diff --git a/package/tor/0001-patch-src_lib_crypt_ops_crypto_dh_openssl_c.patch b/package/tor/0001-patch-src_lib_crypt_ops_crypto_dh_openssl_c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2df7c6b6a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/tor/0001-patch-src_lib_crypt_ops_crypto_dh_openssl_c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+Fix build with opaque structs in LibreSSL 3.5
+
+Downloaded from OpenBSD ports:
+http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/ports/net/tor/patches/patch-src_lib_crypt_ops_crypto_dh_openssl_c?rev=1.2&content-type=text/x-cvsweb-markup
+
+Patch series was sent upstream:
+https://forum.torproject.net/t/tor-relays-openbsd-stable-net-tor-and-0-4-7-7/3244
+
+Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
+
+Index: src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh_openssl.c
+--- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh_openssl.c.orig
++++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh_openssl.c
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ crypto_validate_dh_params(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNU
+   /* Copy into a temporary DH object, just so that DH_check() can be called. */
+   if (!(dh = DH_new()))
+       goto out;
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+   BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
+   if (!(dh_p = BN_dup(p)))
+     goto out;
+@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ new_openssl_dh_from_params(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *g)
+     goto err;
+   }
+ 
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ 
+   if (!DH_set0_pqg(res_dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) {
+     goto err;
+@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_bytes(crypto_dh_t *dh)
+ int
+ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh)
+ {
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+  again:
+ #endif
+   if (!DH_generate_key(dh->dh)) {
+@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh)
+     return -1;
+     /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+   }
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+   /* OpenSSL 1.1.x doesn't appear to let you regenerate a DH key, without
+    * recreating the DH object.  I have no idea what sort of aliasing madness
+    * can occur here, so do the check, and just bail on failure.
+@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, si
+ 
+   const BIGNUM *dh_pub;
+ 
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+   const BIGNUM *dh_priv;
+   DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv);
+ #else
+@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, si
+     if (crypto_dh_generate_public(dh)<0)
+       return -1;
+     else {
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+       DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv);
+ #else
+       dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key;
diff --git a/package/tor/0002-patch-src_lib_crypt_ops_crypto_rsa_openssl_c.patch b/package/tor/0002-patch-src_lib_crypt_ops_crypto_rsa_openssl_c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1354a4221e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/tor/0002-patch-src_lib_crypt_ops_crypto_rsa_openssl_c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+Fix build with opaque structs in LibreSSL 3.5
+
+Downloaded from OpenBSD ports:
+http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/ports/net/tor/patches/patch-src_lib_crypt_ops_crypto_rsa_openssl_c?rev=1.2&content-type=text/x-cvsweb-markup
+
+Patch series was sent upstream:
+https://forum.torproject.net/t/tor-relays-openbsd-stable-net-tor-and-0-4-7-7/3244
+
+Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
+
+Index: src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c
+--- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c.orig
++++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ struct crypto_pk_t
+ int
+ crypto_pk_key_is_private(const crypto_pk_t *k)
+ {
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+   if (!k || !k->key)
+     return 0;
+ 
+@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(const crypto_pk_t *env)
+ 
+   const BIGNUM *e;
+ 
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+   const BIGNUM *n, *d;
+   RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d);
+ #else
+@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ crypto_pk_cmp_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_
+   const BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e;
+   const BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e;
+ 
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+   const BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d;
+   RSA_get0_key(a->key, &a_n, &a_e, &a_d);
+   RSA_get0_key(b->key, &b_n, &b_e, &b_d);
+@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ crypto_pk_num_bits(crypto_pk_t *env)
+   tor_assert(env);
+   tor_assert(env->key);
+ 
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+   /* It's so stupid that there's no other way to check that n is valid
+    * before calling RSA_bits().
+    */
+@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static bool
+ rsa_private_key_too_long(RSA *rsa, int max_bits)
+ {
+   const BIGNUM *n, *e, *p, *q, *d, *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ 
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,1)
+   n = RSA_get0_n(rsa);
diff --git a/package/tor/0003-patch-src_lib_tls_x509_openssl_c.patch b/package/tor/0003-patch-src_lib_tls_x509_openssl_c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe8586357a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/tor/0003-patch-src_lib_tls_x509_openssl_c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Fix build with opaque structs in LibreSSL 3.5
+
+Downloaded from OpenBSD ports:
+http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/ports/net/tor/patches/patch-src_lib_tls_x509_openssl_c?rev=1.2&content-type=text/x-cvsweb-markup
+
+Patch series was sent upstream:
+https://forum.torproject.net/t/tor-relays-openbsd-stable-net-tor-and-0-4-7-7/3244
+
+Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
+
+Index: src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c
+--- a/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c.orig
++++ b/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c
+@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
+   cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
+   if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) {
+     RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key);
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
++#if defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+     if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024) {
+ #else
+     if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024) {
