diff mbox series

[RFC] bpf: remove global verifier state

Message ID 20171004002025.28521-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com
State RFC, archived
Delegated to: David Miller
Headers show
Series [RFC] bpf: remove global verifier state | expand

Commit Message

Jakub Kicinski Oct. 4, 2017, 12:20 a.m. UTC 
The only global state protected by the verifier lock is
the verifier log.  Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env
and allow verification of multiple programs in parallel.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
---
Like this? :)

Compile-tested, I'm rebasing things and will test shortly.

 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |   5 +
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 520 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 2 files changed, 276 insertions(+), 249 deletions(-)

Comments

Alexei Starovoitov Oct. 4, 2017, 2:52 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Tue, Oct 03, 2017 at 05:20:25PM -0700, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> The only global state protected by the verifier lock is
> the verifier log.  Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env
> and allow verification of multiple programs in parallel.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
> ---
> Like this? :)
> 
> Compile-tested, I'm rebasing things and will test shortly.
> 
>  include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |   5 +
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 520 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
>  2 files changed, 276 insertions(+), 249 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> index b8d200f60a40..598802dd1897 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> @@ -139,6 +139,11 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {
>  	bool allow_ptr_leaks;
>  	bool seen_direct_write;
>  	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
> +
> +	u32 log_level;
> +	u32 log_size;
> +	u32 log_len;
> +	char *log_buf;
>  };
>  
>  int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 4cf9b72c59a0..450f60e6229d 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -153,27 +153,21 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
>  	int access_size;
>  };
>  
> -/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
> - * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
> - */
> -static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
> -static char *log_buf;
> -
> -static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);

yep. looks great.
Please test it and submit officially :)
The commit aafe6ae9cee3 ("bpf: dynamically allocate digest scratch buffer")
fixed the other case where we were relying on the above mutex.
The only other spot to be adjusted is to add spin_lock/mutex or DO_ONCE() to
bpf_get_skb_set_tunnel_proto() to protect md_dst init.
imo that would be it.
Daniel, anything else comes to mind?
Eric Dumazet Oct. 4, 2017, 3:24 a.m. UTC | #2 
On Tue, 2017-10-03 at 19:52 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:

> yep. looks great.
> Please test it and submit officially :)
> The commit aafe6ae9cee3 ("bpf: dynamically allocate digest scratch buffer")
> fixed the other case where we were relying on the above mutex.
> The only other spot to be adjusted is to add spin_lock/mutex or DO_ONCE() to
> bpf_get_skb_set_tunnel_proto() to protect md_dst init.
> imo that would be it.
> Daniel, anything else comes to mind?


16 MB of log (unswappable kernel memory) per active checker.

We might offer a way to oom hosts.
Alexei Starovoitov Oct. 4, 2017, 3:43 a.m. UTC | #3 
On Tue, Oct 03, 2017 at 08:24:06PM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-10-03 at 19:52 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> 
> > yep. looks great.
> > Please test it and submit officially :)
> > The commit aafe6ae9cee3 ("bpf: dynamically allocate digest scratch buffer")
> > fixed the other case where we were relying on the above mutex.
> > The only other spot to be adjusted is to add spin_lock/mutex or DO_ONCE() to
> > bpf_get_skb_set_tunnel_proto() to protect md_dst init.
> > imo that would be it.
> > Daniel, anything else comes to mind?
> 
> 
> 16 MB of log (unswappable kernel memory) per active checker.
> 
> We might offer a way to oom hosts.

right. good point!
we need to switch to continuous copy_to_user() after a page or so.
Can even do it after every vscnprintf()
but page at a time is probably faster.
Daniel Borkmann Oct. 4, 2017, 7:13 p.m. UTC | #4 
On 10/04/2017 05:43 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 03, 2017 at 08:24:06PM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>> On Tue, 2017-10-03 at 19:52 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>
>>> yep. looks great.
>>> Please test it and submit officially :)
>>> The commit aafe6ae9cee3 ("bpf: dynamically allocate digest scratch buffer")
>>> fixed the other case where we were relying on the above mutex.
>>> The only other spot to be adjusted is to add spin_lock/mutex or DO_ONCE() to
>>> bpf_get_skb_set_tunnel_proto() to protect md_dst init.
>>> imo that would be it.
>>> Daniel, anything else comes to mind?

Yes, this should be all. DO_ONCE() for the tunnel proto seems a
good choice.

>> 16 MB of log (unswappable kernel memory) per active checker.
>>
>> We might offer a way to oom hosts.
>
> right. good point!
> we need to switch to continuous copy_to_user() after a page or so.
> Can even do it after every vscnprintf()
> but page at a time is probably faster.

