mode used at the initial connect: When either the AP or the STA tries to use anything else than for the connect we kill the connection. By also adding the KeyID to the KDEs these checks work basically out of the box and the Extended Key ID flag in the RSN capabilities serves a purpose. Alternatively we could relax the checks and accept, that we either still set the Extended Key ID bit in RSN but just assume the keyid is always zero for FT and FILS or even drop the bit in the RSN capabilities and relax the sanity checks for FILS and FT. Since any not Extended Key ID capable STA won't care either way and there are zero implementations for Extended Key ID we have to stay compatible with I decided to first try what I consider the cleanest way. Therefore Unicast KeyIDs have been added to the frames transporting also the GTK ID. Based on the feedback we either keep or change it. src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)