@@ -154,23 +154,6 @@ static void CheckODRViolationViaIndicator(const Global *g) {
}
}
-// Check ODR violation for given global G by checking if it's already poisoned.
-// We use this method in case compiler doesn't use private aliases for global
-// variables.
-static void CheckODRViolationViaPoisoning(const Global *g) {
- if (__asan_region_is_poisoned(g->beg, g->size_with_redzone)) {
- // This check may not be enough: if the first global is much larger
- // the entire redzone of the second global may be within the first global.
- for (ListOfGlobals *l = list_of_all_globals; l; l = l->next) {
- if (g->beg == l->g->beg &&
- (flags()->detect_odr_violation >= 2 || g->size != l->g->size) &&
- !IsODRViolationSuppressed(g->name))
- ReportODRViolation(g, FindRegistrationSite(g),
- l->g, FindRegistrationSite(l->g));
- }
- }
-}
-
// Clang provides two different ways for global variables protection:
// it can poison the global itself or its private alias. In former
// case we may poison same symbol multiple times, that can help us to
@@ -216,8 +199,6 @@ static void RegisterGlobal(const Global *g) {
// where two globals with the same name are defined in different modules.
if (UseODRIndicator(g))
CheckODRViolationViaIndicator(g);
- else
- CheckODRViolationViaPoisoning(g);
}
if (CanPoisonMemory())
PoisonRedZones(*g);
@@ -80,7 +80,12 @@ void InitializePlatformInterceptors();
#if ASAN_HAS_EXCEPTIONS && !SANITIZER_WINDOWS && !SANITIZER_SOLARIS && \
!SANITIZER_NETBSD
# define ASAN_INTERCEPT___CXA_THROW 1
-# define ASAN_INTERCEPT___CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION 1
+# if ! defined(ASAN_HAS_CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION) \
+ || ASAN_HAS_CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION
+# define ASAN_INTERCEPT___CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION 1
+# else
+# define ASAN_INTERCEPT___CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION 0
+# endif
# if defined(_GLIBCXX_SJLJ_EXCEPTIONS) || (SANITIZER_IOS && defined(__arm__))
# define ASAN_INTERCEPT__UNWIND_SJLJ_RAISEEXCEPTION 1
# else
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static const u64 kDefaultShort64bitShadowOffset =
static const u64 kAArch64_ShadowOffset64 = 1ULL << 36;
static const u64 kMIPS32_ShadowOffset32 = 0x0aaa0000;
static const u64 kMIPS64_ShadowOffset64 = 1ULL << 37;
-static const u64 kPPC64_ShadowOffset64 = 1ULL << 44;
+static const u64 kPPC64_ShadowOffset64 = 1ULL << 41;
static const u64 kSystemZ_ShadowOffset64 = 1ULL << 52;
static const u64 kSPARC64_ShadowOffset64 = 1ULL << 43; // 0x80000000000
static const u64 kFreeBSD_ShadowOffset32 = 1ULL << 30; // 0x40000000
@@ -698,9 +698,13 @@ u32 GetNumberOfCPUs() {
#elif SANITIZER_SOLARIS
return sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
#else
+#if defined(CPU_COUNT)
cpu_set_t CPUs;
CHECK_EQ(sched_getaffinity(0, sizeof(cpu_set_t), &CPUs), 0);
return CPU_COUNT(&CPUs);
+#else
+ return 1;
+#endif
#endif
}
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
extern char **environ;
#endif
-#if defined(__has_include) && __has_include(<os/trace.h>)
+#if defined(__has_include) && __has_include(<os/trace.h>) && defined(__BLOCKS__)
#define SANITIZER_OS_TRACE 1
#include <os/trace.h>
#else
@@ -26,9 +26,12 @@
// With old kernels (and even new kernels on powerpc) asm/stat.h uses types that
// are not defined anywhere in userspace headers. Fake them. This seems to work
-// fine with newer headers, too.
+// fine with newer headers, too. Beware that with <sys/stat.h>, struct stat
+// takes the form of struct stat64 on 32-bit platforms if _FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64.
+// Also, for some platforms (e.g. mips) there are additional members in the
+// <sys/stat.h> struct stat:s.
#include <linux/posix_types.h>
-#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__)
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
#include <sys/stat.h>
#else
#define ino_t __kernel_ino_t
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ const unsigned struct_kernel_stat64_sz = 104;
#elif defined(__mips__)
const unsigned struct_kernel_stat_sz = SANITIZER_ANDROID
? FIRST_32_SECOND_64(104, 128)
- : FIRST_32_SECOND_64(160, 216);
+ : FIRST_32_SECOND_64(144, 216);
const unsigned struct_kernel_stat64_sz = 104;
#elif defined(__s390__) && !defined(__s390x__)
const unsigned struct_kernel_stat_sz = 64;
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ static inline uhwptr *GetCanonicFrame(uptr bp,
// Nope, this does not look right either. This means the frame after next does
// not have a valid frame pointer, but we can still extract the caller PC.
// Unfortunately, there is no way to decide between GCC and LLVM frame
- // layouts. Assume LLVM.
- return bp_prev;
+ // layouts. Assume GCC.
+ return bp_prev - 1;
#else
return (uhwptr*)bp;
#endif
@@ -84,14 +84,21 @@ void BufferedStackTrace::UnwindFast(uptr pc, uptr bp, uptr stack_top,
IsAligned((uptr)frame, sizeof(*frame)) &&
size < max_depth) {
#ifdef __powerpc__
- // PowerPC ABIs specify that the return address is saved at offset
- // 16 of the *caller's* stack frame. Thus we must dereference the
- // back chain to find the caller frame before extracting it.
+ // PowerPC ABIs specify that the return address is saved on the
+ // *caller's* stack frame. Thus we must dereference the back chain
+ // to find the caller frame before extracting it.
uhwptr *caller_frame = (uhwptr*)frame[0];
if (!IsValidFrame((uptr)caller_frame, stack_top, bottom) ||
!IsAligned((uptr)caller_frame, sizeof(uhwptr)))
break;
+ // For most ABIs the offset where the return address is saved is two
+ // register sizes. The exception is the SVR4 ABI, which uses an
+ // offset of only one register size.
+#ifdef _CALL_SYSV
+ uhwptr pc1 = caller_frame[1];
+#else
uhwptr pc1 = caller_frame[2];
+#endif
#elif defined(__s390__)
uhwptr pc1 = frame[14];
#else
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
#include "tsan_ppc_regs.h"
+ .machine altivec
.section .text
.hidden __tsan_setjmp
.globl _setjmp
@@ -819,6 +819,21 @@ void __ubsan_handle_cfi_bad_type(CFICheckFailData *Data, ValueHandle Vtable,
} // namespace __ubsan
+void __ubsan::__ubsan_handle_cfi_bad_icall(CFIBadIcallData *CallData,
+ ValueHandle Function) {
+ GET_REPORT_OPTIONS(false);
+ CFICheckFailData Data = {CFITCK_ICall, CallData->Loc, CallData->Type};
+ handleCFIBadIcall(&Data, Function, Opts);
+}
+
+void __ubsan::__ubsan_handle_cfi_bad_icall_abort(CFIBadIcallData *CallData,
+ ValueHandle Function) {
+ GET_REPORT_OPTIONS(true);
+ CFICheckFailData Data = {CFITCK_ICall, CallData->Loc, CallData->Type};
+ handleCFIBadIcall(&Data, Function, Opts);
+ Die();
+}
+
void __ubsan::__ubsan_handle_cfi_check_fail(CFICheckFailData *Data,
ValueHandle Value,
uptr ValidVtable) {
@@ -207,12 +207,20 @@ enum CFITypeCheckKind : unsigned char {
CFITCK_VMFCall,
};
+struct CFIBadIcallData {
+ SourceLocation Loc;
+ const TypeDescriptor &Type;
+};
+
struct CFICheckFailData {
CFITypeCheckKind CheckKind;
SourceLocation Loc;
const TypeDescriptor &Type;
};
+/// \brief Handle control flow integrity failure for indirect function calls.
+RECOVERABLE(cfi_bad_icall, CFIBadIcallData *Data, ValueHandle Function)
+
/// \brief Handle control flow integrity failures.
RECOVERABLE(cfi_check_fail, CFICheckFailData *Data, ValueHandle Function,
uptr VtableIsValid)
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#ifndef UBSAN_PLATFORM_H
#define UBSAN_PLATFORM_H
+#ifndef CAN_SANITIZE_UB
// Other platforms should be easy to add, and probably work as-is.
#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) || \
defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || \
@@ -21,5 +22,6 @@
#else
# define CAN_SANITIZE_UB 0
#endif
+#endif //CAN_SANITIZE_UB
#endif