Also worst case upper limits on verification side for holding state
aside from the log would need to be checked in terms of how much mem
we end up holding that is not accounted against any process (and not
really "rate-limited" anymore once we drop the mutex).
Jakub Kicinski Oct. 4, 2017, 9:57 p.m. UTC | #5 
On Wed, 04 Oct 2017 21:13:47 +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 10/04/2017 05:43 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 03, 2017 at 08:24:06PM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:  
> >> On Tue, 2017-10-03 at 19:52 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> >>  
> >>> yep. looks great.
> >>> Please test it and submit officially :)
> >>> The commit aafe6ae9cee3 ("bpf: dynamically allocate digest scratch buffer")
> >>> fixed the other case where we were relying on the above mutex.
> >>> The only other spot to be adjusted is to add spin_lock/mutex or DO_ONCE() to
> >>> bpf_get_skb_set_tunnel_proto() to protect md_dst init.
> >>> imo that would be it.
> >>> Daniel, anything else comes to mind?  
> 
> Yes, this should be all. DO_ONCE() for the tunnel proto seems a
> good choice.

Hm.  I actually did:

if (!dst) {
	tmp = alloc();
	if (!tmp)
		return;
	if (cmpxchg(&dst, NULL, tmp))
		free(tmp);
}

I don't like how DO_ONCE() doesn't handle errors from the init
function :(

> >> 16 MB of log (unswappable kernel memory) per active checker.
> >>
> >> We might offer a way to oom hosts.  
> >
> > right. good point!
> > we need to switch to continuous copy_to_user() after a page or so.
> > Can even do it after every vscnprintf()
> > but page at a time is probably faster.  
> 
> Also worst case upper limits on verification side for holding state
> aside from the log would need to be checked in terms of how much mem
> we end up holding that is not accounted against any process (and not
> really "rate-limited" anymore once we drop the mutex).
Alexei Starovoitov Oct. 4, 2017, 10:40 p.m. UTC | #6 
On Wed, Oct 04, 2017 at 02:57:44PM -0700, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Wed, 04 Oct 2017 21:13:47 +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> > On 10/04/2017 05:43 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > > On Tue, Oct 03, 2017 at 08:24:06PM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:  
> > >> On Tue, 2017-10-03 at 19:52 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > >>  
> > >>> yep. looks great.
> > >>> Please test it and submit officially :)
> > >>> The commit aafe6ae9cee3 ("bpf: dynamically allocate digest scratch buffer")
> > >>> fixed the other case where we were relying on the above mutex.
> > >>> The only other spot to be adjusted is to add spin_lock/mutex or DO_ONCE() to
> > >>> bpf_get_skb_set_tunnel_proto() to protect md_dst init.
> > >>> imo that would be it.
> > >>> Daniel, anything else comes to mind?  
> > 
> > Yes, this should be all. DO_ONCE() for the tunnel proto seems a
> > good choice.
> 
> Hm.  I actually did:
> 
> if (!dst) {
> 	tmp = alloc();
> 	if (!tmp)
> 		return;
> 	if (cmpxchg(&dst, NULL, tmp))
> 		free(tmp);
> }
> 
> I don't like how DO_ONCE() doesn't handle errors from the init
> function :(

yeah. good point.
Above looks good to me.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index b8d200f60a40..598802dd1897 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -139,6 +139,11 @@  struct bpf_verifier_env {
 	bool allow_ptr_leaks;
 	bool seen_direct_write;
 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
+
+	u32 log_level;
+	u32 log_size;
+	u32 log_len;
+	char *log_buf;
 };
 
 int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 4cf9b72c59a0..450f60e6229d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -153,27 +153,21 @@  struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
 	int access_size;
 };
 
-/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
- * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
- */
-static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
-static char *log_buf;
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
-
 /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
  * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user
  * can figure out what's wrong with the program
  */
-static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...)
+static __printf(2, 3) void verbose(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				   const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	va_list args;
 
-	if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1)
+	if (env->log_level == 0 || env->log_len >= env->log_size - 1)
 		return;
 
 	va_start(args, fmt);
-	log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args);
+	env->log_len += vscnprintf(env->log_buf + env->log_len,
+				   env->log_size - env->log_len, fmt, args);
 	va_end(args);
 }
 
@@ -213,7 +207,8 @@  static const char *func_id_name(int id)
 		return "unknown";
 }
 
-static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
+static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				 struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
 {
 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
 	enum bpf_reg_type t;
@@ -224,21 +219,21 @@  static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
 		t = reg->type;
 		if (t == NOT_INIT)
 			continue;
-		verbose(" R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]);
+		verbose(env, " R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]);
 		if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) &&
 		    tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
 			/* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */
-			verbose("%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
+			verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
 		} else {
-			verbose("(id=%d", reg->id);
+			verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id);
 			if (t != SCALAR_VALUE)
-				verbose(",off=%d", reg->off);
+				verbose(env, ",off=%d", reg->off);
 			if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t))
-				verbose(",r=%d", reg->range);
+				verbose(env, ",r=%d", reg->range);
 			else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP ||
 				 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
 				 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
-				verbose(",ks=%d,vs=%d",
+				verbose(env, ",ks=%d,vs=%d",
 					reg->map_ptr->key_size,
 					reg->map_ptr->value_size);
 			if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
@@ -246,38 +241,38 @@  static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
 				 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big
 				 * for reg->off
 				 */
-				verbose(",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value);
+				verbose(env, ",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value);
 			} else {
 				if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value &&
 				    reg->smin_value != S64_MIN)
-					verbose(",smin_value=%lld",
+					verbose(env, ",smin_value=%lld",
 						(long long)reg->smin_value);
 				if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value &&
 				    reg->smax_value != S64_MAX)
-					verbose(",smax_value=%lld",
+					verbose(env, ",smax_value=%lld",
 						(long long)reg->smax_value);
 				if (reg->umin_value != 0)
-					verbose(",umin_value=%llu",
+					verbose(env, ",umin_value=%llu",
 						(unsigned long long)reg->umin_value);
 				if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX)
-					verbose(",umax_value=%llu",
+					verbose(env, ",umax_value=%llu",
 						(unsigned long long)reg->umax_value);
 				if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
 					char tn_buf[48];
 
 					tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-					verbose(",var_off=%s", tn_buf);
+					verbose(env, ",var_off=%s", tn_buf);
 				}
 			}
-			verbose(")");
+			verbose(env, ")");
 		}
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
 		if (state->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL)
-			verbose(" fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i,
+			verbose(env, " fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i,
 				reg_type_str[state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]);
 	}
-	verbose("\n");
+	verbose(env, "\n");
 }
 
 static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = {
@@ -332,15 +327,15 @@  static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = {
 	[BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
 };
 
-static void print_bpf_end_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+static void print_bpf_end_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			       const struct bpf_insn *insn)
 {
-	verbose("(%02x) r%d = %s%d r%d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
+	verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s%d r%d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
 		BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_TO_BE ? "be" : "le",
 		insn->imm, insn->dst_reg);
 }
 
-static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			   const struct bpf_insn *insn)
 {
 	u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
@@ -348,23 +343,23 @@  static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
 		if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_END) {
 			if (class == BPF_ALU64)
-				verbose("BUG_alu64_%02x\n", insn->code);
+				verbose(env, "BUG_alu64_%02x\n", insn->code);
 			else
 				print_bpf_end_insn(env, insn);
 		} else if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_NEG) {
-			verbose("(%02x) r%d = %s-r%d\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s-r%d\n",
 				insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
 				class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
 				insn->dst_reg);
 		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
-			verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
 				insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
 				insn->dst_reg,
 				bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
 				class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
 				insn->src_reg);
 		} else {
-			verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
 				insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
 				insn->dst_reg,
 				bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
@@ -373,46 +368,46 @@  static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		}
 	} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
 		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
-			verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
 				insn->code,
 				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
 				insn->dst_reg,
 				insn->off, insn->src_reg);
 		else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
-			verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
 				insn->code,
 				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
 				insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
 				insn->src_reg);
 		else
-			verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
+			verbose(env, "BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
 	} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
 		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
-			verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
+			verbose(env, "BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
 			return;
 		}
-		verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
+		verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
 			insn->code,
 			bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
 			insn->dst_reg,
 			insn->off, insn->imm);
 	} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
 		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
-			verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
+			verbose(env, "BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
 			return;
 		}
-		verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
+		verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
 			insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
 			bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
 			insn->src_reg, insn->off);
 	} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
 		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
-			verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
 				insn->code,
 				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
 				insn->imm);
 		} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
-			verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
 				insn->code,
 				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
 				insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
@@ -427,36 +422,37 @@  static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks)
 				imm = 0;
 
-			verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
 				insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
 		} else {
-			verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
+			verbose(env, "BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
 			return;
 		}
 	} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
 		u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
 
 		if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
-			verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
 				func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
 		} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
-			verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
 				insn->code, insn->off);
 		} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
-			verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
 		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
-			verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
 				insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
 				bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
 				insn->src_reg, insn->off);
 		} else {
-			verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
 				insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
 				bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
 				insn->imm, insn->off);
 		}
 	} else {
-		verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
+		verbose(env, "(%02x) %s\n",
+			insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -495,7 +491,7 @@  static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	env->head = elem;
 	env->stack_size++;
 	if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) {
-		verbose("BPF program is too complex\n");
+		verbose(env, "BPF program is too complex\n");
 		goto err;
 	}
 	return &elem->st;
@@ -533,10 +529,11 @@  static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 	__mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
 }
 
