diff mbox

nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID

Message ID 20170701103504.GO9307@breakpoint.cc
State Awaiting Upstream, archived
Delegated to: David Miller
Headers show

Commit Message

Florian Westphal July 1, 2017, 10:35 a.m. UTC 
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> wrote:
> Florian,
> 
> Am 30.06.2017 um 21:55 schrieb Florian Westphal:
> >>> Why not use a hash of the address?
> >>
> >> Would also work. Or xor it with a random number.
> >>
> >> On the other hand, for user space it would be more useful when the conntrack id
> >> does not repeat that often. That's why I favor the good old counter method.
> >> Currently the conntrack id is reused very fast.
> >> e.g. in one of our applications we use the conntack id via NFQUEUE and watch the
> >> destroy events via conntrack. It happens regularly that a new connection has the
> >> same id than a different connection we saw some moments before, before we receive
> >> the destroy event from the conntrack socket.
> > 
> > Perhaps we can place that in a new extension (its not needed in any
> > fastpath ops)?
> 
> To get rid of the infoleak we have to re-introduce the id field in struct nf_conn
> and struct nf_conntrack_expect.

Why will this not work?

> Otherwise have nothing to compare against in the conntrack/expect remove case.

Not following, sorry.  The id is not used anywhere except when we send
info to userspace.

The compare on removal is not needed afaics, and its also not used when
doing lookup to begin with, so we can just recompute it?

Comments

Richard Weinberger July 12, 2017, 9:26 p.m. UTC | #1 
Florian,

Am 01.07.2017 um 12:35 schrieb Florian Westphal:
>>> Perhaps we can place that in a new extension (its not needed in any
>>> fastpath ops)?
>>
>> To get rid of the infoleak we have to re-introduce the id field in struct nf_conn
>> and struct nf_conntrack_expect.
> 
> Why will this not work?

You are right, when we compute the ID from the whole object, it should be fine.

>> Otherwise have nothing to compare against in the conntrack/expect remove case.
> 
> Not following, sorry.  The id is not used anywhere except when we send
> info to userspace.
> 
> The compare on removal is not needed afaics, and its also not used when
> doing lookup to begin with, so we can just recompute it?

Isn't this a way too much overhead?

I personally favor Pablo's per-cpu counter approach.
That way the IDs are unique again and we get rid of the info leak without
much effort.

Thanks,
//richard
Florian Westphal July 12, 2017, 10:19 p.m. UTC | #2 
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> wrote:
> Am 01.07.2017 um 12:35 schrieb Florian Westphal:
> > The compare on removal is not needed afaics, and its also not used when
> > doing lookup to begin with, so we can just recompute it?
> 
> Isn't this a way too much overhead?

I don't think so.  This computation only occurs when we dump events
to userspace.

> I personally favor Pablo's per-cpu counter approach.
> That way the IDs are unique again and we get rid of the info leak without
> much effort.

I have not seen these patches so can't really comment.
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
@@ -443,9 +444,44 @@  static int ctnetlink_dump_ct_seq_adj(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct)
 	return -1;
 }
 
+static __be32 ct_to_id(const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+	static u32 seed __read_mostly;
+	u32 a, b, c;
+
+	if (!ct)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!seed)
+		seed = get_random_u32();
+
+	a = jhash2((u32 *)ct->tuplehash, sizeof(ct->tuplehash) / sizeof(u32),
+		   hash32_ptr(ct));
+	b = ct_to_id(ct->master) ^ net_hash_mix(nf_ct_net(ct));
+	c = hash32_ptr(ct->ext);
+
+	return (__force __be32)jhash_3words(a, b, c, seed);
+}
+
+static __be32 ctexp_to_id(const struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp)
+{
+	static u32 seed __read_mostly;
+	u32 a, b, c;
+
+	if (!seed)
+		seed = get_random_u32();
+
+	a = ct_to_id(exp->master);
+	b = hash32_ptr(exp->helper);
+	c = jhash2((u32 *)&exp->tuple, sizeof(exp->tuple) / sizeof(u32),
+		   hash32_ptr(exp));
+
+	return (__force __be32)jhash_3words(a, b, c, seed);
+}
+
 static int ctnetlink_dump_id(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
-	if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_ID, htonl((unsigned long)ct)))
+	if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_ID, ct_to_id(ct)))
 		goto nla_put_failure;
 	return 0;
 
@@ -1164,8 +1200,8 @@  static int ctnetlink_del_conntrack(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 	ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
 
 	if (cda[CTA_ID]) {
-		u_int32_t id = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_ID]));
-		if (id != (u32)(unsigned long)ct) {
+		__be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_ID]);
+		if (id != ct_to_id(ct)) {
 			nf_ct_put(ct);
 			return -ENOENT;
 		}
@@ -2563,7 +2599,7 @@  ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 #endif
 	if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_TIMEOUT, htonl(timeout)) ||
-	    nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_ID, htonl((unsigned long)exp)) ||
+	    nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_ID, ctexp_to_id(exp)) ||
 	    nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_FLAGS, htonl(exp->flags)) ||
 	    nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_CLASS, htonl(exp->class)))
 		goto nla_put_failure;
@@ -2871,7 +2907,7 @@  static int ctnetlink_get_expect(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 
 	if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]) {
 		__be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]);
-		if (ntohl(id) != (u32)(unsigned long)exp) {
+		if (id != ctexp_to_id(exp)) {
 			nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
 			return -ENOENT;
 		}