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[BUG] user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation caching

Message ID CAJhHMCA=rwLqLOPq3kMOz9SpV83yrzkK_K6RfPmuyXMU1pXT7g@mail.gmail.com
State New
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Commit Message

Pranith Kumar March 22, 2017, 2:55 p.m. UTC
On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 10:46 AM, Peter Maydell wrote:
> On 20 March 2017 at 14:36, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
>> This is an issue in QEMU's system emulation for X86 in TCG mode.
>> The issue permits an attacker who can execute code in guest ring 3
>> with normal user privileges to inject code into other processes that
>> are running in guest ring 3, in particular root-owned processes.
>
>> I am sending this to qemu-devel because a QEMU security contact
>> told me that QEMU does not consider privilege escalation inside a
>> TCG VM to be a security concern.
>
> Correct; it's just a bug. Don't trust TCG QEMU as a security boundary.
>
> We should really fix the crossing-a-page-boundary code for x86.
> I believe we do get it correct for ARM Thumb instructions.

How about doing the instruction size check as follows?

     gen_illegal_opcode(s);

Thanks,
--
Pranith

Comments

Peter Maydell March 22, 2017, 3:04 p.m. UTC | #1
On 22 March 2017 at 14:55, Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani+qemu@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 10:46 AM, Peter Maydell wrote:
>> On 20 March 2017 at 14:36, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
>>> This is an issue in QEMU's system emulation for X86 in TCG mode.
>>> The issue permits an attacker who can execute code in guest ring 3
>>> with normal user privileges to inject code into other processes that
>>> are running in guest ring 3, in particular root-owned processes.
>>
>>> I am sending this to qemu-devel because a QEMU security contact
>>> told me that QEMU does not consider privilege escalation inside a
>>> TCG VM to be a security concern.
>>
>> Correct; it's just a bug. Don't trust TCG QEMU as a security boundary.
>>
>> We should really fix the crossing-a-page-boundary code for x86.
>> I believe we do get it correct for ARM Thumb instructions.
>
> How about doing the instruction size check as follows?
>
> diff --git a/target/i386/translate.c b/target/i386/translate.c
> index 72c1b03a2a..94cf3da719 100644
> --- a/target/i386/translate.c
> +++ b/target/i386/translate.c
> @@ -8235,6 +8235,10 @@ static target_ulong disas_insn(CPUX86State
> *env, DisasContext *s,
>      default:
>          goto unknown_op;
>      }
> +    if (s->pc - pc_start > 15) {
> +        s->pc = pc_start;
> +        goto illegal_op;
> +    }
>      return s->pc;
>   illegal_op:
>      gen_illegal_opcode(s);

This doesn't look right because it means we'll check
only after we've emitted all the code to do the
instruction operation, so the effect will be
"execute instruction, then take illegal-opcode
exception".

We should check what the x86 architecture spec actually
says and implement that.

thanks
-- PMM
Pranith Kumar March 22, 2017, 3:14 p.m. UTC | #2
On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 11:04 AM, Peter Maydell
<peter.maydell@linaro.org> wrote:
>>
>> How about doing the instruction size check as follows?
>>
>> diff --git a/target/i386/translate.c b/target/i386/translate.c
>> index 72c1b03a2a..94cf3da719 100644
>> --- a/target/i386/translate.c
>> +++ b/target/i386/translate.c
>> @@ -8235,6 +8235,10 @@ static target_ulong disas_insn(CPUX86State
>> *env, DisasContext *s,
>>      default:
>>          goto unknown_op;
>>      }
>> +    if (s->pc - pc_start > 15) {
>> +        s->pc = pc_start;
>> +        goto illegal_op;
>> +    }
>>      return s->pc;
>>   illegal_op:
>>      gen_illegal_opcode(s);
>
> This doesn't look right because it means we'll check
> only after we've emitted all the code to do the
> instruction operation, so the effect will be
> "execute instruction, then take illegal-opcode
> exception".
>

The pc is restored to original address (s->pc = pc_start), so the
exception will overwrite the generated illegal instruction and will be
executed first.

But yes, it's better to follow the architecture manual.

Thanks,
--
Pranith
Peter Maydell March 22, 2017, 3:21 p.m. UTC | #3
On 22 March 2017 at 15:14, Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani+qemu@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 11:04 AM, Peter Maydell
> <peter.maydell@linaro.org> wrote:
>> This doesn't look right because it means we'll check
>> only after we've emitted all the code to do the
>> instruction operation, so the effect will be
>> "execute instruction, then take illegal-opcode
>> exception".