-static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
+static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
 {
 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
-		verbose("mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
+		verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
 		for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
 			__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
@@ -646,10 +643,11 @@  static void __mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 	__mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
 }
 
-static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
+static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			     struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
 {
 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
-		verbose("mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno);
+		verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno);
 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
 		for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
 			__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
@@ -664,10 +662,11 @@  static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 	reg->type = NOT_INIT;
 }
 
-static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
+static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			      struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
 {
 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
-		verbose("mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
+		verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
 		for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
 			__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
@@ -676,22 +675,23 @@  static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
 	__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
 }
 
-static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
+static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			   struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
 {
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
-		mark_reg_not_init(regs, i);
+		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i);
 		regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
 	}
 
 	/* frame pointer */
 	regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
-	mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_FP);
+	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP);
 
 	/* 1st arg to a function */
 	regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
-	mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_1);
+	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1);
 }
 
 enum reg_arg_type {
@@ -721,26 +721,26 @@  static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
 
 	if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
-		verbose("R%d is invalid\n", regno);
+		verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (t == SRC_OP) {
 		/* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
 		if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) {
-			verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
+			verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		mark_reg_read(&env->cur_state, regno);
 	} else {
 		/* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
 		if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
-			verbose("frame pointer is read only\n");
+			verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
 		if (t == DST_OP)
-			mark_reg_unknown(regs, regno);
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -765,7 +765,8 @@  static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
 /* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
  * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
  */
-static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
+static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			     struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
 			     int size, int value_regno)
 {
 	int i, spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
@@ -778,7 +779,7 @@  static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
 
 		/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
 		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
-			verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
+			verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 
@@ -813,7 +814,8 @@  static void mark_stack_slot_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int slo
 	}
 }
 
-static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
+static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			    struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
 			    int value_regno)
 {
 	u8 *slot_type;
@@ -823,12 +825,12 @@  static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
 
 	if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
 		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
-			verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
+			verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
 			if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) {
-				verbose("corrupted spill memory\n");
+				verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n");
 				return -EACCES;
 			}
 		}
@@ -844,14 +846,14 @@  static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
 	} else {
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
 			if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) {
-				verbose("invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
+				verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
 					off, i, size);
 				return -EACCES;
 			}
 		}
 		if (value_regno >= 0)
 			/* have read misc data from the stack */
-			mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -863,7 +865,7 @@  static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 	struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr;
 
 	if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
-		verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
+		verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
 			map->value_size, off, size);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -882,8 +884,8 @@  static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 	 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
 	 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
 	 */
-	if (log_level)
-		print_verifier_state(state);
+	if (env->log_level)
+		print_verifier_state(env, state);
 	/* The minimum value is only important with signed
 	 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
 	 * value is 0.  If we are using signed variables for our
@@ -891,13 +893,14 @@  static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 	 * will have a set floor within our range.
 	 */
 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
-		verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
+		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
 			regno);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size);
 	if (err) {
-		verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n", regno);
+		verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
+			regno);
 		return err;
 	}
 
@@ -906,13 +909,14 @@  static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 	 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too.
 	 */
 	if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
-		verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
+		verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
 			regno);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size);
 	if (err)
-		verbose("R%d max value is outside of the array range\n", regno);
+		verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the array range\n",
+			regno);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -951,7 +955,7 @@  static int __check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
 
 	if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || (u64)off + size > reg->range) {
-		verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
+		verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
 			off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -974,13 +978,13 @@  static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 	 * detail to prove they're safe.
 	 */
 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
-		verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
+		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
 			regno);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	err = __check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
 	if (err) {
-		verbose("R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno);
+		verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno);
 		return err;
 	}
 	return err;
@@ -1016,7 +1020,7 @@  static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	verbose("invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
+	verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
@@ -1034,7 +1038,8 @@  static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
 	return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, &env->cur_state.regs[regno]);
 }
 
-static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 				   int off, int size, bool strict)
 {
 	struct tnum reg_off;
@@ -1059,7 +1064,8 @@  static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 		char tn_buf[48];
 
 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-		verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n",
+		verbose(env,
+			"misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n",
 			ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -1067,7 +1073,8 @@  static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 				       const char *pointer_desc,
 				       int off, int size, bool strict)
 {
@@ -1082,7 +1089,7 @@  static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 		char tn_buf[48];
 
 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-		verbose("misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
+		verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
 			pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -1103,7 +1110,7 @@  static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
 		 * right in front, treat it the very same way.
 		 */
-		return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size, strict);
+		return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
 		pointer_desc = "value ";
 		break;
@@ -1116,7 +1123,8 @@  static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
-	return check_generic_ptr_alignment(reg, pointer_desc, off, size, strict);
+	return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
+					   strict);
 }
 
 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
@@ -1148,20 +1156,20 @@  static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
-			verbose("R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
+			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 
 		err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
-			mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
 
 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
 		enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
 
 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
-			verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
+			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		/* ctx accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
@@ -1171,7 +1179,8 @@  static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 			char tn_buf[48];
 
 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-			verbose("variable ctx access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
+			verbose(env,
+				"variable ctx access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
 				tn_buf, off, size);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
@@ -1183,9 +1192,10 @@  static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 			 * case, we know the offset is zero.
 			 */
 			if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE)
-				mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
+				mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
 			else
-				mark_reg_known_zero(state->regs, value_regno);
+				mark_reg_known_zero(env, state->regs,
+						    value_regno);
 			state->regs[value_regno].id = 0;
 			state->regs[value_regno].off = 0;
 			state->regs[value_regno].range = 0;
@@ -1201,13 +1211,14 @@  static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 			char tn_buf[48];
 
 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-			verbose("variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
+			verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
 				tn_buf, off, size);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		off += reg->var_off.value;
 		if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
-			verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
+			verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off,
+				size);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 
@@ -1218,29 +1229,32 @@  static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
 			    state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off] == STACK_SPILL &&
 			    size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
-				verbose("attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
+				verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
 				return -EACCES;
 			}
-			err = check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno);
+			err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size,
+						value_regno);
 		} else {
-			err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno);
+			err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size,
+					       value_regno);
 		}
 	} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
-			verbose("cannot write into packet\n");
+			verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
-			verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno);
+			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n",
+				value_regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
-			mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno);
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
 	} else {
-		verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
-			regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
+		verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
+			reg_type_str[reg->type]);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -1260,7 +1274,7 @@  static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins
 
 	if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
 	    insn->imm != 0) {
-		verbose("BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
+		verbose(env, "BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -1275,7 +1289,7 @@  static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins
 		return err;
 
 	if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
-		verbose("R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
+		verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -1316,7 +1330,7 @@  static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		    register_is_null(regs[regno]))
 			return 0;
 
-		verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
+		verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
 			reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
 			reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
 		return -EACCES;
@@ -1327,13 +1341,13 @@  static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		char tn_buf[48];
 
 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
-		verbose("invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
+		verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
 			regno, tn_buf);
 	}
 	off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
 	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
 	    access_size <= 0) {
-		verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
+		verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
 			regno, off, access_size);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -1349,7 +1363,7 @@  static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
 		if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
-			verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
+			verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
 				off, i, access_size);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
@@ -1392,7 +1406,8 @@  static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 
 	if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
 		if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
-			verbose("R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", regno);
+			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n",
+				regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		return 0;
@@ -1400,7 +1415,7 @@  static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 
 	if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) &&
 	    !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
-		verbose("helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
+		verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -1438,7 +1453,7 @@  static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 			goto err_type;
 		meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM;
 	} else {
-		verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
+		verbose(env, "unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
@@ -1456,7 +1471,7 @@  static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 			 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
 			 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
 			 */
-			verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
+			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type))
@@ -1472,7 +1487,7 @@  static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 		 */
 		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
 			/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
-			verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
+			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type))
@@ -1492,7 +1507,8 @@  static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 		 */
 		if (regno == 0) {
 			/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
-			verbose("ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
+			verbose(env,
+				"ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 
@@ -1509,7 +1525,7 @@  static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 			meta = NULL;
 
 		if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
-			verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
 				regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
@@ -1523,7 +1539,7 @@  static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 		}
 
 		if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) {
-			verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
 				regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
@@ -1534,12 +1550,13 @@  static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 
 	return err;
 err_type:
-	verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
+	verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
 		reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]);
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
+static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+					struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
 {
 	if (!map)
 		return 0;
@@ -1625,7 +1642,7 @@  static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
 
 	return 0;
 error:
-	verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
+	verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
 		map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
@@ -1659,7 +1676,7 @@  static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(&regs[i]))
-			mark_reg_unknown(regs, i);
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
 		if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
@@ -1681,7 +1698,8 @@  static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
 
