[1/1] v2: CVE-2015-1350 fs: Avoid premature clearing of capabilities

From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>


Currently, notify_change() clears capabilities or IMA attributes by
calling security_inode_killpriv() before calling into ->setattr. Thus it
happens before any other permission checks in inode_change_ok() and user
is thus allowed to trigger clearing of capabilities or IMA attributes
for any file he can look up e.g. by calling chown for that file. This is
unexpected and can lead to user DoSing a system.

Fix the problem by calling security_inode_killpriv() at the end of
inode_change_ok() instead of from notify_change(). At that moment we are
sure user has permissions to do the requested change.


(backported from commit 030b533c4fd4d2ec3402363323de4bb2983c9cee)
[kmously: This is a re-implementation of the upstream commit that doesn't include all the refactoring that was done in upstream)

CVE-2015-1350


References: CVE-2015-1350
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>



---
 fs/attr.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

On 13.12.2017 03:15, Khalid Elmously wrote:
> From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
> 
> 
> Currently, notify_change() clears capabilities or IMA attributes by
> calling security_inode_killpriv() before calling into ->setattr. Thus it
> happens before any other permission checks in inode_change_ok() and user
> is thus allowed to trigger clearing of capabilities or IMA attributes
> for any file he can look up e.g. by calling chown for that file. This is
> unexpected and can lead to user DoSing a system.
> 
> Fix the problem by calling security_inode_killpriv() at the end of
> inode_change_ok() instead of from notify_change(). At that moment we are
> sure user has permissions to do the requested change.
> 
> 
> (backported from commit 030b533c4fd4d2ec3402363323de4bb2983c9cee)
> [kmously: This is a re-implementation of the upstream commit that doesn't include all the refactoring that was done in upstream)
> 
> CVE-2015-1350
> 
> 
> References: CVE-2015-1350
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

> 
> 
> 
> ---

Based on the suggestions from Thadeu this looks ok. Personally I am not 100%
sure whether the usage of d_obtain_alias() is valid or not.

-Stefan

>  fs/attr.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
> index df05bc167360..870d45103f29 100644
> --- a/fs/attr.c
> +++ b/fs/attr.c
> @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
>  
>  	/* If force is set do it anyway. */
>  	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
> -		return 0;
> +		goto kill_priv;
>  
>  	/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
>  	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !chown_ok(inode, attr->ia_uid))
> @@ -95,6 +95,20 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
>  			return -EPERM;
>  	}
>  
> +kill_priv:
> +	/* User has permission for the change */
> +	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
> +		int error;
> +		struct dentry *dentry;
> +
> +		dentry = d_obtain_alias(inode);
> +		if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
> +			error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
> +			dput(dentry);
> +			return error;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_change_ok);
> @@ -250,13 +264,11 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr, struct inode **de
>  	if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
>  		attr->ia_mtime = now;
>  	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
> -		attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
> -		ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
>  		error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
> -		if (error > 0)
> -			error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
> -		if (error)
> +		if (error < 0)
>  			return error;
> +		if (error == 0)
> +			ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
>  	}
>  
>  	/*
>

On 2018-01-23 12:32:49 , Stefan Bader wrote:
> On 13.12.2017 03:15, Khalid Elmously wrote:
> > From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
> > 
> > 
> > Currently, notify_change() clears capabilities or IMA attributes by
> > calling security_inode_killpriv() before calling into ->setattr. Thus it
> > happens before any other permission checks in inode_change_ok() and user
> > is thus allowed to trigger clearing of capabilities or IMA attributes
> > for any file he can look up e.g. by calling chown for that file. This is
> > unexpected and can lead to user DoSing a system.
> > 
> > Fix the problem by calling security_inode_killpriv() at the end of
> > inode_change_ok() instead of from notify_change(). At that moment we are
> > sure user has permissions to do the requested change.
> > 
> > 
> > (backported from commit 030b533c4fd4d2ec3402363323de4bb2983c9cee)
> > [kmously: This is a re-implementation of the upstream commit that doesn't include all the refactoring that was done in upstream)
> > 
> > CVE-2015-1350
> > 
> > 
> > References: CVE-2015-1350
> > Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> > Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
> 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > ---
> 
> Based on the suggestions from Thadeu this looks ok. Personally I am not 100%
> sure whether the usage of d_obtain_alias() is valid or not.

Yes, I thought as much, which I stated in my response to Thadeu on 2017-12-11.

For what it's worth, I had also sent the complete set of patches (9 in total) needed for this CVE on 2017-12-07 - so you can review/accept that instead, if you prefer.



> 
> -Stefan
> 
> >  fs/attr.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
> >  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
> > index df05bc167360..870d45103f29 100644
> > --- a/fs/attr.c
> > +++ b/fs/attr.c
> > @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
> >  
> >  	/* If force is set do it anyway. */
> >  	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
> > -		return 0;
> > +		goto kill_priv;
> >  
> >  	/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
> >  	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !chown_ok(inode, attr->ia_uid))
> > @@ -95,6 +95,20 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
> >  			return -EPERM;
> >  	}
> >  
> > +kill_priv:
> > +	/* User has permission for the change */
> > +	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
> > +		int error;
> > +		struct dentry *dentry;
> > +
> > +		dentry = d_obtain_alias(inode);
> > +		if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
> > +			error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
> > +			dput(dentry);
> > +			return error;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> > +
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_change_ok);
> > @@ -250,13 +264,11 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr, struct inode **de
> >  	if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
> >  		attr->ia_mtime = now;
> >  	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
> > -		attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
> > -		ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
> >  		error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
> > -		if (error > 0)
> > -			error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
> > -		if (error)
> > +		if (error < 0)
> >  			return error;
> > +		if (error == 0)
> > +			ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
> >  	}
> >  
> >  	/*
> > 
> 
> 

Khaled


> -- 
> kernel-team mailing list
> kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com
> https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/kernel-team

On 23.01.2018 12:32, Stefan Bader wrote:
> On 13.12.2017 03:15, Khalid Elmously wrote:
>> From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
>>
>>
>> Currently, notify_change() clears capabilities or IMA attributes by
>> calling security_inode_killpriv() before calling into ->setattr. Thus it
>> happens before any other permission checks in inode_change_ok() and user
>> is thus allowed to trigger clearing of capabilities or IMA attributes
>> for any file he can look up e.g. by calling chown for that file. This is
>> unexpected and can lead to user DoSing a system.
>>
>> Fix the problem by calling security_inode_killpriv() at the end of
>> inode_change_ok() instead of from notify_change(). At that moment we are
>> sure user has permissions to do the requested change.
>>
>>
>> (backported from commit 030b533c4fd4d2ec3402363323de4bb2983c9cee)
>> [kmously: This is a re-implementation of the upstream commit that doesn't include all the refactoring that was done in upstream)
>>
>> CVE-2015-1350
>>
>>
>> References: CVE-2015-1350
>> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
>> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> ---
> 
> Based on the suggestions from Thadeu this looks ok. Personally I am not 100%
> sure whether the usage of d_obtain_alias() is valid or not.

I did not want to object to this submission. Just to state that I am looking for
someone else (possibly with better understanding of fs code) to give some feedback.

Anybody? Mueller?

> 
> -Stefan
> 
>>  fs/attr.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
>>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
>> index df05bc167360..870d45103f29 100644
>> --- a/fs/attr.c
>> +++ b/fs/attr.c
>> @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
>>  
>>  	/* If force is set do it anyway. */
>>  	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
>> -		return 0;
>> +		goto kill_priv;
>>  
>>  	/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
>>  	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !chown_ok(inode, attr->ia_uid))
>> @@ -95,6 +95,20 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
>>  			return -EPERM;
>>  	}
>>  
>> +kill_priv:
>> +	/* User has permission for the change */
>> +	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
>> +		int error;
>> +		struct dentry *dentry;
>> +
>> +		dentry = d_obtain_alias(inode);
>> +		if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
>> +			error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
>> +			dput(dentry);
>> +			return error;
>> +		}
>> +	}
>> +
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_change_ok);
>> @@ -250,13 +264,11 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr, struct inode **de
>>  	if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
>>  		attr->ia_mtime = now;
>>  	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
>> -		attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
>> -		ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
>>  		error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
>> -		if (error > 0)
>> -			error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
>> -		if (error)
>> +		if (error < 0)
>>  			return error;
>> +		if (error == 0)
>> +			ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
>>  	}
>>  
>>  	/*
>>
> 
> 
> 
>