> The pc is restored to original address (s->pc = pc_start), so the
> exception will overwrite the generated illegal instruction and will be
> executed first.

s->pc is the guest PC -- moving that backwards will
not do anything about the generated TCG IR that's
already been written. You'd need to rewind the
write pointer in the IR stream, which there is
no support for doing AFAIK.

thanks
-- PMM
Pranith Kumar March 22, 2017, 4:29 p.m. UTC | #4
On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 11:21 AM, Peter Maydell
<peter.maydell@linaro.org> wrote:
> On 22 March 2017 at 15:14, Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani+qemu@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 11:04 AM, Peter Maydell
>> <peter.maydell@linaro.org> wrote:
>>> This doesn't look right because it means we'll check
>>> only after we've emitted all the code to do the
>>> instruction operation, so the effect will be
>>> "execute instruction, then take illegal-opcode
>>> exception".
>
>> The pc is restored to original address (s->pc = pc_start), so the
>> exception will overwrite the generated illegal instruction and will be
>> executed first.
>
> s->pc is the guest PC -- moving that backwards will
> not do anything about the generated TCG IR that's
> already been written. You'd need to rewind the
> write pointer in the IR stream, which there is
> no support for doing AFAIK.

Ah, OK. Thanks for the explanation. May be we should check the size of
the instruction while decoding the prefixes and error out once we
exceed the limit. We would not generate any IR code.

--
Pranith
Richard Henderson March 22, 2017, 8:01 p.m. UTC | #5
On 03/23/2017 02:29 AM, Pranith Kumar wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 11:21 AM, Peter Maydell
> <peter.maydell@linaro.org> wrote:
>> On 22 March 2017 at 15:14, Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani+qemu@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 11:04 AM, Peter Maydell
>>> <peter.maydell@linaro.org> wrote:
>>>> This doesn't look right because it means we'll check
>>>> only after we've emitted all the code to do the
>>>> instruction operation, so the effect will be
>>>> "execute instruction, then take illegal-opcode
>>>> exception".
>>
>>> The pc is restored to original address (s->pc = pc_start), so the
>>> exception will overwrite the generated illegal instruction and will be
>>> executed first.
>>
>> s->pc is the guest PC -- moving that backwards will
>> not do anything about the generated TCG IR that's
>> already been written. You'd need to rewind the
>> write pointer in the IR stream, which there is
>> no support for doing AFAIK.
>
> Ah, OK. Thanks for the explanation. May be we should check the size of
> the instruction while decoding the prefixes and error out once we
> exceed the limit. We would not generate any IR code.

Yes.

It would not enforce a true limit of 15 bytes, since you can't know that until 
you've done the rest of the decode.  But you'd be able to say that no more than 
14 prefix + 1 opc + 6 modrm+sib+ofs + 4 immediate = 25 bytes is used.

Which does fix the bug.


r~
Paolo Bonzini March 23, 2017, 10:27 a.m. UTC | #6
On 22/03/2017 21:01, Richard Henderson wrote:
>>
>> Ah, OK. Thanks for the explanation. May be we should check the size of
>> the instruction while decoding the prefixes and error out once we
>> exceed the limit. We would not generate any IR code.
> 
> Yes.
> 
> It would not enforce a true limit of 15 bytes, since you can't know that
> until you've done the rest of the decode.  But you'd be able to say that
> no more than 14 prefix + 1 opc + 6 modrm+sib+ofs + 4 immediate = 25
> bytes is used.
>
> Which does fix the bug. 

Yeah, that would work for 2.9 if somebody wants to put together a patch.
 Ensuring that all instruction fetching happens before translation side
effects is a little harder, but perhaps it's also the opportunity to get
rid of s->rip_offset which is a little ugly.

Paolo
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/target/i386/translate.c b/target/i386/translate.c
index 72c1b03a2a..94cf3da719 100644
--- a/target/i386/translate.c
+++ b/target/i386/translate.c
@@ -8235,6 +8235,10 @@  static target_ulong disas_insn(CPUX86State
*env, DisasContext *s,
     default:
         goto unknown_op;
     }
+    if (s->pc - pc_start > 15) {
+        s->pc = pc_start;
+        goto illegal_op;
+    }
     return s->pc;
  illegal_op: