diff mbox series

[CVE-2018-8822,Trusty,SRU] staging: ncpfs: memory corruption in ncp_read_kernel()

Message ID 20180423084535.27270-3-po-hsu.lin@canonical.com
State New
Headers show
Series [CVE-2018-8822,Trusty,SRU] staging: ncpfs: memory corruption in ncp_read_kernel() | expand

Commit Message

Po-Hsu Lin April 23, 2018, 8:45 a.m. UTC
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

CVE-2018-8822

If the server is malicious then *bytes_read could be larger than the
size of the "target" buffer.  It would lead to memory corruption when we
do the memcpy().

Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(backported from commit 4c41aa24baa4ed338241d05494f2c595c885af8f)
Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com>
---
 fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

Comments

Colin Ian King April 23, 2018, 8:49 a.m. UTC | #1
On 23/04/18 09:45, Po-Hsu Lin wrote:
> From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> 
> CVE-2018-8822
> 
> If the server is malicious then *bytes_read could be larger than the
> size of the "target" buffer.  It would lead to memory corruption when we
> do the memcpy().
> 
> Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> (backported from commit 4c41aa24baa4ed338241d05494f2c595c885af8f)
> Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com>
> ---
>  fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c b/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c
> index 981a956..76c6a8e 100644
> --- a/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c
> +++ b/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c
> @@ -982,6 +982,10 @@ ncp_read_kernel(struct ncp_server *server, const char *file_id,
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  	*bytes_read = ncp_reply_be16(server, 0);
> +	if (*bytes_read > to_read) {
> +		result = -EINVAL;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
>  	source = ncp_reply_data(server, 2 + (offset & 1));
>  
>  	memcpy(target, source, *bytes_read);
> 

Looks good to me.

Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Stefan Bader April 23, 2018, 9:48 a.m. UTC | #2
On 23.04.2018 10:45, Po-Hsu Lin wrote:
> From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> 
> CVE-2018-8822
> 
> If the server is malicious then *bytes_read could be larger than the
> size of the "target" buffer.  It would lead to memory corruption when we
> do the memcpy().
> 
> Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> (backported from commit 4c41aa24baa4ed338241d05494f2c595c885af8f)
> Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

> ---
>  fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c b/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c
> index 981a956..76c6a8e 100644
> --- a/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c
> +++ b/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c
> @@ -982,6 +982,10 @@ ncp_read_kernel(struct ncp_server *server, const char *file_id,
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  	*bytes_read = ncp_reply_be16(server, 0);
> +	if (*bytes_read > to_read) {
> +		result = -EINVAL;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
>  	source = ncp_reply_data(server, 2 + (offset & 1));
>  
>  	memcpy(target, source, *bytes_read);
>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c b/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c
index 981a956..76c6a8e 100644
--- a/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c
+++ b/fs/ncpfs/ncplib_kernel.c
@@ -982,6 +982,10 @@  ncp_read_kernel(struct ncp_server *server, const char *file_id,
 		goto out;
 	}
 	*bytes_read = ncp_reply_be16(server, 0);
+	if (*bytes_read > to_read) {
+		result = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	source = ncp_reply_data(server, 2 + (offset & 1));
 
 	memcpy(target, source, *bytes_read);