 	/* find function prototype */
 	if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
-		verbose("invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
+		verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
+			func_id);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -1689,13 +1707,14 @@  static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
 		fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
 
 	if (!fn) {
-		verbose("unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
+		verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
+			func_id);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
 	if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
-		verbose("cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
+		verbose(env, "cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -1709,7 +1728,7 @@  static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
 	 */
 	err = check_raw_mode(fn);
 	if (err) {
-		verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
+		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
 		return err;
 	}
@@ -1742,14 +1761,14 @@  static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
 
 	/* reset caller saved regs */
 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
-		mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]);
+		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
 	}
 
 	/* update return register (already marked as written above) */
 	if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
 		/* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
-		mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0);
+		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
@@ -1757,14 +1776,15 @@  static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
 
 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
 		/* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
-		mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_0);
+		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
 		regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0;
 		/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
 		 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
 		 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
 		 */
 		if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
-			verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
+			verbose(env,
+				"kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
@@ -1775,12 +1795,12 @@  static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
 		else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr)
 			insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
 	} else {
-		verbose("unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
+		verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
 			fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	err = check_map_func_compatibility(meta.map_ptr, func_id);
+	err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -1839,39 +1859,42 @@  static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	dst_reg = &regs[dst];
 
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (smin_val != smax_val))) {
-		print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
-		verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n");
+		print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
+		verbose(env,
+			"verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (umin_val != umax_val))) {
-		print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
-		verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n");
+		print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
+		verbose(env,
+			"verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
 		/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
 		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
+			verbose(env,
+				"R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
 				dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
 	if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
 		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
 				dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
 		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
 				dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
 		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
 				dst);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -1936,7 +1959,7 @@  static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
 			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
 			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-				verbose("R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
+				verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
 					dst);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
@@ -1946,7 +1969,7 @@  static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		 */
 		if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
 			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-				verbose("R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
+				verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
 					dst);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
@@ -2001,13 +2024,13 @@  static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		 * ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.)
 		 */
 		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
 				dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
 		return -EACCES;
 	default:
 		/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
 		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
 				dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -2173,7 +2196,7 @@  static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined.  This includes
 			 * shifts by a negative number.
 			 */
-			mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
 			break;
 		}
 		/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
@@ -2201,7 +2224,7 @@  static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined.  This includes
 			 * shifts by a negative number.
 			 */
-			mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
+			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
 			break;
 		}
 		/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts */
@@ -2229,7 +2252,7 @@  static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
 		break;
 	default:
-		mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
+		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -2261,12 +2284,12 @@  static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 				 * an arbitrary scalar.
 				 */
 				if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-					verbose("R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
+					verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
 						insn->dst_reg,
 						bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
 					return -EACCES;
 				}
-				mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
+				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
 				return 0;
 			} else {
 				/* scalar += pointer
@@ -2318,13 +2341,13 @@  static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 	/* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) {
-		print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
-		verbose("verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
+		print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
+		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) {
-		print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
-		verbose("verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
+		print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
+		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
@@ -2342,14 +2365,14 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
 			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
 			    insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
-				verbose("BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
+				verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 		} else {
 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
 			    (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
 			    BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
-				verbose("BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
+				verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 		}
@@ -2360,7 +2383,7 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 			return err;
 
 		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
-			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
 				insn->dst_reg);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
@@ -2374,7 +2397,7 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 
 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
 			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
-				verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
+				verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
@@ -2384,7 +2407,7 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 				return err;
 		} else {
 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
-				verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
+				verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 		}
@@ -2403,11 +2426,12 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 			} else {
 				/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
 				if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
-					verbose("R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
+					verbose(env,
+						"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
 						insn->src_reg);
 					return -EACCES;
 				}
-				mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg);
+				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
 				/* high 32 bits are known zero. */
 				regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
 						regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
@@ -2422,14 +2446,14 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 		}
 
 	} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
-		verbose("invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
+		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	} else {	/* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
 
 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
 			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
-				verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
+				verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			/* check src1 operand */
@@ -2438,7 +2462,7 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 				return err;
 		} else {
 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
-				verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
+				verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 		}
@@ -2450,7 +2474,7 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 
 		if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
 		    BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
-			verbose("div by zero\n");
+			verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
@@ -2459,7 +2483,7 @@  static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 			int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
 
 			if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
-				verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
+				verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 		}
@@ -2812,13 +2836,13 @@  static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	int err;
 
 	if (opcode > BPF_JSLE) {
-		verbose("invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
+		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
 		if (insn->imm != 0) {
-			verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
+			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
@@ -2828,13 +2852,13 @@  static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			return err;
 
 		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
-			verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
 				insn->src_reg);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 	} else {
 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
-			verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
+			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
@@ -2946,11 +2970,12 @@  static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg],
 				       PTR_TO_PACKET_META);
 	} else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
-		verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg);
+		verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
+			insn->dst_reg);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
-	if (log_level)
-		print_verifier_state(this_branch);
+	if (env->log_level)
+		print_verifier_state(env, this_branch);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2969,11 +2994,11 @@  static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 	int err;
 
 	if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
-		verbose("invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
+		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	if (insn->off != 0) {
-		verbose("BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
+		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -3031,14 +3056,14 @@  static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 	int i, err;
 
 	if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) {
-		verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
+		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
 	    BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
 	    (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
-		verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
+		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -3048,7 +3073,8 @@  static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 		return err;
 
 	if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
-		verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
+		verbose(env,
+			"at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -3061,7 +3087,7 @@  static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 
 	/* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
-		mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]);
+		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
 	}
 
@@ -3069,7 +3095,7 @@  static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 	 * the value fetched from the packet.
 	 * Already marked as written above.
 	 */
-	mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0);
+	mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3133,7 +3159,7 @@  static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
-		verbose("jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
+		verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -3150,13 +3176,13 @@  static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w;
 		return 1;
 	} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
-		verbose("back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
+		verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	} else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
 		/* forward- or cross-edge */
 		insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
 	} else {
-		verbose("insn state internal bug\n");
+		verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n");
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -3250,7 +3276,7 @@  static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 mark_explored:
 	insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
 	if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
-		verbose("pop stack internal bug\n");
+		verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n");
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto err_free;
 	}
@@ -3259,7 +3285,7 @@  static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 check_state:
 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
 		if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
-			verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i);
+			verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i);
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto err_free;
 		}
@@ -3640,7 +3666,7 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	int insn_processed = 0;
 	bool do_print_state = false;
 
-	init_reg_state(regs);
+	init_reg_state(env, regs);
 	state->parent = NULL;
 	insn_idx = 0;
 	for (;;) {
@@ -3649,7 +3675,7 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		int err;
 
 		if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
-			verbose("invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
+			verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
 				insn_idx, insn_cnt);
 			return -EFAULT;
 		}
@@ -3658,7 +3684,8 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
 
 		if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
-			verbose("BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
+			verbose(env,
+				"BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
 				insn_processed);
 			return -E2BIG;
 		}
@@ -3668,12 +3695,12 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			return err;
 		if (err == 1) {
 			/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
-			if (log_level) {
+			if (env->log_level) {
 				if (do_print_state)
-					verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
+					verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
 						prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
 				else
-					verbose("%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
+					verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
 			}
 			goto process_bpf_exit;
 		}
@@ -3681,18 +3708,18 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		if (need_resched())
 			cond_resched();
 
-		if (log_level > 1 || (log_level && do_print_state)) {
-			if (log_level > 1)
-				verbose("%d:", insn_idx);
+		if (env->log_level > 1 || (env->log_level && do_print_state)) {
+			if (env->log_level > 1)
+				verbose(env, "%d:", insn_idx);
 			else
-				verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:",
+				verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d:",
 					prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
-			print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
+			print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
 			do_print_state = false;
 		}
 
-		if (log_level) {
-			verbose("%d: ", insn_idx);
+		if (env->log_level) {
+			verbose(env, "%d: ", insn_idx);
 			print_bpf_insn(env, insn);
 		}
 
@@ -3749,7 +3776,7 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
 				 * Reject it.
 				 */
-				verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
+				verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
@@ -3789,14 +3816,14 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			} else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type &&
 				   (dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
 				    *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
-				verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
+				verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
 		} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
 			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
-				verbose("BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
+				verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			/* check src operand */
@@ -3819,7 +3846,7 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				    insn->off != 0 ||
 				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
-					verbose("BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
+					verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
 					return -EINVAL;
 				}
 
@@ -3832,7 +3859,7 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				    insn->imm != 0 ||
 				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
-					verbose("BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
+					verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
 					return -EINVAL;
 				}
 
@@ -3844,7 +3871,7 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				    insn->imm != 0 ||
 				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
-					verbose("BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
+					verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
 					return -EINVAL;
 				}
 
@@ -3859,7 +3886,7 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 					return err;
 
 				if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
-					verbose("R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
+					verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
 					return -EACCES;
 				}
 
