[1/2,X] bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()

Message ID 20180104140124.2515-2-seth.forshee@canonical.com
State New
Headers show
Series
  • [1/2,X] bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()
Related show

Commit Message

Seth Forshee Jan. 4, 2018, 2:01 p.m.
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 95a762e2c8c942780948091f8f2a4f32fce1ac6f ]

Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.

Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.

Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.

v3:
 - add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)

Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CVE-2017-16995
[ saf: Backport to 4.4. Include partial backports of 4923ec0b10d9 ("bpf:
  simplify verifier register state assignments") and 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf:
  direct packet access") to extend reg_state.imm to 64-bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

Patch

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index eb759f5008b8..74ff7218caa0 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@  struct reg_state {
 	enum bpf_reg_type type;
 	union {
 		/* valid when type == CONST_IMM | PTR_TO_STACK */
-		int imm;
+		s64 imm;
 
 		/* valid when type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
 		 *   PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@  static void print_verifier_state(struct verifier_env *env)
 			continue;
 		verbose(" R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]);
 		if (t == CONST_IMM || t == PTR_TO_STACK)
-			verbose("%d", env->cur_state.regs[i].imm);
+			verbose("%lld", env->cur_state.regs[i].imm);
 		else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
 			 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
 			verbose("(ks=%d,vs=%d)",
@@ -478,7 +478,6 @@  static void init_reg_state(struct reg_state *regs)
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
 		regs[i].type = NOT_INIT;
 		regs[i].imm = 0;
-		regs[i].map_ptr = NULL;
 	}
 
 	/* frame pointer */
@@ -493,7 +492,6 @@  static void mark_reg_unknown_value(struct reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
 	BUG_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG);
 	regs[regno].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
 	regs[regno].imm = 0;
-	regs[regno].map_ptr = NULL;
 }
 
 enum reg_arg_type {
@@ -741,6 +739,15 @@  static int check_mem_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 			regno, reg_type_str[state->regs[regno].type]);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
+
+	if (!err && size <= 2 && value_regno >= 0 && env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
+	    state->regs[value_regno].type == UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
+		/* 1 or 2 byte load zero-extends, determine the number of
+		 * zero upper bits. Not doing it fo 4 byte load, since
+		 * such values cannot be added to ptr_to_packet anyway.
+		 */
+		state->regs[value_regno].imm = 64 - size * 8;
+	}
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -1110,8 +1117,15 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 			/* case: R = imm
 			 * remember the value we stored into this reg
 			 */
+			u64 imm;
+
+			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64)
+				imm = insn->imm;
+			else
+				imm = (u32)insn->imm;
+
 			regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_IMM;
-			regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = insn->imm;
+			regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = imm;
 		}
 
 	} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {