diff mbox

[PULL,13/28] 9pfs: local: utimensat: don't follow symlinks

Message ID 1488277840-18608-14-git-send-email-groug@kaod.org
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Greg Kurz Feb. 28, 2017, 10:30 a.m. UTC 
The local_utimensat() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls qemu_utimens()->utimensat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic
links in all path elements but the rightmost one or qemu_utimens()->utimes()
which follows symbolic links for all path elements.

This patch converts local_utimensat() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
utimensat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) directly instead of using qemu_utimens().
It is hence assumed that the OS supports utimensat(), i.e. has glibc 2.6
or higher and linux 2.6.22 or higher, which seems reasonable nowadays.

This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
---
 hw/9pfs/9p-local.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
index 8fb79e44b5f3..a6dd77d7b895 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
@@ -959,13 +959,20 @@  static int local_chown(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path, FsCred *credp)
 static int local_utimensat(FsContext *s, V9fsPath *fs_path,
                            const struct timespec *buf)
 {
-    char *buffer;
-    int ret;
-    char *path = fs_path->data;
+    char *dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(fs_path->data);
+    char *name = g_path_get_basename(fs_path->data);
+    int dirfd, ret = -1;
 
-    buffer = rpath(s, path);
-    ret = qemu_utimens(buffer, buf);
-    g_free(buffer);
+    dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(s, dirpath);
+    if (dirfd == -1) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    ret = utimensat(dirfd, name, buf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+    close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
+out:
+    g_free(dirpath);
+    g_free(name);
     return ret;
 }