@@ -3891,19 +3918,19 @@  static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 
 				insn_idx++;
 			} else {
-				verbose("invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
+				verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 		} else {
-			verbose("unknown insn class %d\n", class);
+			verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		insn_idx++;
 	}
 
-	verbose("processed %d insns, stack depth %d\n",
-		insn_processed, env->prog->aux->stack_depth);
+	verbose(env, "processed %d insns, stack depth %d\n", insn_processed,
+		env->prog->aux->stack_depth);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3915,7 +3942,8 @@  static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map)
 		!(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC);
 }
 
-static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map,
+static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+					struct bpf_map *map,
 					struct bpf_prog *prog)
 
 {
@@ -3926,12 +3954,12 @@  static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map,
 	 */
 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
 		if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) {
-			verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
+			verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		if (map->inner_map_meta &&
 		    !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) {
-			verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n");
+			verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
@@ -3954,14 +3982,14 @@  static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
 		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
 		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
-			verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
+			verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
 		    ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
 		      BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
-			verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
+			verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
@@ -3972,7 +4000,7 @@  static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
 			    insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
 			    insn[1].off != 0) {
-				verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
+				verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
@@ -3981,19 +4009,20 @@  static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				goto next_insn;
 
 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
-				verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
+				verbose(env,
+					"unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
 			f = fdget(insn->imm);
 			map = __bpf_map_get(f);
 			if (IS_ERR(map)) {
-				verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
+				verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
 					insn->imm);
 				return PTR_ERR(map);
 			}
 
-			err = check_map_prog_compatibility(map, env->prog);
+			err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog);
 			if (err) {
 				fdput(f);
 				return err;
@@ -4115,7 +4144,7 @@  static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
 					env->prog);
 		if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
-			verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
+			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		} else if (cnt) {
 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
@@ -4163,7 +4192,7 @@  static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			u8 size_code;
 
 			if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
-				verbose("bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
+				verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
@@ -4182,7 +4211,7 @@  static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 					      &target_size);
 		if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
 		    (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
-			verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
+			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
@@ -4264,7 +4293,7 @@  static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 
 			cnt = map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf);
 			if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
-				verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
+				verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
@@ -4308,7 +4337,8 @@  static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
 		 */
 		if (!fn->func) {
-			verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
+			verbose(env,
+				"kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
 				func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
 			return -EFAULT;
 		}
@@ -4360,30 +4390,26 @@  int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
 		goto err_free_env;
 	env->prog = *prog;
 
-	/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
-	mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
-
 	if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
 		/* user requested verbose verifier output
 		 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
 		 */
-		log_level = attr->log_level;
+		env->log_level = attr->log_level;
 		log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
-		log_size = attr->log_size;
-		log_len = 0;
+		env->log_size = attr->log_size;
 
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		/* log_* values have to be sane */
-		if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
-		    log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
-			goto err_unlock;
+		if (env->log_size < 128 || env->log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
+		    env->log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
+			goto err_free_aux;
 
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
-		if (!log_buf)
-			goto err_unlock;
+		env->log_buf = vmalloc(env->log_size);
+		if (!env->log_buf)
+			goto err_free_aux;
 	} else {
-		log_level = 0;
+		env->log_level = 0;
 	}
 
 	env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
@@ -4420,15 +4446,16 @@  int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
 	if (ret == 0)
 		ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
 
-	if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
-		BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
+	if (env->log_level && env->log_len >= env->log_size - 1) {
+		BUG_ON(env->log_len >= env->log_size);
 		/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
 		ret = -ENOSPC;
 		/* fall through to return what was recorded */
 	}
 
 	/* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
-	if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) {
+	if (env->log_level &&
+	    copy_to_user(log_ubuf, env->log_buf, env->log_len + 1) != 0) {
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto free_log_buf;
 	}
@@ -4455,16 +4482,15 @@  int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
 	}
 
 free_log_buf:
-	if (log_level)
-		vfree(log_buf);
+	if (env->log_level)
+		vfree(env->log_buf);
 	if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
 		/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
 		 * them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
 		 */
 		release_maps(env);
 	*prog = env->prog;
-err_unlock:
-	mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
+err_free_aux:
 	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
 err_free_env:
 	kfree(env);
@@ -4490,10 +4516,7 @@  int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
 	env->analyzer_ops = ops;
 	env->analyzer_priv = priv;
 
-	/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
-	mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
-
-	log_level = 0;
+	env->log_level = 0;
 
 	env->strict_alignment = false;
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
@@ -4518,7 +4541,6 @@  int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
 	while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
 	free_states(env);
 
-	mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
 	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
 err_free_env:
 	kfree(env);